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 Preface 7
PREFACE
During the 19th and 20th century, the Hungarian society experienced many upheavals. 
There is one substantial common element in these historically traumatic changes: all of them 
were affecting the approach of Hungarian society towards property.
As a result of the Revolution and Freedom Fight of 1848-1849 feudal ownership was 
abolished and civil private ownership was born. The fact that development of civil society 
and modern private ownership could only take place under the Austrian rule was one tragic 
event of Hungarian history in the 19th century. This also gives an explanation to the impact 
of Austrian private law that lasts to this day.
Although after World War I, this development was already within the framework of 
an independent Hungarian state, however the Hungarian state that became independent 
again was a country with a significantly mutilated area and economically converging to 
bankruptcy in 1920. Another historical tragedy was the development of the communist 
dictatorship and the almost total abolishment of private property after World War II.
The own property of the Hungarian population was practically limited to properties that 
provides for housing. It is no coincidence therefore, that Hungarian society has developed 
a very close link towards residential real estate and the agricultural land following the 
traditions of the former archaic peasant society. The consequence of the above is the high 
percentage of homeowners in Hungary, which is also outstanding in European comparison.
Hungarian people have always preferred wholly owned apartments against renting a 
home. This only has been intensified after the change of regime, when private property was 
once again recognized.
As the demand of the people for owning real estate property has remained unchanged 
for decades, the political leadership had to take it into account both after 1945 and after the 
change of regime. Means by which the housing stock could be increased and the desire of the 
Hungarian people to own apartments could be met were necessary to be found.
This has become a traditional tool for state-supported housing loans. It has already 
appeared in socialism, and, became a popular tool again after the economic recession of the 
1990s at the turn of the millennium, by which the number of new housing constructions 
has risen over 40,000 again. This demand and tendency had to be taken into account by 
the governments after the political change in 2002. However, a decision of switching from 
domestic retail lending to foreign currency lending was made, instead of state support, for 
various reasons. This volume intends to present, inter alia, the consequences of this step.
In Hungary, retail currency lending has become one of the major economic, legal and 
partly social problems of the 2000s. Many studies, articles and volumes have already dealt 
with the causes and consequences of its development and spread. I would like to refer to only 
one of those works: a multi-authored volume of studies edited by Professor Csaba Lentner 
in 2015 (The Great Handbook of Foreign Currency Lending, National Public and School 
Publisher, Budapest, 2015).
A similar, multi-authored work is now in the hands of the Reader. In the background of 
the idea of publishing such a volume was the fact that by 2018 the crisis caused by foreign 
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currency lending was largely over, most of the issues raised were resolved. Naturally, there 
are still pending trials before domestic and European judicial forums and, unfortunately, 
there are still enforcement procedures related to foreign currency loans.
Part of the society was seriously affected by the drastic weakening of the forint exchange 
rate, after 2008 and for some the significant rise in real estate prices in recent years has not 
solved their problems with foreign currency loans.
However, the situation of many debtors has been resolved and nothing could demonstrate 
better that this crisis is behind the country, from the point of view of the national economy, 
than the fact that retail mortgage lending has begun to show huge growth rates again for 
years. This means forint loans, of course. At the same time, however this also carries potential 
risks, therefore it is worth summing up the lessons learned from foreign currency lending. 
The volume comprises the work of eighteen authors. As an editor, I found it important to 
compile an authorship that involves both economists and lawyers. I was looking for "witnesses’ 
who came into direct contact with this "banking product" from banking or a regulatory or a 
legislative point of view. On the one hand, these are professionals who have seen how retail 
currency lending was spreading and becoming a threat to the entire Hungarian economy, 
directly from the beginning of the 2000s, and on the other hand, professionals who had an 
active role in the legislation when dealing with this issue, after 2010 and 2014.
I would like to use this opportunity to express my gratitude for your work.
The volume is quite colorful: many authors, multiple points of view. As an editor, I obviously 
do not agree with all the positions, but I considered it important to try to capture these differing 
opinions. Let us show what these professionals thought about the events of 8-10 years ago, in 2018.
Whoever was right will be determined by the Reader or the events of the coming years. 
Capturing a decisive segment of the last 15 years period of the Hungarian history in a 
scholarly and objective manner as far as possible, is what was important to me. Hopefully 
this goal has been achieved.
Budapest, 7 May 2019
Dr. Balázs Bodzási
editor
László Balogh 
Deputy State Secretary,  
Ministry of Finance
THE FIFTEEN YEARS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
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(LAUNCH, MANAGEMENT 
AND INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND)

 László Balogh 11
1. International outlook, genesis 
Foreign currency lending is not an unknown phenomenon either in Europe or outside Europe. 
Some examples of foreign currency lending were already known before the European currency loan 
crisis, both in the developed world (Australia) and in developing countries (Mexico). The reason 
why foreign currency lending is attractive is quite simple: the interest rate difference between the 
national currency and the foreign currency is so large that a loan denominated in a foreign currency 
seems to be more favourable to the borrower (and the key word here is seems) than the same loan 
in the national currency. This phenomenon is usually coupled with higher inflation in the home 
country, while the inflation rate in the country of the foreign currency is relatively low. The trap is the 
prevailing exchange rate risk associated with the foreign currency, particularly for longer-term loans. 
In Europe, the FX loans first emerged in Austria in the mid-1990s, mainly in areas of the country 
near the Swiss border. Austrian commercial banks found that local residents (and entrepreneurs) 
were happy to drive 15−20 km to a bank on the Swiss side of the border to take out a loan in Swiss 
francs (CHF), rather than in Austria in the local currency, due to the 1.5 per cent to 2 per cent in-
terest rate difference. In response to this competitive challenge, some Austrian credit institutions 
included Swiss franc loans in their credit product portfolio. The product soon became available all 
over Austria and quickly became popular; in 2005 around 30 per cent of the total residential loan 
portfolio already consisted of this type of loan. This was the beginnings of one of the most dangerous 
“financial time bombs” of the 21st century, which later caused major problems in the Central Eastern 
European region, even becoming a systemic risk factor in some countries, primarily in Hungary.
How can it be explained how foreign currency lending in the 21st century, started in Central and 
Eastern Europe, expanded at such an extremely fast pace? This was basically caused by three factors:
a. The establishment of foreign, typically Austrian and Italian banks in the Central 
 and Eastern European market as part of the local privatisation process; 
b. high inflation and high interest rates in the transforming Central and Eastern 
 European region converging with the Western European economies; 
c. in some cases, a spectacular offensive tool of foreign controlled banks to  increase their 
 residential market share in the banking sector, as opposed to local banks with poor FX resources. 
Figure 1: Share of foreign banks in EU Member States (June 2011)
Source: Consolidated Banking Data, Statistical Data Warehouse, ECB
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Following the Central and Eastern European privatisation process in the 1990s, a 
consequence of the establishment of Western European banks in these markets was that, 
after taking up their positions in corporate lending, they sought to expand their activities 
to the residential segment as well. For these foreign banks, the most spectacular method of 
market share acquisition (from the perspective of the banks) from the 2000s was residential 
foreign currency lending denominated in FX. This was mainly due to the fact that foreign 
parent institutions had an abundance of resources and liquidity in FX, which they happily 
shared with their Central and Eastern European subsidiaries. Affiliate banks were able to 
use those FX resources in the residential segment with a very high margin, and they were 
able to acquire significant parts of the market even from the best-known local players (OTP, 
or Pekao in Poland) since the local players were not in a good position in respect to their FX 
funding potential. This was true for Poland, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Hun-
gary. This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated by the capital flow to the banking sector of 
these countries at the time. There is a clear correlation between the credit expansion of the 
2000s and the amount of capital inflow. 
Chart 2: Credit growth and forex lending in selected EU member states
Source: Balance Sheet Items, ESA95, Statistical Data Warehouse, ECB
Figure 3: Forex borrowing of households and non-financial corporations in EU Member States (February 2011)
Source: ECB, ESRB
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Foreign currency lending is not specific to Hungary but is a typical phenomenon of the entire 
Central and Eastern European region, including Austria. However, albeit to a lesser extent, foreign 
currency lending also emerged in countries that did not adopt the euro such as Denmark and Sweden. 
A distinction must be made between residential and corporate foreign currency lending. 
Through the export of goods or services, many companies can generate regular income in 
foreign currencies, so the repayment of a loan in a foreign currency is less problematic for 
them as part of their standard business operations. In contrast to this, the overwhelming 
majority of the population generate their income in local currency, but their liabilities may 
still be denominated in a foreign currency. Closely related to this fact is that a change in the 
exchange rate risk increases both monthly payments and the total amount of remaining 
debt. While some companies are able to properly handle this kind of exchange rate risk, 
ordinary people are typically not prepared for it. 
The specificity of the Hungarian situation is that the volume and proportion of residential foreign 
currency lending (more precisely, its disproportionateness) was so high that it initially led to a 
systemic financial risk, and then to a societal risk. At a professional and decision-making forum of 
the ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board − European System of Financial Supervision), I described 
the situation as follows: “In Hungary FX lending has become a systemic risk issue, but it has continued 
to slowly grow into a public policy question”. The ESRB agreed with this opinion in every respect. 
So the Hungarian specificity was that the proportion, volume and rate of growth of foreign 
currency lending were extremely high compared to any other European country, which not 
only became a risk in the banking system but also a general societal issue.
The expectations in many countries of the region before EU accession are rarely talked about now, but 
they were an important factor in the 2000s, and in many countries there were also political promises 
in anticipation of imminently joining the euro zone. This actually took place in Slovenia and Slovakia, 
then, a short period later, in the Baltic States, but it did not happen in Hungary and Romania. However, 
the approach of banks and the expectations of the population may have been rational by offering and 
taking loans for 15 to 20 years in the hope that the country would adopt the euro within a few years. 
Note, however, that this argument would have been valid only if the currency of the loans had been the 
euro, rather than CHF. Nevertheless, it seems to be clear that foreign currency lending has not led to 
any significant and long-term problems in countries that have since joined the euro zone. 
Foreign currency lending, which has become widespread in the Central and Eastern European region, 
has some common features in these countries: foreign currency lending emerged as a phenomenon in 
every country where loans with more favourable interest rates could be provided due to the interest rate 
difference between the national and foreign currencies. It is safe to say that the main driver of foreign 
currency lending was the significant difference between the interest rates of the two currencies. 
Another conclusion to be drawn is that the business environment, the legal framework, 
and the different cultures of financial institutions could in some cases result in solutions with 
less damaging consequences. This might be the reason for the different weight, proportion 
and extent of problems of foreign currency lending from one country to another. In saying 
this, I have no wish to down play the problems of foreign currency lending in Poland, Croatia 
or Romania, but, precisely due to some specific factors, its extent and severity was far from 
that in Hungary at the time when the 2008 financial crisis broke out. 
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2. The macroeconomic environment in Hungary and 
other factors leading to foreign currency lending 
Following the change of government in 2002, there were two fundamentally new, almost 
unexpected, dramatic macroeconomic developments: the budget deficit, which had been 
decreasing dynamically until then and was already close to the 3 per cent level, increased 
considerably, reaching 7 per cent, and then 9 per cent. The high budget deficit led to serious 
inflationary pressures. The National Bank of Hungary (hereinafter MNB), which had just 
shifted to a system of inflationary targeting, was forced to increase the key interest rate from 
6.5 per cent to 12.5 per cent within a short space of time. Obviously, this base rate increase of 
600 basis points had a direct and drastic impact on the private housing HUF loans granted 
by commercial banks. Almost in parallel with that, the Medgyessy Government abolished 
the interest rate subsidies on housing loans, introduced by the first Orbán Government.1
Figure 4:  Budget balance and current account
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Central Bank of Hungary
Thus, as a result of the increase in the base rate and, almost simultaneously, the abolishment 
by the Medgyessy Government of the interest-rate subsidy mechanisms introduced by the 
previous Government, the actual level of the interest rates of long-term (HUF) loans for housing 
construction increased to 15-18 per cent. It was obviously not a rational decision for potential 
loan recipients to become indebted for 10 to 15 years or even longer at this interest rate. 
A vacuum was created in the market as banks could not provide loans in HUF at a lower inte-
rest rate, but no one wanted to become indebted at this interest rate for 15 to 20 years. This was the 
1 Two housing subsidy programmes were running during the Orbán Government: interest rate subsidies on 
loans financed with mortgage deeds and additional interest rate subsidies. Without describing the system in 
detail, let me just point out that the maximum interest to be paid by the borrower fell to 6 per cent in autumn 
2001. The sytem was succesful: Banks provided mortgage loans amounting to 493 billion HUF in 2002 and as 
much as 825 billion HUF in 2003. 
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vacuum that was filled by foreign, mainly Austrian, banks already present in the domestic market 
from 2003 or 2004, which introduced euro- (EUR) and Swiss franc- (CHF) denominated loans into 
the domestic retail market. The nominal interest rate of such foreign currency loans was 3-5 per cent. 
At that time, there was abundant liquidity in Western Europe, and it seemed to be an 
exciting and attractive idea for bank managements to bring the CHF product, already 
tried and tested in Austria, to the Central and Eastern European region, where the western 
margin could almost be doubled. This was another method for them to take advantage of the 
opportunity of profit maximisation offered by the abundance of liquidity. 
Prior to the emergence of foreign currency loans, OTP dominated the Hungarian market 
for private housing loans. Together with cooperative savings banks, OTP had a market share 
of nearly 80 per cent. Unexpensive funding in contrast to foreign banks, OTP and cooperative 
savings banks did not have a cheap source of foreign currency for the introduction of EUR 
and/or CHF products. This means foreign banks wanted to take advantage of the situation 
created by additional inadequate economic policies not only for profit maximisation, but 
also to acquire an actual market share. This could help them to reduce the market share of 
Hungarian banks, and thus gain a larger segment of the Hungarian market for themselves. 
And they succeeded: Following the introduction of CHF products, by 2007, the combined 
market share of ERSTE, Raiffeisen, Unicredit (Bank Austria) and other foreign banks (e.g. 
CIB) increased spectacularly, mainly was funding of OTP. Although, after a while, OTP 
was forced to enter the competition with CHF products, foreign resources were much more 
expensive for them than for their foreign-owned competitors. 
Figures 6 and 7 perfectly illustrate that foreign banks used the vacuum created by the extremely 
high interest rates of HUF mortgage loans quite deliberately and aggressively to actively increase 
their market share by providing CHF-denominated loans. Between 2003 and 2010, their loan 
portfolio increased nine-fold, and the amount of CHF-denominated loans rose from zero to 
HUF 3,200 billion. Simultaneously, the market share of foreign-owned banks in the market of 
residential loans increased from approx. 28 per cent to almost 60 per cent during the same period. 
Figure 5: Expansion of foreign banks on the Hungarian household loan market (billion HUF) 
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Figure 6: Share of foreign banks on the Hungarian household loan market
Because the sale of CHF credit products was extremely profitable for banks, it took 
place amidst ever fiercer competition. Furthermore, foreign currency-denominated cre-
dit products were increasingly sold through the intermediation of credit agents, often very 
aggressively. Due to short-term profit interests and high commissions, the sale of credit 
products was not only aggressive, but also often coupled with misleading, or even deceptive, 
sales practices. Therefore, CHF mortgage loans were taken out by a large number of people 
even if they did not really need them. Moreover, those who actually needed such loans for 
housing purposes could hardly find anything else in the product portfolio of banks in 2005 
other than CHF-denominated mortgage loans. Lending conditions were gradually eased, 
and the loan-to-value ratio required by banks became increasingly lower, while the rules 
covering borrowers’ income became increasingly lax, and in some cases were even abolished 
altogether. Worthy of note is a well-known advertisement by one of the commercial banks. 
The bank’s advertisement stated: "… We do not care how much you earn, we are only interested 
in the value of your property!" The methods of irresponsible lending by banks at that time 
could hardly be better illustrated. 
The profit level of mortgage loan products for housing purposes was so high that the 
affected banks soon entered the market with their Swiss franc-denominated home equity 
loans as well. This new credit product was used by many borrowers to buy consumer goods or 
to travel abroad. The aggressive and misleading sale of bank loans tempted consumers, who 
otherwise did not want this type of loan, even more aggressively to pledge their residential 
properties, and on a CHF basis. 
Looking back, the question seems to be justified: where were the risk managers of 
banks? How could the internal risk management rules of that time allow bank managers to 
approve such loans under the principle of prudent lending? The absurdity of the issue is also 
illustrated by the fact that the mortgage loan, which had been used for decades as a product 
for the purchase of residential properties, was transformed into a credit product for luxury 
or premium consumption. As early as 2008, 70 per cent of residential mortgage loans were 
already being used for consumer goods. This clearly indicates the degree and irresponsibility 
of competition between banks in the residential market and the extent to which borrowers 
were unprepared and deceived when they pledged their residential properties for premium 
consumer items or any other purpose not related to housing. 
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Furthermore, the CHF schemes developed in the field of car financing, which had been 
used in Hungary since the late 1990s, also posed serious prudential and consumer risks. In 
international practice, car financing typically requires an own risk of 30-50 per cent, and 
the loan for the remaining amount is provided for 3 or a maximum of 5 years. Hungary was 
first characterised by car loans without an own risk, and then those were provided for 7-10 
years. This scheme can hardly be regarded as prudent from a financial point of view because 
an 8- 10 year-old vehicle cannot provide realistic coverage due to its loss of value over time. 
3. Regulatory issues, response from the authorities, 
or the lack of it 
During the period concerned, between 2004 and 2009, there was practically no action by 
the authorities, regulation or supervisory intervention whatsoever in Hungary in favour 
of consumers. As a rare example, the 2003 Annual Report of the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority (HFSA) drew attention to the prospective risks of foreign currency 
lending, which was insignificant at the time (3 per cent) but had alarming dynamics. 
However, the political response was clear: In the first half of 2004, the HFSA was transformed 
through an infamous act called Lex Szász, and the entire management of the financial 
supervisory authority was dismissed. The independence of the supervisory authority, 
previously guaranteed by law, was circumvented by abolishing the position of the president 
in the authority and creating a new decision-making body (the Supervisory Board). Unlike 
its predecessor, the new supervisory authority is a declared government agency, reporting 
quarterly to the Minister of Finance, who is also entitled to provide guidance to the financial 
supervisory organisation. 
Today, there is extensive literature on the reasons why the state, i.e. the HFSA, the MNB 
and the Ministry of Finance, did not intervene between 2004 and 2010, and why they did 
not keep the dynamically expanding market of private housing foreign currency lending 
under control. Several questions have been raised, such as: why they did not require more 
stringent risk management and stronger financial consumer protection, and why did they 
not incorporate adequate income and coverage standards into the system to control the huge 
volume of risk? 
The responses of the actors of the time are mostly limited to claiming that neither the 
supervisory authority nor the MNB had the legal means to stop or ameliorate the process. 
This is, of course, only the partial truth. Nothing actually prevented the Government from 
setting more stringent coverage requirements or prescribing stricter checks of income in 
financial legislation. The supervisory authority could have set a higher capital requirement 
for this type of loan, making such loans more expensive and more prudent. The MNB, on the 
other hand, could have specified standards for the mandatory reserves of banks. However, 
such measures were not implemented. I will come back to the reasons later. 
The alleged lack of means can be refuted with the abolishment of yen loans. In addition 
to EUR and CHF, Japanese yen-denominated mortgage loans also emerged, mainly in the 
product range of two banks. The Japanese yen was at that time characterised by significant 
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volatility, as well as by rapid and abrupt exchange rate fluctuations, so the response 
threshold of the MNB experts and the supervisory authority had already been reached by 
this phenomenon. A few months after the introduction of the product, the banks concerned 
discontinued the disbursement of yen-denominated mortgage loans in response to the (non-
legal) joint action of the supervisory authority and the MNB. This fact also indicates that, if 
there had been sufficient recognition and will after 2004, the MNB and the HFSA could have 
easily decelerated the rapid proliferation of CHF loans and could have applied the brakes at 
any time. As we know today, they did not.
The question therefore arises, what could the reason for the “laissez-faire, laissez-passer” 
approach adopted and maintained until 2009. When seeking an answer to this, the start-
ing point should be the fact that the performance of the Hungarian economy at the time of 
the rise of foreign currency loans was miserable: From 2006, economic growth had started 
to slow down sharply. This fall was so drastic that GDP grew by only 0.4 percent in 2007 
and 0.9 per cent in 2008. At that time, there was still no sign of a crisis in Europe; quite the 
opposite: the money market sentiment was buoyant, there was an abundance of money in 
the markets, and world trade was soaring. Even the slightest deceleration of the domestic 
credit market, which was still growing rapidly, could have had a boomerang effect, mainly in 
the construction industry. In that period, the Hungarian construction industry − precisely 
as a result of dynamic lending − produced 35 to 40 thousand new homes annually. The 
deceleration of lending would clearly have led to an almost immediate fall in GDP growth, 
which was already quite low. Obviously, because the crisis emerging in autumn 2008 had not 
been anticipated by anyone in Hungary (and even those who anticipated it said that, “only 
the side wind of the crisis of the west will affect Hungary”), all the decision-makers wanted 
to keep GDP stable. Therefore, there was not the slightest intention to decelerate, or even 
to exercise stronger control over domestic foreign currency lending, which was growing 
dynamically and posed increasing risks.
Another dilemma also needs to be mentioned. It is frequently asked why the Hungarian 
population became indebted in CHF. Or, more precisely: why Hungarian banks granted their 
loans in CHF (and not in EUR)? The answer on the behalf of banks is clear: due to the different 
levels of inflation, CHF loans could be sold at a nominal interest rate of 1.5-2 per cent below 
that of the same loan in EUR. Obviously, this seemed to represent a more attractive option for 
those borrowing housing loans. Fierce market competition and the all-important pressure to 
increase market share forced banks and credit intermediaries to exploit even the slightest short-
term advantage. The Hungarian economy was linked to the euro and the euro zone in myriad 
ways already by the 2000s, and until 2006 political actors also continued to make promises 
that the euro would soon be introduced. It was precisely after the huge budget deficit of over 
9 per cent in 2006 that the then president of the MNB declared at a conference in Vienna that 
Hungary had little chance of joining the euro zone before 2014.2 There were countries such 
as Croatia, where banks, and the public, adopted a more rational approach, and, in addition 
2 Of course, Zsigmond Járai, the then president of the MNB, did not anticipate the imminent financial crisis 
and the resulting crisis of the euro-zone, which lasted for many years.
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to CHF lending, EUR lending was also significant. The irrationality of CHF lending is also 
illustrated by the fact that, although the MNB had considerable foreign exchange reserves at 
that time, the reserves mainly consisted of EUR and, to a lesser extent, USD. However, they 
contained no CHF at all. In other words, the MNB actually failed to provide coverage for a 
serious exchange rate risk in the event of an emergency. 
From time to time, the question is raised in the media, and partly also in the literature: 
What is the root cause of the possibility of foreign currency lending in Hungary? The first 
Orbán Government is often blamed for allowing the emergence of foreign currency loans 
by closing the foreign exchange liberalisation process and abolishing the last restrictions by 
law. But the reality is quite different. 
When joining the OECD in 1996, Hungary undertook, with a few exceptions, to fully 
liberalise the regulation of foreign exchange operations by 2001. At the time of the OECD 
accession in 1996, Hungarian commitments were legally proclaimed by the National As-
sembly. Hungary was also obliged to take this foreign exchange liberalisation measure 
due to its imminent EU accession. This resulted in the annulment of the previous foreign 
exchange act in 2001, which automatically enabled a number of foreign exchange operations, 
including the provision of residential foreign currency loans. 
The elimination of previous legal constraints led to the same degree of liberalisation of 
current and capital operations as in other EU and OECD Member States. Accordingly, it 
would not have been possible to either prohibit or prescribe a separate licence for foreign 
currency lending due to both OECD and EU regulations. It is no coincidence that the 
problem of foreign currency lending was by far not limited to Hungary in the 2010s, since 
several other EU Member States were also affected. This does not of course mean that it 
would have been impossible to decelerate, or even stop, the proliferation of foreign currency 
lending by various prudential and other means when the volume of foreign currency loans 
and the associated risks reached a level that was already dangerous for the national economy. 
4. Some Hungarian peculiarities of foreign currency 
loan contracts 
One of the peculiarities of contracts related to foreign currency-denominated mortgage 
loans was that they allowed banks to alter interest rates and other charges unilaterally. This 
feature increased the dominance of banks in an already highly asymmetric bank-customer 
relationship. As a result, on the one hand, consumers (households) were exposed to an 
increase in payment due to exchange rate fluctuations, and, on the other hand, to a unilateral 
modification of contractual terms by banks. Several unilateral increases in interest rates also 
played a significant role in the increase of payments in the case of long-term mortgage loans. 
In 2005 to 2006, clients already typically took out loans above an annual percentage rate 
(APR) of 6-7 per cent. This included a surcharge of about 5 per cent by banks compared 
to the CHF reference rate (CHF LIBOR). In the case of contracts already signed, banks 
unilaterally increased the APR by another 2 per cent to 8-9 percent during the crisis, thus 
significantly increasing monthly payments. 
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Figure 7: Annual percentage rate (APR) of a typical Swiss franc-based mortgage loan in different scenarios
Source: MNB (Central Bank of Hungary) 
Another peculiarity of Hungarian foreign currency lending was that banks used different 
selling and buying rates of exchange for the disbursement and for the repayment of loans. 
This can also be explained by the dominant position of banks. As a result, the banks realised 
some additional exchange gain when the loan was repaid by the borrower. They were allowed 
to do so until the end of 2010. However, in autumn 2010, the new Government prohibited 
this practice, requiring banks to use the medium rate.3
5. Recognising the problem, moving towards solutions 
It was only after the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 that decision-makers first recognised 
the close connection between the problem of foreign currency lending and the crisis of 
the economy, more specifically a significant increase in unemployment and changes in the 
situation of borrowers (e.g. job losses). All this represented a serious credit or repayment 
risk, a part of which had already been realised. For reasons already mentioned above, the 
payments borrowers had to make were constantly increasing, just like the difference between 
foreign exchange rates, and banks used higher and higher interest rates (surcharges). An 
increasing number of borrowers were unable to pay the ever-increasing monthly payments, 
because the incomes of their families also fell significantly. This was the time when policy-
makers actually directly faced the enormous risk of foreign currency lending accumulated 
over the years, as well as the serious challenges to families, which resulted in a spectacular 
increase in the rate of problematic loans and, even more, non-performing loans. Non-
performing loans represent a problem for banks, or even the entire banking system, as they 
require special provisions, which significantly lower their profit levels. 
3 In contrast, in Serbia only the medium rate could be used for both the provision and the repayment of the 
loan.
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Problems gradually became more than just banking difficulties. Within a very short space 
of time, non-paying families fell into a situation where mortgage enforcement, or even 
eviction, already posed a real threat to them. The more such individual, family problems 
there were, the more obvious it was that all this would lead to social tensions, which needed 
to be handled by the authorities in some way. 
In 2009, it was recognised that there was no institution or authority in Hungary that 
could take legitimate action for the protection of financial consumers in order to handle 
the vulnerability of consumers created by foreign currency loans. Basically, the legislative 
bodies authorised the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority by providing a legislative 
mandate for prudential supervision and the supervision of financial market processes (market 
surveillance). Until the outbreak of the crisis, supervisory authorities were traditionally 
responsible for the stability of the financial system and institutions. At that time, such bodies 
did not have express authority over financial consumer protection in Europe. It was the crisis 
that led to a situation where financial supervisory authorities received a role in consumer 
protection. Hungary was one of the first European countries where this change took place. 
In 2009, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority was completely reorganised, new 
legislation was passed, the former management left the organisation, and, with one-person 
management, the supervisory authority now had a President again instead of a collective 
decision-making body. This decision in itself indicates that the then Government implicitly 
admitted the operational inability, incapability and incompetence of the former Supervisory 
Council with respect to recognising and managing the risks of foreign currency lending in 
a timely manner. 
Thus, from 1 January 2010, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority was granted 
consumer protection powers. This was an essential measure for the authority to start to address 
the issue of foreign currency lending, already affecting the entire sector, and to mitigate the 
problems of consumers and the population. All of this enabled the authority, sooner or later, to 
manage the systemic risk, already present at that time, in some form or other. 
6. The measures of the new Government, the problems 
of foreign currency loans from 2010 
One of the first measures of the second Orbán Government, established in 2010, was to 
replace the management of HFSA and to appoint a dedicated Vice President in charge of 
specific financial consumer protection issues. The first strategic task of the supervisory 
authority was the assessment of problems and the preparation of short- and longer-term 
proposals to mitigate the situation. A separate directorate was formed to manage and 
process consumer protection issues, to examine individual submissions already reaching 
a magnitude of tens of thousands, and to find solutions. The existing legal framework also 
had to be examined in the same way. One of the key questions was where brakes had to be 
applied in the legal environment in effect at that time. 
One of the first measures of the Orbán Government was to de facto ban residential mortgage 
loans. This was not a complete ban de jure as those natural persons who had regular income in 
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a foreign currency and whose monthly income was at least fifteen times the monthly payment 
were still entitled to take out foreign currency loans. This condition was of course so strict that 
only very few private individuals had access to foreign currency loans, and the act actually put 
an end to the disbursement of new foreign currency loans in Hungary in the summer of 2010. 
Incidentally, a total ban would also not have been possible because Hungarian legislation 
is based on the EU Directive on consumer credit.4 Of course, the prohibition of the provision 
of new foreign currency loans did not solve the problem in itself, but at least prevented 
further growth in the volume of loans. 
Upon a proposal of the supervisory authority, further legislation was adopted in 2010.5 
According to the new law, in the future only the medium rate could be used for the calculation 
of payments. In addition, the law reduced the prepayment charge, or maximised the charge 
at that reduced level. The law prescribed a free-of-charge procedure for borrowers able to 
make a final repayment or a higher-amount prepayment on their loans. As another important 
element of the law, credit institutions were limited in unilaterally amending their contracts. In 
this respect, the law stipulated that the credit institution was no longer allowed to change the 
contract unilaterally to the disadvantage of the borrower. This could only be done in a way that 
was beneficial to the consumer. Furthermore, borrowers in dire straits were allowed, on a single 
occasion, to request the extension of their credit contracts for a maximum of five years. The 
creditor could not deny such a request, and the amendment of the contract was free. 
Subsequently, the Government and the National Assembly adopted further measures to 
mitigate the problem for foreign currency borrowers. In autumn 2011, the final repayment of 
foreign currency loans was allowed under very favourable conditions. Within a few months, 
approx. 170 thousand borrowers had exploited this opportunity. The debt thus released was about 
HUF 370 billion, while the total amount repaid was HUF 1,355 billion. As a benefit for borrowers, 
it was possible to repay Swiss franc-based debts at a rate of HUF 180, instead of the official CHF 
exchange rate of around HUF 250. In the case of euro-denominated loans, the foreign currency 
loan could be repaid at a rate of HUF/EUR 250, while a discounted rate of HUF/JPY 2 was used 
for Japanese yen. Banks could deduct up to 30 per cent of their resulting losses from the bank tax. 
The average amount of repaid loans was HUF 5.8 million, based on the fixed final repayment rate. 
Anyone could opt to make a final repayment by 30 December 2011. The availability of coverage 
for final repayment had to be confirmed by 30 January 2012, and the loan had to be settled by 28 
February 2012 at the latest. The measure was all in all successful, significantly reducing both the 
number of foreign currency borrowers and the volume of foreign currency loans. Nevertheless, it 
was only a single step in the management of all the problems. On 30 September 2011, there were 
750 thousand foreign currency mortgage loan borrowers, compared to only 560 thousand on 31 
March 2012. The volume of foreign currency mortgage loans decreased from HUF 5,600 billion 
on 30 September 2011 to HUF 4,245 billion. 
4 Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit agreements, transposed into Hungarian law by Act CLXII of 2009 
on consumer credit.
5 See Act XCVI of 2010 on the amendment of certain finance-related acts in order to support consumers in a 
difficult situation due to taking out housing loans (promulgated on 28 October 2010)
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A so-called “exchange rate cap” was introduced in September 2011 to mitigate the effects of 
exchange rate fluctuations. The exchange rate cap was aimed at temporarily dampening the 
effects of exchange rate fluctuations, so the repayment exchange rate for foreign currency-
denominated mortgage loans was fixed for five years. This fixed exchange rate was HUF/CHF 
180 for Swiss franc-denominated loans, HUF/EUR 250 for euro-denominated ones, and HUF/
JPY 2.5 for loans denominated in Japanese yen. Borrowers who opted in were also granted 
debt relief. The interest part of the deferred debts of clients choosing the exchange rate cap was 
taken on by banks and the state budget at 50−50 per cent. Clients choosing the exchange rate 
cap were exempted from the payment of interest amounting to approx. HUF 60 billion. About 
186 thousand foreign currency borrowers had entered into such contracts by the end of 2014. 
According to the legal regulation, after the 5-year fixed period of the exchange rate cap, a further 
limit was used to protect consumers when including in the payment the amount accumulated as 
a result of the exchange rate cap, recorded in a separate account. Pursuant to this limitation, the 
payment could not be increased by more than 15 per cent. In terms of figures, 15 per cent of the 
average payment (approx. HUF 56 thousand) was not more than HUF 8,400 per month. 
In addition, the Government protected borrowers in the most difficult situations with 
an extraordinary eviction moratorium in effect until 16 September 2015, preventing the 
auctioning of their residential properties and the loss of borrowers’ homes. 
As a result of another government measure, the National Asset Management Company 
was launched in 2012. The National Asset Management Company was established to help the 
socially most deprived borrowers. They purchased the property of borrowers for the state, but 
the erstwhile borrowers could still remain in the property as tenants for rents much lower 
than the market price. In addition, the creditor banks released the borrowers’ outstanding 
debts from mortgage loans. The National Asset Management Programme was based on a 
joint effort by the Hungarian state and the banks. The state supported the purchase of homes 
with substantial budgetary resources, while banks put up with losing a significant part of the 
affected loans to support the programme. The amount of rent was regulated by a government 
decree on a mandatory basis. The law also guaranteed the right of repurchase: Borrowers were 
entitled to repurchase their homes if their financial situation improved. The borrower was able 
to apply for an interest subsidy for housing loans to repurchase his or her home. 
The programme was originally planned for three years, but was later extended: The 
National Asset Management Company purchased 25 thousand homes by the end of 2014. By 
the end of 2018, 36 thousand residential properties had actually been taken over by the asset 
manager, so approx. 150 thousand people were affected by this kind of state aid. Based on 
authorisation by the Government, the National Asset Management Company had accepted 
offers for the purchase of more than 42 thousand properties by 31 May 2018, and financial 
settlement with the borrowers was still partly in progress at the end of 2018.
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7. The complete phase-out of foreign currency loans 
and settlement with banks 
Despite a number of Government measures providing a great deal of help to borrowers, 
in 2014 it was already obvious that a comprehensive solution had to be found to settle the 
situation of foreign currency borrowers both definitively and reassuringly. The solution had 
to simultaneously provide an opportunity to the banking system to break out of an endless 
spiral. The increasing number of non-performing loans severely worsened the profitability of 
the banks and lowered their lending capacity. This was to the detriment of the real economy. 
The solution had to be based on insight into an extremely complex legal framework, 
and the room for flexibility had to be clarified. Furthermore, legislative changes to a large 
number of civil law contracts raised questions regarding constitutionality, and the reliance 
of consumer credit regulations on EU legislation also had to be taken into consideration. 
In addition to legal complications, some fundamental economic policy issues also came up. It was 
only possible to even consider the HUF conversion of foreign currency loans in a healthy banking 
system, with stable macroeconomic foundations, proper equilibrium indicators, and much lower 
HUF interest rates than at the time of taking out the loan. The inadequate timing of settlements 
and the phase-out of foreign currency loans could even have been harmful to borrowers. 
Therefore, the decisions of the Constitutional Court of 28 February 2013 and 24 March 2014 
represented a true milestone. Based on the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, the National 
Assembly could exceptionally change the content of civil law contracts if the borrowers’ homes 
were at risk or in the event of an abuse of a dominant position by credit institutions. Furthermore, 
on 30 April 2014 the European Court of Justice decided (because of the involvement of the 
relevant EU Directive) that Hungarian courts were also entitled to investigate the unfairness 
of foreign currency loan contracts. Subsequently, in its uniformity decision of 16 June 2014, the 
Curia declared that the legal answer to the question raised by many in thousands of lawsuits was 
that the exchange rate proliferation was unfair in all foreign currency loan contracts. The Curia 
also concluded that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the unilateral contract amendments 
for residential loans by banks did not meet the requirements of fairness. 
The decision of the Curia in June 2014 gave a legal opportunity to the National Assembly to 
provide a comprehensive solution to the problem. The decision of the Curia created a special 
situation: hundreds of thousands of borrowers felt encouraged to sue based on the uniformity 
decision, in the hope of sure success. However, such a large number of legal actions would have 
completely paralysed the Hungarian judicial system, and the plaintiffs would have had remedy 
only after many years. The Government therefore decided that the issue should be dealt with and 
resolved at a legislative level, and the act adopted in July 2014, based on the uniformity decision 
of the Curia, declared the nullity of the contractual clause on the application of the exchange rate 
proliferation and made a presumption regarding the unfairness of clauses on unilateral contract 
amendment.6
6 Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the resolution of questions relating to the uniformity decision of the Curia regarding 
consumer loan agreements of financial institutions.
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During 2015, banks were required by law to settle accounts for the refund of overpayments 
due to the unfair exchange rate proliferation and unilateral contract amendments with those 
clients who had taken out a foreign currency loan with them. In the course of the settlement 
process, banks sent out 2.1 million letters and the refunded, credited amount came to 
nearly HUF 750 billion. This resulted in a significant reduction of burden for households. 
The amount to be repaid fell considerably, and the amount of outstanding principal also 
decreased, resulting in a 25 per cent reduction in monthly payments. 
The repayment obligation of clients was further reduced by the fact that, from 1 February 2015, 
fair interest rates had to be restored for all loan contracts affected by the settlement process, which 
typically meant the restoration of the interest rates applied when the contract had been signed. 
8. HUF conversion of mortgage loans 
The settlement process, the reduction in outstanding principal achieved through the act, and the 
lower payments would only have been useful for the population in the long term if the exchange 
rate risk still present in the new situation was eliminated. This was the purpose of the act on 
the HUF conversion of loans.7 The act, which entered into force on 1 February 2015, ensured 
the conversion of both mortgage loans for housing purposes and home equity loans. The banks 
converted the loans of nearly 500 thousand borrowers into HUF. It was important that the 
conversion should take place at market rates, in accordance with the decision of the Curia. 
According to preliminary estimates, the amount of foreign currency that had to be converted 
into HUF was around EUR 9 billion. The question arose as to how to prevent the conversion 
of this large amount of money from causing serious disruption in the market, and how to keep 
the exchange rate stable. To avoid speculation, the exchange rates to be applied for conversion 
were fixed on 7 November 2014: HUF/CHF 256.47 (the average of the period elapsed since the 
Curia decision of 16 June 2014), HUF/EUR 309.97 and HUF/JPY 2.163 (official MNB exchange 
rate of 7 November 2014). Based on its agreement with commercial banks, the MNB provided 
the necessary foreign currency at the expense of its own reserves to ensure the conversion took 
place in a professional manner, without market disruption. 
The HUF conversion protected the population from further significant burdens. The conversion 
was performed at the exchange rate fixed in November 2014, but the HUF/CHF exchange rate was 
already significantly higher at the beginning of 2015, because the Swiss National Bank unexpectedly 
abolished the CHF/EUR exchange rate cap (CHF/EUR 1.20) in the second half of January 2015. 
The positive effects of the HUF conversion of mortgage loans were already visible in the short 
term: As a result of the exchange rate fixing at the end of December, immediately preceding the 
HUF conversion, the dramatic weakening of the HUF against the CHF in mid-January 2015 no 
longer exacerbated the payment burdens of mortgage borrowers and the risk exposure of banks. 
Therefore, the significant national economic risks associated with residential loans were not 
realised. 
7 Act LXXVII of 2014 on settling certain issues related to the conversion of the currency of certain consumer 
loan agreements and to the rules governing interest rates
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Croatia and Poland were not in such a favourable position. In both countries, indebtedness 
in foreign currencies, mainly in Swiss francs, was also causing serious difficulties, but the 
resolution to the problems of foreign currency borrowers did not progress as far as in Hunga-
ry. In Poland, payments for Swiss franc borrowers increased by more than 15 per cent, and in 
Croatia by nearly 10 per cent, compared to the amount payable a year before. Without the HUF 
conversion, the debts of citizens would have increased by approx. HUF 400 billion in Hungary 
too. This would have meant more than 10 per cent higher payments on average.
9. HUF conversion of other consumer loans 
Residential foreign currency loans other than mortgage loans continued to be associated with 
an exchange rate risk. The appreciation of the Swiss franc in January 2015 raised the burden 
on borrowers with foreign currency-denominated consumer loans. Therefore, after the HUF 
conversion of foreign currency mortgage loans, the Government looked for a solution for the 
HUF conversion of remaining car and personal loans as well. Although the volume of such 
loans (HUF 305 billion) was significantly lower than that of mortgage loans, a large number of 
households were affected as the number of contracts exceeded 240 thousand.
On 22 September 2015, the National Assembly adopted an act regulating the HUF 
conversion of foreign currency-denominated car and consumer loans, which affected about 
200 thousand contracts.8 The banks and the state both took over half of the burden caused 
by the difference between the exchange rate used for mortgage loans in November 2014 and 
the exchange rate in August 2015 (HUF 15 billion each). 
This measure resulted in payments of about 10-11 per cent lower. However, borrowers no 
longer faced exchange rate fluctuations and unpredictable monthly repayments. 
As a result of these Government measures, residential foreign currency loans were 
virtually phased out completely in Hungary by 2016. This is also reflected in the statistics, as 
the share of foreign currency loans within the total volume of residential loans reached 71 
per cent by 2009, while it dropped to less than 1 per cent by the beginning of 2016. 
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ANNEX 
Background tables
Amount of housing loans granted in the reference period (in HUF million)
The development of the average interest rates on foreign currency mortgage loans for housing 
purposes for new and existing contracts in Poland, Hungary and Romania (source: MNB)
Interest rate of loans denominated in forints, euros and Swiss francs
Trends in interest rates
Average interest rates of bank loans and      Interest of forint- and Swiss franc-based housing loans 
deposits denominated in forints  compared to the target base rate of the Swiss Central Bank
Source:  MNB, Central Bank of Hungary      Source :  MNB, Central Bank of Hungary
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The government and the Hungarian Banking Association signed the agreement on the 
conversion into forints of foreign currency based household mortgage loans on 9 November 
2014. This was followed on 25 November 2014 by the adoption by Parliament of Act 
LXXVII of 2014 on the settlement of issues related to the conversion of the currency of 
certain consumer loan agreements and rules regarding interest (the so-called Settlement 
Act). Pursuant to the Settlement Act, the financial institutions were required to convert 
foreign currency-based loan agreements until 31 March 2015. When defining the monthly 
instalments however, as of 1 January 2015, they were required to apply the fixed exchange 
rate determined in legislation (EUR: 308.97 HUF, CHF: 256.47 HUF, JPY: 2.163 HUF). 
This overview will evaluate regulatory measures necessary to ensure the conversion into forints 
of the foreign currency based loans by examining the timing and the method of conversion as 
well as comparing the Hungarian experience with that of other countries of the region. 
1. The Timing of Conversion 
When assessing legislative intervention targeting the conversion of foreign currency based 
loans, it is appropriate to identify the legal and economic conditions without which the 
measures could not have been successfully implemented. In doing so, one should also 
consider when these conditions emerged.
1. 1. Legal environment
•	 Civil	Law	Uniformity	Decisions	6/2013	(‘6/2013	PJE’)	and	2/2014	(‘2/2014	PJE’)	of	 the	
Curia offered clear guidance on the treatment of the exchange rate margin and of the 
unilateral amendment of contracts. They served as a key reference for legislation that 
eventually paved the way to conversion. 
•	 Parliament	followed	up	Decision	2/2014	PJE	by	adopting	Act	XXXVIII	of	2014	on	settling	
certain issues relating to the uniformity decision of the Curia in respect of consumer 
loan contracts entered into with financial institutions and later Act XL of 2014 on the 
rules of settlement regulated in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on settling certain issues relating 
to the uniformity decision of the Curia in respect of the consumer loan contracts entered 
into by financial institutions, and certain other provisions.
•	 Additionally,	 Decision	 6/2013	 PJE	 of	 the	 Curia	 also	 held	 that	 the	 fact	 itself	 that	 the	
exchange rate changes burden the debtor in exchange for the more favourable interest 
rate does not render the foreign currency based loan contract arrangement unlawful, 
obviously immoral, usurious or sham, nor is the contract aimed at impossible services. 
This was also confirmed by Decision 2/2014 PJE which stated that the clause of a foreign 
currency based loan contract which stipulates that the risk of foreign exchange rate shall 
be taken without restrictions by the consumer – in exchange for a favourable interest 
rate – forms part of the main subject matter of the contract, therefore, as a main rule, 
its unfairness is exempt from assessment. The decisions passed down by the Curia with 
regard to exchange rate risks had clarified that conversion was to take place at market 
rates prior to the adoption of the Settlement Act.
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1. 2. Economic environment 
•	 By	the	end	of	2014	the	National	Bank	of	Hungary	(‘MNB’)	was	able	to	provide	sufficient	
foreign currency for the purposes of conversion into forints owing to a favourable 
constellation of the volume of foreign currency based mortgage loans (EUR 9 billion), 
the foreign reserves of the MNB (EUR 35-37 billion) and short term external debts (EUR 
21 billion). Whereas in previous years the foreign currency reserves were at the same 
level (from 2010 EUR 35+/- 4 billion), the volume of foreign currency based loans was 
larger (peaking at EUR 19 billion) and the short-term external debt higher (between 
2010-2012-ben EUR 35-38 billion).
•	 The	initiative	could	only	succeed	if	it	could	be	ensured	that	conversion	into	forints	would	
not entail the increase of instalments for the customers. Reasonably, the total cost in 
forints could not exceed the total cost in foreign currency before conversion. As a result 
of the interest rate reduction cycle, the 7% base rate applicable in the summer of 2012 
dropped to 2.1% by the autumn of 2014, which was closely followed by the decrease of the 
3-month BUBOR. Owing to the decline of BUBOR to 2.1%, the gap between the cost of 
borrowing funds in forints and Swiss francs diminished significantly, the banks did no 
longer need to face further considerable losses after write-offs associated with settlement 
made in accordance with Act XL of 2014.  
With the hindsight of four years, we can state that the timing of the conversion as well as 
the legal and economic conditions were ideal as all the ingredients had come together by the 
end of 2014 to implement the measures with success. As for timing, it should be stressed that 
the conversion of loans into forints applied from 1 January 2015 protected the customers and 
the financial sector from the hardly foreseeable negative economic consequences of the 2015 
exchange rate shock. 
2. Conversion: Its Impact on Customers, the Banking 
Sector and the National Economy 
Economic actors believe that the conversion of foreign currency based loans into forints 
represented one of the most impressive measures taken by the central bank and the 
government, moreover both the design and the implementation were correct.  The benefits 
of conversion are enjoyed by customers owing to smaller burdens, by the banking sector 
owing to the mitigation of credit risk and to the strengthening of financial stability as well 
as by the national economy through its reduced vulnerability.1
1 On the impact of conversion see: KOVÁCS Levente: Pénzügyi szektor a bizalmatlanság árnyékában. In: KO-
VÁCS Levente – SIPOS József (ed.): Ciklusváltó évek, párhuzamos életrajzok. Arcképek a magyar pénzügyi 
szektorból, 2014-2016. Magyar Bankszövetség, Budapest, 2017. 16.
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2. 1. MNB’s foreign currency sale program prevented the further weakening 
of the forint
The MNB realized that the required amount of foreign currency (EUR ~9 billion) could 
not be obtained through market transactions as that could have evere repercussions on 
the forint’s exchange rate. According to a study published by the experts of the MNB2, a 
depreciation of 30% could have been projected based on data from 2008.  
To avoid this, the central bank sold foreign currency from its reserves in the value of EUR 
9 billion to banks by carrying out coordinated tenders in the fourth quarter of 2014 and in 
January 2015. Out of this amount, around EUR 8 billion was linked to conversion (the banks 
were trying to hedge the net position resulting from the difference between the receivables 
amounting to EUR 9 billion and an impairment loss of EUR 1 billion) and EUR 1 billion was 
due to capital reduction resulting from settlement. The banks were required to hedge against 
the EUR/CHF exchange rate risk, this however did not cause any problems owing to the far 
broader EUR/CHF market.
The MNB took into account that the various market actors achieved closed currency 
positions with different methods. While some of the banks held foreign currency deposits 
within the balance sheet, other financial institutions used off-balance sheet swap transactions 
to finance their foreign currency loans. Whereas the central bank provided the first group 
with a facility (in a value of HUF 601 billion) that was conditional upon reducing short-
term debts, those entering a swap transaction were granted a longer-term unconditional 
instrument in the total value of 2,216 billion forints.
2. 2. The conversion performed at the end of 2014 protected debtors from 
the exchange rate shock of early 2015, and the decreasing BUBOR favoured 
customers
•	 On	15	January	2015	the	Swiss	Central	Bank	abandoned	the	1.2	EUR/CHF	exchange	rate	
cap, which resulted in the considerable appreciation of the Swiss franc. As opposed to the 
exchange rate of 256.47 CHF/HUF applied at the time of the conversion, the exchange 
rate exceeded even 320 CHF/HUF on 18 January 2015. Although the Swiss franc has 
weakened somewhat since then, the CHF/HUF exchange rate has not once moved below 
the 256.47 rate used for conversion. The ~285 CHF/HUF exchange rate valid at the time 
of writing the present review is still 11% higher than the fixed conversion exchange rate. 
•	 In	 early	 2015	 the	 instalment	 of	 the	 average	 CHF	 mortgage	 loan	 transaction	 of	 6.5	
million forints was HUF 62,000 following settlement and conversion. Had conversion 
not been implemented, an average customer would have been confronted with a nearly 
20% higher instalment amounting to HUF 73,000 due to the strengthening of the 
Swiss franc. Whereas the 3-month BUBOR stood at 2.1% at the time of the conversion, 
it ranged between 2-30 basis points in 2018. As a result, the HUF 62,000 instalment 
of the average customer was reduced to HUF 56,000 (-10%). Without conversion, the 
2 KOLOZSI Pál Péter - BANAI Ádám - VONNÁK Balázs: A lakossági deviza-jelzáloghitelek kivezetése: időzítés 
és keretrendszer. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 2015. 3. sz. 60-87.
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average customer would repay his loan at an unchanged premium rate (7.1%) using the 
285 CHF/HUF exchange rate, representing a 71,000 forint monthly burden. The average 
debtor paid 580,000 forints less between the beginning of 2015 and October 2018 owing 
to conversion, moreover his principal is also HUF 770,000 less than if he had opted out 
from conversion. The benefit realized by the average customer during this almost four-
year period was therefore 1.35 million forints in case of a transaction amounting to 6.5 
million forints (20.8% of the principal at the time of conversion). While the estimated 
total benefit with regard to the portfolio converted to forints so far is around 450 billion 
forints, savings are expected to reach 770 billion forints over the entire life of the credit 
based on the current forward exchange and data interest rates. If one calculates with the 
estimated forward exchange rate and interest curve, the total savings of customers might 
reach 1,000 billion forints. 
The Experience of Other Countries of the Region
In order to put the Hungarian experience of foreign currency based lending into 
perspective, it is also worth examining the lessons learned in neighbouring countries. 
Foreign currency based lending affected the EU Member States of the Central-East 
European (CEE) region to varying degrees, which required different reactions on behalf 
of the countries. 
•	 While	Slovakia	and	Slovenia	had	entered	the	eurozone	before	the	crisis	(in	2008	and	
2007, respectively), Bulgaria pegged its currency, the leva to the euro. Owing partly to 
the low interest rate of the euro, foreign currency based loans were not offered in these 
countries.
•	 In	the	Czech	Republic	as	a	rule	 it	was	companies	that	resorted	to	foreign	currency	
based loans. Households got indebted in Czech crowns at lower interest rates, therefore 
residential foreign currency based lending has not been a substantive phenomenon.
•	 Although	 in	 Romania	 and	 in	 Croatia	 the	 indebtedness	 of	 households	 in	 foreign	
currency was considerable, transactions in Swiss francs represented only a small 
proportion of loans, most of them having been taking out in euros. 
•	 In	 this	 respect,	Hungary	 and	Poland	were	 the	most	 severely	 affected	 countries:	 in	
their case the excessive foreign currency debts of the households were mainly due in 
CHF.
Although all the four EU-member CEE countries affected by the foreign currency based 
lending issue attempted to mitigate the burdens of foreign currency debtors, especially those 
of CHF debtors, the Hungarian solution was undoubtedly the most successful and best-
timed of all. 
•	 In	Croatia	it	was	decided	in	September	2015,	that	is	eight	months	after	the	abolition	of	
the EUR/CHF peg that loans would be converted at the EUR//CHF rate applicable at the 
time of borrowing. This measure, however failed due to a change of government. 
34 It’s All about Timing
•	 Poland	virtually	decided	upon	the	nullity	of	the	exchange	rate	margin	in	August	2016,	
furthermore a voluntary conversion scheme was announced. Since this did not work 
out, the CHF loans of Polish households continues to be high on the political agen-
da. There were suggestions to charge 50-90% of the exchange losses occuring in the 
meantime to the banks. The total volume of Polish residential foreign currency loans 
amounts to nearly EUR 40 billion, much of which is Swiss franc-based. Whereas in the 
summer of 2008 1 Swiss franc was worth only 2 zlotys, the CHF/PLN exchange rate 
jumped to 4.5 in January 2015 and stabilized at around 4. At the time of writing, the 
market rate is 3.8 CHF/PLN.
•	 In	October	2016	the	Romanian	Parliament	decided	upon	the	conversion	of	Swiss	franc	
transactions at the rates applied at the time of borrowing. The associated burden for 
the banking sector is estimated around 0.5 billion euros owing to the low share of CHF 
loans. While in 2008 the CHF/RON exchange rate was 2.1, it peaked in January 2015 at 
4.5 and subsequently stabilized at 4-4.2. 
 The above shows that Hungary was the only country that took measures to address the 
issue before the exchange rate shock hit the economy in January 2015. Whilst Poland, which 
found itself in a similar situation has not come up with a comprehensive response yet. 
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We have analysed a specific foreign currency loan contract to conduct a detailed investigation on a 
credit structure that became widespread in Hungary, allowing banks to arbitrarily change the loan in-
terest rate during the term of the loan. Furthermore, we have presented the Code of Ethics for banks 
of 2009 and the later government measures that target the settlement and the reimbursement of 
unethically increased interests and the regulation of the interest algorithm. Finally, we have described 
the risks of the variable-rate loans in the light of recent trends in the Hungarian mortgage market.
1. Introduction
The history of foreign currency lending in Hungary has already been discussed by many 
authors from several aspects. There will certainly be a lot of debate in the future as well 
about how it emerged, what motivated the players, how government interventions can be 
evaluated, what solutions should have been provided at that time or what we can do now to 
mitigate negative effects and prevent similar social crises.
In the second part of the study, we have presented a case study to illustrate the conflicts, 
regulatory challenges and solutions related to foreign currency-denominated loans with in-
terest rates that are changed arbitrarily by the banks.
By now, mortgage loans are denominated in HUF nearly exclusively and the changes in 
the interest rates are determined by a predefined algorithm. However, even this new system 
contains another type of risk. In the third part, we have analysed the developments of the 
regulatory environment in the context of housing market trends that have been slowly 
evolving and becoming more and more prominent over the past eight years.
In the last part, we have derived the conclusions.
 
2. Variable interest rates 
2.1. Loan contract 
In November 2009, a Hungarian couple took out a Swiss franc-denominated mortgage loan 
for housing construction with AXA Bank for a duration of 25 years. The transaction interest 
rate was defined as follows in the loan contract:
“After the date of disbursement, during the term, the Debtor shall pay for the Loan provided by 
the Bank a transaction interest rate specified in the applicable Announcement of the Bank, with an 
initial rate of 3.45% (three point forty-five per cent), which can be unilaterally changed by the Bank. 
The annual transaction rate will be variable during the term after each 1 (one) year interest period”/
According to standard international financial textbooks, the interest rate of a loan can be 
fixed or variable (floating) or possibly inverse floating.1 However, unilaterally variable in-
terest rates are not part of the financial canon. The mass spread of this scheme in foreign 
currency lending was a Hungarian specialty – a kind of hungaricum.
In the contract reviewed, it was not only the interest rate but also some non-negligible 
handling charges that could be changed unilaterally as outlined below:
1 BREALEY – MYERS, 2005. 765., and BODIE – KANE – MARCUS, 2005. 485., 491., 493. 
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“After the date of disbursement, the Debtor shall pay for the Loan provided by the Bank a 
monthly handling charge, which can be unilaterally changed by the Bank, with an initial rate 
of 1.9% (one point nine per cent)”.
The loan contract specifies in detail the “cause and effect conditions” whose variation may 
affect the elements of interest, fees and costs, such as the yield on government bonds and mortgage 
deeds, capital and money market interest rates, the central bank base rate, interbank credit in-
terest rates, costs of funds of the creditor, country risk reflecting Hungary’s politico-economic 
situation, costs of the credit and operational risks of the bank, with special regard to the risk of 
residential loans, a reduction in the creditworthiness of clients, a deterioration in the rating of 
debtors or in their solvency, unemployment rate, the value of the collateral, mandatory rules for 
reserves, operating costs of the bank, office rental fees, marketing costs, gross average salaries in 
the financial sector, postal and distance charges, legislation, consumer price index, tax, etc.
As can be seen, the list contains a number of risk elements that are directly related to neither 
the given loan nor the existing mortgage loan portfolio of the bank (e.g., marketing costs and 
consumer price index). The factors listed are only reference bases, which are not defined in more 
detail (e.g., there are thousands of market rates of interest), and whose weighting is completely 
arbitrary, as you can always find both favourable and unfavourable trends. Most of the factors 
listed are not risks, but rather uncertainties, which cannot be quantified, priced or covered. 
Moreover, they are related to business/strategic/entrepreneurial decisions of the bank (e.g., 
country risk, increase in the operating costs of the bank). There is no algorithm whatsoever for 
their exact relationship with the interest rate and the handling charge. Consequently, if there are 
favourable conditions, nothing forces the bank to reduce the interest and other costs of the loan.
Therefore, in case of such a scheme, the debtor is highly vulnerable, as the lender is not restricted 
in any way from increasing interest rates and charges. Hence, it is reasonable to ask: how could the 
consumer protection authority allow the spread of such contracts and why did the clients sign them?
2.2. Code of Conduct for banks
In autumn 2009, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA), the Hungarian Bank-
ing Association and the Hungarian Competition Authority developed a document named 
“Code of Conduct for Banks” (MK, 2010). The Code of Conduct was designed to regulate the 
lending practices of banks, particularly with respect to contract amendments (e.g., interest rate 
increases), the obligations of banks to provide information (e.g., verbally) and the rules of bank-
ing procedures (e.g., what to do if a client fails to pay). The Code of Conduct defined professional 
standards in the spirit of transparency, regularity and symmetry, and the banks who adopted the 
Code of Conduct could voluntarily comply with it in addition to the legal regulations in force.
This means the Code is a “soft” means of regulation – similar to regulatory recommendations 
and supervisory influences – which play a key role in the field of finance as well.2 In addition 
to compliance with laws and regulations, professional guidelines and self-restraint may be 
necessary, as the reality is highly complex, and the legislator cannot take everything into 
account. According to Tirole, the maximisation of shareholder value can be abandoned in 
2 DÖMÖTÖR – MISKÓ, 2016.
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favour of socially responsible corporate governance when the legal system does not function 
properly and/or it is difficult to enforce contracts. However, he also notes that the maximisation 
of shareholder value is perfectly compatible with long-term social goals in many cases.3
According to MK (2010), unilateral changes in interest rates were still allowed, but banks had 
to fix their pricing rules in the so-called “Pricing Principles.” With reference to business secrets, 
the Pricing Principles did not have to be made public; it was enough to make them available 
to the HFSA. It was an important step forward that a list of reasons had to be published. These 
reasons could not go beyond those listed in MK (2010), including only changes in the legal and 
regulatory environment, the money market and the macro environment and the risk rating of 
the client. However, banks also chose to “refrain from raising interest rates due to a change in 
the risk rating of clients who continuously fulfilled their contractual obligations and were not in 
default of payment over the term of the loan” (MK, 2010, 1.3). Consequently, the deterioration 
of the client portfolio could no longer be passed on to well-paying debtors.
This means that most of the risk factors mentioned in the contract described above were 
not compatible with MK. In addition, the Code of Conduct also stipulated that if there was a 
positive change in the costs of funds or in the exchange rate, instalments had to be decreased 
while the charges could only be increased by the rate of inflation, and that banks had to set 
more favourable conditions for prepayment.
In November 2009, when the above loan contract was signed, it was already known that 
the majority of banks (e.g., Budapest Bank, CIB Bank, Citibank, Erste Hungary Bank, FHB 
Jelzálogbank, K&H Bank, Magyar Fejlesztési Bank, MKB Bank, Magyar Takarékszövetke-
zeti Bank, OTP Bank, Raiffeisen Bank, UniCredit Bank and Volksbank) had joined the Code 
of Conduct. These banks covered more than 90% of the total volume of residential loans. 
However, some banks, including AXA, rejected the initiative completely).
Tibor Szekeres, Director of the AXA Group in Hungary, said, “The Code imposes an unnecessary 
burden on lenders, although the market is already properly regulated, and there is no need for new 
rules in addition to existing legislation. AXA has always acted fairly with its clients... The state, 
rather than the banking sector, is responsible for the Hungarian crisis, which is partly independent 
of the global crisis … the Code is unnecessary action by the state”. Mr. Szekeres also announced 
that AXA would initiate legal action if AXA was blacklisted for non-compliance with the Code.4
On the contrary, the government and professional organisations evaluated the Code of 
Conduct positively.5 Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai said, “The document was created in 
response to legitimate consumer needs and client complaints. The Code provides protection to 
clients against the naturally occurring unilateral dominance of banks and creates a predictable, 
balanced relationship between the client and the creditor”. According to Mihály Patai, Vice 
President of the Hungarian Banking Association, “the Code will enter history and represents 
a turning point in the life of the Hungarian banking system”. Ádám Farkas, President of the 
3 TIROLE, 2006. 56-62
4 portfolio.hu, 2009.
5 fogyasztok.hu, 2009.
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Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA), expressed his hope that this would 
restore “the trust that has recently been lost between creditors, i.e., banks and clients”.6
Contemporary press reports suggest that banks adopting the Code were not entirely happy 
about the agreement as it was not completely voluntary; they rather gave way under external 
pressure. This is also supported by the fact that Péter Felcsuti, President of the Banking 
Association, resigned in autumn 2009, immediately after the agreement was signed. To 
explain his resignation, he said, “My opinion on some strategic issues in the banking sector 
is significantly different from that of some of the key members of the Banking Association”.7
The prisoner’s dilemma,8 well known from game theory, refers to a situation where rational 
actors do not cooperate due to their own self-interests, and finally, the result achieved by all of 
them is worse than it would have been if cooperation had been facilitated. The prisoner’s dilem-
ma can be identified in a number of economic situations (e.g., evisceration of natural resources, 
commercial wars, Brexit, etc.), and players can pull out of this stalemate, which is unfavourable 
to all of them, only through external intervention. For instance, cooperation can be encouraged 
by “punishing” those who are unwilling to cooperate. In the context of the Code of Conduct, one 
of the “punishments” was to publish the names of banks refusing to adopt it in January 2010.
At that time, banks did not yet suspect that they would later face much more significant 
and much more costly government measures in connection with residential mortgage loans 
than the restrictions in the Code of Conduct.
2.3. Interest rate increases
Figure 1 shows that in the specific case under review, the bank did not increase the interest 
rate and the handling charges for more than two years (3.45% + 1.9% = 5.35%); however, in 
the summer of 2012, its prices already started to reflect the increased country risk.
Figure 1: Development of interest rates and handling charges on a CHF-denominated loan transaction
Source: Loan transaction details (MNB, 2015)
6 fogyasztok.hu, 2009.
7 origo.hu, 2009.
8 See MÉRŐ, 2007.
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The CDS surcharge reflecting the risk of government bonds denominated in foreign 
currencies, a kind of proxy for country risk that directly attributed to the financing costs of 
banks, had its peak between summer 2011 and summer 2012 (above 7%). Figure 2 shows the 
breakdown of the CDS surcharge on a country-specific basis according to international factors.
Figure 2: Decomposition of the change in the Hungarian CDS surcharge
Source: MNB (November 2015, Figure 9) 
Figure 2 suggests that, in the period under review, the growth of country risk was driven by 
international factors rather than by country-specific effects to a greater extent. Nevertheless, AXA 
bank increased the costs of its loans with reference to the increase in the CDS surcharge, ignoring 
the fact that the interest rate as well as the exchange rate of the Swiss franc even dropped slightly 
at that time. This means that if interest rates and charges had been tied to the CHF exchange rate 
and the reference interest rate, then the costs of loans would have decreased rather than increased.
Figure 3 shows that banks had previously already raised the interest rates on CHF loans, 
with the largest increase in early 2009 followed by a long stagnation. All in all, the average 
interest rate of Swiss franc-denominated loans was a lot less favourable to borrowers 
in Hungary than in Poland, where variable interest rates were determined by an explicit 
algorithm (CHF LIBOR + fixed margin); therefore, the increase in the CHF exchange rate 
was compensated by a reduction in CHF interest rates.9 Hudecz describes the practices of 
foreign currency lending in Poland, Romania and Hungary in detail.10
9 KIRÁLY – SIMONOVITS, 2017.
10 HUDECZ, 2012.
Base pointBase point
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Figure 3: Average interest rates on the total volume of CHF loans in Hungary and Poland
Source: Király, Banai, 2011
This means that in addition to direct market risks, Hungarian banks also passed on 
their business risks in a broad sense to their clients, including international effects such 
as the global fall in risk appetite. This picture is further complicated by the fact that the 
period between 2009 and 2012 was characterised by a lot of government measures that were 
extremely unfavourable to banks – a special bank tax was introduced in the second half of 
2010. The discounted final repayment took place at the end of 2011, and the act on the financial 
transaction duty was adopted in summer 2012. The discounted final repayment cost banks 
HUF 260 billion net,11 and additional expenditures amounting to approximately HUF 144 
billion and HUF 260 billion were created by the special bank tax and the transaction duty, 
respectively (2013 data).12 These significant extra costs are also likely to have contributed to 
the decision of AXA Bank in the summer of 2012 to increase interest rates, as described in 
the case study.
Schepp and Szabó note that the increase in their costs appeared only partly in their inte-
rest rates, and they think the dominance of banks was much more manifested in the initial 
pricing.13 However, Radnai demonstrated through model calculations that, in their own 
interest, banks should have decreased rather than increased the interest rates and other 
cost elements in this situation, as, due to the higher instalments, default rates also started 
to increase immediately, which had a dramatically destructive effect on their profits as a 
boomerang effect.14
When investigating residential lending in Hungary, Balás et al. found that default could best 
be explained by the payment-to-income (PTI) ratio.15 The banks increased the interest rates 
11 KIRÁLY – SIMONOVITS, 2017.
12 BARCZEL, 2015.
13 SCHEPP – SZABÓ, 2015.
14 RADNAI, 2015.
15 BALÁS – BANAI – HOSSZÚ, 2015.
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on residential foreign currency mortgage loans by 2 percentage points on average, which itself 
resulted in a 16.8% rise in instalments for a 20-year loan. In addition, the CHF exchange rate 
also increased by 55%, possibly leading to a total instalment rise between 70% and 80% (the 
average increase was between 50% and 60%). The situation was further exacerbated by higher 
unemployment, lower wages and lower real estate prices due to the crisis. As a result of all of 
these factors, the rate of non-performing loans (NPL) for more than 90 days gradually increased 
to over 22% in the segment of residential foreign currency mortgage loans, which turned into a 
serious systemic social problem (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Ratio of household NPL for each product
Source: MNB (May 2014, Figure 58)
Figure 4 emphasises the risks of foreign currency loans and, consequently, the currency 
risk, even though unfavourable outcomes were also driven by unilateral increases in interest 
rates. It would be difficult to determine the exact role of interest rate increases in the drama 
of foreign currency borrowers, but it is likely that they contributed to the situation to a much 
greater extent than it usually appears in public discourse.16
2.4. Regulation of interest rates
The new act on transparent pricing17 came into effect at the beginning of April 2012, 
stipulating that, in the case of new residential mortgage loans, banks were not allowed to 
charge any other interest rate-type fees or costs regularly payable in addition to the interest. 
Furthermore, they were also not allowed to offer a temporary discounted interest rate and, 
16 KIRÁLY – SIMONOVITS, 2017.
17 Act CXLVIII of 2011.
44 The risks of variable interest rates
most important for our present subject, the interest rate had to be either fixed or tied to a 
reference rate. In the fixed-rate scheme, at the end of the fixed interest period (3, 5 or 10 years), 
the bank was still entitled to unilaterally change the interest rate; however, the client was 
also entitled to terminate the contract and make a prepayment free of charge. This provision 
protects debtors, as, if the loan becomes too expensive, they can simply and quickly refinance 
it with another bank. If the loan interest rate was tied to a reference rate, then the interest 
surcharge over the reference rate (spread) had to remain fixed throughout the term according 
to the 2012 regulation (provided that the client was not in significant default).
After 2015, however, the interest surcharge could also be changed due to the fact that 
under extreme market conditions, risk premiums may increase significantly (Act LXXVIII 
of 2014). Additionally, the bank may modify the interest rate and interest surcharge of the 
loan up to 5 times during the term, up to the interest change ratio or the interest surcharge 
change ratio. The National Bank of Hungary (MNB) has defined various versions of both 
ratios and continuously publishes the current value thereof. In the case of HUF loans, a 
change in the reference interest rate may be based on the interest rate or secondary market 
yield of benchmark bonds registered by the Hungarian State Debt Management Agency 
(ÁKK) or on the rates of Budapest Interest Rate Swap (BIRS). In both cases, there is also a 
version where fiscal burdens are incorporated according to a predetermined algorithm.
The so-called “Uniformity Act” resulted in a significant change in the evaluation of variable 
interest rates.18 It stipulated that contractual provisions on unilateral contract amendments 
did not comply with the principles of clear and understandable wording, itemised definition, 
objectivity, factuality and proportionality, transparency, cancellability and symmetry, and 
they were, therefore, null and void.19 This created a theoretical basis for the settlement of 
foreign currency loans, whose framework was later determined by the Act on Settlement. 
20Settlement focused on the repayment of the so-called “unilateral interest rate increases” 
and the so-called “exchange rate spread” (more precisely, the reduction of debts), but only 
for those debtors who were not in default. The loss of the banking sector, which resulted 
from this measure, was larger than that from final repayment, approximately HUF 900 
billion, and it definitively closed the era of unilaterally variable interest rates.
2.5. The twilight of foreign currency loans
As a result of the worsening of the foreign currency loan portfolio and related government 
measures (special bank tax, final repayment, exchange rate cap, transaction duty, settlement 
of interest and exchange rate spread), the banking sector suffered a significant loss between 
2010 and 2015. Table 1 shows the after-tax income of the entire banking system, in general, 
and that of AXA Bank, in particular, between 2010 and 2017, thereby indicating the most 
important government measures.
18 Act 2014 of XXXVIII.
19 For more details, see: BODZÁSI, 2015.
20 Act XL of 2014.
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Table 1: After-tax income of the Hungarian banking system and AXA Bank (2010−2017), billion HUF
Year Banking system as a whole
AXA 
Bank Government measures
Estimated cost of 
measures for banks*
2010 0 −9 Introduction of special tax 144 per year 
2011 −289 −37 Final repayment Single 260 
2012 −174 −16 Introduction of exchange rate cap and transaction duty 80 + 260 per year 
2013 31 6  
2014 −541 −38 Settlement of interest and exchange rate spread Single 900 
2015 −29 −12 HUF conversion 100 per year 
2016 442 11  
2017 629 n/a  
* Annual costs were determined based on data from the first full year following implementation.
Source: MNB, 2018, e-beszamolo.im.gov.hu 
As seen from Table 1, the final repayment of foreign currency loans and, in particular, the 
interest and the exchange rate spread had the greatest influence on the profitability of banks, 
which is also reflected in the data of AXA Bank.
Pursuant	to	the	so-called	‘HUF	Conversion	Act’,21 foreign currency loans were converted 
into HUF with effect from 1 February 2015 (at an exchange rate of 256.5 for CHF and 
308.97 for EUR). The interest on HUF-denominated loans was tied to the 3-month BUBOR. 
Additionally, the interest surcharge is identical with the original interest surcharge, but it is 
at least 2% and not more than 5.5% for housing loans. As a result of lower interest income, 
HUF conversion led to approximately HUF 100 billion further revenue loss for banks.
However, from 2016 onwards, the lending activity and profitability of banks gained new mo-
mentum (see Figure 5). To a non-negligible extent, this was due to the emerging boom on the real 
estate market and a new wave of residential borrowing, which is now already denominated in HUF.
Figure 5: After-tax losses of banks and branch offices with a negative after-tax profit in Hungary
Source: MNB (2018, Figure 45)
21 Act LXXVII of 2014
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At the beginning of 2016, AXA Bank Europe SA sold its Hungarian business to OTP Bank 
and left the country. The Hungarian branch office of AXA Bank did not place new loans 
after 2011, but it had a substantial mortgage portfolio – as a result of the transaction, OTP’s 
mortgage portfolio increased by nearly 20%.
The situation suggests that the French parent bank of AXA was seriously affected by the losses 
suffered in Hungary and did not have any chance of recovery at the beginning of 2016. “The share of 
the Hungarian branch in the balance sheet of AXA Bank Europe SA as of 31 December 2015 amounted 
to EUR 633 million, while its liabilities represented EUR 662 million. In its annual report, AXA Bank 
Europe SA mentions the discontinuation of its Hungarian business as part of a strategy that had began 
a year before. The goal of this step is to focus the activities of the bank solely on its Belgian operations”.22
Figure 6 shows that the Hungarian banking system is much more sensitive to cycles 
than the EU-wide banking system: in periods of booms, it is much more profitable than 
the European average, but in a recession, it suffers much higher losses. Furthermore, it is 
easy to be wise after the event, but it seems that the timing of the entry of AXA Bank in the 
Hungarian market (2009) as well as its exit (2016) could not have been any worse.
Figure 6: After-tax ROE indicator of the EU banking system
Note: The distribution shows the 40−60 and 20−80 percentiles of the EU banking systems.
Source: MNB (2018a, Figure 9)
There are a number of studies dealing with the critical analysis of government measures, 
and the opinions vary widely.23 For example, Baksay and Palotai claim that, “By 2010, as a 
first step, the government de facto banned residential foreign currency-denominated mortgage 
loans and took measures that helped to avoid a social disaster. They proclaimed an eviction 
22 www.mno.hu, 2016.
23 BETHLENDI, 2011; KORNAI, 2013, BERLINGER – WALTER, 2013, 2014, 2015; KOLOZSI et al., 2015; 
BAKSAY – PALOTAI, 2017.
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moratorium, reduced the foreign currency exposure of the population through final repayment, 
and introduced the institution of exchange rate cap”.24
In my opinion, the social disaster was, unfortunately, only partly avoided. Additionally, this is further 
reflected in the 2018 Housing Report of an NGO called Habitation for Humanity: “Currently, about 1.4 
million households (one-third of all households) have some kind of loan, and at least 13% of households 
have been in arrears paying their utility bills for over 60 days, while 750,000 enforcement cases are in 
progress, amounting to 7% of the annual GDP. Knowing these facts, it becomes clear why there are about 
a dozen evictions each day, and why the (foreign currency) credit crisis cannot be considered resolved”.25
The discounted final repayment of foreign currency loans was extremely harmful, as it 
helped those who did not need it at extremely high costs, while the support provided to those 
actually in need was much lower. (It would be worth a separate analysis on why a larger 
number of people were not admitted to the programme of the National Asset Management 
Company. As I see it, besides limited state budget resources, complicated administration 
also played a role in this.) The final repayment destroyed the legal and institutional system 
by overwriting the existing private contracts: “In a state governed by the rule of law, the 
executive and legislative branches cannot force contracting parties, through retroactive 
legislative acts, to modify their contracts despite their own better judgment. However, this is 
exactly what the government did again, particularly at the expense of the banking sector”.26
Furthermore, this measure has increased moral hazard, as wealthier citizens will probably 
continue taking greater risks, knowing they will be provided help in an emergency. 
27Additionally, another argument against final repayment is that borrowers have consciously 
accepted a currency risk in exchange for a lower interest rate; they could have become indebted 
in HUF as well, and they have long enjoyed the advantages of the difference in interest rates.
I fully agree with the subsequent settlement of interest in both legal and economic terms, 
as I think the unilaterally variable interest scheme is extremely worrisome from a financial, 
risk management and consumer protection point of view, and it was not even consistent with 
the consumer protection regulations in force at the time of conclusion. However, as far as the 
spread of exchange rate is concerned, I do not think it is technically correct that the middle rate 
had to be used for settlement – it would have been more appropriate to allow the use of a mini-
mum exchange rate difference, as trading at the MNB’s middle rate is not possible.
Furthermore, the conversion into HUF was timed and implemented properly, although 
the corresponding proposal had been published long before.28 The systemic risk dropped 
significantly, and, meanwhile, the banking system emerged from the crisis as well and 
recommenced in almost every segment. Figure 7 shows the collapse and build-up of foreign 
currency loans, which reached 10% of GDP at its peak in 2010.
24 BAKSAY – PALOTAI, 2017. 713.
25 Habitation for Humanity, 2018. 1.
26 KORNAI, 2013. page 29.
27 See KORNAI, 2003., 2013. for the soft budget constraint syndrome.
28 SURÁNYI, 2011.
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Figure 7: Foreign currency and HUF loans of the household sector as a percentage of GDP
Source: Baksay-Palotai, 2017, Figure 11
A similar share and volume of non-performing loans is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: The share of non-performing household loans from credit institutions per contract
Source: MNB (2018a, Figure 35)
Since 2015, the rate of household loans overdue for more than 90 days has fallen spectacularly 
(Figure 8, red bars, right scale). This is mainly due to the fact that banks sold a significant share of 
their non-performing loans to debt management and recovery companies, such that problematic 
loans disappeared from the balance sheets of banks; however, the social and economic problem 
did not cease to exist. I am still of the opinion that a real and long-term solution would be the 
establishment of an income-based collection system that is specifically designed for non-paying 
debtors, which could be voluntarily joined by debtors and banks (recovery companies).29
29 For details on our suggestion, see: BERLINGER – WALTER, 2013., 2014., 2015.
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3. Variable interest rates
Over the past eight years, a new wave of residential housing loans has emerged, although at a more 
modest level, where the role of foreign currency loans has been taken over by HUF loans (see Figure 9).
Figure 9: Volume of new housing loan contracts by interest and denomination
Source: MNB (2018b, Figure 33)
However, HUF loans vary widely based on how long the interest rates are fixed. Suppose you currently 
want to take out a housing loan of HUF 20 million for 20 years. Table 2 shows the lowest annual percentage 
rate (APR) that can be reached with different interest periods using the bankracio.hu search engine.
 Table 2: Mortgage loan offers (20 years, HUF 20 million, 13/Oct/2018)
Interest period 
(year)
Lowest 
APR
Monthly 
instalment 
(HUF)
Credit interest Government bond reference yield
Estimated 
interest 
surcharge
1 2.64% 107,013 2.57% 0.38% 2.19%
3 3.89% 118,994 3.79% 1.89% 1.9%
5 3.55% 115,814 3.45% 3.33% 0.12%
10 4.06% 121,317 3.98% 3.92% 0.06%
20 5.26% 132,988 5.09% 4.39% 0.7%
Source: www.bankracio.hu, www.akk.hu
We can see from Table 2 that the APR is highly dependent on the interest period chosen by the 
borrower, i.e., how long he/she fixes the interest rate on the loan. The APR difference between in-
terest rates fixed for 1 year (2.64%) and 20 years (5.26%) is currently 2.62%, which results in a 
monthly difference of 132,988−107,013 = 25,975 in the amount of instalment. Furthermore, loan 
interest rates are somewhat lower than the APR, as the latter includes the impact of various one-off 
charges as well. Additionally, government bond reference yields show the yields (internal rates of 
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return) of 1-, 3-, 5-, 10- and 15-year government bonds, which can be considered a risk-free return 
for the relevant period. The estimated interest surcharge is the difference between the loan interest 
rate and the reference yields of government bonds (the contracts do not necessarily include exactly 
the same interest surcharges, as different reference yields may be used, but the deviation cannot 
be too high). It is conspicuous that the interest surcharge is the highest for the 1- and 3-year inte-
rest periods, suggesting that banks try to motivate clients to use longer interest fixation periods.
Note that the same table contains somewhat different data for the summer of 2017 – the 
APR difference was higher (3.52%), the difference between instalments was also higher 
(HUF 36,000) and the interest surcharges were distributed much more evenly, close to 2%. 30
The shift is largely due to the fact that MNB was aware of the risk associated with loans with a 
variable interest rate and used several different instruments to motivate clients to fix loan interest 
rates for a longer period of time. The most important of these instruments are the increasingly 
strict debt brake rules, cheap refinancing options provided to banks for longer-term loans and 
qualified consumer-friendly housing loans (MFL). The MFL initiative was launched by the MNB, 
and banks could voluntarily join, agreeing to offer their clients more favourable and safer housing 
loan schemes (fast administration, interest rates fixed for at least 5 years, cheap prepayment, 
maximised charges, etc.). Thus, MFL was, in its spirit, extremely similar to the Code of Conduct, 
but, interestingly, it was perceived much more positively by banks and clients in every respect.
Figure 10 shows that within new loans, the share of loans with interest rates fixed for 1 to 
5 years has increased over the past one or two years, but, most probably, there are still many 
loans within the total volume with an interest period of less than 1 year.
Figure 10: Distribution of disbursed housing loans by interest rate fixation period and share of MFL products
Source: MNB (2018a, Figure 25)
This means borrowers are faced with the dilemma of whether to take a higher risk with a lower 
interest cost or a lower risk with a higher interest cost. In the current environment of low interest 
rates, a short interest period is risky, as interest rates are almost at a historic low all around the world; 
30 BERLINGER, 2017.
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it must also be noted that the period of low interest rates has never been so long. In the future, if 
interest rates rise, instalments will also be increased almost immediately if the interest period is 
short. I have concluded in another study that in case of a 1 percentage point increase in interest, the 
percentage change of instalments is at least the average time of cash flow fixed with current interest 
rates (the impact is slightly higher due to the curvature).31 This means that if current low interest rates 
increase by 1 percentage point, the monthly instalment for a 20-year loan will increase by almost 10%. 
Additionally, I have also used a scenario analysis to demonstrate that if risk-free interest rates rise to a 
realistic level of 5% in the near future (2% real interest rate + 3% inflation), the monthly instalment of 
a 20-year loan will increase by approximately 50%. As seen in the case of foreign currency loans, an 
average increase of 50% to 60% in instalments led to a default ratio of more than 22%. This can happen 
again if default rates continue to be so closely related to the instalment/income ratio as before.32
Table 3 compares the cumulative volume and riskiness of variable-rate HUF and floating-
rate foreign currency loans.
Table 3: Comparison of variable-rate HUF and foreign currency mortgage loans
New mortgage loans for housing 
purposes 2013−2017
Total volume of foreign currency 
mortgage loans End of 2008
Value of contracts ~1,872 billion HUF* ~2,300 billion HUF
Includes interest periods shorter 
than 1 year ~ 750 billion HUF
Number of contracts ~ 234,000** ~500,000
Share within household loans (in value) 46%*** 68%
APR difference 2−3% 5−6%
Increase in instalment 49%**** ~50−60%
Share of non-performing loans ? ~ 22%
* Adding up the volume of new loans in 2013−2017 (MNB, 2018b, Figure 33)
** Estimated value assuming an average credit value of HUF 8 million (MNB, 2018a, Table 6)
*** Calculated based on MNB (2018a, Figure 24) for the years 2013−2017
**** Calculated with scenario analysis with 2% real interest rate and 3% inflation, 20 year term and annual re-pricing
Source: own editing
The volume of foreign currency mortgage loans at the end of 2008 was the result of intensive lending 
for about 4 to 5 years. For the sake of comparability, in Table 3, I have aggregated data for the latest 
wave of housing mortgage loans for the past 5 years – from 2013 to 2017. The value of contracts (1,872 
billion HUF) was close to, but did not reach, the value of foreign currency loans in 2008 (2,300 billion 
HUF), and, of course. it was also less in real value, especially when compared to income. If, however, 
data for 2018 were also added, we would probably end up with a figure of the same order of magnitude. 
Moreover, no public data is available on the distribution of interest periods for the total volume of 
loans; hence, I can only estimate that the share of loans with an aggressively variable rate (interest 
periods shorter than 1 year) may be approximately 40%, i.e., they amount to about HUF 750 billion.
The main message of Table 3 is that, at first glance, HUF-denominated variable-rate mortgage loans 
do not seem to be as risky as foreign currency loans, but a sudden increase in interest rates can easily 
result in a 50% rise in instalments, which can again lead to a default rate of up to 22%. All this depends on 
31 BERLINGER, 2017.
32 BALÁS – BANAI – HOSSZÚ, 2015.
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how quickly and to what extent the interest rates rise, what is the maturity structure of the loan portfolio, 
what is the rate of increase in instalments that is still tolerable for borrowers with their current income 
and, of course, how the general economic situation and the value of real estate collaterals develops.
The share of loans with a variable interest rate is not exceptionally high in Hungary in a 
European comparison (see Figure 11).
Figure 11: The share of variable-rate loans in the EU depending on the difference in interest rates
Source: EMF (2017/Q2), Bloomberg
For example, the interest period of the total volume (100%) of residential mortgage loans in 
Poland is shorter than one year, and the situation is similar in Romania and Sweden as well. The 
high share of variable-rate loans in these countries may become a critical problem in case of a 
significant increase in interest rates, which may affect the entire European banking system. Figure 
11 confirms that a higher interest rate differential shifts, lending towards shorter interest periods.
Analysing a sample of sixty thousand people, Dancsik found that an exchange rate loss suffered 
earlier from foreign currency loans increases the likelihood of a client fixing the interest rate of a 
new HUF loan for at least 5 years.33 This means that clients who have burnt themselves with foreign 
currency loans are now more cautious with HUF loans with a variable interest rate. In addition, even 
higher incomes and higher loan/collateral ratios increase the likelihood of interest rate fixing. However, 
if the term is longer, the client has had a mortgage loan earlier, the services of a credit intermediary are 
used or there is a large difference in interest rates (which is consistent with the positive relationship 
shown in Figure 11), then it is more likely that a short interest period will be chosen.
It is generally taught during financial awareness campaigns that attention should be paid to 
APR, and it should be minimised. Additionally, offers are automatically listed in ascending order 
of APR by Internet search engines. However, if someone blindly follows this advice, paradoxically, 
due to the method used for the calculation of APR, they may choose potentially riskier (e.g., 
CHF-based or very quickly re-priced variable-rate) schemes, often without being aware of this 
fact. To increase risk awareness, I have suggested changing the calculation method of APR.34
33 DANCSIK, 2017.
34 BERLINGER, 2017.
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4. Conclusions
In this study, I have presented the history of residential foreign currency loans and HUF mortgage 
loans in recent years from a specific perspective – changes in regulations for loan interest rates. The 
focus was on taming variable, and then floating interest rates, where we have undoubtedly come a long 
way and achieved significant results. However, development has not been easy for either borrowers, 
banks or the supervisory authorities, and we still cannot be sure that the residential mortgage loan 
portfolio is developing healthily in every respect. We particularly cannot be certain regarding what 
will happen to the victims of earlier credit crises (OTP residential loans and foreign currency loans), 
especially to non-performing debtors who have been in a hopeless situation for a long time.
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1. The Economic and Social Background of Foreign 
Currency Lending 
1. 1. The Role of Real Estate Property in Hungarian Society
Over the last hundred and fifty years, Hungarian society witnessed the radical 
transformation of ownership structures on three occasions. One of the main achievements 
of the Revolution and Freedom Fight of 1848-1849 was the liquidation of feudal ownership. 
After 1945 nationalisation affected society as a whole with central planning introduced 
in the economy. As a result, private ownership had dropped to a minimal level and was 
virtually restricted to housing property. In the wake of the political changeover of 1989-
1990 an opposite process unfolded: state property was dismantled, privatisation and 
restitution began. Private property expanded rapidly and the number of privately-owned 
businesses (business associations) increased from 45.770 in 1990 to over 280.000 in 1997.1 
These developments have determined both the attitude of the Hungarian population to 
property and the development of areas of law that are closely associated with economy, 
like civil law.2 
Due to historical upheavals, real estate ownership has gained special significance in 
Hungarian society. As a vestige of archaic rural society, this includes the ownership of both 
arable land and the house. Real estate ownership which should be preserved and extended is 
also characteristic of the bourgeois mindset.3
One of the features of residential property is that it either requires total renovation by each 
generation or it should be replaced by an entirely new home. In view of the number of inhabitants 
and the size of families, around 40.000 new homes should be constructed in Hungary each 
year. This target was met by the first Orbán government (1998-2002) for the first time since 
the 1980s. The subsidized forint-based home loan scheme of the first Orbán government was 
the first successful attempt that besides increasing the number of housing constructions, also 
encourage newlyweds to move into modern homes of their own.4 Consequently, the number 
of residential constructions increased steadily from 1999.5
1 At the same time the number of state corporations decreased drastically: whereas in 1990 there were 1859 such 
companies, their number dropped to 3 by 1997. The number of businesses owned by the state, however, was 
much higher than that.  The increased number of business associations implied more insolvency procedures. 
See.: HARMATHY, Attila: Das Recht der Mobiliarsicherheiten – Kontinuität und Entwicklung in Ungarn. In: 
KREUZER, Karl F. (Hrsg.): Mobiliarsicherheiten – Vielfalt oder Einheit?, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999. p. 78-83. 
2 On the impact of the last 150 years on civil law see: HARMATHY, Attila: Jogpolitika – polgári jog. Magyar Jog, 
12/2010. p. 705-719.
3 KOVÁCS Levente: A devizahitelek háttere. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 3/2013. p. 183., See also: KATZENBACH 
Zoltán – OSVÁTH Piroska: Lakhatás és befektetés – egy új lakásfinanszírozási modell. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 
4/2012. p. 289-297.
4 KOVÁCS: i.m. 183.
5 In 1999 19.287 new apartments were built; in 2000 the number was 21.583 and in 2001 it was 28.054 and in 
2002 31.511. Source: Central Statistical Office (KSH)
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1. 2. Switching to Foreign Currency-based Residential Mortgage Loans
Following the general elections of 2002, the new government discontinued the interest-
rate subsidization of mortgages denominated in forints for budgetary reasons. People, 
however, continued to yearn for owning a home. Forint-based residential lending became 
unsustainable in the absence of subsidies due to the fact that while the base-rate of the forint 
ranged between 8-12%, the market interest rate was 14-18%.6
Extremely high forint interest rates triggered the (seemingly good) idea of switching 
residential mortgage landing to foreign currencies as these were available at lower interest rates. 
Inflation as well as the high base-rate directed households towards foreign currency loans due 
to significant interest rate differentials.7 This was the time when loans denominated in foreign 
currency, in particular Swiss francs, which were offered at a low interest rate, appeared on 
the Hungarian market. These foreign currency-based housing loans were associated with a 
reduced payment obligation owing to lower interest rates. The repayment curve of the foreign 
currency-based loans was also more attractive as the debt service started from a low level, 
therefore initial payment burdens were lower than in the case of forint-based loans. 
Nevertheless, this lower interest burden was offset by the ever-fluctuating exchange rate of the 
principal debt. At first the issue of the exchange rate risk was completely set aside.  The stable interest 
rate of foreign currencies which was much lower than that of the forint was taken into consideration 
instead. A classic bubble phenomenon could be observed on the market. Debtors and creditors 
both appeared to nearly totally ignore risks in the hope of huge profits. The majority of borrowing 
households only took the monthly payment instalment into account when making the decision. 
As for the lending banks, they made their assessment and took decisions on the basis of real estate 
collateral rather than by examining the future life situation and the payment capacity of prospective 
debtors.8 With hindsight, it can also be established that banks failed to act in a in good faith when 
they accepted properties that had no chance to be sold on the market (for instance residential real 
estate properties taken over by the National Asset Management Program) as collateral.9 
The proliferation of foreign currency-based loans can also be attributed to the fact that 
judging from political declarations, in 2003 the financial sector could reasonably expect 
the introduction of the euro as legal tender in Hungary within a few years. It seemed to be 
a logical choice to offer long-term loans spanning several decades in euros or Swiss francs 
anchored to it rather than in the constantly appreciating forint with its high interest rates. 
This solution enabled wider segments of the Hungarian population to upgrade their home or 
acquire a new home despite the relatively low level of wages in the country.10
6  KOVÁCS: i.m. p. 184. During this period the base rate of the central bank and the inflation rate were both 
rather high: In 2002 5,2 %, in 2003 4,7 %, in 2004 6,8 %. Source: KSH. Rising inflation was mostly linked to 
budgetary adjustments.
7 NYESTE, Orsolya – ÁROKSZÁLLÁSI, Zoltán: Devizahitelezés Magyarországon – régiós makrogazdasági, 
fiskális és monetáris politikai megközelítésben. In: KOVÁCS, Levente (szerk.): Negyed százados a magyar 
bankrendszer. Magyar Bankszövetség. Budapest, 2012. pp. 149., 153.
8 NYESTE – ÁROKSZÁLLÁSI: i.m. p. 150.
9 The National Asset Management Program was launched pursuant to Act CLXX of 2011 on the housing 
provisions of natural persons incapable of meeting their payment obligations under their loan
10 KOVÁCS: i.m. p. 185.
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As a consequence, housing constructions continued to pick up, then peaked in 2004.11 
During this year over 43,000 new homes were built in Hungary. Subsequently the number of 
constructions showed a slight downturn before and stagnation until 2008, then fell rapidly.12 
1. 3. Impacts of the 2008 Crisis 
In the wake of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, whereas the Hungarian forint depreciated 
substantially, the euro and even to a greater degree, the Swiss franc appreciated significantly. 
In the very year of 2008, 90% of new residential loans were denominated in foreign currency. 
The first signs of the storm, however, had emerged as early as in 2006. This is when the 
interest rate of the Swiss francs and of the euros moved apart due to the fact that the European 
Central Bank started to raise interest rates in 2006. As a result, between 2006 and 2008 the 
average interest rate of loans denominated in euros first exceeded 10 %, then after a slight 
decrease stabilized around 10 % from 2009 onward. In the meantime, the average interest rate 
of Swiss franc-based mortgage loans was 5-6% and exceeded 6% only from 2009 onward.13
Since the Hungarian financial supervisory authority failed to take measures, foreign 
currency lending became particularly widespread between 2006 and 2009. The foreign 
currency loan portfolio of households grew from 2,000 billion forints (approximately EUR 
6,2 billion) at the end of 200614 to 6.000 billion forints (approximately EUR 19 billion) by early 
2009. It is perplexing that the foreign currency loan portfolio of the Hungarian population 
should have increased with a further amount of 1.000 billion forints (approximately EUR 3 
billion) even after the onset of the financial crisis.15
Foreign currency lending was initially dominated by housing loans, however, free-to-
use mortgage loans became increasingly popular later on and were used by households for 
consumption purposes. 
The Hungarian financial supervisory authority first reacted in substance to the risks associated 
with foreign currency-based lending immediately before the outbreak of the crisis, on 15 February 
2008. The Chairman of the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) and the Chairman of the Supervisory 
Council of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (PSZÁF)16 issued a joint recommendation 
on the systemic risks involved in foreign currency lending. Apart from the fact that it was several 
years overdue, the recommendation identified an interestingly increased risk with regard to Japanese 
11 In 2003 35.543 new homes were built. Source: KSH
12 In 2005 41.084, in 2006 33.864, in 2007 36.159, and in 2008 36.755 homes were built. The number of housing 
constructions subsequently dropped sharply: in 2009 31.994, in 2010 20.823, in 2011 12.655, in 2012 10.560 
and in 2013 only 7.293 new homes were constructed. Source: KSH
13 The interest rate of free-to-use Swiss franc-based loans was higher by around one percent. For more details 
see: PITZ, Mónika: A svájcifrank-alapú jelzáloghitelek kamatait alakító tényezők. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 2012. 
augusztus, Különszám, pp. 62-69.
14 In the present study the 320 HUF/EUR exchange rate was used
15 In addition, foreign currency loans were granted to the corporate sector as well, the expansion of which was 
the most spectacular in 2007 (cca. HUF 800 billion/EUR 2,5 billion) and in 2008 (cca. HUF 900 billion/ EUR 
2.8 Billion). See: NYESTE – ÁROKSZÁLLÁSI: i.m. p. 150.
16 The MNB and the PSZÁF used to be separate organisations at the time.
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yen-based lending.17 Since then it has become apparent that debtors of yen-based loans suffered the 
least in the crisis owing to the decrease of the interest rate of the yen as well as its weakening. 
The reaction was delayed. In fact, by this date the phenomenon that was to distress Hungarian 
debtors was in full swing: namely that not only the forint, but the euro also depreciated considerably 
against the Swiss franc. During the crisis the Swiss franc became a reserve currency (safe haven 
currency) and as a result, strengthened by around 25 % against the euro. Meanwhile, the forint 
weakened by around 10 % against the euro. As an overall outcome, while in early 2008 one Swiss 
franc was worth ca. 150 forints, in 2010 it stood at 200 forints, and in 2012 it reached 250 forints. 
The depreciation of the forint against the euro was less marked, but still impressive: whereas at the 
beginning of 2008 one euro was worth around 250 forints, it stood at 280 in 2010 and at 300 in 2012. 
The rapidly deteriorating forint, especially against the Swiss franc, affected the situation of 
indebted households drastically. As far as banks are concerned, the quality of their mortgage loan 
portfolio declined, as the share of non-performing loans within the portfolio rose consistently.18
In response to the 2008 crisis, Hungary’s country risk rating (the so-called CDS spread) 
increased considerably.19 While in September 2008 the spread of the five-year Hungarian foreign 
currency bond yields fluctuated around 100 basis points, two months later it reached 700 basis 
points. Simultaneously, the refinancing costs of the Hungarian banks increased, too. However, 
the further increase of refinancing costs was halted by the fact that both the European Central 
Bank and the Swiss central bank introduced interest rate cuts.20 As the financial authority 
failed to take measures and no limits had been set by national legislation, Hungarian banks, 
that are regularly abusing their statutory right to amend contracts unilaterally, embarked upon 
interest raising. Acting contrary to the original purpose of their unilateral right to modify the 
contracts, the Hungarian banks started to use this tool to augment their profit. 
1. 4. Other Reasons for the Prevalence of Foreign Currency Lending 
The wide-spread use of foreign currency lending stemmed from other factors as well, 
including competition between the banks based increasingly on risk, considerable 
information asymmetry between creditors and debtors, the instability of the financial 
17 The Austrian financial authority issued a Communication as early as on 30 June 2006 to highlight the risks 
associated with foreign currency-based loans. One of its key statements is that all foreign-currency-based 
loans are ultimately forein currency speculation transactions. See:  https://www.fma.gv.at/de/ueber-die-
fma/presse/pressemitteilungen/pressemitteilungen-detail/article/fma-und-oenb-praesentieren-einen-
informationsfolder-zu-den-risiken-von-fremdwaehrungskrediten.html Later, in October 2008 the Austrian 
financial authority practically prohibited the granting of new foreign currency-based loans. In 2008 yet 
270.000 Austrian households had a foreign currency (in particular Swiss franc)-based loan agreement, this 
number fell by 45% by 2018, i.e. to 150.000 due to the prohibition.
18 NYESTE – ÁROKSZÁLLÁSI: i.m. p. 150.
19 The value that shows how risky it is for a foreign bank to lend in a given country.
20 As a result, LIBOR rate decreased to 0 %. In the meantime, the CHF LIBOR turned negative. On 27 February 
2015 its three month LIBOR was -0,73 %. This trend affected the euro as well: the one-week EUR LIBOR stood 
at -0,06 % on the same day. Hence it was necessary for the Hungarian legislature to take action and to clearly 
state in connection with the negative interest rate that in accordance with Hungarian civil law negative inte-
rest rates cannot be charged in the case of loan agreements. See: Sections 2(5) and Section 3 of Act II of 2015 
amending Act on the Consumer Loan Agreements of Financial Institutions and other private law related acts.
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intermediaries, financial illiteracy as well as failure to introduce lending rates pegged to 
the reference interest rate. These issues were addressed in the Report of the Parliamentary 
Committee for Constitutional, Justice and Procedural Matters of February 2012.21
In economics literature it is held that the spread of foreign currency lending in a catching-
up, small, open, liberalized and under-capitalized economy is a natural phenomenon 
associated with an open foreign currency position. In the case of Hungary, however, open 
foreign currency positions appeared on the balance sheet of the retail sector with higher 
amounts than in other countries of the region, which led to systemic problems when the crisis 
broke out in 2008. The indebtedness of the sector in foreign currencies, that subsequently 
turned out to be unsustainable, should be seen as a symptom that reflected mostly the so-
called crowding out effect of the unruly fiscal policy, the conflicts between the monetary and 
the fiscal policies as well as the fundamental structural issues of the Hungarian economy.22
1. 5. Belated Legislative Measures 
Due to its size and the associated risks, by the early 2010s the retail foreign exchange loan 
portfolio had become an obstacle to economic growth. The following data serve to illustrate the 
burden weighing on society as a whole: at the end of June 2014 the retail foreign exchange loan 
portfolio was still above 4,147 billion forints (EUR 13 billion), of which 3,607 billion forints 
(EUR 11 billion) represented mortgage loans. In the same period the forint denominated retail 
loan portfolio amounted to 3.792 billion forints (EUR 12 billion) (of which 2.122 billion forints 
– i.e. EUR 6,6 billion constituted mortgage loans). In aggregate there were approximately 
872.000 existing retail foreign currency loan contracts at the end of the first half of 2014.23
The legislature was therefore constrained to take steps. As a first major result, foreign currency 
retail lending was virtually banned in 2010. This was followed by further legislative measures 
that are of outstanding relevance both economically and legally. In 2014 retail mortgage loans 
were converted into forints then in 2015 the same was done to personal loans and car loans. 
However, before going into the details of the provisions, it is necessary to provide an overview 
of the legal nature of foreign currency-based loans as special banking products. 
2. The Legal Nature of Foreign Currency Based Loan 
Contracts
2. 1. Foreign Currency Loan and Foreign Currency-based Loan
When examining the legal characteristics of foreign currency-based loan contracts, one 
should start with the term itself. As pointed out in the recital of Uniformity Decision 6/2013 
PJE of the Hungarian Supreme Court, the Kúria, the notion of foreign currency loan was 
not defined in any legal regulation when foreign currency lending became a common 
practice. A definition was provided only later on in Section 200/A (1) of Act CXII of 1996 on 
21 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/05881/05881.pdf
22 NYESTE – ÁROKSZÁLLÁSI: i.m. p. 164.
23 Out of these the number of debtors with debts more than 90 days overdue was 195.000, affecting a FX loan 
portfolio of 973 billion forints (EUR 3 billion). Thus, the share of bad loans exceeded 22-23 %. Source: MNB.
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Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises (former on Credit Institutions Act), which was 
effective from 27 September 2010. In accordance with this Act, foreign currency credit and 
loan agreements as well as financial leasing agreements are classified as foreign currency-
based if they are denominated or provided in a foreign currency and repaid in forints. 
Foreign currency-based loans come under the wider notion of foreign currency loans. 
Foreign currency loans are defined as loans where the currency of the debt claim is not 
the Hungarian forint. In the absence of a statutory prohibition, the parties to a contract of 
pecuniary interest are essentiallyfree to define the currency of the claim (principle of free 
settlement). According to the above a foreign currency-based loan is also a foreign currency 
loan since the debt is determined in a foreign currency. What is specific to it, however, is that 
the creditor should disburse the loan in forints and the debtor should repay it in forints, that 
is both the creditor and the debtor are obliged to pay the obligation in forints. 
In this regard, Decision 6/2013 PJE of the Kúria stresses that parties are not prevented from 
agreeing that both of them shall be obliged to fulfil their obligations in the currency in which the 
debt was denominated (effectivity clause). In this case both the disbursement and the repayment 
are honoured in the currency in which the debt was denominated (in this case in foreign currency). 
Hence, there are two types of foreign currency loans: (genuine) foreign currency loans with an 
effectivity clause and foreign currency-based loans without an effectivity clause. In the absence 
of an agreement between the parties, foreign currency-based loans are the general rule, genuine 
foreign currency loans being an exception requiring the explicit agreement between the parties.
Hungarian civil law differentiates between credit and loan contracts.24 Such differentiation, 
however, is not relevant for the purposes of the present study. Irrespective of whether the 
laws or the parties have called their contractual relationship a credit contract or a loan 
contract, the point is that the debtor acquires the right to the temporal use of the foreign 
currency according to a scheme under which the currency of the denomination and of the 
payment differed. This means, as established by Decision 6/2013 PJE of the Kúria, that the 
parties define the pecuniary obligation  in such a way that at the due date the debtor will 
pay (discharge) an amount in forints that is equivalent to the pecuniary debt defined in the 
contract in a foreign currency (typically Swiss francs, euros, Japanese yens). When entering 
into a foreign currency-based loan contract, the borrower intends to access as well as to 
repay the loan in forints, while his interest payment obligation should be much lower than 
that of forint loans applied at the time of the conclusion of the contract. This requirement 
was fulfilled by foreign currency-based loan schemes the legal basis of which was established 
by	Section	231	of	Act	IV	of	1959	on	the	Civil	Code	(hereinafter	‘Civil	Code	of	1959’).	
2. 2. On the Invalidity of the Contractual Arrangement 
As far as invalidity is concerned, distinction should be made between individual consumer 
loan contracts on the one hand and foreign-currency-based loan contracts as a contractual 
arrangement on the other. 
24 While credit contracts are governed by Section 6:382 of Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (hereinafter Civil 
Code), loan contracts are governed by Sections 6:383-389 of the Civil Code. A key difference is that under 
Hungarian civil law, actual transfer of money only occurs in the case of loan agreements.
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With respect to the latter, Decision 6/2013 PJE of the Kúria held that the arrangement itself 
was nor in conflict with any statutory regulation, and was neither manifestly immoral. The 
main argument of the uniformity decision in this respect is that at the time of the enactment 
of foreign currency-based contracts these contracts were not condemned by the public. 
Simply due to the contractual arrangement, foreign currency-based loan agreements 
cannot be considered as usurious or false either, nor are they intended for the purposes of 
providing impossible services. 
As an overall assessment, the Kúria stated that the unforeseeable one-way shift of 
contractual burdens after the conclusion of the contract cannot be evaluated from the 
viewpoint of invalidity. Changes, however, might occur subsequently during a long-term 
lending relationship that will upset the economic and risk balance of the contract and will 
lead to serious disproportions. Although this does not affect or interfere with the validity of 
the contract, it might necessitate subsequent intervention in the contracts unless the parties 
are able to remedy these disproportions mutually through contract modification. According 
to the Kúria, however, the latter qualifies as contract amendment through legislation. 
2. 3. The Issue of Unfairness 
The contractual arrangement of foreign currency-based consumer loan agreements was not 
regarded as invalid by Hungarian judicial practice. A reason for invalidity, however, may 
exist in the case of individual loan agreements. Such reason, however, should be established 
by a court during its proceedings or in exceptional cases, by legislation. Unfair contractual 
terms are the most significant reason for the invalidity of individual consumer contracts. 
Under Hungarian civil law this is the only ground for invalidity with a European legal 
background. In fact, a separate piece of EU legislation, Directive 93/13/EEC lays down the 
provisions on unfair general terms and conditions in consumer contracts as well as of unfair 
contractual terms not negotiated individually. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code of 
1959 transposed the provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms applied in consumer 
contracts. As these rules are set out in a Directive, ultimately the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter ECJ) is entitled to interpret the relevant provisions. Therefore the Hungarian 
legislature as well as those applying the law must take both Hungarian judicial practice and 
the case law of the ECJ into account. 
2. 4. The Requirement of Transparency
Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC stipulates that the assessment of the unfair nature of terms does 
not relate either to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of 
the price and remuneration against the services or goods supplied in exchange in so far as these 
terms are plain and intelligible. As an exception to the principal prohibition, the unfairness of 
the terms can also be examined if they are not plain and intelligible. In fact, the requirement of 
transparency is gaining ground in both the EU law and the private law of the member states.25
25 See Max, LEITNER: Transparenzgebot. Wien, Manzsche Verlag- und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2005. 160. p.
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2.4.1. The Requirement of Transparency in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice
In 2013 the Kúria addressed the European Court of Justice with a request for preliminary ruling in 
order to clarify among others, whether not individually negotiated contractual terms incorporated 
into foreign-currency based loan agreements, pursuant to which currency exchange rates are applied, 
may be interpreted as falling within ’the main subject matter of the contract’ (C-26/13). In this context 
the Kúria and the European Court of Justice examined mainly the unfairness of contractual terms 
with regard to various exchange rates applied by banks (i.e. exchange rate margins). 
In its judgement in case C-26/13 of 30 April 2014 the ECJ stated in particular that the requirement 
of transparency of contractual terms laid down by Directive 93/13/EEC cannot therefore be reduced 
merely to their being formally and grammatically intelligible. The ECJ stated that as the system of 
protection introduced by Directive 93/13/EEC was based on the idea that the consumer is in a 
position of weakness vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, in particular as regards his level of knowledge, 
the requirement of transparency must be understood in a broad sense. 
The Court ruled that Article 4 (2) of Directive 93/13/EEC shall not only be interpreted to mean 
that the term in question should be grammatically intelligible to the consumer. Compliance 
with the requirement of transparency also necessitates determining whether the contract sets 
out transparently the reason for and the particularities of the mechanism, for converting the 
foreign currency as well as the relationship between that mechanism and the mechanism laid 
down by other terms relating to the advance of the loan, so that the consumer can foresee, on 
the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the economic consequences for him which derive from it. 
The statements issued in Case C-26/13 have been confirmed and developed in further 
judgements of the EJC. In its judgement in Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15 of 21 
December 2016 the European Court of Justice ruled that the requirement of transparency laid 
down in Article 4 (2) of Directive 93/13/EEC, must be construed as involving not only formal 
compliance, that is the clear and intelligible nature of its formulation, but also the respect of 
transparency in practice. Transparency in practice means that the consumer should be provided 
with sufficient information on the legal and economic aspects of his contractual commitment. 
The EJC reaffirmed that it is of fundamental importance for a consumer to have information 
on the contractual conditions and the consequences of entering into that contract before the 
conclusion of that contract. Therefore on the basis of the case law of the ECJ it can be established 
that the assessment of the unfair nature of a contractual clause relating to the definition of 
the main subject-matter of a contract falls within the scope of Directive 93/13/EEC where 
the consumer did not have the necessary information on the contractual conditions and the 
consequences of entering into that contract before the conclusion of that contract. 
In its judgement in Case C-186/16 the ECJ added to the above that financial institutions 
must provide borrowers with sufficient information to enable them to take prudent and well-
informed decisions. Such information must include the impact of a severe depreciation of 
the legal tender of the Member State in which a borrower is domiciled, and of an increase of 
the foreign interest rate, on instalments. An average consumer should be aware that in the 
value of the foreign currency loan, both a rise or a fall may occur of the foreign currency in 
which the loan was taken out, and he should also be able to assess the potentially significant 
economic consequences of such a term with regard to his financial obligations. 
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In its Judgment in Case C-51/17, the EJC underlined that the requirement stemming from 
Article 4 (2) of Directive 93/13/EEC means that a term relating to the foreign exchange risk must 
not only be understood by the consumer at the formal and grammatical level, but also in terms 
of its actual effects. This means that the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect, should be aware of the possibility of a depreciation of the 
national currency in relation to the foreign currency in which the loan was denominated. The 
EJC stressed again that an average consumer should be able to assess the potentially significant 
economic consequences of such a term with regard to his financial obligations. 
2.4.2. Evaluation of the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice
As for the assessment of the requirement of transparency, it should first be noted that the 
case law of the European Court of Justice is evolving and expanding continuously. On the 
other hand, when interpreting the transparency requirement of Directive 93/13/EEC it is 
clearly visible that the issues in which the breach of the obligation to inform the consumer 
prior to concluding the contract overlap with those of the unfair, not individually negotiated 
contractual terms. At the EU level this does not cause any problems, since it is limited to the 
unfairness of not individually negotiated contractual terms. In this regard, Article 6 (1) of 
Directive 93/13/EEC stipulates that Member States should lay down that unfair terms used in 
a contract should not be binding on the consumer. If the contract is capable of continuing in 
existence without the unfair terms, it shall continue to bind the parties upon unchanged terms. 
Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with 
a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be 
binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those 
terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms. 
Hungarian civil law satisfies this requirement by stipulating that unfair contractual clauses 
shall be null and void. Such grounds of invalidity typically gives rise to partial invalidity, to 
which reference is made by Lajos Vékás: „Nullity ousts the unfair clause, preventing it from 
producing legal effect, nevertheless the other parts of the contract shall bind the parties”26 This 
follows from Section 6:103 (3) of the Civil Code as well, which provides for the nullity of the 
unfair clause, rather than that of the entire contract. Pursuant to Section 6:114 (2) of the 
Civil Code, in the event of limited invalidity of a consumer contract, the entire contract shall 
fail only if the contract cannot be performed without the invalid part.27
26 VÉKÁS, Lajos: Szerződési jog. Általános rész. Budapest, Eötvös Kiadó, 2016. p. 135.
27 This provision was used in a number of cases by the Hungarian courts to rule on the total invalidity of consumer loan 
agreements due to the unfairness of provisions in transferring the exchange rate risk to debtors. In some cases, however, the 
court established only the partial invalidity of the contract. In a particular case, the Regional Court of Debrecen ruled that what 
is unfair is the unlimited extent to which the exchange rate is transferred to the debtor. On the basis of the oral information he 
had received, the debtor might have thought that the exchange rate risk affected him only in a limited manner, amounting in 
the worst case to his instalment increasing to HUF 47.000. The fact that the exchange rate risk was entirely transferred to the 
consumer resulted in the partial invalidity of the part exceeding the 223 HUF/CHF exchange rate. Consequently, the relevant 
contractual terms are not unfair in their entirety, unfairness being limited to specific, well-defined parts. In fact if on the basis 
of the information received at the time of concluding the contract the consumer could have assumed that the exchange-rate 
risk exposure had an upper limit, risk-taking exceeding such ceiling is invalid. (ÍH 2017. 56)
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At the level of Member States’ civil law, however, mixing the obligation to inform the consumer 
prior to concluding the contract with the invalidity of any unfair clause of the consumer contract 
has led to further problems. In Hungarian civil law, under Section 6:62(1) of the Civil Code the 
duty to communicate information prior to concluding the contract is included under the general 
provisions governing contracts. Pursuant to this section, the parties are required to cooperate during 
preliminary negotiations, at the time of the conclusion and termination, and during the life of the 
contract, and are bound to communicate information to each other on circumstances relevant to 
the contract. In accordance with Subsection (3) if the contract is concluded, the party who breaches 
the obligations referred to in Subsection (1) shall be subject to liability for damages caused by non-
performance of an obligation to the other party. In addition, Subsection (5) stipulates that if the 
contract is not concluded, the party who breaches the obligation referred to in Subsection (1) shall be 
subject to liability for damages in accordance with the general provisions of non-contractual liability.
The above shows that for any breach of the duty to provide information prior to concluding 
the contract, Hungarian law imposes a payment of compensation rather than invalidity. In 
this context Lajos Vékás stresses that in the system of the Civil Code the duty to co-operate, 
including the duty to inform during contractual negotiations and at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract, may be deemed a so-called culpa in contrahendo, that is a fault in the conclusion 
of the contract. In accordance with the Civil Code, such breach might entail liability to provide 
compensation. Liability is subject to whether the contract was concluded or not.28
The same logic applies to Section 16 (5) of Act CLXII of 2009 on Consumer Credit.29 As 
a matter of fact, this section stipulates that if the lack of the relevant content item does not 
affect the conclusion of the contract, the creditor is obliged to compensate the consumer for 
damages suffered from the lack of such content item in accordance with the rules on liability 
for damages due to a breach of contract. Thus, if the creditor failed to include a substantial 
element in the loan agreement to be concluded with the consumer, but that element does not 
affect the conclusion of the contract (it is not a substantive element), the contract will be valid, 
but the consumers may bring action for damages against the creditor on a contractual basis. 
When interpreting the requirement of transparency in accordance with Directive 93/13/
EEC, one should take into account the doctrinal differences between the obligation to inform 
prior to concluding the contract on the one hand and the invalidity of unfair contractual 
terms on the other. Further clarification is needed on when the lack of information qualifies 
as the breach of the duty to communicate information prior to concluding the contract and 
when it is to be considered as a not sufficiently clear and intelligible contractual term. 
Delimitation between the two, however, is not always easy, since in practical terms the consumer 
is faced with uncertainties of interpretation of a not sufficiently clear and understandable term 
that was not explained properly before concluding the contract. In this case the consumer could 
in principle rely on the fact that if he had received proper information on the contractual term in 
question, he would have understood its precise meaning and would not have signed the contract. 
28 VÉKÁS: i.m. p. 88.
29 This Act transposed into Hungarian law Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit agreements.
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This, however, might produce an even more complicated situation as it is typically a case of error.30 
In fact, error can give cause to the contract being challenged, which under Hungarian law is possible 
within one year of concluding the contract. All in all, often the same information deficiency may 
result in the breach of the duty to communicate information prior to concluding the contract, in 
error and in the nullity of the unfair contractual term. 
3. Legislative Steps in 2014 with Regard to Foreign 
Currency Loans
Since consumer loan contracts started to create an increasingly significant social and 
economic issue in Hungary from 2008, the Hungarian legislature had to take action. 
Substantive legislative steps were taken after 2010. Moreover, in 2014 within a few weeks of 
the formation of the new government, the first act on foreign currency loans was adopted, 
followed by three other acts in the same year. The process was completed in 2015, which 
resulted in the elimination of consumer loans in foreign currency. 
3. 1. The First Act on Foreign Currency Loans 
On 16 June 2014 the Hungarian Kúria adopted Integrative Civil Law Decision 2/2014.31 Subsequently 
the Parliament adopted Act XXXVIII of 2014 on settling certain issues relating to the uniformity 
decision of the Kúria in respect of consumer loan contracts entered into with financial institutions 
(hereinafter: Act DH1). The Act was promulgated on 18 June 2014, barely a month after the adoption of 
the integrative decision. The majority of the provisions of Act DH1 entered into force on 26 July 2014. 
National legislation was justified by the fact that although the integrative civil law decision 
of the Kúria is binding only upon courts, the principles of law set out therein, affected a wide 
range of both legal relationships and debtors. Legislation was needed to enforce the relevant 
requirements. Owing to Act DH1, the provisions of the integrative decision of the Kúria became 
applicable to all foreign currency debtors, without the necessity of taking legal proceedings. 
Most importantly, it avoided hundreds of thousands of lawsuits with regard to the nullity of the so-
called  exchange rate margin.32 Section 3 (1) of Act DH1 established: „In the consumer loan contract, 
with the exception of the individually negotiated contract term, the clause under which the financial 
institution applies the buying rate when disbursing the financing for the purchase of the borrowed or 
leased object, while for the repayment of the debt it applies the selling rate or an exchange rate other than 
the exchange rate specified when the disbursement was made shall be null and void.” Subsection (2) 
added that the clause qualified as null and void under Subsection (1) is to be replaced by a provision 
prescribing the application of the official foreign exchange rate of the National Bank of Hungary, both 
30 Error in continental law is considered as a ground for invalidity. The conclusion of the contract itself is 
recognized, but it does not have any legal effect. In English and American common law, by contrast, in 
the case of error the contract may be declared void ab initio, i.e. as if the contract was never made. See: 
MENYHÁRD, Attila: A szerződés akarathibák miatti érvénytelensége. Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Ál-
lam- és Jogtudományi Kar, Polgári Jogi Tanszék, Budapest, 2000. p. 16-29.
31 In the subject of the unfairness of certain provisions of foreign currency-based loan contracts not addressed 
by 6/2013 PJE.
32 In Hungary 180.000-200.000 civil law cases are initiated. Source: National Office for the Judiciary (OBH)
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in terms of disbursement and repayment (including the payment of the instalment and any cost, fee or 
commission denominated in foreign currency). Finally, Section 3(5) in this respect also stated that the 
financial institution is obliged to make a settlement with the consumer as specified in a separate Act. 
A further important aspect of Act DH1 is that Section 4 established a rebuttable presumption 
of the unfairness of contractual clauses providing for the opportunity to amend the contract 
unilaterally. Section 4 transposed the criteria specified in the Kúria’s integrative decision.33 
In this respect the Act allowed financial institutions to prove the fairness of their clauses on 
the unilateral amendment of the contract under an expedited procedure.
Section 4(3) laid down the settlement obligation of the financial institution: if the court 
established the nullity of the contractual clause providing for the opportunity to amend the 
contract unilaterally, the financial institution is obliged to make the settlement with the 
consumer in the manner defined in a separate Act. It is to be pointed out that this clause does 
not only apply to loans in foreign currency, but also to forint-based consumer loan contracts. 
Act DH1 laid down special provisions for managing pending actions. Pursuant to Section 
16 these should be suspended. Data provided by the National Office for the Judiciary show 
that 13.268 actions were suspended pursuant to Act DH1. Proceedings the subject of which, 
in part or in full, was a contract clause on exchange rate margins and on the opportunity 
to unilaterally amend the contract had to be suspended. These were typically actions for a 
declaration initiated pursuant to Section 239/A (1) of the Civil Code of 1959.34
Whereas Section 17 of Act DH1 contains special provisions on judicial enforcement, 
Section 18 provides for the suspension of the sale of pledged lien outside judicial enforcement. 
It should be noted that Act DH1 takes an unambiguous stance on the expiry of claims originating 
from consumer loan contracts. In fact, in accordance with Section 1 (6) of the Act the provisions 
of the Civil Code of 1959 concerning the statute of limitation in the case of claims arising from 
consumer loan contracts should be interpreted in a way that such claims do not expire during the 
existence of the loan contract, the limitation period shall commence when the contract terminates. 
The legislature intended to eliminate an uncertainty in applying the law. Although this solution 
has later come under criticism in legal literature,35  in our opinion the act codified the correct 
doctrinal solution. A similar position was adopted by the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) 
with regard to German law. BGH’s ruling of 28 October 2014 (BGH XI ZR 17/14) examined the 
administrative fee charged at the time of concluding the consumer loan contracts.36 In its ruling on 
the time period of the redeemability of the administrative fee the BGH stated that the limitation 
33 The issue of the unfairness of the right to amend a contract unilaterally was raised in the context of non-
consumer contracts well. In this connection the Regional Court of Szeged ruled in a specific case that the 
criteria for establishing the unfairness of unilaterally increasing interest are applicable mutatis mutandis to 
non-consumer loan contracts. (ÍH 2016. 136.).
34 Section 239/A (1) of the Civil Code of 1959 stipulated that: „The party may bring action asking the court to declare 
a contract or specific clauses of the contract invalid (partial invalidity) without requesting the application of the legal 
consequences of the invalidity.” This heavily criticised provision was taken over by Section 6:108 (2) of the Civil Code.
35 István, GÁRDOS: A kölcsönszerződésből fakadó követelések elévülésének kezdő időpontja. Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 9/2014. p. 387-399.
36 This ruling was immediately preceded by another ruling of BGH on 13 May 2014 (BGH XI ZR 170/13.).
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period can only commence when all the necessary circumstances occur. Thus, also according to 
the BGH, the limitation does not commence on the date of the conclusion of the contract, either. 
At last, it also worth mentioning that in its Decision 34/2014 (14 November) the 
Constitutional Court rejected the initiative of judges to establish that Act DH1 was not in 
harmony with the Fundamental Law of Hungary and to annul it. The Constitutional Court 
ruled among others that Act DH1 did not constitute retroactive legislation. 
Concerning the limitation period, the Constitutional Court stressed that consumer loan contracts 
tend to be long-term integrated contractual legal relationships between parties that lay down the 
parties’ mutual rights and obligations. Despite the differing views expressed in legal literature, from 
the aspect of constitutionality the acceptable position is that in these cases claims alone cannot be 
extinguished during the existence of the contract. In order to handle the legal relationship as a single 
unit, through the Act the legislature gave an interpretation that is similar to the one applied to paying 
instalments in leasing agreements, according to which limitation only begins when the contractual 
relationship terminates pursuant to the contract. This does not contradict the limitation rule defined 
in the Civil Code of 1959. Namely while the debtor’s liability towards the financial institution (and 
the claim of the financial institution towards the debtor) subsist, the limitation of the individual 
payments and claims cannot commence independently of each other, that is the claims with regard to 
the payments made by the debtor may not lapse. [Section 136 of CC Decision 34/2014 (14 November)]. 
3. 2. Settlement Act 
Act DH1 had already foreseen that financial institutions would have to repay to their debtors 
the amounts that they realized through applying unfair contractual terms. A separate 
Act was adopted on the settlement of (past) overpayment by consumers linked to unfair 
contractual terms (hereinafter: Act DH2).37
Section 5 (2) of the Act laid down the principles of settlement. In accordance with this, the 
consumer’s claim should be calculated according to the decree issued by the Governor of the 
National Bank of Hungary upon the authorisation of this Act as if overpayments had been 
paid as prepayments at the time of overpayment. 
The legislature could have chosen among a number of settlement methods. Out of these the 
most favourable one for the consumer is the so-called settlement based on prepayment. This 
implies that overpayment should be credited to the debtor as prepayment of the outstanding 
amount. The argument that prepayment is only possible of the free will of the debtor could 
not be brought up against this method. In fact, in this case the issue of prepayment does not 
even arise as the debtor had not been aware at the time of paying the due instalment that he 
was paying in excess. Overpayment was recognized by the debtor only subsequently and it is 
to be assumed that he would wish the overpayment to offset part of the outstanding amount. 
Owing to settlement based on prepayment, the profit arising from the previously applicable 
favourable exchange rate was realized directly by the debtors. As a general rule, in accordance 
with the settlement method based on prepayment, the consumer must be placed in a position 
37 Act XL of 2014 on the rules of settlement regulated in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on settling certain issues relating 
to the uniformity decision of the Kúria respect of the consumer loan contracts entered into by financial 
institutions, and certain other provisions.
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as if settlement had occurred at the rate specified in Section 3 of Act DH1 and at the original 
interest rate (prior to raising the interest rates) applicable at the time of concluding the contract. 
In the event that the repayment of the debt was defined in a foreign currency, overpayment 
should also be converted to that currency. In doing so, overpayment should be accounted for 
at the rate that was used by the financial institution for converting the outstanding amounts, 
that is the capital repayments and the interest payments. 
In case the consumer had overdue debts vis-a-vis the financial institution, the settlement 
of the overpayment is governed by Section 293 of the Civil Code of 1959 (Section 6:46 of the 
Civil Code). In this case the sum constituting the overpayment should be used for paying the 
costs first, then the interest, and, finally, the principal debt. 
With regard to the above the Settlement Act covers the following questions: 
- the manner of the settlement; 
- the procedure of the settlement; 
- specific rules applicable to forint loans as well as consumer loan contracts registered 
in foreign currency and disbursed in foreign currency; 
- special procedural provisions governing suspended legal actions and enforcement 
proceedings;
- 18-month moratorium on interest rate increases; 
- provisions on accounting and taxation; 
- provisions on the necessary amendment of Act DH1. 
In a number of cases Act DH2 introduced deferring accounting rules: 
- on consumer loan contracts in the case of early final repayment; 
- regarding consumer loan contracts affected by residential properties offered to the 
National Asset Management Company for purchase; 
- in case of consumer loan contracts affected by the exchange rate cap;
- regarding consumer loan contracts affected by bridging loans. 
Act DH2 also laid down the time limit for complying with the settlement obligation. 
Irrespective of this clause, however, for foreign currency credits and foreign exchange-based 
loan contracts the effective date of settling the consumer’s claim was 1 February 2015. For 
forint-based credits the effective date of settling the claim was 30 June 2015. 
As for the revision of the settlement, Act DH2 stated that should the consumer dispute the contents 
of the settlement issued by the financial institution, he may first submit a complaint to the financial 
institution. If the complaint is rejected, the consumer could initiate the proceedings of the Financial 
Arbitration. The consumer may initiate a non-contentious civil proceeding against the Financial 
Arbitration Board’s decision to terminate the proceedings or to establishing the correct settlement. 
Specific rules apply to proceedings launched by actions in the public interest. These could 
be launched by the National Bank of Hungary if the General Terms and Conditions published 
after 26 November 2010 were amended or the previous General Terms and Conditions were 
modified after this date. As a matter of fact, in these cases unfairness of the contractual 
terms allowing for unilateral amendment was not to be presumed. 
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Section 37 of Act DH2 intended to remedy the abusive exercising of rights originating from 
the opportunity granted by Section 239/A (1) of the Civil Code of 1959.38 Act DH2 therefore 
stipulated that in respect of contracts falling under the scope of this Act, the party may request 
the establishment of the invalidity of the contract or of certain contractual provisions (partial 
invalidity) from the court, irrespective of the reason for invalidity, regarding the application 
of the legal consequences of invalidity, that is to declare the contract valid or effective until 
the date when the decision is made. If the party requests the legal consequence of invalidity or 
partial invalidity to be deducted, he shall also indicate the legal consequences the court shall 
apply. This provision was examined by the European Court of Justice in its Judgement in Case 
C-118/17. A detailed analysis thereof will follow below in 4.2. 
According to the data provided by the National Bank of Hungary of 1 October 2015, 
following the settlement, an average amount of HUF 393.000 (EUR 1.200) that had been 
unfairly incurred was reimbursed to the debtors by the Hungarian financial institutions. 
The amount was HUF 718.000 (EUR 2.240 EUR) in the case of mortgage loans and HUF 
201.000 (EUR 630) with respect to non-mortgage loans. The sums charged in an unfair 
manner amounted to HUF 734 billion (EUR 2,3 billion). As a result of the settlement the 
outstanding debts of the consumers decreased by HUF 550 billion (EUR 1,7 billion).
While the average monthly instalment of Swiss franc-based mortgage loans decreased by 
HUF 26.154, that is by 25%, the average principal (not yet due) debt dropped from HUF 8 
million to HUF 6,5 million (that is by HUF 1,5 million – EUR 4.700). The level of interest 
rates fell to an even greater degree: for Swiss franc-based housing loans interest rates dropped 
from 5,85 % to 4,28 %, that is on average became 27 % lower after the settlement. The interest 
rate level of EUR-based housing loans decreased by 22 %. The slightest decrease occurred in 
Japanese yen-based housing loans: here the level of interest only dropped by 3 %. 
The monthly instalments of 85% of foreign currency-based loan contracts decreased at 
the time of the settlement. Owing to the settlement by banks, the amount of omnibus credit 
contracts fell by 92% (by 140.000 contracts and thus their number was reduced to 13.000). 
In Hungary in the wake of the Settlement Act, more than a total of 2,2 million claims were 
settled. As a result of the settlement, 66.196 claims lapsed. Most of the contracts and claims 
affected by settlement were car loans. 
3. 3. New Criteria for Credits Provided for Consumers: The ’Fair Banking Act’
The problems of the foreign currency borrowers have drawn attention to the rules on 
consumer credits and their deficiencies. Consumer credits constitute a special group of 
credits and differ essentially from credits provided to corporate clients in several respects. 
The significance of consumer credits is proven by the fact that this area had been regulated 
by a Directive within the European Economic Community as early as in 1987. This was 
replaced by Directive 2008/48/EC, which was transposed in Hungarian law by Act CLXII of 
2009	on	Credit	Provided	to	Consumers	(hereinafter	‘Fair	Banking	Act’).	The	Fair	Banking	
Act entered into force on 1 March 2010. 
38 This possibility is also secured by Section 6:108 (2) of the Civil Code.
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Since the entry into force of the Fair Banking Act in 2010, Hungarian courts have dealt 
with a number of consumer credit cases. The recent developments in case law as well as the 
previous acts to support debtors in foreign currency necessitated the amendment of the Fair 
banking Act in 2014.39
The primary objective is to make sure that banks offer credits to consumers under fair 
contractual terms that are transparent to consumers themselves. The amendment of the Fair 
Banking Act therefore contains the following provisions: 
- defines new, transparent rules for unilaterally modifying consumer loan contracts: 
the new provisions cover the unilateral raising of interest rates, charges and costs; 
- sets out in detail and renders more efficient the duty of the creditor to communicate 
information prior to concluding the contract, with the main aim of enabling the 
consumer to take an informed decision on the possible conclusion of the credit 
agreement and on the risks involved; 
- offers the consumer a free of charge termination right if the credit has already been 
disbursed: the objective is to facilitate bank switching and competition between banks; 
- maximizes late interest rates: the purpose is to prevent creditors from applying 
usury-like interest rates to debtors already struggling with payment difficulties; 
- extends the duty of the creditor to inform prior to concluding the contract to the surety 
and to the lien obligator: the aim is to make sure that these consumers, who are different 
from the main borrower, can also make an informed decision on offering the guarantee; 
- encourages the Hungarian Banking Association to work out a sample general 
business rules for its members in order to ensure that banks provide loans based 
on standard contractual terms, which helps the consumer make their choice among 
these credit products and renders contractual terms more transparent. 
The Act amending the Fair Banking Act was primarily designed to give greater protection 
to consumers suffering from a lack of information. The legislature nevertheless formulated 
certain requirements vis-a-vis the consumer, too. Although it is clear that in consumer 
credit transactions the consumer is the weaker party due to his economic situation 
and information asymmetry, the consumer can still be expected to gather appropriate 
information. Circumspect, prudent behaviour can be expected from the consumer as well, 
especially when he is about to offer his residential property as security for a loan agreement 
spanning several decades. In this respect the amending act stipulates that the provisions of 
the Fair Banking Act should be applied in compliance with Section 6:62 of the Civil Code on 
the mutual obligation of parties to cooperate and communicate information. 
As a result of evolving case law, the legislature amended Section 16 (5) of the Fair Banking 
Act. In accordance with the earlier rule, the lack of any content requirement defined in the 
Act led to the invalidity of the consumer loan agreement as a whole. The invalidity of the 
entire contract, however, does not favour consumers either, as in this case they would be 
obliged to repay the debt, together with interest and charges, in one amount. To avoid this, 
the relevant provision of the Fair Banking Act was replaced by the following: „If the lack of 
39 Act LXXVII of 2014 on amending Act CLXII of 2009 on credit provided for consumers and other related acts.
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any content item under this Section does not affect the coming into being of the agreement, the 
creditor shall compensate the consumer for any loss that may arise from the content deficiency 
of the agreement under the rules of liability for losses caused through a breach.” 
It is worth noting that besides taking into account the evolvement of domestic case law, the 
Hungarian legislature also paid attention to legal developments in Austria and Germany.40 
Furthermore, the provisions of Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers 
relating to residential immovable property were also considered. 
It is on this basis that the new Section 13 (1) of the Fair Banking Act set out that if mortgage 
credits and financial leasing relating to real estate are requested, the draft agreement should 
be placed at the consumer’s disposal minimum seven days prior to the conclusion of the 
agreement even without the consumer’s request. 
3. 4. Act on Conversion into Forints 
3.4.1. The Purpose of the Act and its Main Provisions 
The legal measures serving to protect the debtors of foreign currency-based consumer loans 
were completed by the Acts on the conversion into forints of mortgages in 201441, and of car 
loans and personal loans in 2015,42 respectively. 
The law of 2014 on the conversion into forints of mortgages was conceived with a dual 
objective in mind: 
- to end the exposure of consumers with a foreign currency debt to exchange rate 
fluctuations, 
- to secure the stability of the financial architecture by eliminating currency exchange risks. 
The law gave rise to the amendment of contracts through legislation, since the currency in 
which the debts had been held was modified ex lege. 
The revaluation of outstanding liabilities did not lack precedent in Hungarian law history. 
The economic crises of the 20th century actually provide a number of examples for similar 
revaluations through law. One of the most significant among these has been Law Article 
XII of 1928 on the revaluation of certain pecuniary debts under private law. In fact, the 
revaluation carried out on the basis of the 1928 Law was not limited to simple conversion, 
as it also extended to the restoration of the value equilibrium between the services of the 
parties along fair criteria.43 This shows that revaluation of the outstanding debts occurred 
during major economic crises in order to facilitate recovery.
40 See: BODZÁSI Balázs: A bankkölcsönszerződésekben kikötött kamat módosítására vonatkozó szabályok a né-
met és az osztrák jogban. Magyar Jog, 2/2013. p. 103-116.
41 Act LXXVII of 2014 on the settlement of issues related to the conversion of the currency of certain consumer 
loan agreements and rules regarding interest.
42 Act CXLV of 2015 on the Settlement of certain issues related to the conversion of claims arising from certain 
consumer loans to forint.
43 See details thereof in CZUGLER, P. Áron: Hitelválságok kezelése egykor és most. A bethleni konszolidáció ma-
gánjogi válságjogának tanulságai a jelenkor számára. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1/2015. p. 40.
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The primary purpose of the conversion act therefore was to eliminate the burdens associated 
with future exchange rate risks in the otherwise valid loan contracts. This was achieved by 
defining the exchange rate. Under Section 10 of the Act: „The financial institution that is the 
beneficiary of the given foreign currency or foreign currency-based mortgage loan agreement 
shall, by the deadline for the fulfilment of its obligation of settlement under the Settlement 
Act, convert the total debt existing on the basis of or arising from the foreign currency or 
foreign currency-based consumer mortgage loan agreement as determined on the basis of 
the settlement rendered in accordance with the Settlement Act, including any interest, fees, 
commissions and costs charged in a foreign currency, into a forint claim as of the effective day 
at one of the following exchange rates, whichever is more favourable for the consumer:
a) the average of the foreign exchange rates of the given currency officially quoted by the 
MNB between 16 June 2014 and 7 November 2014, or
b) at the foreign exchange rate of the given currency officially quoted by the MNB on 7 
November 2014 (hereinafter referred to as „forint conversion”).”
In defining the conversion rate it had to be taken into account that Integrative Decision 2/2014 
of the Kúria concluded that in valid loan contracts exchange rate risks are to be borne by the 
debtor. A further consideration was that interest on foreign currency and foreign currency-based 
loans had always been lower than that of forint-based loans provided for the same purpose. It 
had to be ensured that borrowers with loans in forint could not get into unfairly disadvantageous 
situation compared with debtors in foreign currency and foreign currency-based loans. The 
exchange rates applicable to conversion into forints set out in the Act validated this aspect, too. 
The Act on conversion into forints, following past examples, did not merely stipulate the 
conversion into forints of the existing foreign currency debts. In fact, defining the initial interest 
in forints of loans converted into forints was just as essential as defining the exchange rate. Thus, 
Section 11 of the Act laid down that for debts converted into forints a reference interest rate should 
be applied that must consist of the three-month BUBOR and the interest margin featured in the 
original loan contract. The act also specified the interest margin: The interest margin cannot be 
less than 1 per cent, and may not exceed 4,5 per cent in the case of housing consumer mortgage 
loan agreements or 6,5 per cent in the case of non-housing consumer mortgage loan agreements.
In addition to defining the initial interest in forints following the conversion, the Act also specified 
how often repricing may occur in the light of the residual maturity, that is, at what intervals the financial 
institution may increase the interest rate. In this connection Section 8 of the Act set forth that interest 
in the future may only be altered in accordance with the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act.44
The purpose of the legislature had equally been to avoid banks defining the highest 
permitted interest in the loan contracts, but to create competition in defining the interest and 
other charges of the existing contracts. Therefore Section 13 of the Act enabled the consumer 
to terminate the loan contract free of charge if another financial institution offered lower 
interest on loans and to conclude a contract with the financial institution offering more 
favourable credit conditions. 
44 The relevant provisions of the Consumer Credit Act were amended by Act LXXVIII of 2014.
 Dr. Balázs Bodzási 75
In addition to existing loan contracts, conversion into forints of outstanding debts for 
certain terminated contracts also took place (Section 15). The aim was to stop the further 
increase of the total debt (that had given rise to a number of enforcement proceedings against 
debtors) due to unfavourable currency fluctuations.
It is to be highlighted that subject to certain conditions, the Act opened up the possibility for 
consumers to request the dispensation of converting the debt originating from the loan contract 
into forints. This provision is included in Section 12 of the Act. Maintaining foreign currency 
(and foreign currency-based) loans might have primarily been advantageous for debtors who 
either received their income in a foreign currency or the remaining repayment period was short 
or else their outstanding foreign currency debt was insignificant compared with their income. 
In the case of debts originating from already terminated loan contracts the Act did not fix any 
conditions, which means that dispensation of the forint conversion could be requested without 
restriction. In this regard Section 15 (3) of the Act sets out that if initiated by the consumer in 
writing, within 30 days of the receipt of the notification of the financial institution, the financial 
institution was obliged to re-convert the claim converted into forints into a claim denominated 
in the original currency at the exchange rate determined in Section 15 (1). 
The Act also established that in the case of loan contracts not affected by conversion 
into forints, the financial institutions should revert to the originally calculable interest or 
interest margin. In accordance with Section 14: „In the case of forint-based consumer loan 
agreements and foreign currency and foreign currency-based consumer loan agreements not 
provided against mortgage security, the interest or interest margin applicable as of the effective 
day may not exceed the originally calculable interest or interest margin.” 
Thus, the existing contract became amended by the power of law. The Act did not 
prescribe any obligation binding the consumer in this respect. The financial institutions 
sent the notification on the conversion of the debt into forints to the debtors together with 
the notification on having fulfilled the settlement obligation. 
The Act did not establish any presumption as to whether the loan contract was otherwise 
valid. As a consequence, the Act did not remedy retroactively the grounds for invalidity that 
might have existed at the time of concluding the loan contract. By requiring the conversion 
of the debt into forints in the case of foreign currency and foreign currency-based loan 
contracts provided against mortgage security, the Act eliminated future exchange rate risks. 
The advantages and proper timing of the Act on conversion into forints were highlighted 
in particular by the decision of the Swiss National Bank in early 2015 to scrap the euro cap 
on the Swiss franc. 
3.4.2. Decision 33/2015 (03 December) of the Constitutional Court Assessing the Act on Conversion
The Hungarian Constitutional Court received hundreds of submissions (constitutional 
complaints) concerning the Act on Conversion into Forints. The Constitutional Court 
handled the submissions jointly. The resulting Decision 33/2015 (03 December) first and 
foremost examined whether the constitutional conditions for amending contracts through 
the Act on Conversion into Forints (i.e. by legislation) existed. 
76 Legislative Steps in Hungary to Address Issues...
The Constitutional Court first established that the provisions of the Act laying down the 
provisions for mandatory conversion into forints of debts originating from contracts falling 
within the scope of the Act clearly constituted an intervention in the contractual freedom of the 
requesting parties (complainants). The contracts affected by the Act on conversion into forints 
were amended for reasons beyond the parties’ control, partly without any further legal action, 
partly through mandatory rules binding the parties. Consequently, the ex-post amendment of 
rights and obligations arising from concluded contracts with legislative measures, imposing the 
obligation to convert foreign currency debts into claims denominated in forints, was clearly an 
intervention in the contractual freedom of the parties. The Constitutional Court, however, did 
not deem the intervention to be necessarily incompatible with the Fundamental Law of Hungary. 
The constitutional conditions for exceptional legislative intervention were developed by a series 
of the Constitutional Courts’ previous decisions in order to ensure the amendment by legislation 
of long-term contractual relationships. In this regard, in its key Decision 8/2014. AB (20 March) 
the Constitutional Court established that long-term private-laws contracts could be amended by 
legislative measures only when the requirements of the clausula rebus sic stantibus principle are met.
The primary objective of the legislation making the conversion of foreign and foreign 
currency-based loans mandatory was to eliminate the exchange rate risk for consumers (as 
debtors) for the future since this has put an unpredictable and heavy burden on them. In 
accordance with Section 45 of the recital Constitutional Court Decision (hereinafter CC 
Decision): „The unpredictability of possible future exchange rate fluctuations meant such 
uncertainty for debtors that in view of the large number of debtors threatened with the risk 
of significant financial and social loss for the entire society. The aim of avoiding such risk 
provides the legislature with constitutional grounds to intervene, primarily in the debtors’ 
interest (It should be noted that the mandatory conversion into Hungarian forints was 
performed primarily in the debtors’ interest as it eliminated future exchange rate risk). It 
must be emphasized that by ordering the mandatory conversion in Hungarian forints[…] the 
legislature did neither interfere with the outcome of ongoing individual court proceedings, nor 
did it take a decision on the validity/invalidity of individual contracts (or contractual clauses)”. 
Besides the protection of debtors, the other aim of legislative intervention was to protect 
creditors. From the point of view of constitutionality, the key interest that the legislature 
had to take into account was to close the creditors’ open foreign currency positions. In 
fact, the creditors had to close their open foreign currency positions as soon as possible, 
which required the conversion of the largest possible number of foreign currency-based 
contracts to Hungarian forints. Thus, one of the objectives of conversion into Hungarian 
forints, beyond protecting consumers, was to reduce the exposure of creditors as much 
as practicable. Additionally, the protection of the creditors led to the protection of the 
depositors indirectly. In that respect the Constitutional Court stated: (Section 47 of the 
recital of the CC decision): „Failure to convert the foreign exchange debts into forints or 
delaying their conversion represents a systemic risk for Hungary because of the large number of 
foreign exchange loan contracts and the size of the outstanding debt. Without eliminating this 
situation, a significant weakening of the Hungarian forint could have been expected, which 
would have further ruined the financial situation of the debtors.”
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As far as conversion into forints is concerned, it should be remembered that the Act had provided 
for „opting out”, that is it allowed debtors to request the dispensation of the forint conversion under 
certain conditions. In the case of existing contracts, nevertheless, this was not only subject to the 
consumer’s choice, but was tied to certain conditions in Section 12(3) of the Act. In the case of 
already terminated contracts, on the other hand, the Act provided for the dispensation of the forint 
conversion of debts arising from these contracts more widely. With respect to these contracts, 
Section 15 (3) of the Act provided for opting out from forint conversion without restriction. 
The Constitutional Court stressed that in formulating the rules of conversion into forints, 
the legislature had to keep in mind the interests of not only debtors, but those of creditors and 
their depositors as well. Recital 54 of the CC Decision underlines: „The primary objective of 
intervention was to ensure the implementability of the contract, this was the reason for which the 
effect of exchange rate fluctuations on the payment obligation of debtors had to be eliminated, 
which serves the interests of all the subjects of the contractual relationship , and at the level of 
national economy, the interest of the financial sector. The high percentage of foreign currency or 
foreign currency-based loan contracts out of the total number of contracts also represented a risk 
for creditors and thereby for the stability of the financial system. The element of the legislation 
that provides affected consumers with only a limited dispensation of the process of conversion into 
forints in the case of existing contracts should be considered in this light. A review of the exceptions 
reveals that they only concern the particular cases in which conversion into forints would have 
actually been unreasonable and specifically unfavourable for the debtors. (the debtor receives his 
income in the foreign currency of the debt, he would be eligible for taking a foreign currency-based 
loan at the time of conversion into forints, the contract is for a short or medium term etc.). Such 
contracts represent only a smaller percentage compared to the total number of contracts, their non-
conversion does not place the affected creditors at a disadvantage and therefore their continuation 
cannot represent a risk to the stability of the country’s financial intermediaries, either” 
All in all, the Constitutional Court stated that the legislature decided to convert the debts 
affected by the Act into forints out of general social interest, due to a change in circumstances 
involving the overriding of compelling and legitimate interests in the wake of the conclusion 
of the contracts. In drafting the Act, the legislature took due account of both the contractual 
freedom of the consumers to be protected and of the interests of the other party, the creditors, 
affected by the legislative intervention in order to restore the economic equilibrium of the 
relevant contracts. In the view of the Constitutional Court the fact that the legislature did 
not provide consumers the opportunity for opting out of the process of conversion into 
forints without limitation and ensured it only to those who would have indeed been affected 
negatively, met the criterion of rationality. 
Based on the above, the Constitutional Court rejected constitutional complaints seeking 
to establish the non-constitutionality and the nullity of the contested provisions (Section 10 
and 15) of the Act on conversion into forints. 
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4. Recent Case-Law of the European Court of Justice in 
Connection with Hungarian Foreign Currency Loan Cases
The integrative civil law decisions of the Kúria as well as the rules laid down by the Hungarian 
legislature failed to put an end to legal issues arising from foreign currency lending in Hunga-
ry. In fact, since 2013, Hungarian courts initiated a number of requests for preliminary ruling 
from the EJC. In view of the decisions taken in these cases, Hungarian debtors brought new 
actions before Hungarian courts. In the meantime, the ECJ has further developed its own case 
law on loan contracts in foreign currency. In the following we will summarize the most recent 
decisions of the ECJ as well as their legal impact on Hungarian debtors and Hungarian law. 
4. 1. Judgment in Case C-51/17 (20 September 2018) 
4.1.1.  Facts of the Main Proceedings 
On 15 February 2008 the borrowers concluded a loan agreement denominated in Swiss francs 
with a Hungarian bank. Paragraph 4.7.1 of the loan contract stated that „The debtor is required 
to fulfil the payment obligations to which he is subject, denominated in the currency of the loan, 
by transfer of the exchange value in Hungarian forints to the “credit” account … opened with 
for the purposes of this loan. The debtor is required to fulfil the applicable payment obligations 
at the latest on the day the debt becomes due, in accordance with the selling rates of the currency 
concerned, published under the provisions of the internal regulations, ensuring to replenish the 
account referred to above, at the latest on the due date, up to the exchange value in Hungarian 
forints. The creditor shall convert into Hungarian forints the debtor’s payment obligations 
denominated in a foreign currency in accordance with the rates referred to in this paragraph 
on the due date and it shall debit that sum from the “credit” account in Hungarian forints […].” 
Paragraph	10	of	the	loan	contract	at	issue,	entitled	‘Declaration	of	notification	of	risk’,	was	
worded as follows:
‘In relation to the loan risks, the debtor declares that he is aware of and understands the 
detailed information relating to this matter provided to him by the creditor, and is aware of 
the risk of taking out a foreign currency loan, a risk which he alone bears. With regard to the 
foreign exchange risk, he is aware, in particular, that, if during the term of the contract there were 
variations in the exchange rate between the Hungarian forint and the Swiss franc which were 
unfavourable (that is to say, in the event of depreciation of the exchange rate of the Hungarian 
forint as opposed to the exchange rate at the time of disbursement), it might even happen that the 
exchange value of the repayment instalments, which are fixed in foreign currency and payable 
in Hungarian forints, would increase significantly. By signing this contract, the debtor confirms 
that he is aware that the economic repercussions of this risk lie entirely with him. He also declares 
that he has carefully assessed the possible effects of the foreign exchange risk and that he accepts 
them, having weighed up the risk in the light of his solvency and economic situation, and that he 
will not be able to make any claim on the bank as a consequence of the foreign exchange risk.’
On 16 May 2013 the borrowers brought an action before the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest 
Regional Court, Hungary) for annulment of the loan contract at issue on the ground, inter alia, 
that they were not able to evaluate the extent of the foreign exchange risk, since the contractual 
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term concerned had not been drafted in plain intelligible language. Furthermore, on 22 July 
2013 the bank terminated the loan contract owing to the borrowers’ failure to perform it. 
The Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Regional Court of Appeal, Budapest) upheld the borrowers claim by 
judgment of 11 March 2016. It noted, first, that the conclusion of a loan contract in a foreign 
currency was at the time more favourable and cheaper than that of a contract denominated 
in Hungarian forints. Secondly, it underlined that the bank should have been aware „having 
regard to the incipient economic crisis, that recourse to the Swiss franc as a safe-haven currency 
presented considerable risks”. The bank failed to warn the borrowers in that regard. In addition, 
the contractual term relating to the foreign exchange risk was not drafted in plain intelligible 
language. On the basis of the above, that court decided to convert the borrowers’ outstanding debt 
into Hungarian forints, as if the loan contract at issue had been denominated in that currency. 
Following an appeal, the Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Regional Court of Appeal, Budapest) decided to 
stay the proceedings and to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice. 
The Regional Court of Appeal addressed altogether five questions to the European Court. 
With respect to the third relevant issue for the purposes of the present study the European Court 
of Justice clarified that the borrower must be clearly informed of the fact that, in entering into a loan 
agreement denominated in a foreign currency, he is exposing himself to a certain foreign exchange 
risk which will, potentially, be difficult to bear in the event of a depreciation of the currency in 
which he receives his income in relation to the foreign currency in which the loan was granted. On 
the other hand, the seller or supplier, in this case the bank, must be required to set out the possible 
variations in the exchange rate and the risks inherent in taking out a loan in a foreign currency. 
With respect to the third question the European Court (ECJ) affirmed that Article 4(2) of 
Directive 93/13/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that the requirement for a contractual 
term to be drafted in plain intelligible language cannot be reduced merely to it being 
formally and grammatically intelligible to borrowers in order to make informed and well-
founded decisions. This requirement implies that a term relating to the foreign exchange risk 
must be understood by the consumer both at the formal and grammatical level and also in 
terms of its actual effects. As a result, the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect, would not only be aware of the possibility of a 
depreciation of the national currency in relation to the foreign currency in which the loan 
was denominated, but would also be able to assess the potentially significant economic 
consequences of such a term with regard to his financial obligations. 
It is against this background that the Regional Court of Appeal of Budapest as referring court will 
have to decide whether the information received from the creditor complies with the criteria laid 
down by the European Court. Should the regional court deem the information provided to debtors 
inappropriate and therefore rule on the unfairness of the relevant General Terms and Conditions 
that might entail the invalidity of the entire loan contract. A further question is which of the legal 
consequences will be applied by the Hungarian court in this case. Nonetheless, the ECJ stated that 
judging from the available data, the borrowers received among others an information sheet relating 
to the foreign exchange risk, containing examples of specific calculations of the risk in the event of a 
depreciation of the Hungarian forint in relation to the Swiss franc (see Section 77 of the Judgement). 
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4.1.2. Implications for Hungarian Law
4.1.2.1. Position of the Consultative Body of the Kúria
The Consultative Body set up by the Chairman of the Kúria to assess jurisdictional issues that 
arose in connection with lawsuits claiming the invalidity of foreign-currency loan agreements 
held a meeting on 10 October 2018. In interpreting Judgement C-51/17 of the ECJ, the Consultative 
Body came to the conclusion that it did not contain any new elements that had not been already 
developed by the European Court of Justice and that had not been taken into consideration by 
the Kúria in its law uniformity efforts. The Consultative Body stated that for the time being there 
was no need for the Kúria to issue new, general guidelines or to amend former ones.45
At its more recent meeting of 10 April 2019, the Consultative Body of the Kúria added that in 
line with the statements on the unfairness of the information provided in judgements in cases 
C-26/13, C-186/1 and C-51/17, the guidelines set out in the integrative civil law decisions of the 
Kúria continue to be valid (Paragraph 3 of Judgment 6/2013 PJE, Paragraph 1 of Judgment 2/2014 
PJE). In order to judge whether the information furnished on exchange rate risks was fair or not 
in a given case, all the available evidence needs to be considered, therefore no further general 
mandatory guidelines may be issued to the courts through law uniformity decisions in this subject. 
The Consultative Body established that failure to provide information or furnishing 
inappropriate information on the exchange rate risks that lie with the consumer („not plain, 
not intelligible”), the provision of the contract which states that the exchange rate risks are 
borne by the consumer is invalid. Since this contractual provision concerns the principal 
supply of services, its invalidity entails the invalidity of the entire contract, as a result the 
consumer cannot be obliged to bear the exchange rate risks.
If bearing the exchange rate risk can only be inferred from certain clauses of the contract or 
through the joint interpretation of several documents (e.g. GTC, business rules, advertisement), 
that does not qualify as appropriate communication of information. The fact that the information 
sheet on exchange rate risks and the contract are signed simultaneously cannot be challenged if 
the party had sufficient time at his disposal to study it prior to signing the contract. 
According to the Consultative Body the fact that the consumer did not act with due 
diligence caution, does not prevent him from claiming that the financial institution failed 
to meet its obligation to provide information or provided it in an inappropriate manner. 
In order to judge whether the consumer acted with due diligence when he did not request 
further information from the financial institution, one has to take into account the potentially 
ambiguous, vague and complicated wording of the contract for the average consumer. 
As set forth in the guidelines of the EJC, information is adequate if it is apparent from it 
that unfavourable exchange rate fluctuations to be borne by the customer are without any 
upper limit, which means that instalments may increase considerably as well as that the 
possibility of exchange rate fluctuations is a realistic scenario, which might occur during the 
term of the contract. The information should not only unambiguously clarify that exchange 
45 The memorandum of the meeting of10 October 2018 of the Consultative Body of the Kúria is available in 
Hungarian at: http://kuria.birosag.hu/sites/default/files/konz_testulet/sajtokozlemenyc-51.17_masolata_0.pdf
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rate fluctuations are to be reckoned with, but also that this implies risks which are not to be 
neglected and which might increase the repayment instalments significantly. 
Another key statement of the Consultative Body is that if the upper limit of the expected 
exchange rate increase or its highest order of magnitude can be inferred from the plain and 
intelligible written or oral information, the consumer is liable for the exchange rate risks 
only the degree defined therein.46 This is line with the judgement of the Regional Court 
of Debrecen (Debreceni Ítélőtábla) referred to previously, according to which in the event 
that the consumer may come to the conclusion from the information given at the time of 
concluding the contract that there is an upper limit to his exposure to exchange rate risks, 
any degree of risk-taking exceeding this limit is invalid (ÍH 2017. 56). 
4.1.2.2. The Requirement of Conduct to be Expected from the Consumer
It is essential to stress once again from a doctrinal and practical viewpoint that, just as in 
former judgements, in the judgement handed down in case C-51/17 and in the recital of the 
judgement, incompleteness of information provided prior to the conclusion of the contract 
is confused with the not plain and not intelligible general (and individually not negotiated) 
contractual clause of the specific general term of the contract (lack of transparency).
In accordance with Paragraph 76 of the Judgement, as stated in Recital 20 of Directive 
93/13, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to become acquainted with 
all the terms of the contract. The ECJ stresses that information, provided in sufficient 
time before concluding a contract, on the terms of the contract and the consequences of 
concluding it, is of fundamental importance for a consumer in order to decide whether he 
wishes to be bound by the terms previously drawn up by the seller or supplier. 
The statement of the European Court is incontestable. It should be added, however, that the 
consumer himself is also obliged to enquire about the contractual terms and the consequences 
of entering into the contract. In this respect he cannot exclusively rely on information received 
from the other party prior to concluding the contract. A certain level of obligation to inquire can 
be expected from the consumer too. As Lajos Vékás put it: the duty to inform only complements 
circumspect, prudent action that is required from everyone in conducting his own affairs.47
It is conceivable that he had not received adequate information from the other party prior 
to entering into the contract, but he himself took the necessary steps, obtained the relevant 
information and thereby came to understand the contractual terms and the consequences 
of signing the contract. 
In this regard we agree with the statement of the referring court in Case BDT 2013. 2889 
that in accordance with the requirement of good faith and fairness and with the duty to 
cooperate, having regard to the nature of the long-term contract, the huge amount and risk 
involved, it can be expected from the consumer to gather information prior to concluding 
the contract. He should study the sheet containing the contractual terms with reasonable 
46 The memorandum of the meeting of 10 April 2019 of the Consultative Body of the Kúria is available in 
Hungarian at: https://kuria-birosag.hu/sites/default/files/konz_testulet/emlekezteto_deviza_20190410.pdf
47 VÉKÁS: i.m. p. 88.
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care expected from the average consumer and if he notices a provision that he does not 
understand, he should ask for proper explanation.48
On the basis of the above, the findings of Recital 76 of the Judgement of the EJC that 
couples the opportunity to examine all the terms of the contract with information provided 
to the consumer before the conclusion of the contract should be supplemented. In fact, the 
consumer is also liable with respect to the opportunity to examine the contractual terms. 
It is also questionable whether the not plain and not intelligible nature of a(n individually 
not negotiated) contractual term can be established based on the incompleteness of 
information provided before the conclusion of the contract. Although the information 
provided to the consumer prior to concluding the contract might have been incomplete, 
the relevant provision in the enacted contract can still be clear and understandable. The 
Declaration of Notification of Risk in Paragraph 10 of the loan contract in question contains 
fairly concrete and detailed information on the dangers of exchange rate risks to be borne 
by the consumer. This fact is established in recital 77 of the ECJ judgement. It would be 
difficult to argue that Paragraph 10 of the loan agreement is not clear and not intelligible 
for the average consumer who is reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect, 
and therefore it is unfair. Nonetheless, it is possible that in this particular case the debtors 
had not received appropriate information on the exchange rate risk before concluding the 
contract. This is something that they have to prove before the court. 
Thus, two different legal instruments and two issues are mixed: on the one hand whether 
debtors receive adequate information on the exchange rate risk and the associated dangers prior 
to the conclusion of the contract. On the other hand, whether Paragraph 10 of the loan agreement 
and its provisions on exchange rate risks concluded with the debtors is intelligible and plain. 
This raises a further question, namely if the oral and written form of communicating 
information to the consumer are treated in the same way. Typically, communication of 
information before concluding the contract is provided orally. By contrast, the plain and 
intelligible nature of the contractual clause can only be assessed on the basis of the written 
text. Failure to provide oral information prior to concluding the contract or the incomplete, 
inadequate nature of such oral information does not entail the invalidity of the contract as its 
legal consequence. In this event the consumer may bring action for damages against the other 
party who failed to honour its duty to communicate information. The transparency (plain and 
intelligible nature) of the contractual provision, however, can only be judged from the written 
documents produced in connection with the conclusion of the contract. Therefore whether the 
nature of a contractual provision is plain and intelligible can hardly be established from the 
oral information that had been given to the consumer before concluding the contract. 
We believe that in this context the following statement of the summary prepared on the 
meeting of the Consultative Body of the Kúria of 10 April 2019 also needs clarification: „If 
the upper limit of the expected exchange rate increase or its highest order of magnitude can be 
48 The consumer as the debtor of the loan agreement with the bank may request this explanation from the 
notary, too. The majority of these contracts are acknowledged by a notarial act in order to ensure immediate 
enforcement. By virtue of Subsection a) of Section 120(1) of 1991 on civil law notaries, the notary is obliged to 
inform the concerned party about the nature and consequences of the legal transaction.
 Dr. Balázs Bodzási 83
inferred from the plain and intelligible written or oral information, the consumer is liable for 
the exchange rate risks only the degree defined therein”. In fact, the lack of communication of 
plain and intelligible information preceding the conclusion of the contract is not a ground 
for invalidity, but a circumstance for bringing action for damages in favour of the consumer. 
4. 2. Judgement in Case C-118/17 
4.2.1. Facts of the Main Proceedings 
On 24 May 2007, the debtor concluded a loan contract denominated in Swiss francs with 
a Hungarian bank. According to the terms of that contract, the loan should have been 
advanced in Hungarian forints by applying the CHF-HUF exchange rate based on the bank 
buying rate on that day. This resulted in a payment of HUF 14.734.000, the resulting amount 
of the loan in Swiss francs being CHF 115.573. The contract also provided that the loan 
repayments are to be made in Hungarian forints, the applicable exchange rate being however 
the selling rate practised by the bank. The judgment of the EJC highlighted that the exchange 
rate risk connected with fluctuations in the exchange rate of the currencies concerned was 
borne by the debtor.49
On 12 April 2016, at the request of the bank, the notary public ordered the enforcement 
of the contract.50 The debtor filed an objection to the enforcement. She claimed that the 
contract was null and void on the ground that it did not specify, in accordance with Article 
214 (1) (c) of the former Act on Credit Institutions, the difference between the exchange rate 
applicable when the funds were released and the exchange rate applicable when the loan was 
paid off, the so-called exchange rate margin. 
The Hungarian referring court decided to stay the proceedings and to request a preliminary 
ruling from the European Court of Justice. The Hungarian court addressed altogether five 
questions to the European Court. 
4.2.2. Judgment of the EJC 
In its Judgment the ECJ states that the Hungarian legislature amended the foreign currency-
based consumer loan contract by legislative means in such a way that the validity of the contracts 
was safeguarded. This is compatible with the objectives pursued by the EU legislature as set out 
in Directive 93/13 and in particular Article 6 (1) thereof. The objective consists in restoring the 
balance between the parties while in principle preserving the validity of the contract as a whole 
rather than in cancelling the entire contract. Thus, Article 6 (1) of the Directive seeks to restore 
the balance between the parties, and not to cancel the contract containing unfair terms.
49 Such provision, however, was not likely to be included in the loan agreement. The conclusion that the 
risk associated with the exchange rate was borne by the debtor can rather be drawn from the contractual 
arrangement and other provisions of the contract.
50 In accordance with Hungarian law if the contract or a unilateral declaration of commitment is acknowledged 
by a notarial act, that commitment becomes immediately enforceable without litigation proceedings. In this 
case enforcement was ordered by the notary at the request of the of the party seeking enforcement, after which 
the enforcement proceedings are carried out by the competent bailiff.
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A contract must continue in existence, in principle, without any amendment other than 
that resulting from the deletion of the unfair terms, in so far as, in accordance with the rules 
of domestic law, such continuity of the contract is legally possible. A contractual term held to 
be unfair must be regarded, in principle, as never having existed, so that it cannot have any 
effect on the consumer. Thereby it has the consequence of restoring the consumer to the legal 
and factual situation that he would have been in in the absence of that term. 
Article 7 (1) of Directive 93/13/EEC does not preclude the Member States from using 
legislation to put an end to the use of unfair terms in contracts. The legislature of the Member 
State, however, must in that context respect the requirements deriving from Article 6 (1) of 
that Directive. The fact that certain contractual terms were, by means of legislation, declared 
to be unfair and void and replaced by new terms, in order to allow the continued existence 
of the contract at issue, cannot have the result of weakening the protection guaranteed to 
consumers. 
Article 6 (1) of Directive 93/13/EEC does not preclude national legislation preventing the 
court seised of the case from granting an application for the cancellation of a loan contract 
on the basis of the unfair nature of a term. This, however, is only possible if finding that such 
a term is unfair allows the legal and factual situation that the consumer would have been in 
the absence of that unfair term to be restored. 
The EJC then examined Section 37 (1) of the Settlement Act (Act XI of 2014). Pursuant to this 
subsection: „In relation to contracts falling within the scope of this Law, the parties may apply to the 
court for a declaration of invalidity of the contract or of certain contractual terms (“partial invalidity”) 
— irrespective of the grounds for such invalidity — only if they also request determination of the legal 
consequences of invalidity, namely a declaration of validity or effectiveness of the contract up to the time 
of adoption of the decision)[…].” The referring Hungarian court contested the provision according to 
which in case of establishing the invalidity of the loan contract, as a further legal consequence the 
court should either declare the contract valid or effective up to the time of adoption of that decision. 
With regard to the examined Hungarian provision the EJC found that the examined 
Hungarian provision implies that consumers, where they invoke the unfair nature of a 
term other than that relating to the exchange difference or that permitting the unilateral 
amendment of the contract, must also request the court seised of the case to declare the 
contract to be valid until the date of its decision. The ECJ held that the provision prevents, in 
breach of Article 6 (1) of Directive 93/13, consumers from being exempted from the unfair 
term concerned, where appropriate, by means of the cancellation of the contract at issue 
in its entirety if that contract cannot continue in existence without that term. In fact, it is 
apparent from the findings made by the referring court that the continuation of the contract 
would be contrary to the interests of the consumer. 
Based on the above, the ECJ replied to the first three questions raised by the Hungarian 
referring court as follows: 
a) Article 6 (1) of Directive 93/13/EEC does not preclude national legislation which 
prevents the court seised of the case from granting an application for the cancellation 
of a loan contract on the basis of the unfair nature of a term provided that a finding that 
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terms in such an agreement were unfair would restore the legal and factual situation 
that the consumer would have been in, had that unfair term not existed, 
b) Article 6 (1) precludes national legislation which prevents, in circumstances such as 
those at issue in the main proceedings, the court seised of the case from granting an 
application for the cancellation of a provision of the loan contract relating to exchange 
rate risks on the basis of its unfair nature (where the referring court finds that the term 
is unfair and that the contract cannot continue to exist without the term). 
4.2.3. Implications for Hungarian Law 
The judgment handed down in Case C-118/17 was based on an essential doctrinal 
misunderstanding with regard to Hungarian law. In accordance with Recital 53 of the 
judgment, that the declaration by the referring court of the validity of the contract until 
the decision prevents the consumer from enjoying exemption from the unfair contractual 
clause, if necessary, through the cancellation of the entire contract. 
In Hungarian civil law until 15 March 2014 the legal consequences of the invalidity of 
contracts are set out in Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 237 of the Civil Code of 1959.51 
Pursuant to Subsection (1): „With regard to invalid contracts, the state of affairs having 
existed prior to the conclusion of the contract shall be restored.” And Subsection (2) sets out 
that: „If the state of affairs having existed prior to the conclusion of the contract cannot be 
restored, the court shall declare the contract valid for the period up to the date of judgment. 
An invalid contract may be declared valid if the cause of invalidity can be abolished, in 
particular by eliminating the disproportionate advantage in the case of a usurious contract 
or the unreasonable disproportion between the services of the parties. In such cases, it shall be 
necessary to provide for the return of any services that might remain without consideration.” 
In accordance with the Civil Code of 1959 therefore the court may apply the following 
legal consequences in case of establishing invalidity: 
- restoring the original state of affairs (in integrum restitutio); 
- declaring the contract to be valid; 
- declaring the contract to be in force. 
Hungarian judicial practice primarily seeks to save the contract that is to declare it to be 
valid. The declaration of an invalid contract to be valid is one of the typical cases of judicial 
contract amendment during which the court amends the original content of the contract. 
The contract continues to remain in force with the content amended by the court.  
If however the declaration of the validity of the contract cannot take place for any reason, 
the court attempts to restore the original condition preceding the conclusion of the contract. 
In case this is impossible (e.g. contracts on so-called irreversible services), the court creates 
a special settlement relationship between the parties. This is the declaration of the invalid 
51 On 15 March 2014 Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code entered in force. In the main proceedings before the ECJ, 
however, the Civil Code of 1959 is applicable. It is worth noting that the new Civil Code ceased to include 
declaration of the contract to be in force until the decision in the legal consequences of invalidity. Instead, 
Section 6:113 of the Civil Code is on payment for monetary value for unjust enrichment.
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contract to be in force provided by the Civil Code of 1959. In this event provision should be 
made of the return of the service without remuneration or the refunding of performed services. 
The objective of declaring the contract valid in the case of contracts of pecuniary interest is 
to make sure that compensation for the performed services is granted. The compensation is 
not necessarily equivalent to the compensation defined by the parties in the invalid contract. 
Moreover, if the legal relationship had already ceased between the parties, the contract does 
not need to be declared effective until the date when the decision is made. The limitation 
period, however, should be taken into account when declaring the contract effective.52
Under Hungarian civil law doctrine it was difficult to declare an invalid contract effective 
as the issue of effectivity could only arise in the case of valid contracts. Invalid contracts 
cannot be nor effective neither ineffective. In exceptional cases and in limited circumstances, 
the issue of the capability to produce legal effects may also arise with regard to ineffective 
transactions. This is because the establishment of invalidity occurs only years after the 
conclusion of the transaction, hence a transaction declared ineffective retrospectively 
may be capable to produce legal effects for a while. Nevertheless, the capability of invalid 
transaction to produce legal effects should be regarded as an exceptional legal phenomenon, 
which should be delimited from the effectiveness of valid transactions. 
The Civil Code of 1959 was forced to recognize the capability of invalid contracts to 
produce legal effects among the legal consequences of invalidity. Civil law had to match 
realities. A contract could be declared valid exceptionally in the interest of equity, in order 
to ensure the principle of value for money of the services provided.53
Consequently, the related statement in the Judgement of the ECJ cannot be interpreted with 
respect to Hungarian law. In accordance with the judgement of the ECJ, EU law precludes national 
legislation which prevents, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the 
court seised of the case from granting an application for the cancellation of a provision of the loan 
contract (relating to exchange rate risks) where the referring court finds that the term is unfair. 
The ECJ deemed that the instrument of Hungarian civil law allowing validity to be declared 
prevents the consumer from not being bound by the unfair contractual term. 
As shown above, however, in case an invalid contract is declared effective, the court grants 
an application for the cancellation of the loan contract. In cases of declaring effectiveness, the 
court first establishes the (full or partial) invalidity of the contract. It can then decide on the 
declaration of effectiveness, provided that this had been requested by the concerned party. 
If in contrast the party had not requested the application of the further legal consequences 
of invalidity, the court only establishes the invalidity of the contract. In this event separate 
proceedings have to be launched to establish further legal consequences. 
The statement of the ECJ according to which the declaration of invalidity prevents the 
consumer from being not bound by the relevant unfair contractual term is also incorrect. 
Whatever the circumstances, the consumer is exempted from the unfair contractual term 
owing to the fact that invalid legal representations do not bind the parties. It is a different 
52 SÁNDOR, István: A szerződés tartalma és tárgya. In: OSZTOVITS András (szerk.): A Polgári Törvénykönyv-
ről szóló 1959. évi IV. törvény magyarázata. I. kötet, Opten Kft., Budapest, 2011. pp. 696-697.
53 SÁNDOR: i.m. p. 697.
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matter that performance, movement of assets could also occur on the basis of the invalid 
transaction. A loan contract is typically such a situation, as the creditor has disbursed the loan 
amount, and the debtor has started to pay the instalments. The resulting imbalance should be 
addressed in one way or another even if the court has established the invalidity of the contract. 
This however does not mean that the consumer is bound by the invalid contract, even less that 
the court could not declare the invalidity of the contract containing the unfair clause. 
The statements of the ECJ therefore cannot be interpreted when applied to Hungarian law, 
since these rules are unknown to Hungarian civil law. Moreover, the judgement of the ECJ 
does not make mention of the provision that applies to loan contracts at issue in the main 
proceedings under Hungarian law. This rule is laid down by Section 37 (1) of the Settlement 
Act. Thus, in relation to loan contracts falling within the scope of the Settlement Act, if the 
court declares the full or partial invalidity of the contract, only two legal consequences may be 
applied: the court either declares the contract to be valid or declares it to be effective up to the 
time of the adoption of the decision. This provision actually confirms that in case invalidity is 
declared with regard to these loan contracts, the original condition cannot be restored.
The above follows from the legal nature of services covered by loan contracts. In fact, loan contracts 
contain an irreversible service as well: the debtor uses the creditor’s money during the term of the loan, 
and such use cannot be undone even if invalidity has been declared. As a result, if the invalidity of 
the loan contract is declared, the original situation that existed prior to the conclusion of the contract 
cannot be restored. In the case of loan agreements, the concept of in integrum restitutio is excluded. 
This is underlined by the fact that once the loan amount has been disbursed, the parties cannot 
withdraw from the contract. They may only terminate it for the future unilaterally by termination.
For that matter, Section 37 (1) of the Settlement Act was examined by the ECJ in another 
judgement and found it to be in compliance with EU law. In its judgement in Case C-483/16 
of 31 May 2018 the ECJ stated: Article 7 of Directive 93/13 should be understood not to 
preclude national legislation which lays down specific procedural requirement (such as those 
at issue in the main proceedings), for actions brought by consumers who concluded loan 
agreements denominated in foreign currency, containing a term concerning the difference 
in exchange rates and/or a term concerning the power of the creditor to make unilateral 
amendments on the increase of interests, charges and costs (provided that a finding that 
terms in such an agreement were unfair would restore the legal and factual situation that the 
consumer would have been in had those unfair terms not existed). 
5. Summary
5. 1. Evaluation of Foreign Currency-based Loan Agreements as a 
Contractual Arrangement
In our view the most essential issue relating to the arrangement of foreign currency-based 
consumer loan contracts was that the parties transferred nearly all risks associated with the 
transaction to the weaker party, the consumer. Paragraph 10 of the consumer loan contract 
assessed in Case C-51/17 provided that: „the debtor….is aware of the risk of taking out a 
foreign currency loan, a risk which he alone bears.” 
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It is obvious that all transactions imply risks. The parties seek to mitigate their own risks 
and to transfer them to the other party. Civil law must react to this situation and in doing 
so, must take into account that the legislature itself seeks to distribute risks in a balanced 
way (as apparent in dispositive legal norms). Transferring risks associated with transactions 
therefore is one of the most crucial and most debated matter of civil law. 
The fact that a contractual arrangement which transferred nearly all the risks arising 
from the transaction to one of the parties, the consumer, could develop and was applied 
extensively can be attributed to weaknesses of the Hungarian legal environment and 
legislation. Exchange rate risk stands out of all such risks. In this respect one of the views 
expressed in legal literature was that banks in fact did not transfer the exchange rate risk to 
the customers, as that risk by definition is always to be borne by the debtor.54
Our position is that in this case the principle of reasonable conduct, an important principle 
of Hungarian civil law should also have been considered. In accordance with Section 1:4 (1) of 
the Civil Code, unless otherwise provided by this act, in civil law any reference to what can be 
expected of or by a person, or in a particular situation, is a reference to what can reasonably 
be expected. The question is what could have been reasonably expected from the consumer 
with regard to the exchange rate risk. Would he have been expected to reckon with a currency 
depreciation of roughly 20-30% on the basis of the exchange rate fluctuations of the previous 
ten years? Would he have been expected to foresee previously unprecedented degrees of 
depreciation of the forint against the Swiss franc? If financial institutions and experts did not 
reckon with such a degree of depreciation, how could the consumer have predicted it? These 
questions will be answered by the courts in the pending proceedings the subject matter of 
which among others is the transfer of the entire exchange rate risk to the consumer. 
An additional problem is that neither judicial practice nor legal theory has come to terms 
to date with the legal consequence of the full or partial invalidity of foreign currency-based 
loans. Although the matter was examined carefully and thoroughly by a group tasked with 
analysing legal practice that was set up by the Kúriai 2015, no convincing majority opinion 
has emerged.55
It is to be seen whether in the case of the invalidity of the foreign currency-based loan 
contract the condition prior to the conclusion of the contract can be restored (in integrum 
restitutio). A view expressed in legal literature denies this and rather considers the declaration 
of effectiveness pursuant to the Civil Code of 1959 as a viable option.56 We agree with this 
position, but the exact meaning of declaring the contract effective as well as the settlement 
to be applied between the parties in such cases requires further clarification. 
Uncertainty persists on the part of those who apply the law despite the fact that the legislature 
took an unequivocal position in Section 37 (1) of Act DH2 as to the potential legal consequences 
of the invalidity of consumer loan contracts. In this respect the Act only identifies the declaration 
54 GÁRDOS, István – NAGY, András: A devizahitel jogi alapkérdései. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 5/2013. p. 376.
55 See the summary report on the applicability of the legal consequences of invalidity to loan contracts. Accesible 
in Hungarian online at: www.lb.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglalo_velemeny_i.pdf
56 GÁRDOS, Péter: A kölcsönszerződés érvénytelenségének jogkövetkezménye. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 11/2014. 
pp. 509–510.
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of the contract to be valid and the declaration of its effectiveness up to the time of the adoption of 
the decision. The legislature deems that based on this in the case of the full or partial invalidity 
of the consumer loan contract, the original condition cannot be restored. The correctness of this 
legislative position, however, continues to be challenged by those applying the law. 
5. 2. Conclusions
The spread of foreign currency lending and the shift of balance that occurred in these 
contracts in the wake of the 2008 crisis produced the most burning social issue in Hungary 
since the political changeover. Since it already threatened economic growth, the legislature 
had to address it. The acts passed in 2014 were devised to free Hungarian society from the 
difficulties caused by foreign currency loans definitively.
By now however it has become clear that for certain social groups neither settlement 
nor conversion into forints represented actual help. As a matter of fact, these debtors 
accumulated outstanding debts that well exceeded the value of the residential real estate 
offered as security; moreover they had experienced considerable delays in making payments 
even before the adoption of these acts. In their case the State had to come up with different 
solutions, among the measures of social policy. From a national economy perspective, a 
substantially simplified personal bankruptcy procedure would also be essential.57
It is to be hoped that both the Hungarian financial sector and those applying the law 
will draw the conclusions that would help to prevent similar situations in the future. This, 
however, requires the dissemination of financial literacy in the country, responsible lending 
as well as well-based decisions on borrowing on the part of the debtors. 
The above is necessary since the key issue is not whether a crisis similar to that of 2008 can occur 
again. It is rather when it will occur. A recently published study on the specificities of Hungarian 
financial cycles stated clearly: the financial sector regularly experiences periods of expansion, which 
are accompanied by rising leverage, increasing risk-taking behaviour and looser lending standards. 
Periods of expansion are followed by contractions that can occur in the form of financial crises 
when financial institutions rapidly de-leverage, which results in a collapse of the credit supply.58
It would therefore be important for both Hungarian society and legislation to be better 
prepared for the next recession and handle its consequences more efficiently. Each economic 
downturn undoubtedly entails painful consequences and these cannot be addressed with 
legal instruments alone. The legal environment and legal practice have a role to play in 
mitigating the effects of a next crisis. To mention just one example: competent bodies should 
be less hesitant in exploiting the potential of launching actions in the public interest.  
As far as the level of consumer protection in the financial sector is concerned, legislation 
in force in Hungary does not really differ from Western European standards owing to 
the adoption of new laws in 2014 as well as to the amendment of the Fair Banking Act. 
The potential therein however should be exploited not only be consumers, but also state 
authorities charged with the protection of consumer interests. 
57 In Hungarian law Act CV of 2014 on the debt settlement of natural persons introduced reorganisation 
(personal bankruptcy) for private individuals facing payment difficulties.
58 ROTS, Eyno: Üzleti, lakáspiaci és hitelciklusok – Magyarország esete. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 4/2018. p. 6.
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In this study we provide a historical overview about the process of domestic households’ 
indebtedness observed in the 2000s, which meant the spread of foreign currency denominated 
loans from 2004. The first credit cycle following the democratic transformation commenced around 
the turn of the millennium, and the credit volume of households grew nine-fold in eight years in 
proportion to GDP. We demonstrate that the spread of this credit type was equally supported by 
demand and supply side factors: on one hand, the interest rate difference, the termination of inte-
rest rate subsidies and the previously relatively stable CHF/HUF exchange rate; on the other hand, 
the shifting of bank competition from the corporate credit market to the retail segment, as well 
as the access of financial intermediaries to foreign currency funding. The role of the institutional 
environment is also essential in order to understand the process since the consumer protection 
regulation had not represented an obstacle to the mediation of the products that later became 
toxic. This phenomenon, along with a monetary policy reacting to the high inflation environment, 
balance of payment deficit due to low savings and loose fiscal policy, as well as high external debt 
put the economy in a vulnerable situation by the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008.
1. Introduction
From the establishment of a two-tier banking system in Hungary, the financial system did 
not have one single peaceful decade. During the 1990s, the transition from the structural 
heritage of socialism and the single-tier banking system caused tension, which eventually 
led to the consolidation of the sector. At the beginning of the 2000s, an already more stable 
financial system characterized the economy, which took an active role primarily in lending 
for the corporate sector, while lending for households was still marginal at the time.
The 2000s were all about the indebtedness of the household segment. In the first years 
of the decade, the generous support of the government fuelled household and especially 
housing lending. First foreign currency denominated (FX) loans appeared with the blow-
out of the subsidies, which quickly spread, and dominated the entire credit stock of the 
household sector by 2008. This progress is interesting as no obvious responsibility can be 
identified: households, banks, and even the regulators could argue that participation in 
FX-lending seemed rational. Subsequently, it is clearly apparent that the emerging situation 
posed serious financial stability risks, however, the dominating narratives before the crisis 
had a much more supportive approach to the processes of the time.2
The consequences are well known: with the spread of FX-loans, financial vulnerability 
increased rapidly, therefore the financial crisis that had become more entrenched in 2008 found 
the macro-economy in an unstable state. This vulnerability led to extreme pressure to adapt: the 
economic stakeholders (households, corporations, credit institutions and even the Government) 
were obligated to deleverage, which accompanied the contraction of the real economy. 
2 Hungary is not a unique case in this respect. Most financial crises are preceded by euphoria (KINDLEBERGER 
– ALIBER, 2005), in which typically the economic stakeholders optimistically rate the processes and reject 
the parallelism that can be detected in the case of earlier crises – “this time is different”, as the title of the book 
by REINHART and ROGOFF (2011) aptly remarks.
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Although the imbalances that formed before the crisis had an impact on numerous 
industries and sectors of the economy, we argue that household lending was the process 
that led to the most serious consequences. Beyond the direct financial effects, the social 
consequences were also serious, and despite multiple interventions by the Government, 
there were still over 100 thousand defaulted debtors in 2018.3
The aim of this study is to collect and synthetically present the causes already explicated in other texts. 
Such a summary is useful for two reasons. On one hand, most studies on FX-lending only concentrate 
on a particular segment of the inducing causes, so a synthesis and contextual analysis of these causes 
might be helpful. On the other hand, if more studies demonstrate the serious consequences of FX-
lending, it may serve to remind future financial experts that indebtedness in a foreign currency is a 
“sin”4 the consequences of which may be damaging for an economy for many years after.
2. What happened?
The indebtedness of households in Hungary started 10 years after the political transition.5 In 2000, 
the credit-to-GDP of the sector was only 4 per cent, and in fact all disbursed loans were denominated 
in HUF and borrowed from credit institutions. Only about one quarter of these were mortgages taken 
out for housing purposes. However, not much later, in the mid-2000s a rapid growth of outstanding 
loans was observed, and there were substantial changes in the denomination structure (Fig. 1).
It can be noted about the credit stock that while it was some HUF 500 billion at the turn of 
the millennium, it increased by nearly HUF 1 thousand billion annually between 2003 and the 
outbreak of the crisis. Growth was faster in consumer loans than in the case of housing loans. 
During this period, consumer loans were mostly secured – this was the golden era of home 
equity loans. Due to the above, the credit volume of households increased to HUF 9.5 thousand 
billion, up to 35 per cent of GDP. In the meantime, the relative importance of various financial 
intermediaries also changed: while about 9 per cent of the credit volume could be linked to 
financial corporations in the early 2000s, this ratio was over 20 per cent from 2003 onwards.
Figure 1: Credit stock of the household sector by loan product and denomination
Source: MNB (Central Bank of Hungary)
3 MNB 2018a.
4 EICHENGREEN et al. (2007) go so far as to call indebtedness in foreign currency “original sin”.
5 Regarding the circumstances, see Chapter 3.
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It must be noted when examining the growth of housing loans that traditionally a large 
proportion of the Hungarian population – 85 per cent to 90 per cent – are homeowners (Fig. 
2). This attitude is similar in other post-socialist countries.6 Based on a survey by Eurostat, 
one-tenth of the population lived in a home for which they were repaying a mortgage in 2005 
– this ratio was 18 per cent in 2008 and peaked at 24 per cent by 2010. The increase in cre-
dit penetration is confirmed by other micro-level surveys: based on the questionnaire-based 
survey research of the Tárki Household Monitor the share of households with mortgages 
increased from 9 per cent in 2003 to 15 per cent by 2017.7 According to their surveys 
conducted every two years, in 2001 nearly one-fifth of households had some kind of bank 
loan product, and by 2009, 35 per cent already had this type of debt. 
Figure 2: Distribution of domestic households by tenure status
Source: Eurostat 
From 2004 on, an increasing proportion of FX-denominated products appeared among 
the borrowed loans. Before that, their role was marginal, and mainly represented financing 
in EUR. However, from 2004, initially EUR loans, then CHF loans took over the leading role 
in the disbursements (Fig. 3). While in 2003 FX-loans represented a monthly 0.2 to 0.7 per 
cent of new housing loans, this increased sharply from 2004 and was 34 per cent in 2004, 63 
per cent in 2005, 75 per cent in 2006 and 85 per cent in 2007. Consumer loans started from 
a higher level, but during certain months in 2007 80 per cent of new disbursements were 
already denominated in FX.
6 KOLOSI and FÁBIÁN, 2016.
7 MEDGYESI, 2016.
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Figure 3: Monthly volume of new loans in the household sector
Source: MNB 
As the first credit cycle progressed, clients who represented an increasingly higher cre-
dit risk were given loans from financial institutions. The growing risks can be detected in 
the development of the loan-to-value ratios of debtors, the extended maturities and the 
increasing contract sizes, and it is also confirmed by the narration of banks (see the MNB’s 
Lending survey).
So directly before the crisis, the debtors’ riskier status was accompanied by the spread of 
loan products comprising (interest rate and) exchange rate risk. 
CHF-denominated household loans first appeared in the product range of foreign-owned 
banks, however, due to their popularity domestic-owned banks also soon – with a delay of 
about six months – took over this “innovation” to keep and increase their market share (Fig. 
4). An increasing number of banks joined the disbursement until the outbreak of the crisis: 
while in early 2005 three quarters of FX housing loans were linked to four large banks, this 
concentration ratio started to decline in 2006. By the end of 2007, 10 banks had a market 
share over 1 per cent, and the share of the four largest institutions dropped to two-thirds. 
Since many institutions were involved in the spread of FX loan products, the volume of non-
performing loans that quickly climbed to a high level with the outbreak of the crisis forced 
almost all the participants in the banking system to book major losses.
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Figure 4: Monthly fluctuation of household CHF credit volume of domestic banks and foreign branches
Source: MNB
3. Why did it happen?
For FX-denominated lending to spread among households, three participants need to 
show willingness. On one hand, it is important that households prioritize FX-denominated 
products against loans denominated in the domestic currency. On the other hand, it is 
essential that the credit institutions are available in the given foreign currency, for which 
primarily their easy access to these resources is required. Finally, it is also a necessary 
condition that the regulatory institutions do not introduce measures which would prevent 
the spread of FX-lending. Overall, demand, supply and the institutional conditions of the 
establishment of FX-lending are distinguishable.
3.1. Demand conditions: the micro-level motivations of households8
The studies investigating the establishment of FX-lending based on aggregated data regularly 
examine the impact of a few macro-economic variables in the share of FX-loans. Among these 
macro-economic variables, one can most often find the difference in interest rates on domestic 
and foreign funds and the level and volatility of inflation and the real exchange rate.9
However, the findings produced by varied research are ambiguous. Basso et al. (2011) found 
that the relative volatility of inflation and the real exchange rate play a role, whereas Neanidis 
and Savva (2009), and Neanidis (2010) found these variables insignificant. The results in respect 
to the interest rate differentials are also diverse: Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008), Csajbók et al. 
(2010), and Neanidis (2010) identify this impact, while according to Basso et al. (2011), and 
8 In the presentation of the international literature we greatly rely on a study by BECKMANN and STIX (2015).
9 BECKMANN – STIX, 2015.
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Luca and Petrova (2008) their extent is marginal. In addition to the above, the share of foreign 
banks10 and the “dollarization” on the deposit side11 may also induce the spread of FX-loans.
Instead of examining the impact of macro-economic variables on each other, other studies 
use questionnaire-based surveys. The advantage of this research method is that it is easier to 
separate the impacts of supply and demand, as macro-economic variables may effect both. 
In their research focusing on Central-Europe, Firdmuc et al. (2013) found that it contributes 
to the spread of FX-lending if households have little trust in the stability of the domestic 
currency and financial institutions, and progress is further strengthened if they are 
anticipating the introduction of the euro in the foreseeable future. By examining Austrian 
households, Beer et al. (2010) found that the households borrowing FX-loans are usually less 
risk-avoiding, with such people being older, wealthier, and with a greater degree of financial 
awareness than on average. By examining Hungarian households however, Pellényi and Bilek 
(2009) observed that those borrowing FX-loans do not have deeper financial knowledge, are 
not well off, and do not prefer risks more than those borrowing HUF loans. 
By taking a closer look at the Hungarian situation, the interest rate disadvantage of the fo-
rint was obvious compared to foreign currencies, especially in respect to the Swiss interbank 
interest rate. In 2005, the average level of interbank HUF interest rates exceeded 7 per cent, 
while the average of the 3-month CHF LIBOR did not even reach 1 per cent during the 
same period (Fig. 5). The interest rate differential was about 630 basis points on average 
that year, which was only moderated to 550 and 520 basis points in the following two years. 
Consequently, while at the beginning of the decade the typical 6 per cent HUF interest rates 
of the period of generous government subsidies were competitive against FX interest rates, 
FX-loans might have seemed more attractive to households after the termination of these 
subsidies. 
Figure 5: The development of the 3-month interbank yields of HUF, EUR and CHF 
Source: European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank, MNB
10 BASSO et al., 2011.
11 LUCA – PETROVA, 2008.
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The importance of the interest rate differential can be easily understand if we look at the 
average parameters of loans denominated in various currencies (Table 1). At the end of 2005, 
the price of an average 65-square metre dwelling was HUF 11 million, which meant a nearly 
HUF 7.8 million contract size with a 70 per cent loan-to-value ratio (LTV). If this amount of cre-
dit was borrowed in HUF, it was accompanied by a HUF 87 thousand monthly instalment rate 
with the average interest rate levels of that time (assuming a 15-year maturity), which used up 
nearly half of the income of a household with two average wages. In contrast, by borrowing a loan 
denominated in CHF the amount of the monthly instalment rate was HUF 65 thousand, which 
was only about 36 per cent of the household’s income. From another perspective: those who were 
indebted in HUF were able to take a substantially smaller credit amount with a safer, 30 per cent 
payment-to-income ratio than those in a foreign currency. This means that liquidity-constrained 
households (with less savings) were more likely to choose FX-loans to satisfy their credit demand.
Table 1: Characteristics of a housing loan disbursed in December 2005 in different denominations
 
Note: Calculations are based on the average price of a 65 square metre dwelling at the end of 2005 with 
70 per cent LTV-ratio and a 15-year maturity. We assumed a household with two average wages for the 
calculation of the payment-to-income ratio, where both wages correspond to the national net average.
Source: Own calculations, based on MNB
Of course, the interest rate differential benefiting the FX-loans does not guarantee by itself 
that the total financing costs of these loans will be actually lower12 during the entire maturity 
than that of HUF loans. Namely, the depreciation of the forint can easily cut back on the 
benefit that the borrower takes with the lower interest rate.13 With this in mind, a well-prepared 
borrower not only needs to examine the interest rates, but also the exchange rate fluctuations.
However, the HUF/CHF exchange rate was reasonably stable during the years of FX-lending 
(Fig. 6). The exchange rate was in the range of HUF/CHF 141 to 180 between August 2005 and 
August 2008. Overall, the fluctuation between the strongest and weakest exchange rate seemed 
affordable in respect to debt service: during 2005, the difference between the strongest and 
weakest status was barely 7 per cent, in 2006 it was 15 per cent, in 2007 it was 9 per cent, and in 
2008 it was already 20 per cent. So, even if households considered the exchange rate fluctuations 
of the last few years when deciding on the currency of the credit to take, they might have come 
to the conclusion that even in the event of a relatively substantial exchange rate depreciation they 
would pay a lower instalment than if they took the credit in HUF. The expectations regarding 
12 Here, total financing costs do not denote the legal term of the annual percentage rate of charge (APR), since 
this rate inter alia contains neither the “expenses” of the exchange rate fluctuation, nor that of the change in 
interest rates. See BERLINGER, 2017.
13 KIRÁLY – SIMONOVITS, 2015.
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a stable exchange rate were also reinforced by the EU accession, which might have encouraged 
households to anticipate the introduction of the euro. This would have eliminated the exchange 
rate fluctuation against the euro within a reasonable time from the borrowing of the credit.
Figure 6: Development of the HUF/CHF exchange rate
Source: MNB 
The indebtedness of the households had already commenced before the spread of FX-lending 
at the beginning of the 2000s, mostly due to generous government subsidies. Two new subsidies 
were introduced in 2000, the complementary interest rate subsidy and the mortgage interest rate 
subsidy, which became the most significant form of subsidy within a few years, thanks to their 
low costs (Table 2). The interest rate subsidies enabled the average interest rate level of mortgages 
to fall well under the market interest rate level, therefore borrowing became possible for a wide 
range of society. Following the introduction, several further easing measures were introduced 
related to the rules of utilization, and in addition the amount of the subsidy was raised, until the 
Government was forced to reduce its volume in 2002 due to the budget effect. The magnitude 
of the programme can be well presented by the fact that, at its peak, the subsidy for a HUF 10 
million mortgage could reach up to HUF 7.47 million at the present value (Table 3).14
Table 2: Estimated volume of housing subsidy expenditures (HUF billion)
Source: Hegedűs et al. (2006)
14 HORVÁTH, 2008.
 Bálint Dancsik, Gergely Fábián, Zita Fellner 101
Table 3: Discount from the subsidies and its value compared to the house price 
Source: Horváth (2008), page 83
3.2. Motivations on the supply side
After the establishment of the two-tier banking system, banks were primarily engaged in 
lending for the corporate sector. This was partly evident since in many cases both borrower 
companies and lender banks were under foreign ownership, and potentially a business 
relationship between the parent companies already existed. In contrast, on the household 
credit market there was considerably less information about the debtors, therefore the 
informational asymmetry between the banks and the households was more substantial. 
This was also noticeable in the structure of the credit market’s deepening: while in 2000 
corporate credit-to-GDP reached nearly 25 per cent, the size of household credit market was 
under 5 per cent of GDP (Fig. 7).
At the same time, a deeper corporate credit market also meant that this market was a 
lot more saturated by the beginning of the 2000s, accordingly it was also characterised 
by fiercer competition, so the available interest rate spreads were also significantly lower. 
This saturation steered the banks towards the household segment, for which the increasing 
government subsidies in the beginning of the 2000s provided proper timing. The government 
subsidies increased the share of households which could appear as solvent demand on the 
credit market. Consequently, the deepening of the household lending market commenced as 
well: until 2005, the outstanding loans nearly tripled in proportion to GDP.
102 The conditions for the emergence of foreign currency lending
Figure 7: Household and corporate credit-to-GDP
Source: MNB 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, after the reduction of government subsidies only 
FX interest rates were able to guarantee that price level by which the solvent demand on the 
household credit market kept growing. CHF-loans provided materially high interest rate 
spreads for banks, therefore they could earn substantially higher levels of profit on these loans 
than on corporate lending (Fig. 8). If in addition to the funding costs, we also consider other 
expenses in the calculation of the profit surcharge (based on the estimated results of the Lerner 
indices), it can be observed that household lending provided a higher margin for the banks.15
Figure 8: Interest rate spread in housing and corporate loans over the 3-month interbank rate
Note: CHF loans in the corporate segment and EUR loans in the household segment were insignificant. 
Source: MNB 
15 HOSSZÚ – DANCSIK, 2018.
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In parallel with the growing disbursements of FX-loans, however, this market also became 
more saturated. This meant that in order to increase their market share, certain banks were 
obligated to ease lending standards and reduce prices. The latter development also appeared 
in the decreasing Lerner-index between 2005 and 2007. On one hand, the semi-annual MNB 
Lending survey proves the easing of credit conditions: for several semesters from 2005 more 
than one-third of the banks eased housing lending standards (Figure 9: 9). The same is proved 
by the distribution of disbursed housing loans by loan-to-value ratio: in 2008, nearly 70 per 
cent of the disbursed loans had an LTV ratio over 70 per cent (Fig.10).16 The role of credit agents 
also boomed during this period, which also contributed to the increasing volume of FX-loans 
and on average meant lending to clients with a significantly lower credit rating. Overall, it can 
be stated that risk competition was established between banks during this period.17
Figure 9: Changes in credit conditions in the housing loan segment 
Note: The difference between tightening and easing banks (compared to the previous quarter) weighted 
by market share. 
Source: MNB, based on banks' responses. 
16 No data is available on the distribution of payment-to-income ratio, but based on surveys we can estimate 
the average level of PTI ratio at between 30 per cent and 40 per cent (BALÁS et al., 2015). As a comparison: in 
2017, the majority of the HUF loans – without exchange rate risk – were disbursed with a 20 per cent to 30 per 
cent PTI ratio.
17 KIRÁLY – NAGY, 2008. This was also confirmed by bank experts making statements about FX-lending. In 
addition to the risk competition, they also pointed out the bandwagon effect as the distortions of the volume-
based incentives system (see HVG, 2011).
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Figure 10: Distribution of new housing loans by LTV 
Source: MNB 
To disburse FX-loans banks needed foreign currency on the liability side too – in order to close 
their open position. They typically created that in two ways: by raising foreign currency funds 
directly, in many cases from the parent banks with short duration, on the balance sheet (Fig.11, Fig. 
12), or by creating it synthetically, often off a balance sheet with short-term FX-swaps (Figure 14:). 
The loan-to-deposit ratio of the sector was also reflected in the financing structure, the value of 
which was well over 100, indicating (Figure 13:) that the financing of the credit expansion was not 
carried out by involving relatively stable deposits but by more volatile resources. By increasing 
foreign currency funds banks were able to facilitate the sector not having an exchange rate risk 
in the balance sheet, therefore the HUF/CHF exchange rate fluctuations’ direct impact on profits 
was marginal. However, in parallel with the spread of FX-lending, the sector was increasingly 
relying on renewing foreign, short-term FX-funds,  18the prerequisite of which was to have a 
permanent global abundance of liquidity, and to avoid tensions in the given financial markets. 
Figure 11: The volume of external liabilities  Figure 12: External liabilities to total assets in an
     and their proportion to total assets in  international comparison
            the Hungarian banking sector
           
          Source: MNB             Source: ECB  
18 KOVÁCS, 2009.
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Figure 13: Loan-to-deposit ratio in   Figure 14: The volume of foreign currency swaps and 
in the Hungarian banking sector  their proportion to total assets the Hungarian 
       banking system
        
         Source: MNB      Source: MNB 
During the mid-2000s however, there was no sign of these tensions. This period was the 
period of global liquidity abundance, during which one could access funds remarkably easily – 
in many cases through the mediation of foreign parent banks. The low CDS spreads (typically 
under 50 basis points) and the low spreads were indicating tension-free access to the funds. 
Therefore, domestic banks could easily obtain foreign currency funds required for FX-lending.
4. Institutional frictions
Following the supply and demand factors of FX-lending it is also important to discuss its 
institutional environment. Among these, in relation to exchange rate policy prominent 
significance is assigned to the central bank and its objective, as well as the strategy set out 
to reach the objective, and, in connection with that, the relation of the central bank to the 
level and volatility of the exchange rate. Consumer protection rules also have an important 
role, which might limit and steer the lending activity of banks to an appropriate channel. 
In respect to FX-lending, available alternatives also have an important role, e.g. whether it 
is possible to take out a loan with long-term interest rate fixation in domestic currency. The 
latter cannot be decoupled from the funds available to the banks: loans with long-term inte-
rest rate fixation can be sustainable for the financial system if their interest rate risk can be 
managed with proper financing (e.g. mortgage bond issuance or securitization).
4.1. The role of monetary policy
Since the summer of 2001, the central bank has pursued its monetary policy in an inflation 
targeting system. This means that during the operation the objective is to achieve the 
pre-announced inflation target, then to maintain the inflation at this level. Within this 
framework, the primary objective is to achieve the inflation target, and all other endeavours 
(such as the aspects of financial stability or the support of the Government’s economic 
policy) can only be considered afterwards. The central bank has several instruments to affect 
inflation, out of which the most important is the modification of its base rate.
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In the case of an open economy such as that of Hungary, the development of the exchange 
rate plays an important role in the evolution of inflation. The depreciation of the HUF 
exchange rate makes imported goods more expensive, while its appreciation, in contrast, 
makes them cheaper, having a lowering effect on inflation. Therefore, a monetary policy step 
(for example, the increase of the base rate) partly unfolds its effect through the exchange 
rate channel.19 The expectations also have an important role: if economic decision-makers 
anticipate an increase in inflation, they might make decisions which can justify these 
expectations as self-fulfilling prophecies. Therefore, in reaching the inflation target the 
management of expectations plays a prominent role.
At the beginning of the 2000s, inflation was at a rather high level – and over the inflation 
target in several periods – in Hungary (Figure 15:). Inflation, of course, was not independent 
from the overspending fiscal policy that characterised this period. It can be stated in general that 
when the fiscal policy is conducting over-spending, it makes the disinflational endeavours of the 
central bank more difficult as the constant overshooting of the inflation target might damage 
the operations of the expectations channel and the credibility of the central bank. All the above 
means that a central bank would have to conduct a tighter monetary policy to achieve disinflation 
than if the fiscal policy was more prudent and the inflation expectations stayed close to the target.
Figure 15: Developments in the inflation and the inflation target after the introduction of inflation targeting
Source: MNB
According to certain opinions about the monetary policy, the MNB led an overly restrictive 
monetary policy during this period, i.e. the central bank base rate was higher than it should 
have been.20 According to the argument the HUF base rate primarily has to “compensate” the 
investors for higher inflation and higher country risks, but the HUF base rate contained a 
higher premium than this compensation. This higher premium, according to the study, led to 
a “stronger-than-appropriate” HUF exchange rate, which also manifested in the consolidation 
19 For the channels of monetary policy and the monetary policy of the MNB see VONNÁK, 2006 and MNB (2012).
20 ERDŐS, 2010, ERDŐS, 2011.
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of the real exchange rate. Bihari and Valentiny (2010) contest this statement and point out that 
despite a “too strong” forint, the export performance of the economy continuously increased 
during these years. Furthermore, they also point out that the consolidation of the real exchange 
rate is quite usual in convergence countries similar to Hungary. They also stress that based on 
the legal regulation of the MNB, that it had no room for manoeuvre: the overshooting of the 
inflation target resulted in the restrictive monetary policy. 
Based on the empirical results of Csajbók et al. (2010), the fact that the central bank had a 
“fear of floating” the exchange rate also contributed to the spread of foreign currency loans 
in Central and Eastern European countries. The relative stability of the exchange rate in 
this case could also contribute to households’ underestimating the extent of the exchange 
rate risk. Ex post, it can be easily identified that the restrictive monetary policy of the MNB 
would have had less side effects if the FX-lending had been made more difficult through the 
use of other legal tools by the governmental decision-makers, as it was in other countries in 
the region.21 A less expansive fiscal policy in the period under review would have also helped 
the efficiency of the inflation targeting.22
4.2. The legislative environment
In connection with the legislative environment, two factors are worthy of note: first, how 
supportive the effective legal regulation was towards FX-lending (how difficult it was to 
contract a foreign currency loan), and second, how adequate the disbursed loans were from 
in respect to consumer protection. 
In respect to contracting FX-loans, the legal regulation did not impede the spread of these loans. 
Prior to the crisis, in contrast with several other countries in the region, there were no measures 
in Hungary that would have prevented the institution of FX-lending, except for the informative 
communication of certain institutions (primarily by the MNB) announcing the risks.23
The primary problem was that it was not clear: which institution among those in charge of 
financial stability and the banking system should deal with such fundamentally macro-prudential 
problems as foreign currency lending. Besides the uncertainty of the scope of responsibility, the 
tools allocated for the institutions were also not suitable for efficiently managing problems like 
this. The possible measures and responsible institutions are in Table 4.24
21 BETHLENDI, 2011
22 ERDŐS, 2007
23 BETHLENDI, 2011
24 An interesting additional factor is the behaviour of the Polish banking system, which also provided CHF-
loans: certain Polish institutions visited the Polish financial supervisory board together in 2005 to request the 
prohibition of foreign currency lending. In the end, administrative prohibition did not take place; however, 
the supervisory board notified the banks in a recommendation in 2006 about higher risk awareness, more 
thorough information and to first try to offer clients zloty loans (the domestic currency of Poland) (MUCSI 
et al., 2015).
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Table 4: Possible measures to restrain unhedged foreign currency lending and the responsible institutions 
Note: HFSA: Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, MoF: Ministry of Finance. 
Source: MNB (2006)
The most important preventive measure, however, would have been the reduction of 
the budget deficit: its inflation moderating effect would have enabled the reduction of the 
base rate. On one hand, this would have made FX-loans less attractive by reducing the in-
terest rate differential. On the other hand, it would have increased their financing costs 
with the relative depreciation of the exchange rate. All this draws attention to the fact that 
the measures of the major economic policy institutions generating contradicting impacts 
(fiscal alcoholism versus inflation targeting) might have resulted in severe imbalances in the 
economy.
At the same time, we must add that the administrative limitation of FX-loans would not have 
been free of every legal difficulty: one of the four freedoms of the European Union is the free 
movement of capital, and the prohibition of foreign currency lending would not have met this.25
In addition to the occurrence of foreign currency lending, the consumer protective 
insufficiencies of the contracts also caused problems. It became obvious after the outbreak of 
the crisis that the vast majority of the contracts provided a dominant position in unilateral 
pricing for the bank, i.e. the latter could have shifted relatively easily its losses to the debtors 
of existing loans. This means that banks did not apply a through the cycle price during the 
years of FX-lending, but a lower one, knowing that in the event of any external shock it 
would be able to raise the interest rates ex post. This was later confirmed: following the 
25 This is well reflected by the fact that when the FX-lending was actually prohibited in 2010, the European 
Central Bank objected to this measure, due to which it had to be modified. Currently, the borrowing of 
foreign currency loans is allowed, however, only for borrowers who meet very strict conditions (which are 
impossible for most debtors).
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outbreak of the crisis banks raised the interest rate of existing FX-mortgages by an average 
of 2 percentage points,26 which – beside the depreciation of the HUF exchange rate – 
substantively contributed to the increasing monthly debt service. 
Although the unilateral interest rate increases were paid back to the clients with the 
settlement in 2015, it would have been more reasonable if during the disbursal of FX-loans 
the legislative environment provided an unambiguous and transparent system of conditions 
for both parties for signing the contracts.
5. Consequences and outlook
In recent decades (and especially following the outbreak of the financial crisis), international 
literature has striven to define those processes which might imply an emerging financial 
crisis in the economy. Though each crisis is obviously different according to the unique 
characteristics of the economies, studies have still managed to identify a few trends that 
substantially increased the vulnerability of the economy and the probability of an emerging 
banking crisis. 
These studies found that banking crises are most often preceded by excessive lending. 
Either from an historical aspect27 or by statistical analysis28 the common feature of periods 
prior to the banking crisis is a large amount of credit flowing out to the economy. This, often 
simultaneously with a reduction in saving willingness, can lead to a deteriorating balance 
of the current account, i.e. the economy depends more on foreign capital – and this capital 
is often only available with ever shorter periods of maturity.29 The large-scale credit outflow 
often contributes to the increasing price of a real or financial asset, thus house price or stock 
market booms might develop. 
The most widespread method for seizing the excessiveness of lending is the quantification of 
the credit-to-GDP gap. During the calculation of the indicator, the development of credit-to-
GDP is decomposed to a trend and a cycle component, and if the actual value of the indicator 
exceeds the trend considerably and permanently, lending is considered excessive. The trend-
cycle decomposition can be carried out by multiple methodologies but none of them are free 
from estimate uncertainties.30 Based on the credit gap calculated for the domestic household 
outstanding loans the credit volume exceeded the estimated equilibrium level after 2005, 
and the credit gap reached its maximum peak by the turn of 2008 to 2009 (Figure 16:). This 
implies that lending dynamics were not coupled with income developments. 
26 The increases were certainly defensible in respect to economics by the increasing resource costs, country risk, 
state burdens and bank losses (SCHEPP – SZABÓ, 2015, SCHEPP – MÁTRAI-PITZ, 2016), however the possible 
changes of burdens derived from the contract were made non-transparent and untraceable for the consumer.
27 KINDLEBERGER and ALIBER, 2005, and SHULARICK and TAYLOR, 2012
28 BORIO – DREHMANN, 2009
29 LÁMFALUSSY, 2008
30 HOSSZÚ – KÖRMENDI – MÉRŐ, 2016
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Figure 16: Household structural credit-to-GDP gap
Note: Based on Hosszú, Körmendi and Mérő (2016). Source: MNB
The development of the current account showed a large deficit before the outbreak of the 
crisis (Figure 17:). Its emergence can be largely linked to the budget deficit, the extent of which 
was not even approached by the continuously decreasing contribution of households to the 
balance. As the previous chapters showed, the substantive part of external funds involved to 
finance the deficit of the current account flowed into the economy via the banking system, and 
they mainly consisted of short-term funds. The two conditions of vulnerable financial systems 
– excessive lending and current account deficit – were both met in Hungary before the crisis. 
Figure 17: Net lending of specific sectors (as a percentage of rolling annual GDP)
Source: MNB
The picture is not so obvious in the development of asset prices. Excessive lending did not fuel the 
housing market to the same degree as was typical in the case of real estate crises during previous 
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banking crises. In the period of 2005 to 2008, models showed a slight overvaluation of house prices, 
moreover, the price level could be considered as equilibrium based on estimates (Figure 18:). 
However, overvaluation could develop in the real exchange rate during the period of 
foreign currency lending (Figure 19:): between the summer of 2006 and 2008, the real 
exchange rate appreciated by some 21 per cent. The external funds and the disbursement of 
FX-loans both contributed to this exchange rate appreciation to a great extent.
Figure 18: Deviation of house prices from the estimated level justified by fundamentals, nationally and in Budapest
Note: Light bars denote the uncertainty of the national estimate. For methodology see MNB (2018b) footnote 4. 
Source: MNB (2018b)
Figure 19: The development of the HUF real exchange rate (December 2007 = 100 per cent)
Note: Higher values mean the appreciation, lower values mean the depreciation of HUF. 
Source: Bruegel Institute based on Darvas (2012)
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In addition to the macro-economic consequences, the impacts on debtors is also worthy of 
note. The realization of the exchange rate risk, as well as the unilateral interest rate increases 
by the banks substantially affected the amount of the credit instalments. In respect to 
the interest rate increases, the comparison with Polish FX-loans is especially interesting, 
these already being linked to the reference rate before the crisis. In their case, the base rate 
reductions of the Swiss central bank following the outbreak of the crisis were priced in 
the mortgages completely. Conversely, in Hungary, the banks – as previously mentioned 
– increased the interest rates (Figure 20:). Due to the two impacts, the credit instalments 
sometimes increased by up to 80 per cent in the case of a typical mortgage (Figure 21:). 
Figure 20: Average interest rate of the outstanding FX-denominated loans 
Source: National central banks of these countries
Figure 21: The fluctuation of an average housing loan’s instalments compared to the initial value
Source: Own calculation
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The increasing instalments led to the spread of non-performing loans. Especially those 
loans proved to be the most problematic that were disbursed during the one and a half years 
prior to the outbreak of the crisis, in the most intense period of competition. Nearly 40 per 
cent of these loans later became non-performing, and their share was still 60 per cent within 
the non-performing loan portfolio in 2018 (Figure 22:).
Figure 22: Distribution of the household mortgage loan contracts outstanding at the end of March 2018 
by rating category and the month of contract conclusion
Source: MNB (2018)
Overall, the financial crisis of 2008 found Hungary in an extremely vulnerable situation 
with high external debt, a current account deficit, and relying on foreign funds. 
The correction of the imbalances took many years, although as a legacy of foreign currency 
lending several tens of thousands of families were still struggling with a debt service that 
they could not pay easily in 2018. Although the situation was settled with the conversion 
of foreign currency loans into forint loans and the settlement of unilateral interest rate 
increases, during their tenure FX-lending caused immense damage to the economy.
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The financial crisis of 2008 found Hungarian mortgage credit debtors in a vulnerable 
situation, due to which the ratio of non-performing loans increased to a high level. The aim 
of our study is to identify those factors, which have an influence among non-performing or 
restructured mortgage credit debtors in respect to what degree the debtor is able and willing to 
repay debt. We examined non-performing and restructured mortgage loans to see whether the 
outstanding debt decreased between January 2014 and January 2015, taking into account the 
income levels of debtors, the loan characteristics, as well as variables describing the settlement 
in which the debtor lives. Based on our logistic regression analysis, people who had a larger 
relative indebtedness, i.e. the loan-to-value rate was higher, and they had lower incomes and 
more dependants in their households, were less likely to reduce their debt. While carrying 
out our estimate, we also identified non-financial variables that might reduce the willingness 
to pay: if the debt of the debtor multiplied compared to the borrowed credit amount, if the 
loan was a home equity loan, or if there was a higher proportion of non-performing debtors 
in the given debtor’s settlement. The social capital variable that we created at the settlement 
level also indicated an increase in debt in our models, while if the debtor had been in default 
for a relatively longer time, the same effect could be observed. It was also significant which 
institution owned the debt, a factor which might indicate that the recovery strategies of some 
institutions motivated clients to perform better, while others less.
1. Introduction
Due to the unhealthy structure of lending with a significant exchange rate risk by borrowers 
between 2004 and 2009, the emerging financial crisis found Hungarian households in a 
particularly vulnerable position. This also manifested in the increasing ratio of defaults: the 
proportion of non-performing household loans beyond 90 days in the credit institution sector 
first increased to 11 per cent in 2010, then to 19.3 per cent in 2013 from 3.8 per cent in 2008.
The biggest problem, which remains the case today, stemmed from non-performing 
mortgage credit households. Mortgage loans, due to their unique nature (large credit size, 
long maturity), may well define the finances of debtors for decades to come. These loans are 
also special in respect to their underlying collateral – property – that theoretically provides 
a potential exit strategy for the debtor from the transaction, if serving the debt becomes too 
onerous. However, such a strategy can become problematic if prices fall on the real estate 
market, or the outstanding amount of the loan increases. Due to the denomination in foreign 
exchange and the stagnation of the housing market in Hungary, both factors were applicable 
so in many cases the loan-to-value ratio increased by over 100 per cent.
The risks of mortgage loans caused tension not only for the debtors, but also for the 
domestic banking system. In 2013, the entire financial system had over 164 thousand non-
performing mortgage credit contracts. Due to the growing ratio of defaults and the reduction 
of collateral values, the banks were forced to provision a considerable rate of loan losses on 
the household credit portfolio, to the total amount of HUF 1,750 billion between 2008 and 
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2014, not including the quarters of early repayment. This amount represented 83 per cent of 
the regulatory capital as of the end of 2008.
The aim of our study is to identify those factors, which have an influence among non-
performing or restructured mortgage loan debtors to what degree such debtors are able and 
willing to repay the debt. During the analysis we concentrated not only on the financial 
features in the strict sense (income, loan-to-value ratio), but also integrated certain non-
financial indicators in the scope of our analysis, for example the level of social capital typical 
for the residence of the debtor.
The study is structured as follows; we will summarize the relevant literature in Chapter 2, 
by which we will partly demonstrate previous studies regarding our domestic households, 
and will partly discuss the conclusions of the international literature on non-performing 
loans. In Chapter 3 we will present our research approach, database and the methodology 
applied for data analysis. In Chapter 4 we will list the results, and finally in Chapter 5 we will 
summarize our conclusions.
2. Literature review
Both in the relevant national and international literature we find relatively few studies regarding 
why the non-performing debtors remain in default, and also what proportion of the debt servi-
ce they can repay after falling into default status. The majority of the analyses published on the 
domestic situation address the reasons why debtors fall into default, therefore we will discuss 
this topic next. Meanwhile, when discussing the variables explaining the situation of default, 
the relevant international literature places a great deal of emphasis on when it is worthwhile for 
debtors to default, i.e. under which circumstances they might strategically default.
2.1. Previous research on domestic mortgage debtors2
Several studies in Hungary have dealt with the reasons why loans fall into default, however the 
number is not as many as we would anticipate from the magnitude of the problem. The MNB 
(the Central Bank of Hungary) – primarily in its Financial Stability Reports – have analysed the 
problem numerous times, but mostly in respect to the banking system. The aim of the report of 
April 2012 was to identify the reasons for non-performance based on macro-economic variables 
due to the typically aggregated nature of the available data: based on the results the increasing 
exchange rates and interest rates, as well as the rise in unemployment explain approximately half 
of the defaults, primarily due to the previous two factors (MNB 2012). 
Gáspár and Varga (2011) achieved a similar result with micro-simulation methods: based 
on their study the reason for non-performance was mainly the increase in instalments, 
whereas unemployment only played a minor role in the escalation of the problem. The study 
also concludes that the financial circumstances of some 50 per cent of non-performing 
debtors was already risky when they borrowed the loan and their default status would have 
taken place in any case even in the absence of the above-mentioned shock. 
2 Based on DANCSIK et al., (2015).
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Hosszú (2011) and Balás (2013) point out, based on micro-level data, that the problem 
was the concentration of household indebtedness (primarily in the balance sheet of the 
population on lower incomes), even if the aggregate indebtedness of the household sector 
did not stand out by international comparison. 
Szigel and Fáykiss (2012) focus on the amount of interest rates paid by the households, and 
also point out that the risks are higher than what the size of the outstanding stock implies. 
The study concludes that the indebtedness of the sector based on the amount of interest to be 
paid is a lot more serious than it seems based on the outstanding debt, i.e. the debtors "flow" 
leverage is higher than the "stock" leverage.3
Out of the studies that have been published so far, the most detailed descriptive analysis was 
provided by Dancsik et al. (2015), primarily based on the circumstances of debtors at the end 
of 2014. The main observations of the study confirmed that the reduction of non-performing 
retail mortgages was typically hindered by the excessive indebtedness of debtors, i.e. high 
instalments and the large volume of outstanding debt. However, a significant proportion of 
the non-performing population has some income, i.e. substantive “restructuring reserves” 
can be identified in the portfolio, however, the banks are not active enough in exploiting 
these reserves. The study establishes that due to the lack of consequences of non-payment, 
a considerable segment of the non-performing portfolio (10 per cent to 20 per cent) were 
typically less willing to pay, which is also underlined by the experiences of lenders. Figure 1 
indicates the segmentation of debtors according to their ability and willingness to pay.
Figure 1: The composition of non-performing debtors based on the ability and the willingness to pay
Note: Sufficient income for debt service category: the payment-to-income (PTI) is less than 30 per cent 
(in the case of a valid contract), or the ratio of the outstanding debt and annual income is less than four 
(in the case of a terminated contract). The debt is too high compared to income: the PTI exceeds 30 per 
cent (valid contract), or the ratio of the credit amount and annual income is greater than four per cent 
(terminated contract). Moderate redemption: the debtor pays 1 per cent to 80 per cent of the payment 
obligation due between January 2014 and January 2015 (in the case of a valid contract). Substantive 
redemption: the debtor pays at least 80 per cent of the payment obligation (valid contract), or can 
reduce the overall debt (terminated contract). 
Source: MNB (2016) p. 8, MNB mortgage loan database.
3 See BERLINGER et al., 2012
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The magnitude of the problem remained substantial even years after the outbreak of 
the crisis, despite the fact that the Government tried to moderate the consequences with 
numerous measures. On one hand, following the outbreak of the crisis, in order to prevent a 
major social crisis the Government significantly aggravated the implementation of collateral 
vindication (moratorium on evictions, quotas on foreclosures). On the other hand, in order 
to manage the problem several other measures were also introduced (preferential early 
repayment option, exchange rate cap, conversion into forints with 25 per cent debt relief, 
National Asset Management, settlement and conversion into forints, Family bankruptcy 
protection),4 which provided an escape route from a difficult situation for a wide range of 
debtors. However, the measures not only influenced the debtors’ situation ex post, since 
by forming expectations they also subsequently modified their behaviour. According to a 
questionnaire survey conducted in 2015, about 80 per cent of non-performing debtors did 
not agree with the statement that the Government had already provided a lot of help to 
debtors and further measures relating to the problem could not be expected.5 The continuous 
sustainment of Government support and the reduction of default costs contributed to the fact 
that the ratio of debtors, which can be characterized by moral hazard, became substantial. 
The aforementioned analysis also concludes that in Hungary, as of 2014, the opportunities 
for collateral sales were limited. The voluntary sales of collateral or selling via the bank 
were substantively limited by the local features of the real estate market in the case of some 
debtors. A considerable part of collateral is in such regions and settlements where, due to the 
weaknesses of the real estate market, the market-base sales might be hindered, aggravating 
the cleaning of the portfolio. Finally, administrative limits make the successful management 
of the problem more difficult, especially in respect to the terminated loan contracts. The 
costly and extended foreclosure proceedings, the ambiguous taxation regulations in certain 
areas and the problematic restructuring of terminated loans pose a risk to the cleaning of the 
non-performing mortgage loan portfolio.
2.2. International literature review
The focus on the analysis of non-performing loans in foreign literature is on a far wider scale 
than the Hungarian one. One branch of literature is attempting to identify the factors which 
impact the debtor’s default status through micro-economic modelling (however, in many 
cases this is supplemented by empirical testing). 
Schelkle (2018) distinguishes between two large areas within the micro-economic models. 
According to one type of model,6 falling into default is basically an option. The debtor will 
default when the value of this option is positive, and not expected to grow any further. The 
option nature of defaulting, however, is not an option in every country: the designers of the 
model typically examined the problem of non-performing mortgages in countries where the 
so-called “walk away” right is in effect, i.e. by giving up the collateral, the debtor is relieved 
4 For details on these measures, see a study by DANCSIK et al., 2017.
5 DANCSIK et al., 2015
6 See for example KAU, KEENAN and KIM, 1994, KAU et al., 1992, 1995, QUERCIA and STEGMAN, 1992, 
KAU and KEENAN, 1995, and also VANDELL, 1995
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of paying the entire debt. In this case the value of the option is positive, if the LTV-ratio 
(loan-to-value, i.e. the ratio of the loan to the collateral value) exceeds 100 per cent. 
As per the other type of models, the negative equity (i.e. an LTV rate over 100 per cent) is a 
necessary, but not sufficient pre-condition for being in default. It has two main reasons: on one 
hand, an LTV rate over 100 per cent is to no avail, if the additional reduction of the collateral 
value is anticipated, as in this case the value of the walk away option is expected to increase 
and is not necessarily worth utilizing at present. On the other hand, practising the walk away 
right has transaction costs: “utility” stemming from living in the given property ceases, and 
moving involves actual financial costs, while the debtor has to suffer social consequences 
(social stigma) as well, if he returns the property to the bank.7 These social expenses are by no 
means negligible: according to research by Fannie Mae (2010), the majority of people consider 
it morally reprehensible, if someone stops paying his mortgage while actually still being able 
to pay it. Guiso et al. (2013) confirm that in addition to financial considerations, the ethical 
and moral views of debtors also influence the probability of default in the event of negative 
equity, while how others decide in similar situations, has an effect as well. In addition, Bhutta 
et al. (2017) draw attention to the fact that emotional and psychological reasons also play a 
role in defaulting and in refraining from non-performing. Agarwal et al. (2011) investigate 
the probability of starting bankruptcy proceedings, and they find that the size of both the 
individual and the local social capital also play a role in these decisions. 
Overall, it can be established that the phenomenon of entering into default is deeply 
embedded in a social sense, so if it is examined solely from a financial point of view, 
incomplete conclusions may be drawn. 
Contrary to optional theory, according to the so-called “double-trigger” hypothesis, besides 
negative equity a life event must also take place to trigger the default status, for instance a 
divorce, or the loss of a job.8 Negative capital is the pre-condition for falling into default, 
because under a 100 per cent LTV-ratio the debtor can theoretically prevent the default 
status by selling the property.9 There are two implicit key assumptions behind the double-
trigger hypothesis. One is that should the debtor fall into default, he/she will suffer negative 
consequences, therefore non-performance is fundamentally to be avoided. The second is that 
properties can be sold on the market, which, however, is not necessarily plausible amidst a 
stagnating housing market. If these two conditions are not applicable, under a 100 per cent 
LTV ratio, or in absence of a life event, the default position might still arise.
3. Research question, methodology and data
3.1. Research question and possible explanatory variables
Based on the conclusions of the relevant literature, it can be observed that the choice 
regarding non-performing status is the final result of a rather complex decision influenced 
by multiple factors. It could be observed that the financial and wealth situation of the debtor 
7 WHITE, 2010.
8 SCHELKLE, 2018.
9 FOOTE and WILLEN, 2018.
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have considerable roles: the ratio of the loan to the collateral value is imperative (is the 
debtor able to withdraw from the contractual relationship by selling the property), as are 
the liquidity problems of the debtor (due to either rising instalments, or reduced household 
income, e.g. as a consequence of losing a job, or divorce). Beyond the financial aspects 
however, the fact of whether the debtor considers his or her default morally acceptable also 
plays an important role, in the same way as popular non-performing among his/her peers.
In a situation where the financial consequences of defaulting are more uncertain, the 
significance of “costs” in respect to the moral views of the debtor might increase. From the 
vantage point of pure financial utility, if the debtor feels that being in default is not penalized 
by the foreclosure of the property, it is worth giving up the payment obligation, and entering 
onto a path of higher consumption through the released liquidity. This positive incentive 
might be softened by the debtor’s moral attitude, or the degree of the perceived social stig-
ma, which basically appears as a psychological cost to the debtor, and might offset the utility 
surplus that can be obtained by the increased consumption. 
It is an especially interesting phenomenon in Hungary, where the problem of non-performing 
loans was of a different magnitude than in the examples of Western European countries or 
the United States, examined by the international literature. Foreign currency denominated 
lending also makes the Hungarian situation unique, since with this product an extremely wide 
scope of debtors came to feel that paying instalments was useless, as the remaining debt was 
increasing anyway due to the depreciation of the exchange rate. In such a situation – which 
could well violate many debtors’ sense of justice –, it is not clear what moral behaviour means 
to the individual: the repayment of debt, or the rejection of a claim considered as exorbitant. 
However, the moral stance of the debtor is a variable, which is quite difficult to observe, 
especially when not working with questionnaire data. Therefore, when we created the models 
we assumed that the size of the social capital for the settlement that serves as the residence 
for the debtor might be related to psychological expenses brought about by non-performing. 
Currently, there is no standard definition for the concept of social capital. In respect to 
economics, the phrasing that defines social capital as a skill for social cooperation might be 
the most plausible one. In respect to the individual, social capital is therefore the willingness to 
make an individual sacrifice for the community to achieve a higher collective utility level.10 The 
fundamental building block of social capital is trust, as well as the density of the social network, 
i.e. the number of interactions between people in the given society. 
Social capital is connected to many processes related to the banking system: the probability 
of households entering bankruptcy,11 the development of the financial system,12 the stability 
of credit institutions,13 and even the interest rate spread of corporate liabilities.14
10 In respect to game theory, it all corresponds to an n-player prisoner’s dilemma situation: in cases where 
the players are characterised by higher social capital, a balance is more easily found, whereas the players 
following the deserter strategy are fewer, and the cooperative players form a larger proportion.
11 AGARWAL et al., 2011
12 GUISO et al., 2004
13 OSTERGAARD et al., 2016, JIN et al., 2017
14 HASAN et al., 2017
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Based on the above, it seems a plausible statement that social capital might play a role in 
the choice of domestic households when they decide whether or not to service the debt. The 
impact of government measures reducing the probability of foreclosures could be offset, if 
the debtor feels that by not paying he/she damages society,15 or he/she is concerned about 
being stigmatized if the debt is not paid. In this regard we are relying on a positive relation 
between social capital and the willingness to pay.
However, considering that the foreign exchange credit debtors find the extreme extent of the 
realized exchange rate risk unfair in many cases, it is possible that social solidarity will steer them in 
the opposite direction, and a “cooperative” act would be to unite against the lenders and not pay the 
debt service. If this attitude spreads throughout a wide spectrum of society, an opposite indicator 
of the relationship between social capital and the willingness to repay debt may be experienced. 
3.2. Database
In order to make a more detailed analysis of the problem of non-performing credit debtors, 
in the summer of 2015, the MNB requested contract-level data from market participants 
with the most substantial non-performing mortgage loan portfolios. Within the framework 
of this one-off data service, 14 financial institutions – 12 banks, one branch of a foreign 
institution and one financial corporation – provided data for the mortgage loan database 
(hereinafter referred to as: MNB mortgage loan database). The database contains around 229 
thousand problematic mortgage contracts, the total outstanding debt of which was in excess 
of HUF 1,600 billion on 30 April 2015 (Table 1), while the debt, including overdue interest 
payments and fees, amounted to HUF 1,780 billion.
The available database contains the selected data (data available from the financial institution 
describing loan characteristics, the income situation of the debtors, the value of the mortgage 
collateral, and any possible restructuring) of restructured retail mortgage credit transactions, 
and those exceeding 90 days on 31 January 2015. The database contains records dating from 
30 April 2015, from financial institutions with at least one thousand non-performing retail 
mortgage credit contracts – covering 86 per cent of the non-performing portfolio of the time. 
To analyse the debtors’ income situation and debt service based on objective data we 
obtained the income and tax burdens – listed in their personal income tax returns – from the 
National Tax and Customs Office regarding the last two completed tax years of debtors and 
co-debtors,16 as well as all other credit debt of the debtors and co-debtors from the Central 
Credit Information System (KHR). We linked the data regarding income and debt service 
with the records acquired from the monetary institution while, of course, fully complying 
with the principle of anonymity. 
15 This realization also certainly requires that the debtors are clear about the consequences of their actions, 
which is not necessarily taken for granted in the case of a complex system of institutions, like the financial 
system. During the operationalization of social capital, it therefore might be worth supplementing the 
classical indicators with some educational indices. Higher education typically means higher financial culture 
as well (OECD 2016, 31.), so a more educated debtor will more likely see the consequences of their actions, 
which is the pre-condition for moral decisions.
16 Tax years 2013 and 2014.
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Table 1: The outstanding principal debt of non-performing and performing restructured mortgage 
loans listed in the mortgage loan database and the number of contracts in a breakdown by delinquency 
prior to settlement
Note: Outstanding principal debt amounts as of 30 April 2015. Source: MNB mortgage loan database.
The database contains the following main variables by contract:
- Type of product (housing loan or home equity loan)
- Amount and composition of debt (not yet due items and items past due) for the dates 
of January 2014, January 2015 and April 2015
- The original contracted amount of the credit
- The amount of other loans
- The declared taxable (personal income tax) income of the debtor and co-debtor 
- Where we had data about taxable income, we also knew the number of dependants 
- The date of the oldest default as a category variable (the categories are: 0−30 days, 
31−90 days, 91−180 days, 181−360 days, 361−720 days, over 720 days)
- Market value of the collateral
- The settlement where the debtor resides
- The financial institution that owns the claim
We supplemented our data with the following calculated variables:
- The rate of the loan-to-value (LTV)
- A binary variable, which specifically controls for negative equity (i.e. its value over 
100 per cent LTV is 1, under is 0)
- The ratio of the debtor’s debt and income
- The ratio of the outstanding debt as of January 2014 and the borrowed amount, and
- The local social capital variable based on settlement data.
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3.3. The measurement of social capital
The concept of social capital became the central item of social theory from the 1990s, primarily 
following Coleman’s work.17 The concept is addressed by several sociologists,18 due to which 
two main directions were created, followed by their synthesis in the literature: individual 
and collective social capital. They seem to agree that social capital prevails through the 
social relationship network and promotes action.19 Social capital can work via information 
flow, mutual help norms, collective development and competitiveness, collective action and 
social cooperation, or through collective consciousness, trust and solidarity.20
In respect to the measurement of social capital, as stated above, no standard approved methodology 
is available. As per Fukuyama, there are two basic approaches: one is based on the number of social 
groups and group members, the other is on collective trust and the extent of civil organizations.21
The concept of social capital is complex; therefore it is not surprising that different research 
identified it with different variables. Orbán and Szántó (2005) presented the measurement 
method of Putnam state, that ”obviously the exact measurement of the social capital volume 
is an almost impossible mission, since it is partly based on subjective, estimated, or even non-
existing data, which is difficult to collect.” Therefore, a study on social capital can be (partly) 
carried out mostly though data collection using a questionnaire, which generally assesses 
the extent of (institutional) trust and civil society.
The studies addressing the relationship between the banking system and social capital 
frequently use variables that capture the relationship between the individual and the community. 
Guiso et al. (2004) for instance measure the degree of social capital by participation in elections 
and the ratio of blood donors. Jin et al. (2017) also use election data, Hasan et al. (2017) use election 
participation data and the number of civil organisations, while Osteergard et al. (2016) use the 
proportion of newspaper subscriptions and the volume of charity donations as a yardstick. 
During our research, we had to take into consideration that individual social capital elements cannot 
be linked to the debtor-level database, in respect to the data source and the content of variables. Since 
we had to comply with the requirement of anonymity and would have had to analyse a high number 
of debtors, we were not able to carry out a questionnaire-based survey of individuals. However, we 
had information about which settlement the properties were registered at as mortgage collateral. 
Consequently, we connected the debtors with the social capital level characteristic for the settlement.22
Once we decided this, we operationalized social capital to use it as a predictor in the regression 
analysis. The willingness to participate in elections, the extent of the civil sphere (a total of 54 
17 ORBÁN–SZÁNTÓ, 2005
18 See for example BOURDIEU, 1998; FUKUYAMA, 1997, 1999, 2000; PUTNAM, 1993, 2000; and COLEMAN, 
1994, 1998.
19 COLEMAN, 1998. 17.
20 PUTNAM, 2000, summarizes ORBÁN–SZÁNTÓ, 2005
21 FUKUYAMA, 1999, 6-9.
22 It is worthy of note that this solution (1) presumes a settlement-level homogeneity, which should be addressed 
in a regression analysis, (2) during the interpretation of results it must be taken into account that the 
individual does not necessarily have those social capital elements, which characterizes the settlement, e.g. it 
is possible that the debtor did not participate in the parliamentary elections, whereas the settlement in total 
participated to an extent that is above the national average.
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thousand organisations) and levels of education were considered as the components of social 
capital as settlement-level variables.23 The content of each variable is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: The operationalization of social capital elements
Note: The source of election participation data was the National Election Office, while the number of 
civil organisations and population with tertiary education were applied based on the national census 
of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in 2011.
To measure social capital on a settlement level, we assessed these specifics in every national 
settlement. The distribution of each applied variable by settlement covers a substantial 
heterogeneity, which can mainly be detected in the right-skewed distributions, therefore, 
we had to filter out the outliers. In the case of election participation and university/college 
degrees, we applied an outlier filter at the 1st and 99th percentile values, while we only filte-
red out the top 1 per cent of the number of civil organisations (Table 3). Following the outlier 
filtering, the frequency distribution of certain variables can be seen in Fig. 2. 
Table 3: Characteristics of the applied social capital elements’ distribution
Source: Own calculation.
23 During the analysis, we assumed that many other settlement-level variables available are related to each other, 
and together to social capital, which cannot be observed directly. These were the permanence of population 
(number of in-and outbound migrants to the residents), the renewal of the housing stock (number of newly 
constructed homes to the housing stock), the stability of family structure (number of divorces to the number 
of residents), labour market stability (number of job seekers to residents), religious and ethnic heterogeneity 
(proportion of non-religious and non-Hungarian population). During our analysis we found that the listed 
variables are not in relation to each other, by which they would support an integrated social capital concept. 
Therefore, the measurement of this requires further investigation.
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of the applied social capital elements
      
Source: Own calculation.
We created one principal component out of the three variables, which hereinafter we 
will call social capital. Thus, we considered social capital as a latent variable, and the used 
variables as dimensions, through the observation and combination of which the latent 
variable can be created. The social capital principal component covers 51 per cent of the 
variance of the three variables (Table 4).
Table 4: The correlation of the applied variables to the social capital principal component
Source: Own calculation.
Therefore, the social capital principal component can be interpreted as representing the 
settlement-specific (1) willingness to participate in elections, which expresses institutional 
trust; (2) extent of the civil sphere, which shows trust in the local community; and (3) high 
level of education, which defines the opportunity to access resources.
3.4. Methodology
The available databases – although containing certain variables for several dates – is cross-
sectional. We selected a binary variable as the dependent variable of the model, which takes 
the value of 0, if the debt of the debtor decreased between January 2014 and January 2015, 
and takes the value of 1, if the debt has not changed, or increased during the same period.
The change in the amount of debt is an appropriate variable as it can be interpreted both in the 
case of valid and terminated credit contracts. As a contrast, calculations based on instalments 
cannot be interpreted in the case of terminated loans, considering that the contractual relationship 
has terminated. There is therefore no instalment due from the client, but the entire debt becomes 
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due at the time of such termination. We chose the start and end date for the variable taking into 
account that it should not be influenced by the measures regarding foreign currency loans as of 
February 2015, which concerned the amount of the outstanding debt. During the calculation of 
the variable we controlled for the exchange rate fluctuation.
Considering that a binary variable is the dependent variable, the following binary logistic 
regression function was estimated for the applied variables:24
where xj means the debtor-level characteristics, tk means the settlement-level characteristics, 
i.e. social capital and the share of non-performing debtors in the settlement, and w is the control 
variable representing the economic development of the settlement and the proportion of job seekers.
Equivalent to this expression for the realization probability of the event (debt did not 
decrease): 
The independent variables of the logistic regression model are linear in the so-called logit 
function, while they are exponential in the 
odds of the outcome. So the βj sign of the coefficients indicate that the increasing level 
of the concerned independent variable increases, or decreases the probability of the y=1 
outcome of the binary dependent variable on average (however, it does not show the precise 
extent of the impact regarding the probability of realization). The eβ values calculated 
from the estimated regression coefficients specify on average how many times per unit the 
independent variable (presuming that all other factors remain unchanged) raises the odds 
in the examined outcome. Therefore, the coefficients do not provide a precise indication in 
respect to the probability of an decrease or increase in debt.
During modelling we had to take into consideration that the values of the social capital 
and the control variables of debtors living in the same settlement25 are equal, so we calculated 
clustered standard errors for the regression coefficients.26
24 For the descriptive statistics of applied variables see the Appendices .
25 Precisely, those debtors who borrowed loans with mortgage collateral located in the same settlement.
26 For more information about this method, see CAMERON–MILLER, 2015
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4. Results
The results of the estimated logit models are in Table 5. Since the dependent variable takes value 
1 if the client’s debt increased or did not decrease during the examined period, the positive 
coefficients mean the factors pointing towards the increase or stagnation of debt, whereas the 
negative coefficients are the factors increasing the probability of the reduction of debt.
Out of the applied independent variables, the following increased the probability of an 
increase in debt.
If it was a home equity loan. If the non-performing loan is a home equity loan, – controlling 
the income and indebtedness status, and other characteristics of the credit – the debt of 
debtors was less likely to decrease. This result is consistent with the image that can be seen 
from the aggregated statistics, which shows that the NPL-rate in the case of home equity 
loans is a lot higher than in the case of housing loans. This could indicate the higher risks of 
the group (which is already reflected by the indebtedness for consumption),27 which is not 
only reflected in the non-performing status, but also the lower redemption ratio.28
If the debtor has been non-performing for a relatively longer time. The binary variables 
marking certain default categories are significant in most of the estimates, and along with the 
growing default category the size of coefficients also typically show an increasing tendency. 
This means that in the case of debtors with a longer default status, the probability that they 
were not able to reduce their debt between 2014 and 2015 is higher. This indicates that if the 
debtors are in default for a long time, this state can easily become permanent.
27 Besides the purpose of consumption, it would also be worth examining whether there is different willingness 
to pay in the case of housing loans with investment purposes. However, we did not have any information in 
the database regarding this.
28 However, we are not able to clearly state that the positive sign of a variable means an attitude or an ability 
problem. It is possible that these debtors originally had lower incomes during the disbursement of the credit, 
and accumulated lower savings, and this was reflected in subsequently lower instalments. It is also possible 
that the consumption purpose indicates that the debtors’ income volatility is higher, which we are also not 
able to control with the variables in our database.
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Table 5: Estimated results, dependent variable: 1 = the debt increased, or did not change, 0 = the debt decreased
Note: The standard errors are in brackets. Source: Own calculation.
The higher the loan-to-value ratio. Based on our model results, the growth of the loan-to-value 
ratio indicated as a continuous variable increases the probability of the debt increase. The binary 
variable controlling LTV over 100 (i.e. negative capital), which is indicated in the model is also 
significant, and its coefficient is positive, while the interaction of the continuous variable and the 
binary variable had a negative coefficient. This shows that it makes a big difference whether the 
transaction LTV is over 100 or not, but over this level the increasing LTV has a smaller impact on 
 Bálint Dancsik, Gergely Fábián, Zita Fellner 133
repayments by the client.29 However, the problem of reverse causality arises in connection with the 
variable: if the clients, who currently do not pay their instalments, also did not previously pay, the 
debt (and the LTV) increases due to this attitude. In order to filter out this problem, we ran our 
models for each default category separately as well (Table 6), and we found that the coefficient of the 
variable is significantly positive if we only observe the debtors whose default status is relatively new. 
The higher number of dependants. The odds to increase the client’s debt was increased by 
being responsible for more dependants. A higher number of dependants increases the cost 
of living for the household and reduces the volume of income to be used for debt service. 
Therefore, this variable can also be considered as a trait of excessive indebtedness. 
If the ratio of non-performing debtors is higher30 among the population of the settlement. If there 
are relatively more non-performing debtors in the debtor’s settlement, the odds of the debtor’s debt 
not moderating also increases. This result corresponds with the statements of literature, according 
to which if the debtor sees enough examples in their environment of non-performing status, the 
social “cost” related to non-performing also falls, and his/her willingness to pay will also decrease. 
Since our entire database contains performing debtors as well (through restructured transactions), 
in the case of the result of the estimate run for the full sample the suspicion arises that the variable 
merely captures the obvious relationship between the share of non-performing transactions at 
the settlement level and the probability of non-performing at the debtor’s level. Consequently, we 
ran the estimate for the sample of non-performing debtors only, in which case we also received 
a positive coefficient for the variable. The increasing NPL ratio within the settlement might also 
reflect the impact of a local economic shock (e.g. an international company shuts down its local 
factory), although we made adjustments for this using the ratio of job seekers in the settlement.
The higher the amount of debt, as of January 2014, compared to the borrowed credit amount. Based 
on the estimated results, the higher the client’s debt grows compared to the date of borrowing, the 
higher the odds of further increasing debt. The clients’ willingness to pay might be influenced if 
they observe that due to the depreciation of the exchange rate their outstanding debt is not reduced 
despite their payments. Similarly to our LTV variable, the suspicion of reverse causality also arises 
with this variable, therefore we also double-checked this result with the example of new non-
performing debtors. We received a similar result with the latter estimates as well, which implies 
that the coefficient of the variable is not triggered by the debt increasing impact of previous defaults.
Social capital also increases the probability that the client’s debt will increase. Our social capital 
variable is significant in all our models and its coefficient is positive. This result implies that the non-
performing debtors are motivated by the “collective spirit” to continue non-paying. The positive 
coefficient of the variable supplementing our last two variables also support the view that debtors 
find the consequences of foreign currency lending unfair and where the organisational power of 
the community is higher, the probability of the debtors expressing their emotions in action and 
29 We also ran the estimate by indicating the ratio of the client’s outstanding debt and income (only in the case 
of those debtors for whom we had income data). Our LTV variables remained significant in this case too, and 
their signs also did not change, therefore our LTV variable does not simply capture excessive indebtedness.
30 Compared to the voting population.
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stopping paying the debt is higher. The specific forms of these organisations may be different FX 
debtor groups, which advised their members to cease making payments in several cases.31
Out of the applied independent variables, the following reduced the probability of the 
increase in debt.
If the loan contract was terminated by the financial institution. The termination of the 
contract is the first step in the court enforcement of debt (and therefore foreclosure and 
eviction). This state could force debtors to increase their debt service to prevent the sale of 
their home at auction.
If the loan is restructured. The restructuring of debt service might ease the situation for 
the debtor, so the odds are better that the debtor will reduce the debt. The problem of reverse 
causality might also arise here: it is possible that the banks only provide discounts to those 
whose original situation was also not completely hopeless, and they have already paid part of 
the original debt service. In this case, the negative sign of the coefficient reflects the selection 
strategy of the banks, and not the positive impact of restructuring.32
If the income of the debtor is higher. Higher income increases the overall odds that the 
debtor is able to moderate the outstanding debt.33
Increase in the average square metre prices in the debtor’s settlement between 2008 and 
2014. Increasing housing market prices are only significant in some of the models, and on a 5 
per cent or 10 per cent significance level, but typically with a negative sign. Therefore, where 
prices increased at a greater rate (or decreased to a lesser extent) between 2008 and 2014, this 
rather indicated a reduction of debt, but not to a substantial degree. This might be explained 
by the fact that the debtors were aware that the value of their property increases in relative 
terms and it motivated them to try to retain their properties.
31 The extent of such organisations is indicated by the fact that the "followers" of a group on one of the largest 
social media sites exceeds 21 thousand.
32 Bias could also be caused if the restructuring took place between the period we examined between January 
2014 and January 2015, and contained debt relief. In this case, the negative correlation between the variable 
expressing the debt increase and the restructuring clearly applies, but it does not reflect the improving 
repayment ability of the client. However, this bias is minimized by (1), on the one hand, the majority of the 
restructuring occurring before the examined period, (2) and on the other hand, the restructuring of the 
transaction linked to debt relief was a quite rarely applied solution by the banks (DANCSIK et al., 2015).
33 Income was indicated in the model through two variables. On the one hand, since we had no income data 
for a part of the debtors, we controlled for it with a binary variable; on the other hand, the income logarithm 
was used in the model as a continuous variable as well. In the case of the latter variable, before transforming 
it into a logarithm we set the income to HUF 1 for those who had no income, so that we would not need to 
omit these data from the estimate. We addressed the uncertainty caused by the above by making an estimate 
only for those debtors where we had information regarding income. The coefficient of the variable was also 
significant in this case and had a negative indicator.
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Table 6: Estimated results by default category, dependent variable: 1 = the debt increased or did not 
change, 0 = the debt decreased 
Note: The standard errors are in brackets. Source: Own calculation.
In addition to the above variables, the impact of financial institutions which have the claim in 
their balance is not unanimous in respect to the probability of debt increase. We also controlled 
for certain financial institutions in the models with binary variables, which in most cases were 
significant with different indicators. This has a twofold implication: on one hand, the institution 
managing the claim is the same as the institution that originally disbursed the loan in many cases, 
so the institutional variables might reflect the previous risk profile of the bank and also the credit 
rating and risk of debtors. On the other hand, the level of activity of the workout varies from one 
bank to another: the intensity of client approaches and the nature of proposed restructuring are 
also different. This draws attention to the fact that the debtors’ willingness to pay can be greatly 
influenced by the institution’s approach to the non-performing debtors in their balance.
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5. Conclusion
In our study we investigated problematic, domestic mortgage loans to determine the factors 
that influenced debtors in whether they were able and willing to reduce their outstanding debts 
between January 2014 and January 2015. We examined the subject with a regression model based 
on micro-level data supplemented by settlement-level variables. 
Based on our results, the increase in debts are, on one hand, influenced by several characteristics 
of excessive indebtedness. The higher loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and lower income ceteris paribus 
increased the probability of an increase in debt. It has the same impact if the debtor is responsible 
for more dependants, which might also indicate the tension of his/her income status. 
Beyond our results in respect to the financial situation of the debtor in a narrow sense, our estimates 
imply that debtors’ behaviour – willingness to pay – might be influenced by other factors too. Those 
debtors, whose debt multiplied compared to the originally borrowed loan amount, are less likely to 
pay the debt, than the debtors who borrowed for consumption purposes. This has the same effect if 
proportionately more non-performing debtors reside in a given settlement, which demonstrates the 
potential role of social relationships. In order to examine the impact of social capital, we created a 
settlement-level variable with a principal component analysis as a combination of three settlement-
level variables (participation ratio in the elections, the number of civil organisations per thousand 
people, the ratio of people with a university/college degree), which is significant and is included in 
our	estimates	with	a	positive	coefficient.	This	implies	that	the	‘collective	spirit”	rather	steers	debtors	
into the direction of non-payment. It also influenced the additional increase in debt if the client 
was in default for a relatively longer time. Also of significance is which institution owns the debt: 
according to our results, different institutional profiles – and probably different collection strategies 
– might lead to various results regarding the clients’ payments. 
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APPENDICES
Appendix Table 1: The most important descriptive statistics of variables applied in the model
 
Source: Own calculation.
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Appendix Table 2: Correlations between model variables
Note: The correlations greater than 0.4 and less than −0.4 are highlighted. Source: Own calculation. 
 
Appendix Table 3: Multicollinearity among the variables used in the analysis
Note: Multicollinearity is high if the Variance Inflation Factor is higher than 10, i.e. a variable is 
explained by the other independent variables by at least 90 per cent.
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THE RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL FACTORS OF 
FOREIGN DENOMINATED LENDING
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This paper investigates the financial story that facilitated the spread of foreign denominated 
loans, the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity, in the Hungarian market of the 2000s. 
As presented by the study, under the assumption of stationary price changes, foreign currency 
loans outperformed the loans denominated in forint, even for more risk-averse decision-
makers; therefore, taking a foreign currency loan could be a rational choice. The structural 
changes following the crisis of 2008 have caused the cost of foreign denominated loans to 
become higher than that of HUF loans. However, several behavioural effects exacerbated the 
subjective detection of the suffered losses. The analysis points out that foreign exchange loans 
might be an adequate financing alternative for the corporate sector, which is able to assess 
the risks. However, the retail foreign currency lending encouraged individual borrowers 
to take unknown risks, the consequences of which imposed a huge burden on the entire 
society. Under such market conditions, regulation is required to prevent rational decisions 
on a micro level from causing a systemic risk. 
Introduction 
The phenomena of foreign exchange loan and foreign exchange credit lending in Hunga-
ry has become known to the general (not professional) public and is now thought to be 
extremely harmful, mostly due to the individual and society shocks caused by residential 
mortgage loans. 
The financial literature calls this phenomena “dollarization”; it is when, in a given country, 
the currency of another country is accepted as a payment instrument in certain transactions 
instead of the payment being made in full or partially in the national currency. The most 
common reason for the replacement of the national currency in this manner is the unstable 
economic situation and weak central governance. Therefore, we generally find an example of 
dollarization in developing countries. The denomination comes from the working practice 
of Latin American countries, where, following the collapse of the so-called “soft-pegging” 
exchange rate system tied to dollars in order to reinstate financial trust, the national currency 
was replaced by US dollar.1 The replacement currency, however, may not exclusively be USD 
and can be any other financially accepted stable currency.2
With financial dollarization, we understand the presence of deposits and loans in foreign 
currency in the given economy. It is not necessarily paired with the dollarization of real 
transactions and the settlement of other assets or wages in foreign currency.  
The benefit of financial dollarization is that it prevents the capital flight of savings, and the growing 
supply on the credit side contributes to the growth of the economy. Its substantial disadvantage, 
however, is that the impact of the monetary policy tools shrinks, and the consequently created 
foreign exchange rate risk positions render the country more vulnerable in a possible crisis.
The theories serving as explanations for the phenomena can fundamentally be classified into 
three groups according to Ize and Levy Yeyati. The portfolio selection explanations focus on 
1 ROCHON and VERNENGO, 2003
2 RENNHACK and NOZAKI, 2006
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the diversification impact of the assets and resources denominated in foreign currency, and the 
credit risk explanations examine the non-performing risk of assets defined in various foreign 
currencies; the third group of theories traces financial dollarization back to the imperfections of 
the domestic economy, financial markets, and regulatory environment. 3 Ize embeds the above 
explanations into a single model, where the risk-averse, variance-minimizing attitude of the 
investors – fundamentally households – is opposed to risk-neutral companies, which optimize 
their credit borrowing by minimizing the credit risk costs.4 In this model, the foreign exchange 
rate and the interest rates are specified based on market demand and supply, and an internal 
balance is created, which reflects the creditors’ and borrowers’ optimal foreign exchange portfolio. 
Basso et al., contrary to the above, found a negative correlation based on the information of 
22 eastern Central European (including Hungary) and Asian countries regarding the share of 
loans and deposits in foreign currency. They establish that, in addition to the substantial interest 
rate difference, the increasing share of foreign-owned banks increases the credit dollarization, 
especially when there is large competition between the banks to gain market share.5 The study of 
Luca and Petrova highlights the role of bank incentives by examining the demand side (company-
specific) and supply side (bank-specific) factors; according to these, one of the key drivers of 
foreign exchange lending is the foreign-owned banks’ asset to resource conformity.6
With the transition to market economy in the Hungarian market, a similar process took 
place starting from the 1990s. With the high inflation environment and an exchange rate 
system that seemed reliable, along with available credit resources due to the appearance of 
foreign-owned banks, a considerable part of the loans was taken by the market participants, 
not in forints but in foreign currencies, German marks (later in euros), and dollars. 
In the beginning of the 2000s, a substantial part of both the corporate sector and the 
public debt was denominated in foreign currency. This ratio progressively increased through 
the course of the decade, as can be seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The credit volume of the corporate sector (left side) and the structure of the public debt (right 
side) in billion HUF
 
Source: MNB, ÁKK
3 IZE, 2006, LEVY YEYATI, 2006
4 IZE, 2006
5 BASSO et al., 2007
6 LUCA and PETROVA, 2003
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The apparent arbitrage opportunity, due to the significant interest rate difference and the 
stable exchange rate, was harnessed not only by the foreign currency loan borrowers, but the 
majority of the forward FX-stocks – concluded either with hedging or speculation purposes 
– were short foreign currency positions. 
Figure 2 shows that the forward sales (EUR short positions) were roughly double the 
volume of forward purchases (EUR long positions). The fluctuation of forward positions 
was caused mainly by the changes of the foreign exchange rate and the foreign exchange 
rate volatility7 and not the development of foreign trade. The expectation dominated in this 
market as well, based on which the high interest rate difference, apart from the exchange rate 
stability, can (almost) be achieved without any risk. 
Figure 2: Forward FX-positions of Hungarian banks with non-bank resident clients, forints in billions
Source: MNB
In this environment, where all the market players placed their bets on the strong forint, 
it seemed obvious to provide the population with the opportunity to access “cheap” foreign 
exchange credits after phasing out the subsidized housing loans.8 Several studies addressed 
the accumulation process of foreign denominated loans in Central Eastern Europe, including 
Hungary, and the contributing economic and political environment.9
Retail foreign exchange lending is not a Hungarian specialty; similar processes also took 
place in other Central Eastern European countries as well. 
 
7 DÖMÖTÖR and KOVÁCS, 2017
8 BODZÁSI, 2015
9 BROWN and DE HAAS, 2012, KIRÁLY and BANAI, 2013, KIRÁLY and SIMONOVITS, 2017
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Figure 3: The share of foreign exchange loans in the Eastern European region compared to the entire cre-
dit volume (2009) (left) and the Hungarian retail credit volume for 2005 to 2018 in billion HUF (right)
  
Source: MNB, ECB, Financial Stability Review, June 2010
Figure 3 shows that the share of foreign exchange credits was most substantial in the Baltic 
states. Besides these, a considerable part of the retail credits were foreign exchange credits 
in Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria as well. By 2008, about two-thirds of the Hungarian retail 
(primarily mortgage) loans were denominated in foreign exchange. 
While analysing the macroeconomic consequences of foreign exchange loans, Brzoza et 
al. found that, although they decrease the transmission impact of monetary policy, it has 
a positive impact on the macro-prudential policy. Therefore, the foreign exchange loans 
increase prosperity if the interest rate shocks are decisive in the economy; however, they 
reduce prosperity if the foreign exchange rate shocks are dominating. They also highlight 
that the policy-limiting foreign exchange loans leads to short-term economic regression.10
Considering the above, it is clear that neither the population enjoying cheap credits nor 
the banks profiting from the boom in lending, nor the government keeping short-term 
economic growth in sight were interested in reducing foreign exchange lending and the 
consequently created foreign exchange exposure.
The consequences of retail foreign exchange lending are well known by now. The 
weakening foreign exchange rate due to the economic crisis that started in 2008 made it clear 
for the majority of credit borrowers as to what kind of risk is concomitant with the option 
of cheaper credit. Due to the exchange rate increase, the instalments of foreign exchange 
loans grew, which was accompanied by the weakening labour demand due to the crisis. 
The financial distresses of debtors also impacted the banks negatively, the share of non-
performing loans increased, and the deteriorating bank credit portfolios caused substantial 
losses to the lending banks. Further, from a macroeconomic perspective, the financing of 
the huge, open foreign exchange position entailed an increasing risk, and the establishment 
of the sovereign crisis jeopardized the Hungarian financial system.
10 BRZOZA et al., 2017
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The settlement of the retail foreign exchange credit problem began in 2010 by prohibiting 
the retail mortgage loans in foreign currency; then, after numerous proposals11, it ended by 
the conversion of the entire portfolio into forints through several steps. 
This study examines the foreign exchange loan as a financial product from the perspective 
of a rational decision-maker, which may be an individual or a company. By analysing the 
market of the 2000s, I will demonstrate how a foreign exchange loan seemed to be a better 
alternative than a forint loan and how much more expensive it subsequently proved to be as 
compared to a similar HUF loan. I conclude that the depreciation of the forint increased the 
falsely-timed foreign exchange credit costs over the costs of HUF loans. This difference is 
moderate in the case of EUR loans but substantial in the case of credits in Swiss francs. The 
credit borrowers’ subjective sense of loss was enhanced by the fact that they did not consider 
the costs of the HUF loan as a reference point for their credit borrowing. 
Several other factors also contributed to the difficulties faced by foreign exchange credit 
debtors and the escalation of the problem, including the unilateral interest rate changing option 
of the banks, the obvious informational asymmetry, bad incentives, and the reduction of labour 
demand due to the crisis. However, their examination is not the subject of this analysis. 
1. The “big short”of foreign exchange loans
In the beginning of the 2000s, investors in the Hungarian market − including companies, 
the state, and foreign investors as well − were all counting on the exchange rate of forints 
staying stable despite the high interest rate difference. This phenomenon is the failure of the 
uncovered interest rate parity, in which case the expected value of the forward positions will 
be different from zero. 
1. 1. Covered and uncovered interest rate parity
The covered interest rate parity describes the relationship between the spot and the forward 
exchange rates. Accordingly, the exchange rate that can be fixed now and that refers to 
the future – the forward exchange rate − is nothing else but the spot rate increased by the 
difference between two interest rates.
                         (1)
Where,
S0 is the spot rate;
F is the forward rate with given maturity;
t is the time to expiry, expressed in years;
rdomestic is the domestic spot risk-free interest rate for the period t;
rforeign is the foreign spot risk-free interest rate for the period t.
11 BERLINGER and WALTER, 2013, 2014
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The above mechanism of forward pricing is based on consistent (arbitrage-free) pricing; 
neither the investor preferences nor the risk attitude, nor the expected yield of the underlying 
product have a role. The relationship in Equation 1 is always met (assuming a liquid spot 
and forward foreign exchange and interest rate market(s)), unless that the opportunity of 
arbitrage comes up, which will be utilized by the market players.12
If the foreign interest rate is higher than that of the domestic, the forward exchange rate will 
be lower than the spot rate. Conversely − which was characteristic for the Hungarian market 
that has also been analysed by us – the forward exchange rate is higher than the spot one. 
It is worth mentioning that due to the covered interest rate parity, it makes no difference in 
which currency we invest our money; if we agree to convert it back into the national currency 
by conluding a forward  transaction, the profit gained or lost on the interest rate will be 
offset by the exchange rate profit or loss. In case the interest rate of the foreign currency is 
higher than that of the domestic, despite receiving a higher interest rate on our deposit, the 
forward exchange rate is lower than the spot rate, i.e. we receive less national currency per 
unit of foreign currency at the end. 
The same applies to borrowing credit at a lower interest rate in foreign currency, if we prefer 
to eliminate the exchange rate risk with a forward transaction, the forward rate that can be fixed 
now will be higher. Thus, the loss of the exchange rate will exactly offset the interest rate profit.
Based on the above, it is evident that the suggestions, according to which it would have been better 
for the foreign currency credit debtors to hedge their foreign exchange risk by forward transactions, do 
not make much sense, as their credit would have been a HUF loan with higher interest rates in this case. 
The reason for choosing to take foreign currency loan is precisely the lower interest rate cost. In case 
the credit borrower takes a loan in foreign currency, he creates an open position, as he does not know 
the exchange rate he will be able to buy the foreign currency in order to repay the loan upon maturity. 
The spot foreign exchange rate in the future is a probability variable. The question is, what 
can we say about its expected value? Does it equal today’s forward exchange rate? Is the 
following equation valid? 
                    (2)
Where, E is the expected value, and St stands for the spot rate in time t.
Equation 2 describes the uncovered interest rate parity, the relation between the expected 
future exchange rate, and the current interest rates. Accordingly, the spot FX-rate’s (which is 
a probability variable) expected value equals to today’s forward rate, and the exchange rate 
is expected to change according to the interest rate difference between the two currencies. 
The currency with the higher interest rate is expected to depreciate against the other. 
Consequently, in case the uncovered interest rate parity holds, it does not matter as to which 
foreign exchange we take out a loan in, or place a deposit; what we gain (or lose) on the inte-
rest rate will be exactly equal to what we lose (or gain) on the exchange rate. An important 
12  The definition of forward exchange rate and the utilization of the opportunity of arbitrage upon wrong 
pricing is part of all fundamental financial textbooks, for more detail see SZÁZ, 2009, or HULL, 2008.
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difference, however, compared to the above relationship – the covered interest rate parity, 
is that entering into a forward transaction fixes the exchange rate at maturity. however, the 
uncovered interest rate parity determines the expected value of the exchange rate at maturity.
In case the uncovered interest rate parity holds, it is not really worth speculating with 
forward transactions, since the result of the transaction will be randomly distributed around 
zero. According to the modern portfolio theory,13 the expected spot FX-rate will equal to the 
forward exchange rate if the systematic risk of the given asset (correlation with the market 
portfolio) is zero. The risk premium on the foreign exchange market is called country risk 
premium (CRP), and Equation 2 is modified as follows:
                          (3)
In case of a positive country risk premium, the expected future exchange rate will be lower 
than the forward rate, since the investors will request positive risk premium for riskier assets 
and invest in riskier currencies only if the expected change of the exchange rate is lower than 
the interest rate difference.
1. 2. Decomposition of theforeign exchange loan
The foreign exchange loan is nothing else but a HUF loan plus forward sales of the foreign 
currency. The borrower of the foreign exchange loan – assuming that he/she has no income 
in foreign currency – is undertaking a speculative position, obviously with the aim of 
lowering HUF loan costs by the profit of the forward position. 
Let’s examine the above statement through a simple example. We will assume that a credit borrower 
would like to take credit out for one period (1 year) and has to decide which currency to take the debt 
in (foreign or domestic currency). There are credit markets in both currencies, and the interest rate to 
be paid in the domestic currency is rdomestic and in foreign currency is rforeign; the spot rate is S0, and the 
spot rate in one year is S1. Consider the exchange rate as the price of one unit of foreign currency, and 
the credit to be taken out is one unit of foreign currency. The current payment – the actual credit to be 
taken in both cases – is S0. This is the credit amount in the domestic currency. For the credit in foreign 
currency, we convert one unit of foreign currency by the spot rate, so we acquire S0 domestic currency.
The cash flow of the two constructions are identical initially, unlike that at the repayment. We 
know the amount to be paid in domestic currency as the credit taken and the interest rates are 
known. In case of a creditin foreign currency, however, the redemption amount denominated in 
domestic currency depends on the spot rate at repayment. The cash flows are summarized in Table 1. 
t = 0 t = 1
National currency  S0 -S0(1+rdomestic) 
Foreign currency  S0 -S1(1+rforeign) 
Table 1: The cash flows of one-period credits in domestic and foreign currency
13 ELTON et al., 2009
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You can see that at maturity (t = 1) the payment difference, on one hand, depends on 
the difference between the two interest rates (this is known in advance). It also depends 
on the difference between the spot and maturity rates (this is not known in advance). By 
subtracting the two from each other, we get the following Equation:
            (4)
It means that the difference between the two types of credit redemptions equals the value 
of the short forward position of (1+rforeign) unit foreign currency.  Thus, the one-year forward 
sales position’s value at maturity (f) depends on the spot rate at maturity, i.e.
      f=F-S1                   (5)
As a consequence of the above, the amounts to be paid for the foreign currency loan and 
the HUF denominated loan are identical if the spot rate at maturity (in this case, in one year) 
is equal to the forward rate of the credit borrowing date.
As the borrower of the foreign exchange credit has a short forward position, he will suffer 
a loss as compared to the borrower of the HUF loan, if the spot rate increases at a rate 
exceeding the interest rate difference. It is important to note that the foreign exchange cre-
dit debtor was better off than the HUF credit debtor, as long as the increasing exchange rate 
stayed under the forward exchange rate (S1<F).
The real credit constructions were certainly not one-year loans. The above concept can 
however be interpreted similarly in case of a variable (continuously decreasing) credit 
amount and multi-period loans hedged by cross currency swap.14
The foreign exchange lending was nothing but the “shorting” of the foreign currency on 
a national level. 
In the followings, I will examine what kind of risk the foreign exchange loan meant for 
a rational decision-maker who could realistically assess the risks and what kind of risk 
attitude was required for someone to choose to take the foreign exchange loan.
2. Empirical study 
The uncovered interest rate parity holds if the spot rate at maturity is expected to match the 
forward exchange rate. The EUR/HUF and CHF/HUF market development is demonstrated 
by Figures 4 and 5 from 2001, the date of the liberalization of the forint.
 
14 KIRÁLY and SIMONOVITS, 2017
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Figure 4: The EUR/HUF spot rate and the lagged one year forward rate between 2002−2018 (left axis) 
and the difference of the two (right axis)
Source: Bloomberg
Figure 5: The CHF/HUF spot rate and the lagged one year forward rate between 2002−2018 (left axis) 
and the difference of the two (right axis)
Source: Bloomberg
The dark line shows the spot rate, and the light one shows the one year forward rate one 
year before, i.e. the exchange rate of the just maturing transactions. In case the uncovered 
interest rate parity holds, the size of the grey areas that show the difference of the two, under 
and above the zero axis, should be equal. 
It can be seenin both figures that, until 2008, the positive difference is denominated, and 
the forward exchange rate for the majority of the period exceeded the spot rate at maturity. 
During this period, there were some periods when the one-year foreign exchange loan 
proved to be more expensive than the HUF loan. In a longer credit construction, however, 
the foreign exchange loan debtors were obviously better off. 
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After 2008, the foreign currency rate that was considered stable before substantially 
weakened as a consequence of which the payment obligations of the foreign currency loans 
rose over the burdens of the HUF loan. 
I will investigate two questions below. On one hand, I will examine how a rational credit 
borrower in the summer of 2008, directly before the crisis, considered the risks of EUR and 
CHF loans. On the other hand, I will analyse how much more expensive a 10-year foreign 
currency loans taken out in 2008 was for the credit borrower as compared to an HUF loan. 
Although in 2015, the retail foreign currency credits were converted into forints, nearly half 
of the corporate loans are still foreign denominated (see Figure 1).
2. 1. Risk of Foreign denominated loans as of 2008
According to the efficient market hypothesis,15 the prices of products traded on the financial 
markets reflect all available information; therefore, their change is due to random, new 
incoming information. Hence, the price movement has Markov nature and the geometric 
Brownian motion (GBM) is  used for describing the price development.
Presuming the development of the foreign exchange rate according to the GBM, the 
annual logarithmic return is a normally distributed random variable, the parameters of 
which can be estimated from the returns of the previous periods as a random sample from 
the underlying distribution. 
In case an investor had modelled the exchange rates at the end of August 2008, based on the 
EUR/HUF and CHF/HUF prices of the previous five years, one could observe that the HUF 
was expected to strengthen against the EUR by 1.3% annually and against the CHF by 2.26% 
annually. Moreover, the exchange rate volatility would have been 8–9% on an annual level. The 
one- and ten-year foreign interest rates were 3–5% lower on an annual basis than the HUF rates.16 
Based on the model, therefore, the credit borrower could expect that despite the substantial inte-
rest rate difference, not only would the HUF not weaken according to the uncovered interest rate 
parity but also would strengthen, making the foreign exchange loan even cheaper. 
The Markowitz portfolio theory (1952) presumes that an individual decision-maker’s 
utility function depends on the expected return (E(r)) and its variance (ơ2) .
                           (6)
Where,   is the risk aversion coefficient, which measures how sensitive the investor is 
towards the risk measured by the variance. Calculating the level of risk aversion above which 
the decision-maker would rather choose the expectedly more expensive but risk-free credit 
borrowing alternative, the received values are 13.82 and 18.80. As a comparison, the long-
term average risk premium of the American equity market (approx. 8%) with 20% volatility 
corresponds to a 3.6 risk aversion coefficient.
15 MALKIEL and FAMA, 1970
16 Based on the yields of government bonds.
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The data is summarized in Table 2.
Exchange rate (Compared 
to the HUF)
Interest rate difference 
(Compared to the HUF)
Rate of risk 
rejection
Drift Volatility 1-year 10-year A
EUR −1.30% 8.12% 3.12% 3.25% 13.82
CHF −2.26% 8.64% 5.26% 4.75% 18.80
Table 2: Exchange rate modelling based on market data at the end of August 2008
Source: Bloomberg, ÁKK, ECB, SNB
The analysis assumes that the returns are stationary, i.e. the parameters of the underlying 
distribution are stable. 
2. 2. The cost of foreign exchange loan between 2008 and 2018
The crisis led to a structural change in the financial markets, and the model parameters changed 
substantially. Regarding the EUR/HUF exchange rate relation, based on the figures of the ten 
years between 2008 and 2018, the rate of growth for the exchange rate increased to 3.5% per year. 
It was only slightly higher than the difference of the 10-year interest rate levels in 2008. 
Figure 6: The EUR/HUF spot rate and the forward rate fixed in August 2008 (left axis) and the 
difference of the two (right axis)
Source: Bloomberg
In Figure 6, the light line indicates the forward exchange rates that could have been fixed 
at the end of August 2008, while the dark line indicates the actual spot rates. The grey area 
is the deviation from the uncovered interest rate parity. Compared to Figure 4 that indicated 
the difference from uncovered interest rate parity for one year, Figure 6 compares the spot 
rate movement and the forward rate fixed in August 2008 for the given day. In case of a 
10-year loan, the actual cost was determined by the repayment schedule. If we examine an 
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annuity construction, the costs of EUR loans taken in August 2008 exceeded the costs of the 
HUF loan by one percentage point.
This raises a question: if with the worst scheduling – with credit taken out by the lowest 
foreign currency rate followed by a continuous exchange rate increase – the foreign exchange 
loan only proved to be one percentage point more expensive than the HUF loan, why do so 
many people talk about a national catastrophe occurring? 
By 2008, the majority of the retail foreign exchange loans were in Swiss francs denominated. 
17 The exchange rate of the Swiss franc, as compared to the HUF, went through an even more 
drastic change. Figure 7 shows that the debt in Swiss francs had a considerable exchange rate 
loss throughout the entire period. 
Figure 7: The CHF/HUF spot rate and the forward rate fixed in August 2008 (left axis) and the 
difference of the two (right axis)
Source: Bloomberg
The annual growth rate of the Swiss franc exchange rate between 2008 and 2018 was about 
7.5%. To pay the monthly instalments for ten years of a loan taken out in 2008, the CHF had to 
be purchased at an average 39% higher foreign exchange rate than what the forward exchange 
rate was in 2008. Therefore, the interest rate of a 10-year annuity payment CHF credit exceeded 
the interest rate of a similar HUF loan by total 7.74 percentage points ex-post.
3. Behavioural effects
When examining the decision-making situation of a credit borrower above, I have assumed 
that the decision-maker was perfectly informed, was aware of the possible outcomes of his 
decision, and was also rational. Rationality in economics means that one’s choices correspond 
to the maximization of his expected utility, i.e. there exists a utility function, according to 
which the decisions are consistent.18 Based on the above, the analysis of the foreign exchange 
17 KOLOZSI et al., 2015
18 BERLINGER and VÁRADI, 2015
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loans concluded that taking loan in foreign currency must have been a rational choice for a 
credit borrower by the given, not ultimately, high risk aversion level.
Kahneman and Tversky were among the firsts to examine and describe those decision 
anomalies, which were typical for most individual decision-makers and cannot be aligned 
with the theory of expected utility.19 In conjunction with the foreign exchange loans, two 
well-known behavioural effects should be highlighted: framing and the change of the risk 
attitude.
Framing describes the phenomena of how a decision-maker is influenced by the 
formulation of a scenario. The decision depends on how the given situation is presented to 
him/her (when choosing from various therapies, it matters whether we show the survival or 
the mortality rate, although both contain the same information). 
Most likely, less people would have taken credit in a foreign currency if the contract 
included that, in addition to the HUF loan, one must make a series of forward transactions 
– although, basically, this is what they signed.
One manifestation of framing is that, in decision-making situations, we are inclined to 
adjust our future vision to an externally provided or imaginary reference point.20 In case of 
foreign exchange credits, the actual exchange rate appeared to be an anchor in the decisions. 
Even though based on the exchange rate volatility, an unfavourable outcome would have also 
been probable, not only the retail credit borrowers but also the professional lenders did not 
realistically consider the substantial changing of the exchange rate. The overly optimistic 
expectations regarding credit costs were reinforced by the methodology of the Annual 
Percentage Rate of Charge (APRC) calculation, based on which the otherwise uncertain 
future conversion rate has to be replaced by the spot rate.21
The same effect appears in sensing the suffered losses. In the previous chapter, I presented 
that a 10-year EUR loan taken out before the crisis proved to be by an annual one percentage 
point more expensive, while the CHF loan was subsequently 7.74 percentage points more 
expensive than the HUF loan. However, the credit borrowers did not compare the actual 
costs to the HUF loan, but they took the 3 to 5 percentage points more favourable interest 
rates as a reference point.
The subjective risk-detection also played an important role in credit borrowing decisions. 
Kahneman and Tversky demonstrate how the attitude toward risk, on one hand, depends 
on whether we talk about profit or loss and, on the other hand, on how likely these profits 
or losses are to occur.22 In general, risk-aversion is typical when assessing profits with high 
probability and losses with low probability, but the decision-maker becomes a risk-seeker 
when he/she has to decide about losses with high probability and profits with low probability. 
The risk assessment of foreign exchange credit was distorted by the social impact, based 
on which decision-makers become less risk averse during group decision-making.23 The 
19 KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY, 1979, 1992
20 JÁKI, 2013a, 2013b.
21 BERLINGER, 2017
22 KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY, 1979, 1992
23 BERLINGER and VÁRADI, 2015
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spread of foreign exchange credits therefore strengthened the underestimation of related 
risks, and people took mostly unseen risks in return for the lower foreign exchange interest 
rates that were taken as a reference point.
 
4. Conclusions 
The severe individual and social impacts of retail foreign exchange lending make many people 
believe that this form of financing is clearly damaging. However, the fact that nearly half of the 
corporate loans today are foreign denominated loans contradicts the abovementioned point.
The study has demonstrated that EUR denominatedloan borrowed at even the worst 
timing only entailed moderate extra costs as compared to the HUF loan. The sudden losses 
experienced in the CHF loans, however, generated substantial extra costs even compared 
to the cost of HUF loans. This was further worsened by the fact that credit borrowers 
considered the lower foreign exchange interest rates as a reference point, compared to which 
the sensed interest rate surcharge of foreign exchange loans corresponded to 12–13% on an 
annual basis. 
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Introduction 
Foreign currency lending might be the most notable story of 21st century Hungary. It 
impacted a substantial part of the population directly or indirectly, and its consequences 
are still manifest in our daily lives. Therefore, it is practical and necessary to thoroughly 
investigate those reasons and processes, which led to the appearance and penetration of 
this special banking credit product, as well as those impacts and consequences triggered by 
foreign currency lending. 
The study examines the situation of the flourishing Hungarian foreign currency lending 
at the time the economic crisis broke out in 2008. We wish to present the impact the crisis 
had on the stakeholders of this credit lending relationship and, consequently, the types of 
problems that emerged and proposals for solutions made. 
The study fundamentally analyses what happened after the breakout of the crisis from a legal 
perspective. However, we cannot avoid an investigation into the nature of the foreign currency 
loan itself and – also considering the reactive nature of science – those conditions of economics, 
which the legal features of the foreign currency loan and the loan agreement are related. 
The study separately addresses the introduction of self-regulating aspirations of financial 
institutions. Through these, the banks wanted to limit the excessive indebtedness of 
consumers even before the crisis, and to boost market competition by drafting proposals for 
legal regulators. At the same time, it is extraordinarily instructive how the legal regulators 
accepted these aspirations, and to what extent they could integrate the professional knowledge 
based on practical experience. From the regulating side, the efficiency of the applied legal 
solutions needs to be examined, on one hand from the aspect of arising problems, and on the 
other hand by the timely recognition and management of similar future problems. 
In addition, the study presents the legal solutions for the remedy of social-economic 
problems arising due to the crisis (in many cases for their mismanagement), the legislative 
and judicial practice, as well as the solutions and measures proposed by market stakeholders. 
The study does not separately address the specific questions and judicial practice arising in 
foreign currency loan litigation. Reference to litigation serves only to illustrate, sometimes 
justify the said legal context.
1. The foreign currency loan 
1. 1. The concept of the foreign currency loan 
The foreign currency loan is not a concept of our time, it was already known at the end of the 
19th century, so its dogma can be considered elaborate. 
“The lender shall pay the promised loan amount in accordance with the legal provisions 
regarding the payment of monetary debt. The general rule that applies without any specific 
stipulation is that the lender shall disburse the promised loan amount, regardless of how its 
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amount is established, in the legal currency of the place of payment. If the disbursal was not 
in this currency, the recalculation shall take place at the exchange rate of the actual payment 
date. Certainly, there might be an agreement in the legal transaction to have the loan amount 
paid out either in the denominated currency, or effectively in another currency. In all these 
cases, the lender shall pay the loan amount in the currency actually nominated for disbursal 
based on the stipulation. No matter what currency the payment took place in, the lender did 
not loan out the currency amount in which it was imposed in, but the amount, for the payment 
of which it paid. So if the lender committed to loan GBP 100, the loan amount was paid out 
in Zurich, and the exchange rate on the date of payment is 15 Swiss francs per Pound, when 
the lender paid CGF 1500 to the credit borrower, he did not loan CHF 1500, but GBP 100.1”
The lender commits to provide a loan in the specified currency (denominated currency), and 
the debtor shall repay the specified loan amount (in the same currency and in the same amount). 
As a general rule, the loan will be disbursed in the local currency of the place of disbursal, 
however, it does not influence the obligation of the debtor to pay the loan amount specified in 
the denominated currency. The debtor and the lender may agree in the contract (considering 
the disposing regulation regarding the contract) to have the disbursal and/or repayment 
of the loan – contrary to the general rules – paid in another currency. This however does 
not influence the obligation of the lender to provide the loan amount in the denominated 
currency, nor the obligation of the debtor to (regardless of which currency the loan is repaid) 
pay the specified loan amount in the denominated currency based on the contract. 
Tying the debtor’s payment obligation to the denominated currency also means that, from 
the perspective of the construct, the exchange rate fluctuations of the disbursed and paid 
currency is irrelevant between the date of disbursal and the date of repayment. If the currency 
of the repayment is appreciated against the denominated currency, the debtor has to pay a 
nominally smaller amount (less) in the paid currency. On the contrary, if the currency of the 
repayment is depreciated against the denominated currency, the debtor has to pay a larger 
amount (more) in the paid currency. In other words: the burden of exchange rate fluctuation, 
and the exchange rate risk as a consequence of the construct burdens the debtor. 
It is also a generally prevailing rule in the construct that the disbursal of the loan amount 
is usually not in the denominated currency, and the repayment, i.e. redemption of the loan, 
is not in the denominated currency. This however does not change the contractual obligation 
of the parties, which is the nature of the contractual obligation of the parties’ contract. Due 
to the disposing nature of the contract, the parties can certainly agree that both the disbursal 
and the repayment of the loan shall take place in the denominated currency (or any other 
necessary to achieve the commercial objective related to the contract). 
The distinction between a foreign currency loan and a loan denominated in foreign currency 
has no significance from the aspect of legal assessment of the legal relationship. In case of a 
foreign currency loan, the lender’s payment (disbursal) obligation and the credit borrower’s 
1 SZLADITS Károly: Hungarian Civil Law. The extraordinary part of the law of contract. Budapest, Book 
publisher of Károly Grill, 1942. 176-177.
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payment (redemption) obligation is applicable in the denominated currency as per the 
contract, whereas in case of a loan denominated in foreign currency, it is denominated in a 
currency different from the denominated currency. 
This difference was presented by the President of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority (hereinafter referred to as: HFSA) to the Curia in its letter dated 31 May 2013.
Foreign currency loan Foreign currency 
denominated loan
BANK RESOURCE in foreign exchange in foreign exchange
REGISTRATION OF THE 
LOAN
in foreign exchange in foreign exchange
DISBURSAL in foreign exchange in HUF
Conversion within the 
bank before disbursal
none From foreign exchange to 
HUF
REDEMPTION in foreign exchange in foreign exchange
Conversion by the client From HUF to foreign 
exchange *
none
Conversion within the 
bank after redemption
none From HUF to foreign 
exchange
* except, if the client has income or savings in foreign currency2
Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer credit 
agreements related to residential properties, as well as Directive 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/
EU and on the amendment of Directive 1093/2010/EU (hereinafter referred to as: Directive) 
contain provisions regarding the concept of foreign currency loan and the information 
provided for consumers taking the foreign exchange credit. 
According to the Directive (Article 4. 28.) “The Foreign currency loan: means a credit 
agreement where the credit is:
a) denominated in a currency other than that in which the consumer receives the income 
or holds the assets from which the credit is to be repaid; or 
b) denominated in a currency other than that of the Member State in which the consumer 
is resident.” 
The Directive enables member countries to bring further provisions regarding the 
regulation of foreign currency loans, provided they are not backdated [Article 23 paragraph 
(5)]. The Directive therefore considers the institution of consumer credit provided in foreign 
exchange to be in tune with European law in the long-term as well, and the question of 
nullity or unfairness in connection with the contract type does not arise. The Directive 
2 https://felugyelet.mnb.hu/data/cms2401714/PSZAF_levele_a_Kuria_reszere.pdf
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specifically stipulates the general prohibition of retrospective application of legislation in 
connection with foreign currency lending. 
The law of Hungary also contains a similar provision to the previously described principle-
based approach and EU regulation. According to Section 6:45 of the Hungarian Civil Code, 
per the Terms of payment of monetary debts 
(1)  ”A monetary debt shall be settled in the legal tender at the place and time of settlement. 
(2)  If the monetary debt is recorded in another currency, it shall be converted at the exchange 
rate specified by the central bank of the place of settlement in effect at the time of 
settlement, or failing this, based on the money market rate. If a monetary debt is to be 
repaid in a foreign currency, and at the time of settlement the debt cannot be repaid in 
that foreign currency, the monetary debt shall be settled as under Subsection (1).”
1. 2. Banking approach 
During the analysis of foreign currency lending – in addition to the previous legal foundation 
– we must mention the related operations of banks, and their financial mediating role as well. 
The fundamental function of a bank is to provide loans from the deposits placed with them. 
It pays interest on the deposit to the depositor, and collects interest on the loan. The loan 
interest rate (the difference between the interest rates) covers the bank’s expenses and risks, 
and guarantees profit. Therefore it is an economic axiom, that in the same currency the loan 
interest rates are higher than the interest rates paid on the resources, i.e. a credit institution is 
not able to provide a loan (lend) under the level of the interest rates covering its resource costs. 
Axiom 1: The loan conditions are not freely formed by the bank, it must consider the 
deposit (resource) side as well. 
An individual (depositor, investor) with temporary surplus cash puts the money where he/
she gets the highest interest rate (yield). 
Axiom 2: There is market competition regarding the collection of resources, and 
with the establishment of deposit interest rates the bank takes the yield of other 
investments (e.g. government securities) into consideration as well. Also, competitors’ 
loan interest rates. 
The Hungarian economy (including the Hungarian banking system) has traditionally 
lacked resources, with fewer deposits than the demand for credit. With the integration 
of foreign resources, foreign currency lending was already a well-known practice during 
dualism, and between the First and the Second World War. The Hungarian economy has 
always lacked capital, and it had fewer resources (savings), than assets (credit). The banks with 
foreign ownership provided foreign resources for Hungarian developments. They financed 
the construction of mills, railways, cosmopolitan cities, etc. Market practice was followed by 
economic and legal theory, and the application of the denominated and paid currency.
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Axiom 3: Foreign currency lending is not a new invention, it has been practised in 
Hungary for 150 years and has been theoretically grounded.
In Hungarian practice, inflation-indexed pricing is also known in the case of other, 
long-term transactions (e.g. property leasing), when consideration for the service is made 
contingent on an unforeseeable change in the external conditions independent of the parties. 
Axiom 4: Pricing made dependent on an unforeseeable external condition 
independent of the parties is not unknown today, and it does not make the product 
“faulty” in itself, hence also not the foreign exchange credit.
Following the year 2002, under the economic and financial market conditions and due to the 
legal provisions in Hungary of the time, the interest rates of HUF credits (loans) were quite high, 
adapted to the interest rates of available HUF resources. At the same time, it was possible to obtain 
foreign currency loan resources on the international financial markets at a fairly low resource 
cost. In this situation, clients decided on cheaper loans denominated in foreign currency, and 
the credit institutions serving this demand started to outsource loans denominated in foreign 
currency as well as foreign exchange credits in an ever-increasing volume. 
Axiom 5: The bank needed to provide a foreign currency resource for the low-interest 
loan, otherwise (in case of a HUF resource with high interest level) it would have 
suffered a loss. 
The foreign currency resource financing the foreign exchange credits can be (i) the foreign currency 
deposit of clients (ii) the foreign currency loan borrowed from the market, i.e. the institutions (and 
also the equal amount of foreign currency policy issue), as well as (iii) the so-called foreign currency 
swap, when the bank receives foreign currency for a certain period in exchange for forints. The 
common feature of these foreign exchange resources is that upon their maturity dates the bank has 
to “return” a certain amount of foreign exchange to the depositors, the institutional lenders or the 
partner with whom they signed a foreign exchange swap transaction according to the construct. 
Since the foreign exchange amount is given, the weaker the HUF is, the higher the amount the bank 
has to covert to foreign exchange upon repayment, thus the more it costs to repay the debt. 
Axiom 6: The bank owes its own lenders the same way as the client borrowing the 
foreign exchange credit owes the bank, so if the exchange rate is weaker, they have to 
pay a higher amount back in forints. 
It is a unique feature belonging to the prudent operations of banks, that in case of providing 
a foreign currency or foreign currency denominated credit, the bank has to procure foreign 
currency financing in an equal amount. Should the bank not do so, it would have an open 
position, i.e. it would assume a foreign currency exchange rate risk. Risk-taking of this type is 
monitored and tracked by the supervisory entities (MNB, Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
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Authority) on a daily basis. In addition, the banks have to ensure funding by strict legal 
regulations, which should be indicated in its accounting reports. 
Axiom 7: The condition, that there is foreign exchange resource behind the foreign 
currency loan, is certified by the reports of MNB and Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority and the bank’s accounting reports, in addition to the contents of point 5.
In case of a foreign currency loan, the credit resource is available in foreign currency. However, 
the client needed HUF, so the bank disbursed HUF and this HUF amount appeared on the client’s 
account (simply: the bank purchased and converted the credit amount provided for the client in 
foreign currency into HUF). Therefore, the loan amount was disbursed on the client’s account in 
HUF and not in foreign currency. When the bank converts the foreign currency that it borrows 
into forints to be able to disburse HUF to the client, it takes a short-term foreign currency exchange 
rate risk. If the disbursal in foreign currency would also suit the client, the bank would not take this 
risk (as in this case the client would convert the foreign currency into HUF on the current foreign 
exchange rate on the market). With repayment, the situation is exactly the opposite. In order 
to fulfil the client’s payment obligation in foreign currency, the bank sells the required foreign 
currency to its debtor. By this, the bank subscribes a foreign currency selling rate for the client. 
Axiom 8: There was real foreign currency purchase and sales behind the buying rate 
disbursal and the selling rate applied during repayment. 
The foreign currency loan was an immensely popular bank product up until 2009. Its contents 
did not violate any sense of justice, and the transaction type widely applied by banks did not 
trigger the disapproval of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority. The instalment rate 
of a CHF loan, borrowed in the summer of 2004, immediately started to decrease, and up 
until the autumn of 2008 it was lower than initially. In certain cases, it could have been even 
20% lower. Clients could enjoy the benefits and profits derived from the beneficial shifting of 
the exchange rate. Consumers indebted in foreign currency still had to pay less instalments in 
HUF, than those who borrowed a HUF loan during the same period. 
Moreover, the banks also offered a so-called exchange rate guarantee between 2006 and 
2008 for certain foreign currency loans, taking the exchange rate risk. They did it to relieve 
their foreign currency loan clients from this risk. 
Prior to the outbreak of the crisis in 2008, the banks typically procured foreign exchange 
resources at a low resource cost. This resource cost however tripled after the outbreak of 
the crisis. One of the key reasons for the increasing resource costs during this period was 
the growing uncertainty in connection with the forint, the Hungarian economy and the 
entire eurozone. This uncertainty – through the increasing resource costs of banks – also 
appeared in the interest rate to be paid by the client (debtor). The increase of resource costs 
and interest rates therefore was caused by the changing of the same exact factors, which led 
to the depreciation of the HUF against the CHF and EUR. 
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Axiom 9: The increase of resource costs and the clients’ interest rates therefore was 
caused by the changing of the same exact factors, which resulted in the depreciation 
of the HUF against the CHF and EUR. 
2. Foreign currency lending in Hungary 
The ownership and use of acquired foreign currency was tied to strict rules for a long time in 
the Hungarian economy. Compared with that, the establishment of the new Foreign Currency 
Code Act in 1995 (Act XCV of 1995) was considered a revolutionary act. The emphasized 
aim of the Foreign Currency Act was to “promote the expansion of the convertibility of HUF, 
the increased utilization of international commercial and economic cooperation, as well as the 
gradual approach towards foreign currency regulation approved by international institutions 
– depending on the development of economic transition.” Accordingly, the institution and 
system of foreign exchange control was gradually dismissed. As a first step, the Foreign 
Currency Act enabled free convertibility for the running payment transactions both for 
national and foreign citizens. In case of capital transactions, the founding of enterprises 
or acquisition by nationals abroad – by a registration obligation – also became possible. 
With other capital transactions however, the approval by the foreign currency authority still 
remained in effect for a temporary period, not comprehensively. Based on that, the long-
term capital import by foreign citizens was not limited by the foreign currency regulation, 
whereas a financial type of capital export and the short-term capital import was generally 
only possible with a permit issued by the foreign currency authority. 
Natural persons who were abroad were also able to freely purchase convertible foreign exchange 
and foreign currency for their personal needs qualifying as current and ongoing operations. All 
expenditures related to tourism and other running items could be settled without limitation 
domestically. They could retain the foreign exchange that they possessed, and were able to keep them 
on a foreign exchange account, or at home without any limitation concerning the amount as they saw 
fit. Taking a loan however was only possible in a very tight scope and with the disbursal of forints. 
In 2001, the Government found the domestic and international economic environment 
appropriate to eliminate the remaining obstacles for full convertibility. The Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank (MNB, the Hungarian Central Bank) decided on the expansion of the HUF exchange rate 
range with the agreement of the Government on 3 May 2001. This step made the acceleration 
of the elimination of foreign currency limitations necessary. The Government decided on the 
complete elimination of foreign currency limitations at its session dated 5 June 2001, as well as the 
establishment of full convertibility of the forint. This impacted domestic and foreign economic 
stakeholders, organisations and natural persons. By comprehensive liberalization – among other 
things – the permit or the reporting obligation by the foreign exchange authority and the foreign 
exchange import/export obligation was terminated, and holding a foreign exchange or HUF 
account became free, the same as the export of foreign or domestic currency. 
 Government Decree 88/ 2001. (15. VI.)(5) (followed by the reinforcing Act XCIII of 2001) 
enabled free loan borrowing without foreign exchange limitations for national residents. 
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Due to the interest rate subsidy by the Government, housing loans denominated in HUF 
were launched from 2001 [Government Decree 12/2001. (31. I.)]. With the termination of 
the housing support program by the Government however (state interest rate subsidy was 
no longer sustainable due to the increasing retail lending in 2003), and with the substantial 
aggravation of the interest rate subsidizing conditions, subsidized HUF loans were replaced 
by foreign currency loans from 2004. From 2004 to 2005, not long after housing loans 
denominated in foreign currency, foreign exchange-based mortgage loans also appeared. 
The foreign currency loan volume was mostly extended between 2006 and 2008, which might have 
been influenced by sales via agents (credit intermediaries) becoming significant from 2007 at a system 
level. This enabled the previous bank capacity limits to soften, and clients with lower credit rating could 
also access loans via intermediaries – primarily due to improper information provided to the clients. 
In the specialised literature – but mostly in the political public sphere – a vivid dispute 
regarding the termination of retail credit lending limitation has been ongoing ever since. György 
Surányi, in his article on the traps of foreign currency lending3 considers the legal enabling of the 
retail foreign currency lending opportunity as primordial sin. However, he also admits, and in 
his high standard study András Hudecz also provides detailed analysis,4 that despite the obvious 
signs there was no substantive regulation of foreign currency loans until the outbreak of the crisis 
in 2008 – beyond the weak verbal interventions –, neither on the supply, nor on the demand side. 
This study does not undertake to provide a detailed presentation of economic-legal risks which 
appeared before the great crisis (in the words of Surányi: “Great Recession”), and for the parrying of 
which there was at least a faint opportunity. It however can be laid down with great certainty that, 
“During one or the other period of the story of foreign currency lending in Hungary almost all conditions 
were met, which based specialised literature contributes to the penetration of foreign currency lending”,5 
also the resulting regulating opportunities for substantively moderating the risks were omitted. 
The application of the mandatory risk exposure declaration introduced from 01 January 2005 can 
be considered the first substantive regulation. The justification by the minister of the amendment of 
Act CLXII of 1996 on credit institutions and financial enterprises (hereinafter referred to as: Credit 
Act) stipulated: “In case of contracts signed with retail clients, which aim at providing foreign currency 
loans, … the financial institution shall expose the risk for clients in the contractual transaction, the 
acknowledgement of which shall be certified by the client’s signature. The risk exposure declaration shall 
contain information about the exchange rate risk in case of a contract or providing a foreign currency 
loan, as well as its impact on the instalment rate.” According to the justification: “The purpose of the 
amendment of consumer protection regulations is to provide better and more thorough information 
for the clients. Thanks to the lower interest rate, the volume of foreign currency loans compared to 
HUF loans dynamically extended from the beginning of 2004. At the same time, the foreign currency 
loan also has considerable risk in case of the exchange rate fluctuation, as the instalment rates might 
increase, which the clients should be made aware of in a separate risk exposure declaration.” 
3 György SURÁNYI: The traps of foreign currency lending. Portfolio 12 May 2017 https://www.portfolio.hu/
gazdasag/suranyi-gyorgy-a-devizahitelezes-csapdai.248905.html
4 András HUDECZ: Parallel stories - The establishment and management of retail foreign currency lending in 
Poland, Romania and Hungary. Hitelintézeti szemle, 4/2012, 349-411.
5 HUDECZ: i.m. 386.
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The regulation – with its own possible and limited tools – tried to supplement the 
sometimes startling insufficiencies of the consumers’ financial culture with the obligation 
to provide information to financial institutions. It is clear however, that the detailed and 
careful information was not able to make consumers aware of the fundamental financial 
knowledge and correlations (the teaching of which would have been a governmental task). 
3.The aspirations of banks to mitigate risks before the 
Great Recession 
3. 1. The creation of the positive list debtor record 
In the regulation of loan and loan-type financial services, the central registration of credit and 
personal information that can be used to assess the credit application has substantial importance. 
The aim of the credit assessment is to enable the lending institutions to understand the solvency and 
liquidity of their future debtors as much as possible, and to procure the data reflecting them (extent 
and structure of debt) from a reliable source, possibly independent from the credit applicant. One 
of its most important tools is the central credit information system (hereinafter referred to as: CCS). 
In accordance with the regulation that was in effect before 2011, the comprehensive 
registry regarding the credit history of debtors was only realized for companies. Concerning 
retail credit information, the amendment of the Credit Act in 1998 created the opportunity 
to have a so-called negative list central data registry. Retail credit and personal information 
could enter the central credit information system (CCS) in case of severe contract violating 
behaviour, also stipulated in law. These data can be freely used for credit assessment in the 
framework of a precise procedure reinforced by warranty items. 
The necessity to create a comprehensive registry of natural persons, i.e. a comprehensive retail 
loan registry (hereinafter referred to as: CCR) was primarily justified by the interest related to a 
grounded credit assessment. The public interest grounding the governmental intervention was the 
increasing indebtedness of the population: the number of credit borrowing substantially increased 
already in the early 2000s, in which cases the credit borrower tried to satisfy their daily needs by 
committing to impractical credit conditions. It also happened that the debtor entering the debt 
spiral tried to fulfil his obligation derived from a previous credit agreement by creating a new one. 
MNB raised awareness to this dangerous tendency in its 2008 Stability Report: “In 2007, 
the indebtedness of households kept growing, partly due to the catch-up process and partly to 
consumption levelling. The debt service-to-income ratio debt service grew further, especially 
in the poorest households far below the average level of indebtedness. The risks hidden in the 
previous processes are elevated by the fact that retail credit borrowing is not shaped according 
to the economic processes, but it is fuelled by strong supply and the risk-based competition of 
financial institutions with more risks than before.” 6
The forecasts regarding the acceleration of ungrounded retail indebtedness however were 
ignored. 
6 See: MNB report on financial stability April 2008. Available on the Internet: https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/
stab-jel-20080415-hu.pdf
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The domestic banking system initiated the establishment of Comprehensive Retail Loan 
Registry in time. The positive list debtor registration proposal by the Hungarian Banking 
Association prepared in 2002 to 2003 fell through, because according to the Commissioner 
for Citizens' Rights it would have violated the right of citizens for informational autonomy 
guaranteed in the Constitution. According to his view, “the limitation of the fundamental 
right is only constitutional, if it is due to an imperious reason, and the importance of the 
achievable target is aligned with the weight of fundamental right violation caused due to this”.
The Banking Association has been taking continuous steps since 2003 to create such a registry. In 
collaboration with banking experts, a previously drafted solution would have made it compulsory 
for all debtor contracts to be recorded. This would have facilitated more reliable credit assessment, 
differentially lower instalments for debtors paying in a reliable and contractual manner, and on the 
other hand the prevention of the over-engagement of future debtors. Based on the comprehensive 
positive debtors’ list, the credit institutions would have received more precise and more reliable 
information about their future debtors, who therefore would have been relieved from the 
procurement and attachment of countless other documentation (e.g. confirmation of outstanding 
debt without lenders). This procedure could also have significantly accelerated administration. The 
more precise risk assessment enables the differentiated application of the debtor risk surcharge, 
and the reduction of burdens for reliable, good debtors. You can see that the positive list debtors’ 
registry creates a classic win-win situation: it is certainly good for the banks, and good for the 
reliable, good debtors, and it might also provide protection against excessive indebtedness. The 
above-mentioned benefits can be ensured by a comprehensive information system.7
In 2006, first the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, then the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority also categorically upheld the necessity of the positive list debtors’ 
registry, elaborating in detail on its advantages for both clients and credit institutions. In 
practice, the report of the so-called Várhegyi Committee8 also confirmed the same. The 
preparatory working material prepared at the Ministry of Justice of the time (called the 
Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement)9 stipulated: “In order to reach the regulatory target 
such legal solution should be created, which on one hand ensures the fullest possible decision-
making freedom for the client, and on the other hand enables the creation of an infrastructure, 
which is able to reduce the (different kind, but equally existing) risk of lending, consequently 
the risk of the client, the bank, the depositors and ultimately the government and the tax payers. 
The law satisfies its constitutional requirement regarding proportionality, if the informational 
autonomy right of the client-debtor is only limited up to the level, which is required for the 
reliable operation of the “system”. So if we accept the justification and constitutionality of 
7 Regarding the standpoint of the Hungarian Banking Association prepared by banking experts, see the 
presentation of Dr. Katalin Auer on certain questions of the Retail financial services held at the conference 
of 22-23 May 2007, under the title ”The role of the full list credit information system in credit assessment, 
and its connection to the central credit information system”. Available on the Internet: https://www.mnb.hu/
letoltes/20070522-23-auer-katalin-1.pdf 
8 Governmental decree 1097/2006 (5. X.) set up the Expert Committee on Retail Financial Services. The 
president was Dr. Éva Várhegyi. The Committee prepared and publicized its proposals in December 2006 
regarding the management of retail banking service-related problems.
9 Work material on certain questions related to retail financial services, July 2008
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the regulatory target, i.e. that the informational autonomy right can be limited with such 
reason as a fundamental constitutional right, we must find the tool, by which the fundamental 
constitutional right can be limited in an absolutely necessary degree to reach the target.”
On 13 October 2008, the Ministry made an unexpected proposal to the Secretary of State, 
drafted and amended by the MJL. The key features of the proposal were the following:
•	 the	consent	of	the	client	is	required	both	for	the	registration	and	for	the	disclosure	of	
data in the registry, 
•	 the	financial	enterprise	managing	the	CCS	shall	manage	the	data	for	5	years	following	
the termination of the contractual relationship, 
•	 the	client	may	consent	to	the	submission	of	data	to	the	CCS	subsequently	as	well,	or	at	
any time may also revoke consent, 
•	 within	45	days	of	the	law	coming	into	effect,	the	bank	shall	inform	the	clients	in	writing	
about the content of contracts managed by it, the data transfer obligation, the rules 
regarding CCS, the purpose of the registry, and also rights of the clients. The client has 
another 45 days to prohibit data transfer (initial upload),
•	 there	are	complicated	and	strict	client	information	rules	and	administrative	obligations	
related to the management of the entire system.
The draft would basically have created a client consent-based and continuously fluctuating 
voluntary registry, which would have questioned the scope, comprehensive nature and reliability 
of the available information. At the same time, the responsibility and cost of the construction of 
the system as well as supplying it with data would have been borne by the banks. 
The draft, in this form, however would not have been able to efficiently fulfil its original purpose of 
simplifying and accelerating customer service by reducing the risk of lending. Moreover, based on the 
completed modelling it would have had an exactly opposite effect to these targets, with a much higher cost 
than both during the initial upload (uploading the database with older data, e.g. from archive databases) 
and the daily operations. Considering all the above, the Banking Association reported, after submission, 
that it does not agree with the draft and therefore asked for its revocation by the Government. 
The Commissioner on Data Security also expressed his concerns regarding the Government draft 
in the autumn of 2008. He declared: “if necessary, I will turn to the Constitutional Court. According 
to the Ombudsman the Government wishes to implement the provision without a constitutional 
purpose, allowing for business interests. The law would provide an almost unlimited opportunity for 
the credit institutions to learn about the financial situation of citizens. The data security ombudsman 
recalled: since 1998, credit institutions have been trying to have a report prepared on people who 
punctually pay their debts. He believes: officials from the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement 
had a chance to learn about the dismissive view of the commissioner on Data Security at a personal 
consultation last week, since the strategical department leader of the Ombudsman’s office stated that 
the legal provision drafted by the Government is unacceptable. He added: the codifiers are using 
the financial crisis as a pretence to limit the rights of citizens, including good debtors, contained 
in the basic law without a constitutional purpose, from a business interest, unnecessarily and 
disproportionately. The commissioner on Data Security added: with careful and responsible work in 
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daily practice the banks can always clarify whether the person who contacts them for credit has proper 
collateral, or not. Therefore, the central database on good debtors is unnecessary.10
Even at the first signs of the crisis, the Commissioner on Data Security and his office 
apparently did not assess the importance of creating a positive list debtors’ registry as early 
as possible. I am convinced that quite a few debtors could have been saved from excessive 
indebtedness, as they were likely the first victims of the Great Recession. 
In its letter dated May 2010 by the Banking Association, as a reply to the Parliamentary 
Commissioner on Citizen’s Rights clearly elaborated, that the single and obvious objective of the 
positive list debtors’ registry is to protect clients and to prevent their excessive indebtedness: ‘We 
must declare, that the national legal system – considering personal rights and the priority of data 
security – does not substantively limit the unlimited indebtedness of private persons. As long as a 
comprehensive credit registration system does not exist, it cannot be prevented by a well-intentioned 
regulation, similar to the above. As long as the client is not listed in the currently operating CCS 
due to non-payment, the registry on default debtors, he is able to borrow unsecured credits with all 
banks and cooperative banks, as only the client’s declaration is available stating that he has no debt 
elsewhere. The fact that it is living practice is justified by the fact, that the highest amount of live 
debt a client currently has in the CCS is 18, and the average number of loans per client is over1.5. We 
certainly do not state that all clients, or even the majority of clients get credit by misleading the bank, 
but we do state, that the clients are tending to overestimate their own performance. If there was a 
full-list credit registration system, which shows the debt burden of clients, it would be possible to set 
the affordable credit amount more precisely during credit assessment, or even reject the obviously 
not feasible applications. No such opportunity exists today, unless the lender employs visionaries. ”11
3. 2. Self-regulation for the simplification of credit replacement and for 
the fair practice of unilateral contract amendment 
The Expert Committee on Retail Financial Services (so-called Várhegyi Committee) published 
its report in December 2006 under the title Proposals for the management of retail banking 
service-related problems. The Várhegyi Committee saw the resolution for the problems 
exposed in their report primarily to be the self-regulation of the banking community, and 
in case of failure to do so, in legislation. The Banking Association therefore founded eight 
working groups for creating self-regulation frameworks in the following topics:
•	 Working	group	on	account	channelling	and	collection;
•	 Working	group	on	credit	replacement	and	unilateral	contract	amendment;
•	 Customer	relations;
•	 Basic	account;
•	 E-contract,	E-account,	E-account	balance;
•	 Financial	culture	and	knowledge	transfer;
•	 Inter-bank	Code	of	Conduct;
10 Magyar Nemzet, Thursday, 30 October 2008, page 4.
11 The letter of the Hungarian Banking Association to the Parliamentary Commissioner on Citizens Rights, 27 
May 2010.
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•	 Positive	 debtor	 list	 (work	 has	 been	 ongoing	 in	 this	 area	 for	 a	 long	 time	 under	 the	
coordination of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement). 
The working groups aimed at preparing proposals for the recommendations of the 
Várhegyi report in the widest possible scope. Wherever it was not sufficient, they made 
proposals for legislative amendment. The Board of the Hungarian Banking Association 
negotiated the summary proposals prepared by the working groups in the summer of 2007. 
The participants judged the summary to be a forward-looking and an appropriate mix of 
initiatives regarding self-regulation and legislation. 
The competent Prime Ministerial Commissioner submitted his draft to the Government 
including the recommendations of the Banking Association in the middle of July 2007. In 
this, he made a proposal for solving the problems belonging to the scope of self-regulation 
and legislation. The draft stated: 
“During the work there was always unison regarding the necessary norm changes that 
should possibly be executed through the self-regulation of the banking system, and legislation 
should ensure this supplementary, supportive framework and background. For this, the 
active collaboration of the banks (the Banking Association) was necessary, which it fully 
provided up until the current state of work: No such legislative pressure exists today that 
would have to be realized by governmental power despite the banks. Further, there was 
also unison − and this is a grandiose virtue of the initiative −, that the completed work 
and the formulated proposals were rated by all concerned organisations – although not 
of the same immediate and short-term interest – as important and significant. (e.g.: “The 
Office of Economic Competition welcomes proposals regarding the improvement of retail 
banking services, which clearly serve the reinforcement of the banking market competition.”, 
or the opinion of IRM, according to which the summary of the Banking Association “is an 
extremely meaningful and high quality piece of work, …, many elements of which have such 
importance that might provide a strong impetus for retail banking market development”.)” 12
Majority of the initiatives regarding legislation were not realized, or only by considerable 
delay and with substantially modified content. At the same time, the Banking Association 
working groups continued their activity and in the first half of 2008 the President of the 
Banking Association approved and announced on his website: 
•	 his	proposal	1/2008	for	the	standard	management	and	interpretation	of	§.8	section	(4)	of	
the THM decree. 
•	 his	proposal	2/2008	on	the	Credit	Replacement	Code,	
•	 his	proposal	3/2008	on	the	Bank	Changing	Guide.	
Under my direction, the working group engaged in the simplification of credit replacement and 
the establishment of the fair framework of unilateral contract amendment for consumers prepared 
12 Gyula Gaál, Prime Ministerial Commissioner: Summary and proposal for the Government on measures to be 
taken in order to increase the standard of retail financial services - Budapest, 16 July 2007.
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with the Credit Replacement Code by the end of 2007. It intended to shorten the time required for a 
possible bank change and simplify its administration by introducing a form with unified content, as 
well as its standard inter-bank management. Based on widespread professional negotiations, by the 
end of 2008 the working group also prepared the draft of a Code on the fair practice of the unilateral 
amendment right regarding retail loan contracts. The consumer protection organisations (National 
Consumer Protection Union, and the Union of Bank Loan Victims) also collaborated on the wording, 
however, the Office of Economic Competition did not respond to our multiple requests. Considering 
the developments of the financial crisis, the Board of the Banking Association considered it necessary 
to supplement the text of the Code with beneficiary conditions for the consumers. 
From the very beginning, the Office of Economic Competition has sought for regulation on 
the legislative level. During 2008, they presented their proposal regarding the amendment of the 
Credit Act three times (in March, August and December) on different forums, practically with the 
same content. However, the proposals of the Office of Economic Competition were steadily and 
resolutely rejected each time by the experts present (IRM, Ministry of Finance PM, Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Authority, consumer protection organisations and the Banking Association), 
by pointing out its professional insufficiencies in detail and also its expected, quite unfavourable 
impacts on the Hungarian economy. The view of the Office of Economic Competition in contrast 
to the professional arguments was fairly simple: the office of competition did not believe in the 
efficiency of the banks’ self-regulation. Their standpoint was surprising also because despite several 
invitations they did not participate in the meetings of the Banking Association working group, 
hence they did not have the opportunity to contradict the professional work either. 
Following such antecedents and one week after the professional dispute in December 2008, 
on 23 December 2008 the Government (without the mandatory professional reconciliation 
specified by the law on legislation) submitted Bill T/8183 to the Parliament on the amendment 
of certain acts concerning the supervision of the financial intermediary system. The 
submitted government bill contains the proposal from the Office of Economic Competition 
almost verbatim, which has been rejected several times professionally. On 9 February 2009, 
the Office of Economic Competition publicised (according to my view illegally, by violating 
the procedural rules of the Competition Act)13 its sectoral investigation report, which also 
included a professionally quite disputable amendment proposal.14 Afterwards, the President of 
13 According	to	Act	LVII	Section	43/E	§	(2)	of	1996	on	the	prohibition	of	unfair	market	behaviour	and	the	limitation	
of competition: “Before the report is adopted, the undertakings operating in the sector shall be given an opportunity 
to submit comments about the contents of the report in writing. To facilitate this process, a draft version of the report 
with restricted access data removed shall be sent to the undertakings operating in the sector for comments in due time 
to allow at least thirty days for the submission of their comments. The Hungarian Competition Authority shall publish 
on its website the report on the findings of the sectoral inquiry, the summary or minutes of the written comments or 
of the hearing, and ‒ if requested ‒ the documents containing the substantive comments made by the undertakings 
operating in the sector regarding the contents of the report, with restricted access data removed.”
14 http://www.gvh.hu//data/cms998828/banki_ágazati_vizgy_2009_02_09_pdf.pdf 
 The written observations prepared by the members of the Banking Association regarding the Sectoral report 
were subsequently published upon the explicit request of the Banking Association: http://www.gvh.hu//data/
cms998829/banki_ágazati_vizgy_észrevétel_Bankszövetség_2009_06_16.pdf 
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the Office of Economic Competition in his letter to the Prime Minister dated 6 February 2009, 
proposed a broader and more practically retroactive extension than the planned regulation. 
Once they were made aware of the submission of the government bill, the Banking 
Association working group made a proposal for the Banking Association Board for the rapid 
approval of the substantially completed Code on Unilateral Contract Amendment and to 
make it public in the widest possible scope. This would have created an opportunity for the 
presentation of self-regulation based on intense and wide-scope professional consensus and 
the related banking opinions. The Board however did not approve the proposal, instead, at 
the session of 2 February 2009 they decided to write a letter to the Prime Minister. This way 
the self-regulation of the banking community did not appear at all. 
From the very beginning, the working group had the prevailing approach that the most 
efficient tool for protection against unjustified unilateral contract amendment is to establish the 
opportunity for quick and cheap credit replacement. If the debtors have such a tool available, in 
case of a disadvantageous amendment for the debtor, they can be relieved from the impact of 
disadvantageous changes by replacing the lending bank, and the financial institution carrying 
out the unjustified amendment loses its client, and therefore the market. Based on the proposal 
by the working group, the protective tool against unfair unilateral contract amendment would 
not have been the strict, detailed regulation of the unilateral amendment or the prohibition of 
modification. Namely, the regulation considering all future events is on one hand impossible, 
on the other hand such a regulation would make the system unnecessarily rigid and expensive, 
the unfavourable effects of which would encumber the consumer. If, however we enabled the 
reduction of the consumer’s defencelessness by simplifying, accelerating and decreasing the 
administration and costs of the credit replacement, the same consumer protection goal could 
be achieved by a market-conformity solution. 
The realization of this goal however cannot be carried out by mere self-regulation, since it 
does not impact the activity of market stakeholders outside the banking system. Consequently, 
legislation supporting the objective has become necessary in the following areas: 
•	 introduction	of	a	contract	template	for	notarial	documents	on	the	financial	services	market,	
•	 supplementation	of	rules	regarding	the	preliminary	notification	of	clients,	
•	 review	of	rules	concerning	the	disadvantageous	amendment	of	contractual	conditions	
for the client, 
•	 responsible	lending	and	publicity,	
•	 problems	 of	 financial	 product	 mediation,	 in	 this	 context	 a	 required	 amendment	 of	 the	
competence of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, 
•	 preparation	of	a	comprehensive	regulation	regarding	retail	credit	registration,	
•	 bankruptcy	procedure	to	settle	the	debt	of	natural	persons,	
•	 completion	of	the	consumer’s	obligations	based	on	the	credit	agreement	before	the	deadline,	
•	 foundation	of	a	consultation	council	on	financial	services,	
•	 the	client’s	right	to	terminate	the	contract,	
•	 efficient	settlement	of	legal	disputes	in	the	field	of	retail	financial	services,	
•	 review and modify the competence of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority as necessary, 
•	 regulation	of	switching	bank	accounts,	
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•	 inspection	of	the	introduction	of	a	so-called	social	account,	
•	 financial	culture	in	public	education.	
You can see that a consumer protection objective can be efficiently realized with the aligned 
and diverse cooperation of legislation and self-regulation. However, the high standard 
professional working material prepared in the Ministry of Justice and law Enforcement in 
July 2008 was not discussed. Instead, the standpoint of the Office of Economic Competition 
was approved, which was professionally criticised multiple times. 
The importance of unilateral contract amendment in a banking approach
The fundamental function of a bank is to provide loans from the deposits placed with 
them. The bank does not provide the loan from its own money, but from those of the 
depositors: as a financial mediator it lends the temporarily surplus money of depositors 
to the credit borrowers, who apply for it. In Hungary, only the banks are eligible to collect 
depositors, and they should be able to repay the deposits to a full extent. 
However, one must also consider that the loan agreements mean long-term – often 20 to 
30-year – commitment, which should be financed by the banks typically from short-term 
deposits. Such long-term resources cannot be found on the monetary and capital markets, 
which the credit applicants would need. Therefore, the banks must create a balance of 
the maturity of assets and resources in a way that the coverage for the repayment of 
maturing deposits is available from continuously incoming redemptions and newly 
borrowed resources. To renew resources and to outsource new loans new sources are 
required, the procurement of which is influenced by varying monetary and capital market 
circumstances: the quantity of available resources, and the willingness of the financing 
parties to take risks. The asset-resource management of banks was previously supervised 
by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, and currently by the MNB according 
to strict legal provisions. 
The outsourcing of banks should adapt to the needs of the borrowers by also taking 
the consequences of the market competition into account. This adaptation should 
be met in the currency, maturity and the amount as well. The banks are able to fulfil 
these requirements by transforming the resources collected from depositors during the 
outsourcing of loans in maturity, amount and risks. The risks of banks can be partially 
derived from the above-mentioned transformations. Maturity transformation is one of the 
key features of banking. The investors are normally able/willing to give up their savings 
for a shorter period, while the credit borrowers generally need liquid resources, which are 
available for longer. During the maturity, the banks transform the short-term savings into 
long-term loans, while they perform a so-called positive transformation. 
The sustainment of the depositors’ trust at any cost is the pre-condition for enabling 
the applicants in the economy – private persons and business organisations – to actually 
obtain credit. 
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Both the size of the deposit and loan interest rate are defined by the monetary market 
situation, and ultimately the circumstance of the real sphere at one given time. The 
monetary market situation and the influencing real market circumstances can change 
from time-to-time, which changes might have an impact on the counter value (interest 
rates) of money usage through complex transposals. It is a realistic expectation, that the 
parties adjust the level of interest rate to be paid during financial services to the financial 
market situation at times. The unilateral amendment of the interest rate is one of the tools 
of managing the risk that arises in the unforeseeable monetary market fluctuations. And, 
it can be easily understood that it is a fundamental interest of the banks to provide the 
resource with the most beneficial condition available on the market (cheapest and with the 
longest duration) behind their loans.
The fluctuations of the monetary market are not foreseeable either by the bank, or by its 
client, and both parties are impacted either beneficially or unfavourably. Therefore, it is 
the primary interest of both parties to continuously adjust the level of interest rate to the 
prevailing monetary market situation. The unilateral contract amendment is a legal option 
to maintain the pricing of long-term services in an economically justified way. 
In the case of all long-term contracts, the option for contract amendment is available 
due to changing conditions, considering the rule of clausula rebus sic stantibus. The 
changing conditions might directly impact the risk-taking of clients compared to the 
situation of the time of contract signing in case of an insurance, rental, or even a public 
utility contract. Their limitation would mean in practice, that the changed market risk 
cannot be exercised in the contractual relationship of the parties. Consequently, one party 
would have to necessarily perform contractual obligations at higher risk, being isolated 
from the value conditions of the market, while the other party would get richer in an 
unauthorized way (we would like to emphasize, that the market conditions might change 
to the advantage/disadvantage of any contracting party, hence the exclusion of the right 
for unilateral contract amendment might be unfavourable for any party). 
The right of unilateral contract amendment in a legal approach
A legally signed contract according to the traditional principles of civil law is binding 
for both contracting parties, the parties shall only deviate from its rules by common will, 
and shall only modify it by mutual agreement (pacta sunt servanda). The entitlement of 
any party to carry out unilateral amendment in the contract mutually established by the 
parties without the explicit declaration of the other party is quite an exceptional case, 
and the legal regulation allows for such in only very justified cases. The constitutional 
reason for the “exceptionality" of the limitation is the clausula rebus sic stantibus, i.e. 
such substantial alteration of the circumstances in the background legal relationship of 
credit contracts that due to it the ratio of rights and obligations constituting the content 
of the legal relationship fundamentally change, and the sustainment of the contract with 
unchanged content would violate the rightful interest of one of the contracting parties. 
The substantial economic – possibly political –, financial and other social changes clearly 
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impact especially the long-term contractual relationships (war, crisis, inflation, political 
risks, economic nullification, etc.). The unforeseen circumstances during the signing 
of the contract can considerably alter the situation of the contracting parties, the ratio 
of rights and obligations, as well as making the completion of the contract for one of 
the parties extremely cumbersome or even impossible with unchanged content and the 
completion of the contract [Decision AB 32/1991. (6.VI)].
According to the above, the right of unilateral contract amendment is a constitutional 
right based on free market competition and contractual freedom.15 The recognition in a 
legal provision that in long-term legal relationships a mechanism is needed, which ensures 
that the service and counter service are equivalent. It is especially justified in case of such 
contracts, in which the services are completed asymmetrically in time, i.e. the time of 
performance by the parties is different. In case of financial services, a unilateral contract 
amendment might be justified by the alteration of the legal, regulatory environment or 
the monetary market conditions, the modification of the macroeconomic environment 
and the operational conditions of the bank.
The law considers the option of unilateral contract amendment as an exceptional tool, 
and only allows for the amendment of the contract’s pre-defined conditions by fixed and 
strict formalities, i.e. applies it as a risk management tool. This exceptional opportunity 
is provided by law in consideration of the unique nature of financial legal relationships. 
The loan contract is an asymmetric legal relationship regarding time: the lending party 
basically completes its main service at the very start of the legal relationship, whereas the 
debtor does so continuously during the legal relationship, even up to several decades, 
depending on the duration of the loan.
On 12 February 2009, at the State Budget Committee’s debate session on the Government 
Bill submitted without preliminary negotiation as stipulated by legislation, both the method 
of submission and the content of the bill were almost unilaterally objected to, regardless of 
political party. They would have considered the execution of a professional debate useful, at 
the same time the committee found the proposal suitable for general debate. The Parliament 
passed the proposal on 23 March 2009, which was adopted as Act XIII of 2009. 
The text of the law brought up numerous theoretical and practical feasibility issues. These 
were reported by the banks and the Banking Association already prior to passing the law, 
but especially afterwards, both to the legislators, supervisory bodies and the President of the 
Republic, however to no avail. 
Following the pronouncement of the Act, the financial institutions – in consideration of 
the necessary contract amendment, IT, educational and internal regulatory activities in an 
extraordinarily short time – tried to satisfy the provisions of the Act based on their best 
abilities. Their endeavour however was unsuccessful due to the inner contradictions of the 
legal provision. 
15 See AB Decision 32/1991. (6.VI.) point III/4.
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The unenforceability of the regulation became obvious when, according to the legal 
provision, the banks published the amendment of their general contractual conditions on 
15 July 2009. This already incorporated the list of reasons enabling the unilateral contract 
amendment by the banks.
Once the legislator understood that the legal regulation required modification, a decision 
was made on 14 July 2009 on the preparation of a code of conduct. This – among others 
– included those circumstances, referring to which the banks could unilaterally modify 
the previously signed contracts. Simultaneously, with the preparation of the code the 
Government committed to prepare the necessary amendment of law. The banks committed 
to only exercising the unilateral contract amendment unfavourably impacting the consumer 
following consultation with the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority. 
The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, in reconciliation with the ministries and 
the Office of Economic Competition, prepared a draft which was supplemented and refined 
by the banks based on professional criteria. The law amendment was passed by Parliament 
on 14 December 2009 and came into effect on 1 January 2010.16 The key provisions of the 
amendment were the following: 
1. The other contractual condition of a loan or financial lease contract signed with a 
micro-enterprise – unlike the previous regulation – was possible to amend unilaterally, 
unfavourably for the client from 1 January 2010. In case of the same contracts, the 
contractual conditions regarding the interest rate and fee could be amended unilaterally, 
unfavourably for the client by public notification 15 days in advance. (In case the relevant 
contracts included the previous stricter regulations, the bank still had to proceed 
according to the contracts until the relevant sections were amended.)
2. The bank – should it wish to exercise its unilateral contract amendment right – primarily has 
to meet two conditions: (1) the contract shall include the itemised description of objective 
circumstances justifying the amendment, and (2) the bank has to create written “pricing 
principles”. The law specifies the mandatory minimum content of pricing principles 
3. In order to make the amendment understandable for the client, the financial institution shall 
send notification about the amendment via postal letter or other “permanent data carrier”. 
4. In case the interest rate changes due to the amendment of the reference interest rate, the 
provisions regarding the notification and free cancellation do not need to be applied. 
If the interest rate is indexed to the reference interest rate, the rules of notification are 
specified by the Act on Consumer Loans (Act 2009 of CLXII). 
5. The legal compliance and application practice of pricing principles – including compliance 
with the contents of the Code – is controlled by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority. The intention of the legislator based on the text and justification of the Act was 
most likely a subsequent norm control. During the inspection, the Authority considers 
the provisions of the code of conduct approved by the Authority and belonging to the 
scope of Act XLVII of 2008 on unfair commercial practice against consumers. 
16 Act CL of 2009 on the amendment of certain acts related to financial topics
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6. In case of a state subsidized housing loan, unlike the general (60-day) rule, it is sufficient 
to announce the unfavourable, unilateral amendment to the client 15 days prior, and it 
is not mandatory to notify the concerned clients via direct post or other means. [The 
justification of the Act includes the following: “Different rules apply to housing loans 
with state interest rate subsidy. Namely, with these loans the limit concerning the upper 
threshold of the credit fee is published on a monthly basis by the National Debt Office and 
it shall be applied from the following month on, therefore the financial institution is not 
able to provide information 60 days prior to the date of effectiveness of the amendment.”]
7. The loan agreements signed after 1 January 2010, and financed by a mortgage debenture shall 
explicitly include that, “the loan is financed by a mortgage debenture or the client wishes to 
have it financed by a mortgage debenture, as well as its legal consequences. In case of refinanced 
loan agreements by a mortgage credit institution, the client shall be informed latest within 30 
days from refinancing by a posted notice about the execution of refinancing”.
8. From 1 January 2010 on, the announcement on interest rate, fee or cost item amendment 
shall unambiguously indicate (1) which interest rate, fee or cost item, (2) to what extent 
and (3) reason for increase. 
9. The Credit Act specifically contained that the bank (according to the intention of the 
legislator presumably without the obligation of pre-notification) may amend the contract 
unilaterally, not unfavourably, for the client. This provision had to be applied to contracts 
signed before the date of effectiveness. 
4. Debtor protection programs of banks 
As a consequence of the normal operations of the banking system, it is the fundamental interest 
of the bank to promote the complete repayment of loans, by even providing discounts to their 
debtors. The intention of the bank is aimed at having the liabilities enforced by legal means and 
auctioning off the real estate collateral in the case of as few loans as possible. The bank is a financial 
mediator, and the liquidation of collateral objects or assets is a time-consuming and costly process. 
Therefore, the bank strives to support its debtors in reinstating normal redemption order. 
For the efficient solution of redemption problems emerging due to the world economic 
crisis, the banks provided substantial redemption discounts to their debtors under the 
available boundaries. The banks generally tried to provide flexible solutions most suitable 
for the individual lifestyle. They aimed at helping those clients, who previously paid their 
loans denominated in foreign currency or forints, however, due to loss of job, the reduction 
of the overall family income, or the considerable growth of the foreign currency exchange 
rates the further redemption of their loan experienced a problem. 
The following measures were taken in the framework of debtor protection programs of 
banks, which were prepared before the state measures and carried out in practice:
a) In November 2008, the banks signed agreements with the Ministry of Finance, according 
to which in case of clients with loans registered in foreign currency, they introduced 
measures to moderate the burdens due to the increasing instalment amounts. In the 
framework of the measures, the banks committed to provide free opportunity based 
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on the debtor’s request for prolongation, and in case of converting foreign currency 
loans to forints, they do not charge any banking fees arising upon conversion until 31 
December 2008, and shall handle the early repayments until 31 December 2008 flexibly. 
 With this, the banks temporarily waived the payment of several fees, or took them 
over from the clients. Normally the banks provided a lot more concessions to clients, 
than what they committed to in their agreement with the Ministry of Finance. The 
original deadline of 31 December 2008, stipulated in the agreement, was prolonged, 
and they made allowances in many other areas for clients (making pre- or early 
repayment of outstanding debts free and extending it for housing loans in HUF).
b) Beyond the agreement with the Ministry of Finance the banks – in many cases even 
before the date of effectiveness of Act IV of 2009 on Government Guarantees for 
Housing Loans – prepared their own debtor protection programs. In many cases, 
they provided an opportunity for debtors to apply for the temporary reduction of the 
paid instalment rates and/or prolongation. 
Therefore the banks generally ensured, even before the governmental measures, that proper 
tools were available for clients having payment difficulties to bridge their redemption problems. 
The banking measures impacted a wider scope of people than the credit protection program 
planned by the Government, which exclusively targeted clients with foreign currency loans, 
who became unemployed during the crisis, as well as those who suggested that the payment of 
the foreign currency loan caused great hardship for them, but were not in default yet. 
Besides the direct benefits, we should not ignore the fact that due to the contradicting 
processes in real estate lending appearing as the sign of crisis (due to the exchange rate 
fluctuation there was a real estate collateral, which value dropped down to its fraction 
against the boomed credit debt), exposure to the prudential risk of the equity gap was borne 
by the banks, without asking for the usual collateral supplementation, which would have 
been justified at this time.
5. Debt relief legislation 
5. 1. Bridging loan (Act IV of 2009 on Government Guarantees for Home Loans) 
The aim of the Act was to support debtors in need by providing temporary help from the 
Government in the form of government guarantee to those natural persons, who met the 
stipulations of the Act. The natural person, as a debtor, could initiate the signing of a bridging 
loan with the financial institution that provided the housing loan in case an employment 
relationship was terminated. 
The financial institution disbursed the bridging loan by the last day of the 24th month 
following the signing of the loan agreement in an equal amount of the sum of the due 
instalments of the housing loan and the instalment rate committed to by the debtor, also 
equalling the previously due but not yet paid instalment. The bridging loan could only be 
used for payment of the housing loan. The housing loan was redeemed from the amount 
paid by the debtor and the bridging loan. Until the last day of the 24th month following 
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the signing of the loan agreement, the debtor was not bound by a payment obligation, and 
afterwards he only had an obligation to pay the interest rate on the capital debt. The bridging 
loan had to be repaid in maximum 10 years, provided that its maturity date did not exceed 
the maturity date of the housing loan. 
If the debtor breached the credit agreement, the government guarantee applied to the 
amount disbursed until the date of contract breeching. If the financial institution cancelled 
the housing loan, the bridging loan also had to be terminated. The financial institution could 
initiate the enforcement of the government guarantee by the 30th day following the date 
of maturity, or in case of cancellation, the termination date. If during the exercising of the 
government guarantee or the collection of debt, the tax authority established that the debtor 
or another member of the household cheated the financial institution, the natural person 
had to pay 150% of the paid amount upon the exercising of the government guarantee. 
Upon the termination of his employment the natural person, as debtor or co-debtor, could 
not have an over 90-day default debt, which exceeded the amount of the lowest minimum 
wage or the monthly instalment rate. 
The amendment of legal conditions was subsequently necessary to extend the scope of 
eligible persons, who could overcome their financial difficulties with state support. 
The number of loan agreements did not reach 3,000 from the date of effectiveness of the 
Act up until October 2009, which significantly stayed below real demands. The low number 
of eligible people is the result of the strict conditions, which excluded part of the interested 
debtors from applying for the bridging loan. Despite the moderation of the rigour, the 
construction was still not too popular, it was only utilized by a few hundred people. 
5. 2. Legal provision on prudent retail credit lending conditions and 
creditworthiness assessment 
Government Decree 361/2009 (30. XII.) on prudent retail credit lending conditions and 
creditworthiness assessment came into effect on 1 March 2010. The Decree introduced a new 
lending-related concept: the lending limit. Based on the internal regulations of the lender, it 
was an amount defined in forints, reflecting the maximum monthly instalment paying ability. 
According to the new regulation, the lender shall not provide a loan by only taking 
the real estate collateral into account, but with all credit assessment it shall inspect the 
creditworthiness and creditability. According to the internal regulations of the lender, this 
inspection should be based on the income situation of the natural person and the household, 
and the consequently defined lending limit. The regulation sets out detailed requirements 
regarding the contents of the internal regulation. 
Based on the regulation, the monthly instalment rate with EUR and EUR-denominated 
loans must not be higher than 80% of the lending limit upon disbursal. With our foreign 
currency loans, the initial instalment rate should not exceed 60% of the lending limit. 
The regulation specifies that during the establishment of the lending limit the lender shall 
consider all known debts of the client that are outstanding with the lender or other lenders. 
The lender is obligated to proceed with the caution expected in the scope of lending in order 
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to explore the client’s financial situation, including the inquiry of all credit information 
systems to which he or she is a member. 
The regulation was amended by Government Decree 152/2010 (30. IV.). The amendment 
contains technical refinements that simplify application, but it did not solve the fundamental 
problem of the regulation: the regulation was late and in the absence of a full-list credit 
registration system, the creditworthiness check is built on non-verifiable information. 
The integration of the lending limit also hinders the replacement of the existing credit 
volume, since with the assessment of the new loan the internal regulation restrictions and 
the creditability limit for foreign currency loans should be taken into account. In case of 
loans with real estate collateral, the integration of the loan to value limit (LTV) for real 
estate purchase or construction substantially increased the own funds, to which the clients 
were not able to adapt to with the income and financial conditions of the time.17 The late 
austerity measures held back the demand for loans and indirectly had a negative effect on 
the construction industry, thereby elevating the negative processes of the economic crisis. 
Due to the crisis, the majority of banks voluntarily imposed restrictions regarding loan 
assessment even before the regulation came into effect, both in the field of creditworthiness 
and real estate collateral. 
Concerning the absence of a positive list debtors’ registry, we already quoted the letter sent 
to the Parliamentary Commissioner on Citizens Rights by the Banking Association dated 
May 2010.18 In this letter, the Banking Association implied that – despite good will – the late 
regulation did not address the root of the problem, only its symptoms: 
“If the lending and borrowing of loans was handled responsibly by the contracting parties, there 
would be no solution even by careful credit assessment for those cases when the client loses his job, or in 
case of a married couple, both parties become unemployed. We are convinced that the decisive factor 
from the aspect of default loans by private persons is not the increasing instalments of foreign currency 
loans, but the labour market situation. The amendment/tightening of execution-related rules in itself 
does not provide sufficient guarantee for the prevention of default loans by private persons. With cases 
that are already in the implementation phase, the position of the debtor and the lender are given, the 
same as the extent of liabilities, and it is impossible to change the value of the collateral. Re-contracting 
in case of cancelled loan agreements is also primarily a business interest for banks following fair market 
conduct due to lower collateral values as a consequence of the crisis. Unfortunately, the development of 
external factors (e.g. size of unemployment) is not a question of the above-mentioned regulation, if the 
debtor is not able to pay even the minimum amount, this tool cannot be applied.”
17 During the crisis, the value of real estate (consequently of the collateral) declined, therefore one could take 
a substantially lower loan by the same collateral, with a considerably higher own funds. However, under the 
domestic income conditions it was not always possible.
18 The letter of the Hungarian Banking Association to the Parliamentary Commissioner on Citizens Rights, 27 
May 2010.
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5. 3. Amendment of Act LIII of 1994 on court execution (prolongation of 
the eviction moratorium) 
Act LIII of 1994 on court execution (hereinafter referred to as: ExAct.) has prohibited 
execution regarding residential properties during the winter period since 2003. Based on 
the legal prohibition, the executor shall postpone the eviction of residential properties from 
1 December to the period following 1 March, if the obligor is a private person. 
Based on the amendment of the ExAct passed in July 2010, the duration of the prohibition 
was extended in 2010, so the eviction of the housing unit should be postponed not only from 
1 December, but already from the day following the receipt of the court decision ordering 
the eviction, or the request of the auction customer – earliest from the day following the 
effective date of the Act – to 15 April of the next year (based on the later amendment passed 
in March 2011, the eviction moratorium lasted until 1 July 2011). 
According to the justification of the Act, the aim of the legislator was to “provide temporary 
moratorium for the eviction of their flats to those debtors and obligors, who are actually threatened by 
eviction, who are not able to take care of their housing. The population has accumulated substantial 
debts in the form of loans, and due to the financial-economic crisis, their other debts have also increased. 
A substantial part of debtors were not able to settle their debts, due to which their properties have to 
be sold…. The Proposal is a temporary regulation: the aim of prolonging the eviction moratorium is a 
temporary intervention in the order of exercising the claims, which was made necessary by the financial-
economic crisis as an extraordinary circumstance. During the moratorium therefore those debt 
management institutions should be created, which support debtors start a new life, and also serve the 
enforcement of claims in the long-run, but at the same time also the prevention of becoming homeless.” 
Following the adoption of the law, the Banking Association expressed its concerns 
regarding the constitutional and other legal provisions in conflict with other legislation. 
Based on the justification of the Act, the creators of the legal provision thought that forced 
eviction could only be carried out due to cancelled loan agreements, however, the eviction 
moratorium was established with full scope (e.g. the needs of private persons based on 
final judgement also fell under the scope of the amendment). As per the justification, with 
the moratorium they wished to help those who were not able to take care of their housing, 
however, by general regulation the Act also extended the moratorium to those who had 
other housing, or another housing opportunity. Since the ordering of court execution may 
only take place following the legally binding proceedings by the authorities or the court, 
the forced suspension of the execution procedure for nearly one year severely violated the 
rightful interests of parties having adverse interests in the proceedings, furthermore, the 
constitutional requirement of the rule of law and indirectly legal security. It might lead to 
legal uncertainty, if the eligible cannot access his claim even despite a legally binding court 
decision, and also that the reliability of the contractual security system is disrupted. 
According	to	the	Credit	Act,	the	subject	of	the	credit	risk	collateral	may	be	liquid	or	‘value	certain’	
assets. The so-called recognizable credit risk collateral may be such an asset which the lending credit 
institution is entitled to sell within a reasonable time in or outside court execution. Government 
Decree 196/2007 (30. VII.) on lending risk management and capital requirement specifies further 
conditions regarding the recognition of fixed assets as the credit risk collateral encumbering the 
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property. These rules are based on the decrees of the European Union: Decree 2006/48/EC (Basel 
II.)19 on commencing and continuing operation of credit institutions disposes of this. 
According to the opinion of the Banking Association, the rule of law and legal certainty 
by the provisions of the Act contradict the requirement of constitutionality, especially 
the ordering of immediate entry into force upon announcement and prompt application 
in case of pending cases. Additionally, the organisation believes that the Act breached the 
constitutional principle of property rights. It also referred to the fact that the submission and 
approval of the government bill was not preceded by professional reconciliation. 
The eviction moratorium is an extremely sensitive point of property credit lending. On 
one hand, based on legal provisions and banking considerations, the selling of collateral 
might be necessary for the sake of the money outsourced as credit by the depositors On the 
other hand, however, it should be appreciated – especially in an emergency situation –, that 
families are not to be evicted on the streets during winter. This sensitive, balanced situation 
was thrown off by the legislator with the prolongation of the eviction moratorium. 
It would have been a considerable option – based on the practice of other countries – 
to place the evicted tenants in social rental flats. During the 1990s, in Hungary, however 
this type of housing was practically eliminated. The idea of creating the National Asset 
Management arose as another option. This concept was already put to the Government 
by the Hungarian Banking Association, but the Government did not address it for a long 
time. The eviction moratorium introduced, instead greatly elevated the moral risk of 
foreign currency lending, creating the expectation in debtors that a “caring government 
will anyway save them”. 
5. 4. Required law amendment in order to limit mortgage-ensuring 
foreign currency loans – Act XC of 2010 
According to the justification of the law amendment: “The aim of the amendment is to stop the 
penetration of foreign currency loans, prevent excessive indebtedness of clients so that the number 
of people in dire straits does not grow.” Due to the financial crisis, the lending of new foreign 
currency loans has now declined to a negligible extent, so the spectacular measure was basically 
banging on open doors. In addition, due to the inaccurate wording of the approved text, it could 
have led to the land registry offices not registering the new mortgage contracts made under the 
credit replacement. The text of the law incorrectly referred to this procedure as “amendment 
registration”. In contrast, the Property Registration Act only considers changing property data, 
or the name, registered seat and address change of the entitled as amendment registration. If the 
law was not amended, there would have been a risk that the credit replacement by banks shut 
down, and with this the cancellation would have impacted new non-paying debtors. 
19 The regulations of Basel II. strictly define the rules of the credit institutions’ prudential operations, hen-
ce the consideration of fixed assets as the credit risk collateral encumbering the property. If the real estate 
collateral can not be enforced according to the effective rules contained in the ExAct. upon accepting the 
collateral,	it	leads	to	a	prudential	problem	(see	Government	decree	§12.	More	on	this	topic:	https://www.mnb.
hu/archivum/Felugyelet/root/fooldal/bal_menu/eu/eu_felugyeletek/cebs/bazelII_modszertan/crd_jogsz
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The amendment in this form was not suitable to reach the aim of the legislator, since excessive 
indebtedness could be triggered not only by loans in foreign currency, but also those in HUF. 
Moreover, the problem was not caused by the existence of credit insurance (collateral), but the 
exchange rate fluctuations influencing the instalment rates of foreign currency loans. 
Concerning the regulation, the violation of EU law also emerged. One year earlier, the European 
Court (hereinafter referred to as: EUC) ruled, in an uncannily similar case to the Hungarian 
regulation,20 that the indexing of mortgage registrations to the national currency breaches the 
principle of free capital flow, and such limitation might indirectly prevent free capital flow. According 
to the EUC, lending is one of the main channels of capital flow, and one of the fundamental, 
inseparable insurances of lending – especially in case of real estate – is mortgage. The decision, on 
one hand, pinned down that the exclusion of mortgage that can be registered in the currency of 
another member state violates free capital flow. On the other hand, the court stated that it does not 
recognize situations that might be considered as exceptional, which would justify the restriction.21
5. 5. Act XCVI of 2010 on the amendment of certain finance-related 
acts in order to support consumers in a difficult situation due to taking 
housing loans 
The Credit Act amendment restricted unilateral interest rate increase in case of housing loans, 
and prohibited the increasing of costs and other fees. According to the provision of the Act, 
the financial institution may amend the housing loan or financial lease contract exclusively 
regarding the interest rate unfavourably for the client, if the central bank’s base interest rate, 
the refinancing interest rates, the financial market indexes, the lender’s fixed client deposits’ 
interest rate changes, the regulatory environment, or the modification of credit risk defined 
in a government decree justifies it. The Act authorized the Government to establish the cases, 
conditions and means of unilateral interest rate amendment in a regulation. 
The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority did not agree with the direct regulation of the 
Act approved based on the proposal that was submitted as a representatives’ initiative. Based on the 
opinion of the Supervisory Authority, they should have started from the prohibition of contract 
amendment by indexing the credit interest rates to the reference interest rate.22 The Act however 
followed a different regulating direction, based on which the conditions and means of interest 
rate increase could be determined in a government decree. In its opinion, reflecting on the law 
amendment proposal, unlike the contents of the proposal, MNB also would have considered a 
reference-based interest rate and a fixed surcharge as acceptable in case of all loans.
20 Case C-222/97 (Prohibition by a Member State of registration of a mortgage in the currency of another 
Member State - Not permissible)
21 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30db5ffad902f1d146768c06a87e75a1e7bf.e34K
axiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuLa3b0?text=&docid=101448&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=fir
st&part=1&cid=1103421
22 See: Észak Magyarország, Kelet Magyarország, Hajdú-Bihari Napló – 01 July 2010, pages 1- 2, Észak Magyar-
ország, Kelet Magyarország, Hajdú-Bihari Napló - 02 July 2010, pages 2-3, 06 July 2010, m1: Híradó délben, 
Magyar Nemzet - 07 July 2010, pages 1 and 5, Népszabadság - 07 July 2010, pages 1 and 9
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The Banking Association – apart from its concerns regarding constitutionality – pointed out that 
in many banks the client could pay the loans denominated in foreign currency in foreign currency 
as well, and in such cases the question of exchange rate loss did not directly occur. Other banks also 
applied their own foreign exchange buying rates for redemption as well, which was by all means lower 
than their own central rate, and in certain cases even than the central rate of MNB. Again, different 
banks introduced unilateral moderations based on their own initiative, for example applied their own 
or MNB’s foreign exchange central rate instead of their own foreign exchange buying rate, until the 
HUF appreciated over a certain level relative to the CHF. There was also a bank which offset the 
exchange rate loss suffered by its debtor by reducing the interest rate. Finally, there was also a bank 
where the client could choose whether they wanted to pay in HUF or foreign exchange. It was a general 
feature that with the credit replacement aimed at currency swap the banks did not charge an extra fee. 
Whatever was effective, a large part of banks already did. Therefore my view is that 
instead of legal regulation it would have been better to publish these procedures as best 
practice: either in a document by the Banking Association, or as a methodology guide of the 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority. 
5. 6. Eight-point proposal targeting the support for housing loan debtors 
On 10 September 2010, the larger government party announced in front of the press an eight-
point proposal targeting the support for housing loan debtors indebted in foreign currency. 
The package contained the following items: 
1.  Contract amendments unfavourable for clients is prohibited 
2.  “Voluntary” interest rate increase is prohibited 
3.  The application of the central exchange rate is mandatory (it is still to be decided, 
whether it should be a bank, or the central bank) 
4. Free early repayment 
5.  The duration can be automatically extended by five years 
6.  No more than the actual market value can be claimed from the debtor (the “right to 
start with a clean slate”) 
7.  In case of insolvency, no penalty interest rate, or any other extra fees can be charged 
8.  The measures should not cover either business investments, or second or third 
property lending 
The Banking Association did not agree with the proposal. In addition to sounding 
constitutional concerns, they also objected that the program points appeared without 
previous professional consultation. They again advised, that 
- contract amendments can only take place in order to offset the value balance caused 
by the exchange rate fluctuation, 
- the application of the mandatory central rate might be unfavourable for the debtor in 
numerous cases,
- The unilateral modification of the contract duration does not solve, only postpone 
payment difficulties, 
- The “right to start with a clean slate” severely violates the risk management rules. 
186 Retail foreign currency lending and the economic crisis
The proposal of the Banking Association for solving the problem was already in front of the 
Cabinet and they were waiting for their feedback. The organisation had already forwarded its 
proposal more than a year earlier to the Government, although it was the previous Cabinet. The 
Association however did not get a reply from either government. The proposal of banks was 
basically identical with the concept of the National Asset Management. The idea of the financial 
institutions was that those loans which cannot be helped with banking tools (e.g. because the 
debtor lost his job, so he is not able to pay the lowered instalment rate either) should be assumed 
by a state organisation along with the concerned flat. The organisation can rent the property out 
as a rental flat to the previous owner, so he does not have to leave his home. 
The proposals of the governmental party group of representatives was transplanted into 
a legal provision by the amendment of two acts: the Credit Act and Act CLXII of 2009 on 
consumer loans (hereinafter referred to as: Consumer Loan Act). The amendments contained 
all elements of the program package except for the “right to start with a clean slate”.
5. 7. About the amendment of Government Decree 361/2009 (30. XII.) on 
retail credit lending conditions and creditworthiness assessment 
The amendment of Government Decree 361/2009 (30. XII.) on retail credit lending conditions 
and creditworthiness assessment took place based on the initiative of MNB. The aim of the 
amendment was to promote the replacement of loans and to boost competition. 
According to the amendment of the Government Decree, the LTV limits regulated in the 
Decree does not need to be applied for the replacement of previously signed loans. There is 
an opportunity for this if the client converts his foreign currency loan into EUR or HUF 
loan, or changes the HUF for another HUF loan, and the credit debt does not increase in the 
meantime, not considering the exchange rate difference between the lenders. 
The amendment also enabled the replacement of a foreign currency loan denominated in 
CHF by a CHF-denominated loan. In addition, the amendment stipulated that it does not 
qualify as an increase of debt if the amount of the new loan exceeds the debt with certified 
costs related to the borrowing of the new loan. 
The amendment supplemented the scheduling and the provision regulating the 
amendment. Accordingly, the provisions of the regulation do not need to be applied for the 
modification and rescheduling of existing loans, even if the original and the new loan are 
CHF loans or CHF-denominated loans.
5. 8. Omnibus account loan, exchange rate cap – Act LXXV of 2011 
The essence of the construction was that the debt emerging in the exchange rate range over the 
fixed rate was registered on a separate omnibus account loan. The financial institution ensured 
the HUF amount of the difference between the applied instalment rate and the fixed exchange 
rate along with the settlement of completion by disbursal from an omnibus account loan. The 
financial institution did not establish payment obligation by the credit debtor derived from 
the credit amount contract regarding the omnibus account up until the closing date of the 
application period. Afterwards, – taking the outstanding omnibus account debt as basis –the 
monthly instalment obligation was determined based on the rules of annuity. 
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The Government provided government guarantee for 100% of the debt. The pre-condition 
was that the lender terminated the loan agreement and the omnibus account agreement due 
to default by the debtor over 180 days, or enforcement proceedings against the collateral 
during the application period of the fixed exchange rate. The government guarantee took 
place if, following the application period of the fixed exchange rate, the lender terminated 
the loan agreement and the omnibus account agreement due to default by the debtor over 180 
days, or execution proceedings against the collateral and by normal enforcement rendered 
the loan or a part of it irrecoverable.23
The Government and the Banking Association signed an agreement on 15 December 2011, 
based on which the law was amended in March 2012. The exchange rate cap was extended 
so that over the specified exchange rate the bank and the Government assumed the interest 
rate payment from the debtor. The payment of the capital over the specified exchange 
rate bore interest on a separate omnibus account converted into HUF until the end of the 
exchange rate fixing, then the debtor had to pay it. In case of CHF loans, the bank and the 
Government assumed the interest rate payments for an exchange rate of HUF/CHF 180 and 
270 at 50−50%, and over HUF/CHF 270 the State assumed the entire redemption (including 
the capital payment). 
Subsequently, we may say that this was the only debtor-saving construction, which was 
prepared with the collaboration of banks, by substantial state commitment. 
5. 9. Final repayment at a fixed exchange rate – Act CXXI of 2011 on the 
amendment of certain acts related to home protection 
Based on law, in case of final payment in one lump sum, the banks had to allow debtors to 
get out of the loan at HUF/CHF 180 and HUF/EUR 250 exchange rates fixed in the previous 
package serving to save foreign currency loan debtors. The following persons were eligible 
for final repayment: 
- for whom the exchange rate applied upon disbursal was not higher than the fixed rate, 
- whose loan was not cancelled by the bank, 
- who submitted an application for final repayment by 30 December 2011, 
- who undertook early repayment of a bridging or omnibus account, and 
- the final repayment happened by the 60th day following the application. 
The key argument of professional criticism against the Act was state intervention into 
private legal relationships. In connection with that, it is worth mentioning that according to 
the Civil Code a legal provision may only overwrite contracts in exceptional cases. And the 
phrase “exceptional” has identifiable content based on court practice. Accordingly, among 
other things, such a change has to take place in the objective circumstances following the 
signing of the contract, due to which the completion of the undertaken obligation would 
violate the rightful interest of either party. The change has to impact a wide range of society, 
23 This caused a problem in practice, since there was no such case when the Government would have provided 
government guarantee.
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and it should be ensured that the intervention is necessary to achieve the objective, and 
the violation of other basic rights limited by completion should be proportionate. Although 
the exchange rate fluctuation can be considered as an external circumstance according to 
experts, theoretically all debtors should be aware of the option of exchange rate fluctuation 
itself when signing a loan agreement. This was separately addressed by the bank’s contractual 
conditions, and the banks had clients sign a risk-taking declaration. 
We share the professional view that exception must not mean the violation of property 
rights. However, the banks possess property right protection regarding loan capital. This 
means that, while the bank makes money on the loan, at the end of the duration it will 
certainly collect more money with the interest rates from debtors than the amount of 
the loan taken, while still enjoying protection. It was also concerned that, based on this, 
the Government might possibly pay damages to banks if the final repayment paid by the 
debtor at a discounted exchange rate did not reach the outstanding capital debt. Based 
on calculations, if the outstanding capital debt can be paid back by the debtors at a fixed 
exchange rate, the banks accrue loss between 15% and 35% on their capital liabilities. 
The wording of the Act was not completely unambiguous. During its execution, the banks 
had to almost continuously request commitment and guidance. The realization of the 
construction was still accompanied by numerous subsequent legal disputes. 
Based on my view, the Act was on one hand limited in its impact (it concerned not quite 
170,000 loans) on the debtors who were still able to perform (in many cases by using their last 
reserves and taking a replacement loan), however, it did not help the insolvent debtors. On the 
other hand, it placed financial and mainly administrative burdens on the banking system. 
It is also interesting that the scope of the Act applied to final repayments that could 
be completed based on “ Mortgage registered on a residential property in the Republic of 
Hungary”, in its letter dated 15 December 2011, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority informed the banks of the following: according to their views “the consumers 
can have the option to repay their debt at a fixed exchange rate even if the denomination in 
the property registry is not “social vacation home” or “vacation home”, but it is indicated as 
“vacation building, weekend house, apartment, holiday house, or boat-house” clearly referring 
to its vacation purpose24.” Based on the above, those clients were also eligible for final 
repayment at a fixed exchange rate, whose loan collateral was provided by a property, which 
instead of “social vacation home” or “vacation home”, had a “vacation building, weekend 
house, apartment, holiday house, or boat-house” denomination in the property registry. 
5. 10. The establishment of National Asset Management – Act CLXX of 
2011 on ensuring housing for natural persons incapable of meeting their 
payment obligations under their loan contracts 
The basic idea of the National Asset Management (NAM) is that the Government purchases 
the properties of insolvent debtors from banks, who then in turn rent it back from NAM. 
The proposal of the Banking Association for solving the problem was already in front of 
24 Executive letter by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, 15 December 2011
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the Cabinet in 2009. The proposal of banks was basically identical with the finally approved 
concept of the National Asset Management. The idea of the financial institutions was that 
those loans, which cannot be helped with banking tools (e.g. because the debtor lost his job, 
so he is not able to pay the lowered instalment rate either), should be assumed by a state 
organisation along with the concerned flat. The organisation can rent the property out as a 
social rental flat to the previous owner, so he does not have to leave his home. 
Based on the law however, the purchasing conditions of the residential property were 
strict, and a social (means-tested) certificate was required for it. The NAM could only buy 
the property, if the purchase price (which was fixed as the percentage of the market value 
by settlement types) was accepted by the bank. In this case, the bank gave up on its claims 
above the purchase price. The owner signed a rental agreement with NAM and, as a tenant, 
had the opportunity to re-buy the property later. 
The initial 5,000 properties were later extended to 25,000 based on the agreement signed 
with the Banking Association. 
5. 11. Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the resolution of questions relating to the 
uniformity decision of the Curia regarding consumer loan agreements of 
financial institutions 
5. 11. 1. Antecedents: Decision C-26/13 of the European Court 
It belongs to the antecedents of the case, that the Curia initiated preliminary decision-making 
proceedings in connection with a specific consumer-related legal dispute with the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (EUC). In the EUC Decision C-26/13 dated 30 April 2014, the 
question of “if the contractual conditions specifying the conversion rates, which are not negotiated 
individually in case of a loan which was denominated in foreign currency, but was actually 
disbursed in national currency and to be paid exclusively in national currency by the consumer, 
can be integrated under the concept of ‘definition of the primary subject of the contract’?” had a 
prominent role. In its decision, the EUC provided a fairly general answer to the question when it 
stated: the concept of “the primary subject of the contract” only extends on to such conditions, “if 
the court submitting the question establishes based on the assessment of the nature, general system 
and stipulations, as well as legal and factual correlations of the contract, that the above mentioned 
condition defines the fundamental service of the contract, typical service as such”, i.e. it returned it 
to the Curia for inspection. However, it declared as guidance, that “such condition, since it places 
financial obligation on the consumer that he shall pay the amounts derived from the difference 
between the selling and buying rate of the foreign currency during the redemption of the loan, 
shall not be considered as containing a ‘pricing’, which according to the unfair nature of the servi-
ce provided by the lender as counter-service cannot be assessed based on Decree 93/13 article 4 (2).” 
The Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union has been analysed by many 
people from many aspects. Of those I would first like to highlight the analysis of Ákos Szalai. 
He starts by saying that “The first two questions of the Curia referred to how should these 
restrictions be interpreted: what does ‘price’, ‘the primary subject of the contract’, and ‘clear 
and understandable’ phrasing mean. At first glance, the fact that the loan has to be repaid 
according to the buying rate of the concerned foreign currency is a clear, understandable phrase 
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specifying the counter-service undertaken by the consumer. The first and second instance 
however – contrary to the applicable references by the bank – still declared it unfair. ... The 
decision possesses the professional problems generally characterizing the consumer protection 
regulation. To understand it, one needs to know that this regulation was not derived from 
jurisprudence addressing contracts for thousands of years, but from economics modelling the 
fairly simple form of sales. … In reality service faces counter-service in contracts – and not an 
exogenous specific product against some (generally modelled as a single factor) price.” 
“That is exactly why, when consumer protection separates price and remuneration (point 54), it 
tries to enforce quite a foreign model from the contract concept of law. This is well reflected by the 
decision as well. The Court of Luxembourg practically does not offer a test to decide which points of 
the contract should be considered as ‘decisive for the relation of service price/quality’ (point 52). It 
simply states that the definition of the exchange rate is not such (see points 52−58). To put it a bit more 
severely: it questions the clarity of such termination of the contract – and highlights the uniformity 
of the contract. The concept of primary service is less of a problem. Especially, if we identify it against 
the ‘essence’ with ‘subsidiary-type’ elements (point 50) as it appears in the Decision. Even though this 
distinction is known in other areas of civil law as well, it is not a coincidence that it by far does not have 
the same significance in Hungarian law as in the contractual rights in other countries. The fact that 
the separation of these elements is not always simple is also a reason for this. … the verdict does not 
suggest such an inspection (the average consumer test is not brought up by the verdict in connection 
with the separation of the contractual phrases, only by clarity in point 74), and the certain phrases 
should be separated not based on the assessment of the consumers, but the ‘nature, general system 
and stipulations, as well as legal and factual correlations of the contract” (point 1 of the verdict).”25
In connection with the above, Mónika Papp examines the Decision of the European Court with 
the eye of a jurist: “The Luxembourg Body provided many guidelines for the courts of member states 
to decide whether the stipulation similar to the exchange rate gap belongs to the primary subject of 
the contract, or not. It did so despite the fact that in point 37 the verdict established that the primary 
subject of the contract should be interpreted uniformly and independently in the entire European 
Union, with consideration for the correlations and the aim of the regulation, since its text does not 
contain a specific reference to the rights of the member states. In point 47 of the verdict however, the 
EUC highlighted that the primary subject of the contract should be interpreted with restrictions, as an 
exception from the system of contextual examination of unfair conditions. According to the highest 
interpretation of EU law, this exception covers only the basic services of contracts, those which specify 
the essence of the contractual relationship and that are not ancillary. With the separation of the basic 
and non-ancillary service, the condition of whether the parties negotiated the condition should not 
be considered, as the Directive shall only be applied to the not yet negotiated contractual conditions.” 
“As a starting point, the Advocate General suggested that the condition should somehow, from 
a legal or commercial aspect, be a part of the definition of the substantial features of the contract 
objectively. In this sense, the court had to specify if the referenced condition constitutes a part of 
the services defining the contract in itself, by checking if in absence of this condition the contract 
25 Ákos SZALAI: Kásler verdict of the European Court with an eye of a jurist. MTA Social Sciences Research Cent-
re Momentum-HPOPs Research Group. Available on the Internet: https://hpops.tk.mta.hu/blog/2014/05/az-
europai-birosag-kasler-itelete-egy-joggazdasz-szemevel
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would lose one of its fundamental features, or it is not possible to fulfil even with all the remaining 
contractual stipulations. The Advocate General’s question was the following: ‘If the establishment 
of transaction interest constitutes the essence of the loan agreement, what should a mechanism, 
which enables the lender to calculate the monthly interest rates based on the exchange rate of some 
foreign currency qualify as?’ (point 58 of the initiative) In case of a mortgage-type loan agreement, 
where the property is insured by mortgage and is registered in foreign currency, according to the 
Advocate General most likely the primary subject of the contract includes the condition defining 
the exchange rates, since in absence of this condition the fulfilment of the contract is jeopardised. 
In an already concluded, similar British legal dispute the various level of courts arrived at different 
conclusions, whether the (excessive) fee charged by the bank in case of the unauthorized overdraft 
of the bank’s loan amount belongs to the primary subject of the contract or not. As a petitioner, the 
Office of Fair Trading won a case both in front of the High Court and the Court of Appeal by stating 
that the excessive amount of banking fee is unfair (dishonest). The Supreme Court however decided 
without launching a preliminary decision-making procedure, independently, that since the banking 
fee belongs to the primary subject of the contract, therefore its dishonest, unfair nature cannot be 
examined based on the British regulation transposing the directive. (Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey 
National plc and Others [2009] UKSC 6, [2009] EWCA 116, [2008] EWHC 875 (Comm)).”26
The above-mentioned opinions are cautious when they establish that the Decision of 
the EUC is based on rather shaky foundations. My personal view however – by completely 
accepting the contents of the analyses – is stricter than this. 
Let us revisit the definition of foreign currency loans listed in the beginning of the study. 
From the definition of the concept, it is clear that the lender’s services include the disbursal 
of the loan amount denominated in foreign currency according to the legal currency of the 
place of payment, whereas the debtors’ counter-service is the payment of the loan amount 
denominated in the denominated currency, regardless of which currency the payment is 
rendered. Conversion between various currencies is a constructional condition and an 
immanent part of the parties consideration which is necessarily connected to the cost of 
conversion. The cost therefore – according to the concept definition – necessarily constitutes 
the primary subject of the contract, hence its unfair nature cannot be examined based on the 
Directive and the transposing national regulation. The conversion cost is not some kind of 
“fee” charged separately by the EUC as the compensation for a service, but it constitutes the 
primary subject of the contract. 
At the same time, the verdict of the EUC stated that “the primary subject of the contract” 
only extends to such conditions, “if the court submitting the question establishes based on 
the assessment of the nature, general system and stipulations, as well as legal and factual 
correlations of the contract, that the above-mentioned condition defines the fundamental 
service of the contract, typical service as such”.
26 Mónika PAPP: Kásler verdict of the Curia - with the eye of a European jurist. MTA Social Sciences 
Research Centre Momentum-HPOPs Research Group. Available on the Internet: https://hpops.tk.mta.hu/
blog/2014/06/a-kuria-kasler-itelete-egy-europai-jogasz-szemevel
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5. 11. 2. The uniformity decisions of the Curia 
In accordance with the verdict of the EUC, the Curia shall (should) examine, based on the 
assessment of the nature, general system and stipulations of the contract, as well as its legal and 
factual correlations, whether the referenced condition specifies the fundamental and typical service 
of the contract. However, the Curia neglected the more detailed examination of these correlations. 
According to point 1 of the civil law uniformity Decision 6/2013 of the Curia, there is no 
conversion in case of loan agreements denominated in foreign currency, only recalculation, 
for which the usual fee for currency conversion is not due. Due to the application of different 
exchange rates, the financial institutions accrue income not covered by consideration, and 
the consumers accrue an expense, which is unfair. 
In contrast, although point 1 of the civil law uniformity Decision 6/2013 does not address 
unfairness contextually, but in general it implies that “the parties specified the monetary debt of the 
lender and the debtor derived from the loan agreement in foreign currency (denominated currency), 
and both parties had to render that in forints (paid currency). With this type of contract the debtor 
became indebted in foreign currency by a more beneficial interest rate than HUF loans had in this 
period, consequently, he bears the impacts of the exchange rate fluctuation: the depreciation of the 
HUF results in increased payment burden for the debtor, and its appreciation in a reduced burden.”
In its uniformity Decision 2/2014, based on the individual case, the Curia made three 
observations:
1. The exchange rate risk – in exchange of a more beneficial interest rate – is borne 
by the consumer without limitation, is a contractual regulation constituting the 
scope of main service, the unfairness of which cannot be examined as a main rule. 
The unfairness of this regulation can only be examined and established, if for the 
generally informed, reasonably attentive and careful average consumer (hereinafter 
referred to as: consumer) its content was not clear or not understandable during 
signing of the contract, considering the text of the contract and also the information 
received from the financial institution.
2. The contractual provision allowing for unilateral contract amendment is unfair if 
it does not meet the principles listed in point 6 of the PK Opinion 2/2012 (10. XII.) 
on the unfairness of the unilateral contract amendment right listed in the general 
contract conditions applied by the financial institution in the loan agreement (the 
principle of clear and understandable wording, principle of itemised definition, 
principle of objectivity, principle of effectiveness and proportionality, effectiveness 
transparency, callable principle, principle of symmetry).
3. The application of different exchange rates is unfair, because there is no direct service 
provided to the consumer, therefore it means an unjustified cost for the consumer. 
These regulations are also unfair, since the economic reason for their application is 
not clear, not understandable and not transparent for the consumer. Instead of the 
buying and selling rates listed in consumer loan agreements denominated in foreign 
currency as conversion rates, the official foreign exchange rate of the MNB become 
part of the contract, in consideration of the disposing legal provision of the Civil 
Code	of	1959	231.	§	(2).	
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In regards to the application of the exchange rate gap, the following can 
be established:
1. The exchange rate gap is always the difference between the buying and selling rate on 
the same day. It cannot be interpreted as the difference between the buying rate upon 
disbursal and the selling rate upon repayment. 
2. The buying and selling rates are formed by the supply-demand conditions, similarly to the 
stock market rates. It is absolutely not necessary for the bank in charge of foreign currency 
trading to index them to each other and define a fixed exchange rate difference (exchange rate 
gap). The exchange rate gap during the signing of the contract does not mean that the same 
difference will be applicable upon repayment. The consumer cannot conclude in any form 
how the instalment rates will develop on certain instalment dates. The exchange rate gap may 
even change on the day following the signing of the contract due to market fluctuations. 
3. No contract or legal provision mentions the exchange rate gap. It follows from the APR 
decree27 formula that with the APR calculation the buying and selling rate applicable on 
the date of contract should be taken into account, but then it should not be paid by the 
debtor (the known value), unlike the considerable, actually payable real costs during APR 
calculation (e.g. value assessment fee). The difference in the buying-selling rates for the 
debtor is not a cost to be paid on the date of contract, i.e. not an actual cost. The APR helps 
to compare the prices of different banks and banking products, and is a tool supporting 
decision-making for consumers, an indicator, which is only authoritative for one single 
date, the date of contract (but is not a cost!). Its extent – as mentioned in the previous point 
– might even change on the day following the date of contract (in a strictly normative 
way), so it is almost certain that the debtor would not have to pay the cost listed in the APR 
of the contract date in the first and the next instalment rate (and only then).
4. Based on this, all factors taken into account during the APR calculation should be 
considered as cost and separately listed in the contract, since they have already been 
expressed in the APR. With this approach, the debtor could rightfully believe that 
he should pay these factors in addition to the APR as extras. With this approach all 
other costs taken into account during the APR calculation should be listed by item (in 
addition to the APR), and the function of APR is to provide a summarized indicator for 
the consumer to decide which product to choose. 
5. According to the EUC verdict, the APR does not have a meaning that could not be 
interpreted from the legal provision to help the debtor in establishing the amount of his 
future debt. According to law, the role of APR is only to make different banking offers 
comparable, so the consumer knows the gross price of the product. 
6. Upon redemption, the debtor does not pay the exchange rate gap, but the counter value 
calculated with the sales price. The exchange rate gap, with special regard to the content 
of point 2, does not influence the debtor’s payment obligation by any means. 
27 Government Decree 83/2010 (25. III.) effective at the time on the establishment of the Annual Percentage Rate 
of Charge, its calculation and publication..
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7. If the rules regarding unilateral contract amendment were authoritative for the 
exchange rates and consequently the exchange rate gap, the amendment would have to 
be announced 15, or 60 days in advance, which is obviously impossible on the foreign 
exchange market.
5. 11. 3. Act XXXVIII of 2014 
Based on the civil law uniformity Decision of the Curia No. 2/2014, the Parliament approved 
Act XXXVIII of 2014. The Act pointedly “does not declare new financial legal regulations, 
and does not establish new legal principles regarding the consumer credit, loan and financial 
lease agreements, it only codifies the interpretation of the law of the Curia.” 
The Act declared the application of the exchange rate gap as unfair, and established the 
protection of unilateral contract amendment unfairness. In case of applying the latter, it 
created an opportunity for the financial institution to prove the unfairness of the applied 
unilateral amendments in a separate lawsuit, and compliance with the principles stipulated 
in the PK Opinion 2/2012. (XII. 10.) point 6. 
In addition to the above, the Act established the separate rules for legal procedures aimed at 
overthrowing this unfairness protection, the rules to be followed in pending foreign currency 
loan lawsuits and the separate rules of related enforcement proceedings. It referred the rules 
concerning the settlement between consumers and financial institution to a separate act. 
5.12. Act XL of 2014 on the rules of settlement
According to the principle of the so-called Settlement Act created based on Act XXXVIII of 
2014 in case of an unfairly charged exchange rate gap, the financial institution has to settle 
with the consumer by applying the official foreign currency exchange rate published by MNB. 
The Act regulated the settlement of unfair amounts charged based on the exchange rate 
gap and the unilateral contract amendments. The Act pronounced that unfairly charged 
amounts shall be considered as early repayment. 
Additionally, the Act stipulated special rules to adapt to certain debtor-saving legislation 
(early repayment, National Asset Management, exchange rate cap, bridging loan), as well as 
suspended legal or enforcement proceedings. 
5. 13. Act on conversion into forints 
Following the legal uniformity Decision of the Curia No. 2/2014, the Government’s intention 
regarding the mandatory conversion of foreign currency loans to forints was notable. The 
Decision of the Curia made it clear that the exchange rate risk encumbers the debtor. The 
Ministry of National Economy announced in November 2014: “The accountability of banks and 
the conversion of foreign currency loans into forints is underway in accordance with the previous 
decision of the Government. As they promised, the Cabinet phases the foreign currency loans out of 
the market in three steps: first, after the decision of the Curia, it fixed the method of accountability. 
Afterwards, the banks shall settle with their clients. In the third step, the foreign currency loans 
are phased out from the market. With the settlement of the foreign currency loan problem, the 
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Government acted in the utmost consideration of the Curia’s Decision, ensuring complete legality of 
the process, therefore the conversion into forints may also take place based on the Curia’s Decision.”28
The basis for the conversion into forints was provided by the average exchange rate of the 
period since the Curia’s decision, or the daily MNB exchange rate as of 7 November 2014. 
From these two rates, the bank was obligated to apply the more beneficial exchange rate for 
the foreign currency loan debtor. In case of debtors with CHF loans, it meant HUF/CHF 
256.5, and in case of those with EUR loans, a HUF/EUR 309 conversion rate. 
For a manoeuvre of such magnitude great determination, very thorough planning and 
coordinated collaboration was needed. Furthermore, discretion in regards to timing and the 
conversion rate. If the details were leaked, a speculation attack could have easily undermined 
the largest Hungarian financial transaction of all times. 
A foreign currency loan volume of HUF 2,700 billion (approx. EUR 9 billion) had to be converted 
into forints, i.e. the banks had to pay the foreign exchange (resource) behind the loans back to their 
lenders. To put it simply: during the phasing out of foreign currency loans the banks had to pay out 
a lot of forints to buy euros or Swiss francs and close foreign currency loans. The debts, of course, 
remained in the system and in the books of banks, but now in forints. If however, the banks 
simultaneously sold HUF 2,700 billion on the market, it would have caused the unforeseeable 
depreciation of forints. Therefore, the foreign currency resource for repayment was provided by 
MNB (so the banks did not have to get it from the free market), at a fixed rate (it was published on 
9 November 2014, that in accordance with the agreement with banks the conversion into forints 
was carried out on the exchange rate on 4 November), to prevent speculation attacks. 
The conversion into forints was carried out in two steps. First, the loan agreements 
denominated in foreign currency with a mortgage registered on the property were converted – 
including the mortgage registered as independent collateral – with the settlement record date 
of 1 February 2015.29 After this, based on a separate act,30 the conversion of loan agreements 
denominated in other foreign currency were also converted into forints. The Government 
and the Banking Association signed an agreement on 19 August 2015 on the conversion of 
consumer foreign exchange credit and foreign currency denominated loans into forints, and 
based on this the government bill was submitted in mid-September 2015. The conversion into 
forints took place on the foreign currency market exchange rate on 19 August 2015, and the 
resource for this was provided by MNB.
According to the Act, the financial institutions were obligated to prepare the text of 
amended contracts by 15 December 2015 as loan agreements with annuity instalment rate, 
and also send the text of the amended provisions to the concerned principal debtor. 
28 MTI, 09 November 2014, furthermore: https://www.portfolio.hu/finanszirozas/hitel/bejelentettek-ezen-az-
arfolyamon-forintositjak-a-devizahiteleket.206185.html
29 Act LXXVII of 2014 on the settlement of questions regarding the modification of foreign currency of certain 
consumer credit agreements and the rules on interest rates
30 Act CXLV of 2015 on the settlement of questions regarding the conversion of claims derived from certain 
consumer credit agreements into forints
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6. Progressive (proactive) legislation 
6. 1. “Fair Banking” Act – Act LXXVIII of 2014 
The Act made the obligations of financial service providers engaged in retail banking 
services and the rules of contract signing and amendment unambiguous. 
The amendment of the Credit Act incorporated into law concerns the following main 
questions:
•	 making	the	informational	obligation	prior	to	contracting	more	efficient;
•	 new	provisions	regarding	the	amendment	of	the	loan	agreement;
•	 authoritative	 rules	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 free	 cancellation	 of	 the	 loan	 agreement	 by	 the	
consumer;
•	 special	regulations	concerning	loans	denominated	in	foreign	currency;
•	 rules	regarding	the	change	over	to	the	new	contractual	conditions;
•	 Regulations	about	the	amendment	of	Act	XL	of	2014	on	accountability.
According to the law amendment, before signing the loan agreement the lender and the 
credit mediator are obligated to inform the client with clear, transparent and representative 
examples, based on which the consumer may assess whether the loan to be utilized meets his 
needs and financial capacity. During this process, the lender and the credit mediator provide 
the consumer with information required to compare various offers in order to enable the 
consumer to make a grounded decision on the possible signing of the loan agreement. 
A loan with maximum 3-year duration can be provided by
a)  fixed interest rates or
b)  floating rate indexed to the reference interest rate published on the website of the 
MNB and fixed interest surcharge 
during the entire duration and defined in the loan agreement. The interest rate conditions 
of this loan many not be amended unilaterally and unfavourably for the consumer.
A loan with over 3-year duration can be provided by 
a)  floating rate indexed to the reference interest rate published on the website of the MNB 
and fixed interest surcharge during the entire duration or at least in 3-year interest periods, 
b)  loan interest fixed in at least 3-year interest periods, or
c)  fixed interest rate
during the entire duration and defined in the loan agreement. 
In case of loans with over 3-year duration, the financial institution shall fix the loan 
interest, whereas in case of loans indexed to the reference interest rate – floating rate – the 
interest surcharge shall be fixed in advance in at least 3-year interest periods. 
With those loans, where the loan is indexed to the reference interest rate, i.e. that have floating 
rate, the interest surcharge amending indicators should be monitored. They include the mortgage 
credits that are converted into forints. In case of these loans, the interest surcharge – the delta of the 
loan interest and the reference rate – is fixed during the interest period. The interest rate of the loan 
fluctuates during the interest period, by being adapted to the duration of the reference interest rate.
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The reference interest rates and indicators are calculated and published by MNB. Financial 
service providers may use their own interest rate changing and interest surcharge indexes, 
or reference interest rates, if MNB has pre-approved them. The indexes and their values can 
be checked on MNB’s website.31
In addition to the interest rate, the lender may only establish and amend such cost unfavourably 
for the consumer, which – in proportion to its growth – was listed in an itemised way in the 
contract. A further condition is that the cost should have arisen during the contract signing 
or amendment and communication with the consumer directly in the consumer’s interest, in 
connection with the service provided by a third party, and in a transparent way for the consumer. 
In addition to the interest rate, the lender may only establish the payment of a fee (with certain 
exceptions listed in law) if it is listed in the loan agreement in an itemised way, and is in connection 
with the contract signing, contract amendment and termination, or the transaction costs. The lender 
may only increase these fees up to the level of the previous year’s consumer price index published by 
the Central Statistics Office. The lender may amend the cost as it arises, and the fee once per year with 
the effective date of 1 April. The Act maximises the extent of the disbursal and availability fee as well. 
The Act contains detailed regulations regarding the content of the amendments and the 
deadline of the previous information obligation. 
The Act guarantees the opportunity of loan agreement termination both for the consumer 
and the credit institution based on specified rules, and stipulates its detailed rules. 
In regards to foreign currency loans, the law amendment also pronounced the obligatory 
application of the risk exposure declaration already incorporated in the Credit Act earlier, 
and the rule of applying the mandatory central rate. 
The Fair Banking Act can be considered a proactive regulation, since it influences and 
clarifies the rules of providing consumer loans. 
6. 2. Debt brake regulation – MNB Decree No. 32/2014 (10. IX.) 
In order to prevent excessive retail indebtedness and the booming of foreign currency 
lending again, MNB created a new macro-prudential regulation. The debt brake regulation, 
which came into effect on 1 January 2015, fundamentally consists of two main pillars: the 
introduction of the loan-to-value and the income-to-instalment index. 
The regulation, on one hand, specifies the value of exposure upon the assessment of 
the credit application, the so-called loan-to-value index (LTV) by loan purpose. In case 
of secured loans (e.g. mortgage credits), the loan-to-value (LTV) index limits the size of 
borrowable credit in ratio to the collateral (value of flat). 
With loans provided by mortgage collateral registered on the property 
•	 in	HUF	the	value	of	exposure	upon	the	assessment	of	 the	credit	application	must	not	
exceed 80% of the property’s market value, or 85% in case of a financial leasing,
•	 with	EUR-denominated	or	EUR	loans	50%,	or	55%	in	case	of	a	financial	leasing,
•	 35%	of	loans	denominated	in	other	currency,	or	40%	in	case	of	a	financial	leasing.
31 https://www.mnb.hu/fair-bank/kamatfelar-valtoztatasi-mutato
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In case of loans provided for vehicle purchase 
•	 in	HUF	the	value	of	exposure	upon	the	assessment	of	 the	credit	application	must	not	
exceed 75% of the vehicle’s market value, or 80% in case of a financial leasing,
•	 with	EUR-denominated	or	EUR	loans	45%,	or	50%	in	case	of	a	financial	leasing,
•	 30%	of	loans	denominated	in	other	currency,	or	35%	in	case	of	a	financial	leasing.
The income-to-instalment index (ITI) limits the maximum repayment burden that 
could be imposed on a client to a definite percentage of their regular, legal income, while it 
moderates their indebtedness. 
The fundamental aim of the debt brake regulation introduced by MNB is to prevent the 
excessive indebtedness of households and the booming of foreign currency denominated 
loans again. The income-to-instalment index (ITI) tries to offset the negative impact of foreign 
currency denominated loans and to steer demand towards loans denominated in HUF.
If the clients’ or in case of co-debtors, the taxpayers’ total certified monthly net income is 
less than HUF 400,000, the ITI value upon credit assessment may not exceed
•	 50%	in	case	of	a	HUF	loan,
•	 25%	in	case	of	a	EUR	or	EUR-denominated	loan,
•	 10%	in	case	of	foreign	currency	loans	provided	in	another	currency.
If the clients’ or in case of co-debtors, the taxpayers’ total certified monthly net income 
equals or exceeds HUF 400,000, the ITI value upon credit assessment may not exceed
a)  60% in case of a HUF loan,
b) 30% in case of a EUR or EUR-denominated loan,
c)  15% in case of foreign currency loans provided in another currency outside of b). 
According to the new ITI rules, in case of mortgage credit applications received after 1 October 
2018, which have more than 5 years duration – depending on the duration of the loan’s interest 
period – lower than the current ITI limits shall be applied. The amended provisions also ensure that 
in case of an unfavourable interest rate change, the households should have proper income reserves. 
People with higher income – due to their higher redemption ability – can still borrow a loan by 
higher monthly instalment rates. Considering the dynamic salary increases notable in the recent 
years and hopefully continuing in the future, the regulation allows for taking higher ratio instalment 
rates in case of HUF 500,000 monthly income from 1 July 2019 (instead of the previous HUF 400,00). 
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ITI rules for new mortgage credits in HUF from 1 October 2018
Monthly net income Interest period
Varying interest 
− 5 years
5 years − 
10 years
10 years − until 
the end of the term
Below HUF 400,000 
(HUF 500,000 from 1 
July 2019)
25% 35% 50%
HUF 400,000 HUF 
(HUF 500,000 from 1 
July 2019) or above
30% 40% 60%
Source: https://www.mnb.hu/sajtoszoba/sajtokozlemenyek/2018-evi-sajtokozlemenyek/az-mnb-az-
adossagfek-szabalyok-modositasaval-is-osztonzi-a-fix-kamatozasu-lakashitelek-ternyereset 
Besides the above, the MNB regulation also supports the moderation of the interest rate 
risk of already borrowed loans by not having to apply the debt brake rules for contract 
amendments and loan replacements, unless the new loan’s interest period is shortened. 
The Fair Banking Act and the debt brake regulation follow similar considerations as 
the recommendations issued by the Poland banking authority in Poland before and at the 
beginning of the crisis.32 They were able to efficiently prevent the excessive penetration of 
foreign currency loans in Poland, although in a different economic-legal environment. 
In addition to the referenced regulation, the mortgage-financing-compliance index, serving as 
the resource for long-term retail credits, and long-term interest swap transactions and mortgage 
debenture purchasing program applied by MNB can also be considered as regulations with positive 
impact. They promote the penetration of mortgage credits provided by long-term interest periods. 
The Consumer-Friendly Housing Loan rating system serves the strengthening of trust towards 
lending financial institutions. Information regarding its detailed rules exceeds the scope of this study. 
7. Historia est Magistra vitae 
Historia est magistra vitae – said Cicero. Indeed, it is worth contemplating on what we did 
wrong with foreign currency loans, and whether the “adventure” embittering the lives of 
several hundred thousand people could have been avoided. Did we do everything, and did 
we do it efficiently enough to manage the problem? What are the lessons learned for the 
future and can similar situations be prevented, if so, how? 
7. 1. Reasons for the penetration of foreign currency loans 
When we investigate these questions, first and foremost we have to explore what led to the 
population’s mass indebtedness in foreign currency. For this, we must schematically review 
32 HUDECZ: i.m. 366-369.
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those theoretical items, which prompt the consumers under market circumstances to take 
loans in another currency other than one in which they generate their income.33
The answer seems obvious: the foreign currency loan had substantially lower interest rates 
than HUF loans at the given time, hence why consumers chose foreign currency loans. It 
might seem like a simple and logical explanation, however it is worth examining deeper 
correlations. If someone borrows a loan with income in HUF by taking a risk related to the 
foreign currency loan, why does he take this substantial risk? 
The most often quoted reason is that consumers underestimated the risk accompanied by the 
exchange rate fluctuation, or simply ignored it. There might be several reasons to this seemingly 
irrational consumer attitude. The most typical is normally the moral risk, when the consumer trusts 
that the Government will intervene in an extreme case to prevent bankruptcies of banks and social 
tensions. A reason could be that consumers do not consider that the considerable open foreign 
currency position increases the vulnerability of the country, which generally raises the price of loan 
products (not only of the foreign currency loans). In addition, the uncertain or discredited economic 
policy and the high and fluctuating inflation level of the country are mentioned, as well as in which 
environment a tool suitable to fight off the real interest fluctuations could be the foreign currency loan. 
“The clarification of reasons is not autotelic. To solve the problem of foreign currency lending 
(wherever it is a problem,) it is inevitable to clarify its cause. Different causes require different handling 
methods. If, for example, the main cause is the lack of credibility of the economic policy institutions, then 
the limitation of dollarization by administrative or surveillance tools does not address the root of the 
problem, therefore it can only imply long-term, sustainable success in a limited way (let us not forget that 
foreign currency lending is not always “bad”, consequently limiting it is also not necessarily “good” or 
successful). However, if the cause is the lack of information provided to the credit borrowers, wide-scope 
information campaigns might help, whereas if the moral risk or the external factor is the key cause, then 
regulation and the internalization of costs could be the right tool for managing the problem.”34
Based on practical experiences the fundamental pre-condition for foreign currency lending 
is free capital flow, and hence the abundance of inexpensive foreign currency resources. During 
financing via the banking system however – unlike working capital or portfolio investment – 
due to the essence of the construction, the exchange rate risk is inherent to the credit borrower. 
The lack of long-term national resources helps the penetration of foreign currency lending. 
A very significant factor could be the loose and unpredictable fiscal policy, which due to 
excessive indebtedness is accompanied by substantial financing need. This, in turn, increases 
the risk premium of financing, and on the other hand, the state financing requirement forces 
other market players out of the credit market. 
In case of a conscious consumer, the interest rate gap does not necessarily influence the 
consumer’s decision (based on the deliberation of risks). Due to the low-level financial culture 
in post-socialist countries, the consumers faith in unchanging exchange rates shifted demand 
towards foreign currency loans with substantially lower interest rates. It is certainly in the interest 
33 The analysis was prepared based on the quoted work of András Hudecz.
34 HUDECZ: i. m. 356.
 Dr. Szabolcs Korba 201
of lenders to sell their credit products to well-informed and creditworthy consumers, however 
one-time thorough information (even by the thorough and plain wording of risk exposure 
declarations) is not able to supplement such insufficiencies of the financial culture prior to lending. 
At the same time, we cannot deny that part of the lending banks did not completely disclose the 
reason for the exchange rate difference or the risks, consequently the interest of consumers was 
shifted towards “cheaper” foreign exchange credit products to increase their market share. 
The consumer’s faith in unchanging exchange rate can be increased, on one hand, by the 
banking practice that presents the exchange rate risk backwards based on timelines. It is 
only elevated by the central bank’s routine, which keeps the exchange rates permanently 
at the same level (although their amendment would be justified), and also the continuous 
and long-lasting appreciation of national currency which might create the feeling in the 
consumer that the instalment rate of the foreign currency loan is continuously decreasing. 
If we investigate the above theoretical and practical considerations, we have to say that in 
the beginning of the 2000s, in Hungary, all conditions were simultaneously met. 
As	I	wrote	in	the	beginning	of	the	study,	Government	Decree	88/2001.	(15.	VI.)	§	5	(followed	
by reinforcing Act XCIII of 2001) enabled free loan borrowing without foreign exchange 
limitations for national residents. Without limitation meant that the consumer could practically 
borrow a foreign currency loan with equal conditions to the HUF loans, not counting the 
exchange rate risk. It was not a problem for a long time, since based on Government Decree 
12/2001. (31. I.) the subsidised housing loans denominated in HUF were able to satisfy the 
population’s needs. Moreover, the unlimited housing subsidy really increased the appetite of 
the population for loans (the previous decade’s irrational municipality rental flat sales program, 
which created an unhealthy housing structure played a role in this). Therefore within a short 
time, at the end of 2003, substantial restrictions had to be introduced in interest rate subsidies. 
Today it is difficult to clearly establish the role the launching of retail (housing) loans played 
in the preparation of foreign currency loans, the booming, then retaining of the state subsidized 
interest rate program, the authorization of foreign currency swaps for national citizens, as well as 
the expansion of the intervention range of the HUF exchange rate. These steps and circumstances 
either happened simultaneously, or followed each other very quickly. The viewpoint of András 
Hudecz might be acceptable,35 according to which the complete elimination of foreign currency 
restrictions played a minor role in this, since at the EU accession of Hungary they would have 
been eliminated anyway, and foreign currency lending only started to really boom afterwards. I 
believe foreign currency lending could have been held back on the supply side. 
The economic situation became quite uncertain during 2003. The monetary and fiscal 
policy followed substantially different strategies, the exchange rates were extremely volatile 
and the interest rate gap between the HUF and EUR increased by more than 6 percentage 
points by the end of the year compared to the mid-year situation. The fiscal policy was 
overspending for years since 2001, and the monetary policy in an orthodox way considered 
the stability of the exchange rate as its single task, subordinating everything else. 
35 HUDECZ: i.m. 384.
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It is important to highlight those circumstances which also strengthened belief in foreign 
currency lending. On one hand, the outlook was very (excessively) optimistic in the world and 
in Europe both from a political and economic level. The cold war had ended, regime change 
had been carried out in ex-socialist countries, the accession negotiations to the European Union 
had begun, and accession was within reach. This straightforward development enticed with 
the hope of creating a new Europe. In addition to the harmonization of institutions, this would 
have been accompanied by the hope of economic integration, and, as part of that, the hope of 
introducing the euro as means of payment within a reasonable time. In the middle of 2003, the 
Government placed the target date for the introduction of the euro at 1 January 2008. Under such 
circumstances, the risk of borrowing a foreign currency loan seemed remote to the population.36
So by the end of 2003, the legal, economic and social system of conditions for foreign currency 
lending was available in a cumulated way with all known elements. However, we have to 
emphasize that foreign currency lending is not “bad” or “good” in itself, and its appearance in 
Hungarian lending practice is not detrimentally harmful or beneficial. Given a proper regulatory 
environment, it can effectively support the satisfaction of consumer needs. Typically, despite its 
penetration, the ratio of problematic foreign currency loans was not greater than that of HUF 
loans up until the Great Recession. We can much rather say that none of the stakeholders of 
the construct: neither the contracting parties, consumers and lenders, nor the regulatory state 
creating the environmental conditions were prepared for managing such a banking product. 
They did not recognize the impacts and dangers of foreign currency lending. 
András Hudecz mentions that fundamentally it is about a phenomenon, which was already 
known in other parts of the world, although in a partially different social-economic environment. 
This so-called “dollarization”, which in a simplified way means that the economic stakeholders of 
the given country are unable to access sufficient credit in their own national currency for some 
reason, so they become indebted in a more stable and liquid foreign currency. The phenomenon was 
quite prevailing in Latin America and Eastern-Asia (this has also partially contributed to the Asian 
crisis), where typically the USD was the stable foreign currency. This is where the name comes from, 
which by now does not only mean indebtedness in dollars, but also in all other foreign currency.37
7. 2. Hungaricums 
In addition to the lack of regulation, there were however two specifically Hungarian 
conditions, Hungaricums, which led to aggravation of the problem (although they were not 
only connected to foreign currency loans). 
This was, on one hand, the lack of a positive list debtors’ registry fundamentally necessary to 
prevent excessive debt, based on which the lender could assess the consumer’s creditworthiness a 
36 An extraordinarily good and precise summary on the optimistic public atmosphere that emerged by the 
2000s, followed by the measures that were created during the subsequent crisis by TOOZE, Adam’s book 
titled: Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World. Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition 
(First published in the United States of America by Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC 2018. 
First published in Great Britain by Allen Lane 2018) recently published.
37 HUDECZ: i.m. 352.
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lot more precisely and carefully. With this, the excessive lending for the most problematic clientele 
could likely have been avoided. The banking sector recognized the problem early enough, and 
from 2002 on urged the creation of such a database. This view was also shared by the competent 
ministries. The prevailing data security commissioners however kept hindering the creation of the 
database by referring to data security concerns. In my opinion, even at the first signs of the crisis, 
the commissioner on data security and his office did not understand the importance of creating 
a positive list debtors’ registry as soon as possible. The creation of the database in 2011, full of 
compromises, was no longer able to prevent the over-lending of foreign currency loan borrowers. 
The other, specifically Hungarian, feature was the question of how to regulate unilateral 
contract amendments. The report of the Várhegyi Committee pointed out the insufficient 
regulation of the question and, based on professional criteria, correctly emphasized the 
importance of self-regulation by banks. The commenced self-regulation by banks exposed a lot 
of interesting circumstances. It could have provided a legal and banking foundation to establish 
such a regulatory framework, which would have been able to settle this question with market 
tools and in a fair way for the consumer, clearly and understandably, specifically as a tool of 
sustaining contractual balance. The opportunity for an efficient and mutually complementary 
connection of self-regulation and legal regulation also presented itself here in the most obvious 
form. In contrast, based on the initiative of the Office of Economic Competition, a normative 
text was created from an idea which was previously professionally criticized and was proven to be 
unconsummated later. Subsequently, the opportunity of unilateral contract amendment became 
the symbol of the unfairness of banks, and its real economic justification was not recognized. 
In addition to this, the foreign currency loan proved to be a remarkably successful product 
in retail lending. By 2008, some 70% of new retail loans were in foreign currency. Although 
MNB, from 2001, kept drawing attention to the dangers of foreign currency lending in its yearly 
stability reports, and the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority also informed about the 
risk, from the regulatory side the only measure that can be considered as a substantive step was 
the application of the mandatory risk exposure declaration introduced in 1 January 2005. We 
must note that during this period the two organisations operated as separate institutions, and 
neither had legislative opportunity in the concerned field.38 Still, the importance of such limited 
opportunities and their market impact is well indicated by the joint recommendation creating 
awareness of the elevated risk of JPY loans in February 2008. In this, the banks were recommended 
to show how a 20% exchange rate shift and a 1-percentage point instalment rate change would 
affect the instalment rate. As a result of the recommendation, the banks cut back on JPY lending. 
It probably would have been useful to issue such a recommendation earlier and for other foreign 
currency loans as well. 
38 According	to	Act	LVIII	§	60	of	2001	on	the	Magyar	Nemzeti	Bank	the	provision	establishing	the	decision-
making power of MNB was limited in the examined period (base interest rate, reserve rate, cash flow, 
processing, settlement turnover, coin issuance, central bank information system). According to Act 
CXXXV	§	12	of	2007	on	the	Hungarian	Financial	Supervisory	Authority,	the	Authority	was	entitled	to	issue	
recommendation containing the foundations of its legislative practice. The recommendation however did 
not have mandatory power regarding the organisations and persons belonging to the competence of the 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, and its purpose was to increase the reliability of legislation.
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7. 3. Summarizing the lessons learned until the Great Recession 
1. First, prior to implementation, it would have been necessary to carry out research and 
inspections to learn the characteristics and risks of the product. It should have been 
examined whether similar products already existed on the market, and what kind of 
advantage-disadvantage it had both on a macro-and microeconomic level. 
2. The most supportive solution for managing the exposed risks should be selected. 
When selecting the handling method, the opinion of experts from both the 
Government and economic sphere should be widely taken into consideration. It is 
necessary to assess the kinds of questions that can be solved by the self-regulation 
of the economy, and where legislation is required. The most efficient solution can be 
found by aligning self-regulation to legislation.
3. It is extremely important to create a balance between fiscal and monetary policy to 
create proper professional solutions, and to prevent the vulnerability of the Government 
due to the crowding out effect of governmental overspending39 and high deficit.
4. The tight cooperation of regulatory authorities (central bank and supervision) is 
required in risk exposure and management. It is necessary to ensure binding regulatory 
powers (legislation) for the more efficient completion of tasks. In absence of that, an 
influence on the market stakeholders can be made by issuing joint recommendations. 
5. For the sake of creating general lending safety and the prevention of excessive debt of 
consumers, a positive list debtors’ registry needs to be prepared.
7. 4. Lessons learned during crisis management 
From the autumn of 2008, due to the impact of the crisis – considering the tightening of resources 
–, lending (including foreign currency lending) significantly dropped without any separate 
administrative measures. With the fluctuation of exchange rates, the burdens of debtors boomed, 
the value of collateral real estate dropped, and unemployment suddenly increased. Therefore, the 
sustainment of solvency and willingness to pay by debtors, the rescheduling of loans and the 
application of payment moderation took on priority status in banking activities. With this, the 
banks were also looking for the opportunity to cooperate with the Government by means of their 
limited tools. Besides the common viewpoint and payment moderating programs emerging in 
the numerous successful negotiations, unfortunately, there were less successful aspirations as 
well, such as for example the legislative regulation of the right of unilateral contract amendment. 
39 The crowding out effect in simplest terms: if the Government issues government securities to cover the state defi-
cit, it ties up such private savings, which would have financed private investments. See: http://www.econom.hu/
kiszoritasi-hatas/ Product purchases by the Government has a crowding out effect. The crowding out effect caused 
by budgetary overspending is neutralized by the monetary policy. With the help of the tools of monetary policy, the 
central bank can regulate and influence the money supply and/or interest rate on the market. If, as a result of the 
central bank’s measures, the monetary supply increases, the money supply available for asset keeping also increases. 
Due to the increasing money supply, the interest rate declines. Such an intervention is called expansive monetary 
policy. Should the central bank decide on reducing money supply, as a result of the declining money supply, the 
monetary market is balanced by a higher interest rate. The increase of the interest rate moderates investment 
demand, therefore the balanced income decreases. Such a monetary policy is called restrictive monetary policy.
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The rules of the Code of Conduct approved afterwards were created based on best banking 
practice with the collaboration of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the Ministry 
of Finance along with the professional support by banks. The rules of the Code of Conduct later 
served as the basis for legislative regulation. This collaboration could have been the example for the 
coordinated application of self-regulation and legislation.40 Act CLXII of 2009 on consumer loans 
was also created by substantial professional banking support, the Government Decree on prudent 
retail lending and the amendment of the Credit Act on the regulation of intermediary activity. 
I perceived that from 2010 the Government’s practice has changed, both in their 
communication and in professional cooperation. Many times the announcements on 
governmental intentions took place in the press first followed by legislation, often without 
asking for the opinion of professional entities, or with their apparent hearing. This can also be 
attributed to the fact that, during this period, many laws had to be amended retrospectively 
– at least once, but rather several times – in order to ensure execution ability. 
In connection with foreign currency loans, so-called debt relief or home-saving legislation 
emerged. As I have already mentioned, based on the study of András Hudecz, for the substantive 
solution of foreign currency lending-related problems, the cause of the problem has to be first 
understood, and the proper tool selected for it. In many cases, however, the law was not made to 
eliminate the cause of the problem, only to retrospectively treat its symptoms. It was also notable 
that the prepared provision regulates a phenomenon which has already been solved on the market, 
so it resulted in the re-regulation – correctly or incorrectly – of an already formed situation (e.g. 
Government Decree 361/2009. (30. XII.) or Act XCVI of 2010), forcing the market stakeholders to 
adapt. In many cases, legislation was also accompanied by “detrimental side effects”.41
In this question, the opinion of Dan Ariely, Professor of Psychology and Behavioural 
Economics at Duke University, USA, should be considered as a guideline: 
“… when we plan systems, especially, if we do it at a legislative level, we have to solve very 
complex problems and we can never precisely predict the outcome of a new rule.. We can 
never see the consequences of our changes in advance, hence sometimes people’s lives might be 
compromised.”42
From a banking perspective, the communication that was extremely harmful was that 
which criminalized foreign currency lending from the start and introduced the impacts of 
40 It is altogether a different question, that legislation did not consider the provisions of the Code of Conduct 
–since the Code of Conduct was not a legal provision – in any form when passing justice. Regardless, that it 
was prepared based on a governmental initiative, the Supervisory Authority and the ministries were actively 
involved in creating its content, and the normative text of the Credit Act, effective from 2010, also specifically 
disposed of the consideration of its rules, and the majority of its provisions were subsequently integrated in 
the effective legal provisions of the time. This however does not show the difficulty of the aligned application 
of self-regulation and legislation, much rather the problem of judicial and supervisory legislation.
41 Such was the elevation of moral risk, the violation of pacta sunt servanda (https://index.hu/velemeny/jegy-
zet/2009/03/20/bank/), the destruction of trust in banks (https://www.penzcentrum.hu/hitel/oriasi-bizalomvesztes-
a-bankoknal.132330.html), or typing up substantial banking resources for “debt relief”(administration, IT, labour).
42 “A bad financial decision today might haunt us for decades” – interview with Dan Ariely. https://fintechzone.
hu/ha-ma-rossz-penzugyi-dontest-hozunk-az-evtizedekig-kiserthet-minket-interju-dan-ariely-vel/ 
(download: 09. 07. 2018.)
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the crisis as if they were exclusively the consequence of the unfair behaviour of the lending 
banks. To get a fine-tuned opinion, it is worth quoting the standpoint of Sándor Csányi, the 
President-Chief Executive Officer of OTP Bank disclosed in May 2010: 
“I believe that it is not necessarily the banking system which is at fault, or it is not primarily 
the banking system which is responsible for the fact that debtors, including forint debtors 
with HUF and foreign currency loans, are in a more difficult situation than what they 
hoped when they borrowed the loan. I believe it is not the banking system, because when the 
borrowers of foreign currency loans took out the loans five years ago, the exchange rate of 
HUF was fluctuating around 230−240−250 compared to the EUR, and today it is over 270, 
and it has been weaker, therefore the amount of debt denominated in forints has increased. 
This is not the fault of the banking system. This is obviously the problem of irresponsible 
budgetary management over recent years, maybe with the exception of 2008.
- Is this a governmental failure?
- I think it is primarily a governmental failure. That is also why I did not understand 
when the Government tried to save the debtors of foreign currency loans from the banking 
system at the time. The debtors of foreign currency loans should have been saved from 
the given Government at the time when the approximately 10% budgetary deficit led to a 
weakening trust in Hungary and in the Hungarian currency, consequently, the currency 
depreciated and the debt denominated in forints increased. The banking system can also 
not be blamed for the Government, the social Government, introducing the state subsidy 
for foreign currency loans and housing loans in foreign currency. Previously, they only 
subsidized loans in forints, i.e. it was worthwhile for the credit borrowers to become 
indebted in forints, and the subsidizing of foreign exchange credits, I think, decisively took 
place in the interest of foreign banks, otherwise against OTP, since they wanted to “extend 
competition” and reinforce it on the retail market, as OTP was previous lending in forints, 
therefore we only switched to foreign currency loans a year later, when our market share 
was rapidly deteriorating and we had no other choice. So altogether, the Government 
promoted foreign currency loans, had a bad economic and budgetary policy, and thirdly, we 
should mention the monetary policy as well, because if the forint had not been excessively 
over-appreciated, then one euro would not have cost HUF 230 when the debtors borrowed 
the loan, but 260−270, they would have considered whether to be indebted in forints or in 
foreign currency, and even in case of the depreciation of forints, their loan amount would 
have only increased at a much smaller degree.”43
The approach that was widely spread in the press was not emphasizing moral risk as one 
of the main reasons for the penetration of foreign currency lending, but almost exclusively 
the unfair proceedings by banks. Beyond the fact that communications contributed to the 
prolongation of the unsettled situation, it caused more harm by dismounting trust in banks. 
The banking industry operates fundamentally based on trust, it relies on the trust of clients, 
43 Interview with Sándor Csányi -” hír TV” (news channel): “Kontraszt” (Contrast), 16.05.2010
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both on the resource and the asset side. The lack of trust can result in the weakening of the 
entire banking system, which is very difficult to re-establish later. 
When assessing the attempts targeting the saving of debtors in distress, many people 
pointed out that the lending risk in the system is permanent, cannot be reduced by 
administrative measures, it can only be re-distributed between the three stakeholders at 
most. Hence, that is why certain rescue attempts – let us disregard their legality for now – 
only distributed risk-taking, usually against one of the stakeholders, the banking system 
(this is why the emerging situation had to be criminalized), but they were not and could not 
be used to solve the problem.
The system-level risk in foreign currency lending (incremental and stock) was eliminated, 
on one hand, by the establishment of the income-to-instalment index (ITI), and on the other 
hand by the conversion of loans into forints in 2014 to 2015 (which was proposed by Surányi 
already in 2011 and 2013). With the application of the fixed exchange rate, however, the 
debtors bear the instalment rate increase due to the exchange rate fluctuation, which is not 
a final solution for many. 
At the same time, we must look for a long-term solution, not with legal tools, as foreign currency 
lending itself also could not penetrate due to the unfairness of the applied legal solutions. The 
solution can primarily be found with a complex interference of various tools, and certainly only 
in the long-term. An authentic and predictable monetary policy with the right tools is essential, 
the same as an authentic, predictable and thrifty fiscal policy aligned with it. Further, it is 
important to improve domestic monetary markets and to promote long-term domestic savings. 
It should be appreciated that, partially, those positive regulators (legislative right of MNB) 
and mechanisms which were missing between 2001 and 2011 and could have guaranteed 
the safe operation of foreign currency loans (and in general the long-term loans) within 
specified boundaries have appeared and been constructed (KHR, Fair Banking Act and debt 
brake regulation, mortgage-financing-compliance index serving as a long-term retail credit 
resource, long-term interest swaps and mortgage debenture purchasing program). 
It is extremely important to establish an education system, which efficiently increases the 
consumers’ financial culture level, and is able to provide the education of at least the simplest 
financial correlations at a basic skill level. 
These tools, however, are only capable of preventing similar problems by correcting the 
experienced imperfections of the market system. They do not provide a solution for managing 
the problem of debtors in distress. To solve their problems, a proper government social safety net 
should be created, e.g. launching and subsidizing the previously mentioned social flat building. 
7. 5. Summary of lessons learned after 2008 
1. Market mechanisms are able to manage the problems derived from the imperfection 
of the market system within specified boundaries. Legislative intervention is only 
required beyond these boundaries. 
2. It was also proven in this situation that self-regulation and harmonized legislation 
can regulate social phenomena in the most effective way. A regulation not utilizing 
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the professional knowledge and experience of market stakeholders does not achieve 
its objective, usually has detrimental side effects and is wasteful.
3. Preventing similar situations is primarily possible with very carefully harmonized 
fiscal and monetary economic tools, where the development of retail financial culture 
plays a priority role.
4. The supporting of debtors in distress is the responsibility of the Government by 
building a social safety net. 
8. (In lieu of an) Epilogue 
Based on the above, it can be quite unambiguously established that in the emergence, 
penetration and management of consequences of foreign currency lending, all participants 
(government-lender-consumer) played a role and overall did not play their roles well. 
However, this study did not investigate the question of responsibility, but merely exposed 
the reasons for the foreign currency loan phenomena and sought to avoid, or more precisely 
prevent, similar occurrences. I reached the end of the study with rather mixed emotions, 
as I see those positive and proactive changes which are able to manage and prevent the 
occurrence of similar situations. At the same time, based on what happened, I am not sure 
if we have enough strength and commitment to handle the remaining the consequences. 
Currently, however, it seems we did not learn a lot from the crisis: on one hand, debt relief 
was not a solution for numerous debtors, and on the other hand, the situation has not yet 
been settled, so the subsequent criminalization of a social problem continues. 
Dr. Szilvia Kuti 
Deputy Notary Public  
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Initial thoughts 
Foreign currency loan. A single expression, a single seemingly harmless concept. I would be 
curious as to whether there is a Hungarian citizen, between the ages of 28 and 82, who does 
not have a story related to foreign currency loans. Or, one that he has heard of or experienced. 
I think not. I also think this concept might be something like a serious disease. One in which 
many people are affected. Some fight the disease themselves, others know someone who is 
fighting. There are some who were defeated by the disease, and surely there are others who 
tell stories of their miraculous recovery. 
I admit that the first few lines above constitute an unusual start, moreover: many might 
think it is pretentious for a study, which should aim at presenting the experiences of a 
profession related to foreign currency lending. However, it is important to stipulate: this study 
deliberately has a personal intonation and certainly does not reflect the views of all public 
notaries regarding foreign currency lending. At the same time, it strives to comprehensively 
present the kind of role individual public notaries played as law enforcement authorities 
in the foreign currency lending process, and mentions the kind of impact this engagement 
had on the daily practice of the profession. The justification of the subjective, possibly not 
biased, view is on one hand that the author selected the public notary profession and became 
deputy public notary during the period when foreign currency lending was not yet widely 
popular, although with time the scope of tasks related to it has gradually become part 
of her professional life. It would be inappropriate to phrase it generally, since there is no 
professional public opinion poll among public notaries that could be used to draw lessons 
and conclusions on the basis of statistical data gained from the responses, and to make more 
general statements concerning the experiences of public notaries in connection with foreign 
currency lending. 
The story of foreign currency lending in Hungary2 started at the end of the 1990s, early 
2000s, when, as the alternative for subsidized HUF credits, credits denominated in foreign 
currency by consumers – primarily EUR, CHF and JPY to a minor extent – started to 
spread in mass numbers. Commercial banks most often provided a loan with the condition 
that the clients made a directly executable, unilateral declaration of liability based on the 
loan agreements prepared in private documents in front of a public notary to repay the 
loan. It also often happened that the public notary included the loan agreement and its 
insurance contract into the public document. According to my experiences, the accelerated 
2 The loan agreement and credit agreement are not synonyms according to civil law. Act V of 2013 on the Ci-
vil	Code	(hereinafter:	Cc.)	according	to	§6:382	(1):	“Based on the credit agreement the lender shall hold the cre-
dit amount at disposal, and up to the credit amount held at disposal shall sign the loan agreement, warranty or 
guarantee agreement, and other contracts regarding the completion of other credit transactions, and the debtor 
shall pay a fee.” Cc.	and	according	to	§6:383	 :	“Based on the loan agreement the lender shall pay a defined 
amount of money, and the debtor shall pay the amount back to the lender, along with an interest rate on a later 
date defined by the contract.” Despite the above, this study uses the two concepts as synonyms similar to 
common public usage by fundamentally understanding the retail loan agreements denominated in foreign 
currency under the concepts of foreign currency credit and foreign currency loan.
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demand for preparing the documents put a substantial burden on the public notary offices – 
certainly the public notary office in Budapest, which was my workplace at the time –, since 
foreign currency transactions were created by the thousands country-wide. The period of 
contracting already demanded speed, precision and a somewhat contradicting skill to the 
latter: flexibility from the public notaries. 
In this period however, the “foreign exchange credit” as a concept was not an alternative 
to an expletive by any means: it rather meant the opportunity for a widely usable, favourable 
credit for those who applied for a loan denominated in foreign currency. A loan denominated 
in foreign currency could have seemed more beneficial for the average consumer than a loan 
denominated in HUF, because the instalment rates of the former started from a lower level 
than those of the latter. Therefore, in the beginning of the instalment period, the instalment 
rate of the debtor to be paid to the lenders was less, and it was notable from the contracts the 
public notaries were presented. 
I think it is important to include in Chapter II of the study the general experience of public 
notaries in document preparation, which has not undergone substantive changes since the 
heyday of foreign currency lending. The topic is of paramount importance, as the period of 
document editing in connection with foreign currency loan transactions was a period with 
a great deal of work, albeit without conflict, still the public documents prepared at this time 
were those were scrutinized a mere decade later in various forums. 
In the initial phase of retail foreign currency lending, it often happened that clients converted 
their more reliable, but more expensive, subsidized HUF loans to the low interest-bearing, 
but riskier, loans denominated in foreign currency due to the exchange rate fluctuations, 
and asked for the public notary’s support regarding these transactions. The contracts soon 
had to be amended due to various general reasons – e.g. collateral swap, succession – , the 
number of which amendments increased during and after the recession of 2007 and 2008, 
furthermore, the reason for the modifications was more and more the rescheduling of loan 
repayments. When putting the amendments of contracts and previously prepared unilateral 
declarations of liability into documents – in case they were asked – the public notaries also 
collaborated. 
The governmental aspirations to manage the foreign currency lending crisis, such as the 
exchange rate cap, early repayment and the conversion into Forints performed in 2015, were 
also measures influencing the activities of public notaries. Also impacting the work of public 
notaries was that very many debtors “were stuck in their credit”, as non-performing loan 
agreements resulted in cancellation by the banks, and following the cancellations the public 
notary documentations were generally enforced. The publicising of cancellations in public 
documents, and – from 1 June 2010 – the enforcement clause added to the documents also 
took place with the cooperation of public notaries. I will describe the legal problems that 
arose due to this in Chapter III and IV. 
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Although most comprehensively we can talk about foreign currency transactions in 
regards to the preparation of transaction documents, attestations based on a protocol and the 
ordering of enforcement by a public notary, it is also not a rare case nowadays that the debtor 
of the foreign currency loan passes away without paying the debt, which then encumbers 
the heir. Since the execution of succession proceedings belongs to the competence of public 
notaries, therefore – among other things – the public notaries are also responsible for 
managing succession cases often containing substantial liabilities. Chapter VI elaborates on 
the fate of debt arising in succession proceedings.
With the above review, it is notable that, on one hand, the public notaries unintentionally 
became one of the key players of foreign currency lending, and on the other hand answering 
the widespread and quite complex questions regarding loan transactions denominated in 
foreign currency is still one of the regular tasks of public notaries. Consequently, this study 
also tries to investigate, how, with what kind of internal measures and unique educational 
experience did and do people practising in the public notary profession try to meet the 
constantly changing market and legislative demands in the given economic, social and legal 
environment by the increasing impatience of clients and their dissatisfaction expressed in 
different ways. Therefore based on personal experiences, the study primarily analyses how 
the public notary became the “enemy” in the eye of “clients with foreign currency loans”, one 
of the obvious reasons of which was the lack of financial information by clients which could 
not be compensated with legal information provided to them by public notaries. 
1. The emergence of foreign currency lending in 
Central Eastern Europe and its regulation 
in Hungary – historical outlook by describing the 
relevant legal sources and measures from the aspect of 
public notary proceedings 
Act XCIII of 2001 on the elimination of foreign currency restrictions and the amendment 
of certain related acts created by the Parliament as a consequence of establishing market 
economy by completing the convertibility of forints and in preparation for the EU accession. 
This Act which came into effect in two phases in 2002, made foreign currency lending widely 
available to the public.3
Although this legal provision did not specify the concept of foreign currency loans, it is 
worth noting that a foreign currency loan means a loan in which the disbursed currency 
of debt is different from forints. These include loans denominated in foreign currency, 
provided that the loan registered in foreign currency is disbursed by the lender in HUF 
and the debtor shall also pay it back to the lender in HUF. Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish the foreign currency transactions and the transactions connected to loans 
3 According	to	Act	XCIII	of	2001,	§1	(3):	“Unless law or a government decree do not dispose of differently, a) the 
legal transactions and activities of national citizens at home or abroad, b) foreign citizens in Hungary with 
foreign currency, foreign exchange or national currency, as well as claims regarding national currency may be 
freely performed.”
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denominated in foreign currency, as the latter penetrated a wide range of consumers so that 
this credit construction was not initially followed by any legislative explanations.4
We can establish that Hungary belongs to the newly joined EU member states, in which 
foreign currency lending spread during the credit extension and became a substantial factor 
from a macroeconomic aspect as well. Primarily, Hungary and Romania are those new 
member states where the ratio of foreign currency credits within the retail credit volume 
exceeded 50 % in 2012. In other countries – such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – foreign 
currency lending already played a considerable role earlier, therefore credit outsourcing, 
which accelerated from the mid 2000s was performed by a high foreign currency credit 
ratio. In addition, there are some countries, like the Czech Republic, where there was no 
foreign lending, also in Slovakia and Slovenia there was no substantial retail foreign currency 
lending before the introduction of the EUR.5
According to analysers, foreign currency lending may have various economic reasons, 
although – as I have mentioned in the introduction as well –, their penetration is mostly 
explained by the difference between the interest rates of foreign currency credits and credits 
denominated in national currency. More precisely, because in the moment of making a decision 
regarding credit borrowing the instalment rates of credits in HUF were higher than those of 
the foreign exchange credits, and many people chose the seemingly more beneficial foreign 
exchange credits. The economists, of course, did not stick with this “superficial” explanation,6 
however this statement might hold its ground in the framework of this study. Based on my 
personal experience, if I asked the clients entering the public notary office, almost without 
4 Point III.1 of the Curia’s 6/2013 PJE uniformity decision pointed out: “Upon the penetration of loan agreements 
denominated in foreign exchange no legal provision defined the concept of foreign exchange denominated loans, at the 
same time in Government Decree 41/1997 on the calculation and publication of the deposit interest rate, the yield of 
securities and the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge (APR) (5. III.) (THM 1. Decree) §11/B. and § 13. – without specifying 
the concept – the rules concerning the legal instrument in connection with the calculation of APR were included. 
According to Government Decree 83/2010 on the definition, calculation and publication of the Annual Percentage Rate 
of Charge, effective on 11 June 2010 (25. III.) (THM 2. Decree) §2 (1) a foreign currency credit is a credit, disbursed and 
paid in other currency than Forints, whereas the credit denominated in foreign currency is a credit registered in foreign 
currency, but disbursed or paid in Forints. According to Act CXII of 1996 on credit institutions and financial enterprises 
(hereinafter referred to as: Credit Act) XCVI of 2010 on the amendment of certain finance-related acts in order to support 
consumers in distress due to taking housing loans established with §1, effective from 27 September 2010, section 200/A, 
the credit, loan or financial leasing contract is denominated in foreign currency, if it was registered in foreign currency, or 
was disbursed in foreign currency and paid in Forints. According to Act LXXV of 2011 on fixing the exchange rate used 
for the calculation of the instalments of foreign currency loans and the forced sale of residential properties § 1 section (1) 
in the concerned act and legal provision issued based on its authorization, a foreign currency loan is an outstanding debt 
based on a loan agreement erected between a natural person, as debtor, or co-debtor and the financial institution, where 
the registered currency of the loan is EUR CHF or JPY, and the credit debtor pays his payment obligation in HUF. Hen-
ce we can establish that the legal provisions applied quite inconsequent denominations for naming the construction, and 
certain legal provisions defined the loan denominated in foreign currency partially differently.”
5 András HUDECZ: Parallel stories. The establishment and management of retail foreign exchange credit 
lending in Poland, Romania and Hungary, Közgazdasági Szemle, April 2012, 352.
6 “Although numerous empiric inspections exposed that interest rate difference has an important explanatory 
power in the penetration of foreign currency lending, to explain foreign currency lending purely by this would be 
rather superficial.” See: HUDECZ: i.m. 354.
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exception they explained their decision favouring the loans denominated in foreign currency. 
It is also a fact that the housing subsidy system introduced by Government Decree 12/2001 (31. 
I.) tightened7 by Government Decree 221/2003. (12. XII.) introducing a 6-percentage point in-
terest rate increase in ten months also negatively influenced the future of HUF credits.8
In Hungary, foreign currency lending flourished between 2004 and 2008, and from 2004 
to 2005, following the housing credits denominated in foreign currency, home equity credits 
denominated in foreign currency also appeared. Public notaries tried to keep up with market 
demands with intense work, infrastructure extension in some places, and hiring manpower 
capable of preparing documents in order to seamlessly prepare directly enforceable public 
notary documentation. 
The volume of foreign exchange credits increased between 2006 and 2008 to the greatest 
extent, which was also promoted by sales via agents, and which enabled clients with lower 
creditworthiness than before to also obtain credit.9 This could not be completely filtered 
by the thorough work characterizing the document preparing practice of public notaries 
either, although the activities of public notaries had never experienced this kind of random 
filtering function. Please see more information on this in section II. 
Several resources support my personal experience that compared to the entire foreign 
exchange credit volume, a substantial part of indebtedness was triggered by borrowing 
credits denominated in Swiss francs.10 And, since the exchange rate of Swiss francs did not 
change significantly compared to forints between 2002 and September 2008 – at least it did 
not deteriorate in the long-term11 –, credit borrowing became an everyday phenomena, like 
grocery shopping. 
7 The Government published its Decree 221/2003 (12. XII.) amending Government Decree 12/2001 on state 
housing subsidies (31. I.) on 12 December 2003. The amendment of the Government Decree probably 
most perceived by the clients was that in case of a mortgage debenture-interest rate subsidy the amount of 
borrowable credit for buying a used flat, extension or modernization dropped from the previous HUF 15 
million to HUF 5 million. Additionally, if the loan applicant utilized interest rate subsidy after the loan has 
been financed by mortgage debenture, the supplementary interest rate subsidy could no longer be applied 
for that transaction, i.e. the legal provision excluded the disbursal of previous double interest rate subsidized 
constructions for the future.
8 On 17 January 2003, the base interest rate was 6.5 %, then ten months later, on 28 November 2003, it was 12.5 
% (Source: http://www.mnb.hu/Jegybanki_alapkamat_alakulasa) 
9 HUDECZ: i.m. 383.  
10 The base foreign currency of the penetration of foreign currency lending in Hungary was the Swiss franc. The 
foreign exchange credit agreements were signed in the legal payment currency of the Alpine country, which 
fought no war for centuries, and owes its wealth and welfare fundamentally to its banks. The Hungarian 
population having an incomplete financial culture saw safety in the Swiss franc, therefore due to the lack of 
informative activity of banks and the greed for credit by the population led to the mass-spreading of credit 
agreements.” See: Csaba LENTNER: The methodological scheme of the emergence and consolidation of retail 
foreign currency lending. Pénzügyi Szemle, 2015. 3rd issue, 310.
11 Based on the statistical data published on MNB’s website the central rates of CHF were the following 
compared to the HUF: In 2002, HUF/CHF 162.37; in 2003, HUF/CHF 168.30; in 2004, HUF/CHF 159.34; 
in 2005, HUF/CHF 162.33; in 2006, HUF/CHF 156.99; in 2007, HUF/CHF 152.42. Following the outbreak of 
the crisis, at the end of 2008, the central rate was HUF/CHF 177.78. (Source: https://www.mnb.hu/statisztika/
statisztikai-adatok-informaciok/adatok-idosorok/vii-arfolyam)
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Nevertheless, there was no substantive legislation or regulation regarding or influencing foreign 
currency lending during this period. ”The most resolute measure was the joint recommendation in 
February 2008, in which MNB and the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority drew the attention 
of banks to the elevated risk of JPY credits, and warned them to proceed with caution when disbursing 
these credits. The recommendation also included, that the banks should present how a 20% exchange 
rate shift and a 1-percentage point instalment rate change affect the instalment rate. Although this 
recommendation was successful of its kind, as the banks retained their JPY lending by the middle of 2008, 
it did not have a measurable impact on foreign currency lending in general.”- wrote András Hudecz.12
The financial analysts link the outbreak of the worldwide economic recession and the crisis 
due to foreign currency lending in Hungary to the events that took place in the United States 
in September 2008. Namely, a company founded in 1850, Lehmann Brothers – that was 
registered as one of the largest American investment banks and, at the same time, the world’s 
leading broker company – declared bankruptcy.13 As a consequence of the international 
financial crisis, it was primarily the depreciation of HUF compared to CHF and EUR that 
raised the instalment rates of market stakeholders indebted in foreign currency in Hungary. 
This had a shocking effect on Hungarian public opinion and the individuals concerned. It is 
revealing that on this gloomy Monday, from a financial aspect, the euro was 240.92 forints 
and the Swiss franc was 151.65 forints at a central rate, while a month later, on 15 October 
2018, the central rate of the euro was 266.09 forints, and the Swiss franc was 171.81 forints.14 
Following the outbreak of the crisis, the regulation of foreign currency lending suddenly 
became acutely urgent and based on the initiative of MNB the Government announced 
Government Decree 361/2009. (30. XII.). This Government Decree regulated retail lending 
in two steps: From 1 March 2010, in case of household (retail) mortgage credits and vehicle 
credits, the loan-to-value ratio was maximized defined in foreign currency.15 From 11 June 
2010, the banks had to specify so-called lending limits.16
Compared to the above, it was already a measure by the new Government to prohibit the 
registration of a mortgage on a property in the land registration office with an effective date 
of 13 August 2010 if the claim serving as basis of the registration is from a loan denominated 
in foreign currency provided to a natural person. This measure – which contradicts the EU 
provisions concerning free capital flow and later became the victim of deregulation – basically 
eliminated mortgage lending denominated in foreign currency in Hungary.17  However, there are 
some analysts, who draw attention to the fact that the decline of foreign currency lending already 
commenced before the creation of legal provisions, consequently the fact that foreign currency 
lending disappeared in Hungary is not completely the consequence of these two provisions.18
12 HUDECZ: i.m. 386.
13 Source: https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lehman_Brothers
14 Source: https://www.mnb.hu/arfolyam-lekerdezes
15 The loan-to-value ratio in case of HUF credits is 80 %, EUR credits 60 %, and other foreign exchange credits 45 %.
16 HUDECZ: i.m. 387.
17 See Act XC of 2010, Chapter VI on the establishment and amendment of certain economic and financial laws, 
and in its deregulating act, the contents of Act LXXVI of 2012 on the technical deregulation of certain acts 
and legal provisions required to eliminate the over-regulation of the system.
18 HUDECZ: i.m. 387.
 Dr. Szilvia Kuti  217
In addition to the measures restricting foreign currency lending, several new acts and other 
legal provisions also strived to reduce the burdens of debtors with foreign currency loans. 
One of the legal provisions was regarding the prolongation of the eviction moratorium. This 
rule, applied to the winter period, was prolonged by the Government until 15 April 2010. 
Act XCVI of 2010 on the amendment of certain finance-related acts in order to support 
consumers in a difficult situation due to taking housing loans was approved in autumn 2010, 
which contains a package supporting debtors with foreign currency loans. According to the 
Act, it is mandatory for the banks to apply the central rate defined by them or MNB, and 
the Act also attempted to restrict the unilateral amendment of interest rates. It included the 
relevant rule – regarding the ordering of enforcement by public notaries – that the bank shall 
not charge default interest from the 90th day following the termination of the credit agreement, 
and in case of early or final repayment of credits, the maximum fee can be one per cent of 
the paid amount. Further, it was a substantial regulation that in case of mortgage credits for 
housing purposes the debtor could request the prolongation of the credit duration by maxi-
mum five years in writing, which could not be refused by the bank without serious grounds. 
The so-called “Home Protection Program” or “Home Protection Action Plan” was 
introduced in May 2011. It stipulated the agreements between the banks and the government 
in five points concerning support for debtors with foreign currency loans. 
The first item of the program was the so-called “exchange rate cap” regulations implemented 
by Act LXXV of 2011 on the fixing of the instalment rates of foreign currency loans and the 
forced sale of residential properties. Based on the Act, the debtor could apply to pay their foreign 
currency credits by 31 December 2014 at a fixed exchange rate.19 For the difference between the 
actual and the fixed exchange rate, the banks disbursed HUF credit, the so-called omnibus 
account credit. In connection with this, the debtor had no payment obligation during the period 
of the fixed exchange rate. Its interest rate equalled the short-term mid-bank interest rates. The 
payment of omnibus account credit had to be started from 1 January 2015, along with the foreign 
exchange credit payment that was reset to market rate in the meantime.20 The public notaries 
acquired a new task at this point: based on the credit amount agreements regarding the omnibus 
account credit, they prepared the directly enforceable declarations of liability in the documents 
by debtors. The public notary fee and the expenses for their issuance was borne by the lender. 
The option of the omnibus account credit was beneficial for those who had temporary payment 
difficulties, and in general it would have been the right solution, if the forints had appreciated during the 
period of fixed exchange rates. In my experience, few clients utilized this opportunity, and those who 
did choose this option found that they could only “breathe” with the omnibus account construction.21
19 The CHF credit was fixed at HUF 180, the EUR credit at HUF 250, and the JPY credit at HUF 2.5 exchange rate.
20 Based on the agreement between the Government and the Banking Alliance on 15 December the debtors, who 
were able to pay still had an opportunity to enter the exchange rate cap for another year, until the end of 2012. 
According to the agreement, the fixed exchange rate was guaranteed for 60 months, but latest by 30 June 2017.
21 With Act LXVIII of 2013 entering into force on 1 June 2013 on the amendment of Act LXXV of 2011 – therefore it was 
applicable for the transactions that were signed after this date – the closing deadline of 31 May 2013 specified for the 
submission of applications for an omnibus account was later dismissed. Additionally, the closing date of 30 June 2017 
regarding the application of the fixed exchange rate was also abolished. The amendment act also disposed of enabling 
the exchange rate cap for borrowing a foreign currency loan over HUF 20 million in case of at least three children..
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The action plan included the option of limited auctioning of properties, since from 2 
July 2011 the eviction and auction moratorium were cancelled, and banks could start the 
auctioning of properties based on quotas. Lending denominated in foreign currency was 
restarted and its system of conditions was established when they announced the release 
of the mortgage credit lending prohibition. Furthermore, the program contained the 
establishment of the National Asset Management.22
The Government announced its “country protection package” in September 2011. The point 
concerning people with foreign currency credit was that the costs incurred in HUF in case of foreign 
currency credits should only be specified in HUF, and it enabled final repayment at a fixed exchange 
rate.23 The majority of financial experts criticised the execution of final repayment by stating that it 
does not provide an opportunity for the people in real need to get rid of their foreign currency credits. 
Afterwards, the Government and the Banking Alliance signed an agreement on 15 Decem-
ber 2011, three points of which concerned retail foreign currency lending. On one hand, the 
final repayment conditions were tightened. On the other hand, the previous exchange rate cap 
was extended by the Government assuming the payment of the interest from the debtor over 
the specified exchange rate, while the capital portion over the specified exchange rate converted 
into forints earned interest on a separate omnibus account until the expiration of the fixed 
exchange rate, then the debtor has to pay it. The third regulation was regarding the conversion 
of foreign currency credits of clients in default status over 90 days on 30 September 2011 into 
forints between 15 March 2012 and 15 April 2012, a further 25% of the debt is nulled and the 
Government provides a 5-year, yearly depreciating interest rate subsidy for the credit that was 
converted into forints. The pre-condition of this was that the reason for the default status should 
be a permanent deterioration of the debtor’s solvency, also that the market value of the property 
that serves as collateral for the property is maximum HUF 20 million on the contracting date. 
For the sake of the enforcement of requirements derived from the civil uniformity Decision 
2/2014 of the Curia, as well as the preparation of additional measures, the Parliament prepared 
the Act which is simply referred to in everyday speech as the “first foreign currency credit act”. 
This was Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the resolution of questions relating to the uniformity decision 
of the Curia regarding consumer loan agreements of financial institutions. It was followed by the 
so-called Settlement Act on the settlement of retail overpayments related to unfair contractual 
terms,24 and also Act LXXVII of 2014 on settling issues related to the conversion of the currency 
of certain consumer loan agreements and to the rules governing interest rates (Forint Conversion 
Act). Finally, Act CLXII of 2009 was created on consumer credit and Act LXXVIII of 2014 on the 
amendment of certain related acts (the so-called Fair Banking Act). 
22 “... the basic idea is that the government purchases the properties of insolvent debtors from the banks, who then 
in turn rent it back from NAM. The act on the above was passed by the Parliament on 5 December 2011. NAM 
commenced its operations on 1 January 2012. According to the original plan, it would have purchased 5,000 
properties by 31 December 2014, but (…) this number was increased by the Government to 25,000. (…) Until the 
submission of the manuscript NAM has not purchased a single property yet.” See: HUDECZ: i.m. 403–404.
23 HUDECZ: i.m. 404.
24 Act XL of 2014 of the Curia on the Rules of the Settlement and Certain Other Issues Set out in Act XXXVIII 
of 2014 on the Resolution of Questions Relating to the Uniformity Decision of the Curia Regarding Consumer 
Loan Agreements of Financial Institutions (hereinafter referred to as: Settlement Act).
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The regulations of Act LXXVII of 2014 on the amendment of retail loan agreements by the 
power of law came into effect on 1 February 2015. The financial institutions had to settle the 
loan agreements denominated in foreign currency and the foreign currency loan agreements, 
as well as to convert cancelled (but still registered as default claim) debts into forints on this 
date. The provisions of the Act regulated the rules of settlement in a remarkably complex 
way, which required extraordinary attention, learning and a huge amount of work from the 
public notaries, concerning the interpretation of which the associates of the legal Office of 
the Hungarian National Notaries Chamber (hereinafter referred to as: HNNC) provided 
support. They created the tables in Annex 1 and 2 supporting the work of public notaries, 
which meant extraordinary help in keeping deadlines, and bringing proper procedural 
actions, measures and decisions. 
In regards to the procedures of public notaries, the greatest importance was held by the 
provision	contained	in	Act	LXXVII	of	2014,	§	4	(2)	c).	Based	on	the	above,	from	1	February	
201525 the adding of an enforcement clause to the public notary documentation regarding 
the borrowing of credit denominated in foreign currency was only possible to be requested 
for	retail	loan	agreements	amended	by	the	power	of	law,	and	§	15	(1)	for	debt	converted	into	
forints, i.e. only for forints. 
The other important regulation, from a public notary perspective, was that when the 
applicant of the enforcement reported the sending of the settlement to the debtor on such 
date, by which the enforcement document has not been sent to the executor yet, the applicant 
of the enforcement had to send the announcement to the court ordering enforcement, as 
well as the public notary in case of enforcement proceedings initiated based on a document 
prepared by a public notary.26
By creating the last three important legal provisions, i.e. the “first foreign currency credit act”, 
then the Settlement Act, and the Fair Banking Act – the latter made lending more reliable for the 
future – concerning legislation from 1 February 2015, a very tough period of domestic foreign 
currency lending has more or less ended. Simultaneously, foreign currency credit contract 
transactions – at least concerning retail lending – also disappeared from the public notary offices. 
2. The practice of embedding contracts and 
unilateral declarations of liability into public notary 
documentation – during the heyday of foreign currency 
lending and today
2. 1. Unconventional introduction
“Mr. Róna, who graduated from Oxford University with international credits believes, that 
besides the credit institutions, intermediaries and financial supervision, indeed the public 
notaries are also fully responsible for the foreign exchange credit problem. ‘The public notaries 
generally authenticated the credit agreements written by the banks by exactly knowing that 
25 The provision shall be applied for applications to order the submitted enforcement on or after 01 February 2015.
26 Settlement	Act	§	41	sections	(2),	(3)	and	(9)
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the material was incorrect, moreover, even they were unable to interpret them. Nevertheless, 
they qualified the contracts as notarial documents, consequently deprived the borrowers of 
credits from the opportunity of legal remedy.’ – reckons Róna, who previously led a British 
bank. With this, enforcement proceedings can be initiated without a binding court decision – 
and the debtors can soon find themselves in deep poverty and homeless.”27
Seeming to break with the chronology, I open this chapter with a statement attributed 
to Péter Róna, made in 2013 and available on the internet. So, this is from the period 
when foreign currency lending had finished, however the negative economic effects of 
previously made transactions appeared, and when the first court decisions were made and 
the responsible persons of foreign currency lending were sought after in all forums. For 
the sake of factuality, I must state that I do not know whether this statement was precisely 
made in this way, or if it is really by Péter Róna. Still, I start with this statement, because 
I think this offers a proper picture of the kind of public atmosphere the public notaries 
faced after several years of peaceful, but busy, period, which was characterised by “contract 
dumping”. According to my view, the above statement has great importance although – as 
I will mention later – it lacks all professionalism and contains factual mistakes, it is capable 
of undermining the prestige of a profession and “identifies” the work requiring thorough 
professional knowledge from its members “as null”, or worse case, expressly harmful. 
Considering the above, I believe it is important to demonstrate how long the competence 
and task of a public notary generally extends during the editing procedure of documents: 
what is professionally required from a person assigned with authenticity and practising 
public authority, and what is certainly not his or her task. 
2. 2. The rules of public notaries’ editing procedure of documents – in light 
of certain invalidity excuses mentioned in foreign currency credit lawsuits
The rules of the activity and the procedures of public notaries among other acts are 
contained in Act XLI of 1991 on public notaries (hereinafter referred to as: Public Notary 
Act). Accordingly, the public notaries provide impartial legal service in their competence 
specified by legal provision, by performing actions of jurisdictional authority as part of the 
government’s judicial activity, in order to prevent legal disputes. Connected to the above – 
“inter alia” – they issue notarial documents on legal transactions and facts of legal importance, 
as well as support the parties by providing information regarding proceedings assigned to 
their scope of competence and in practising their rights and fulfilling their obligations.28 One 
of the most important tasks of public notaries – which was also performed in connection 
with the foreign currency transactions – is the embedding of different contracts and legal 
declarations into notarial documents. 
27 Source: https://hitelkarosultak.blog.hu/2013/10/04/a_vilaghiru_kozgazdasz_kitart_hibas_termek_es_
csalas_a_devizahitel
28 Public	Notary	Act	§	1.
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Regarding notarial documents, we distinguish between transaction documents and 
notarial attestation documents (public notary certificates), out of which the latter have 
priority roles in cancelled contracts, and which I will mention in Chapter III of the study. 
2. 2. 1. Unfair contractual conditions
The public notary shall fundamentally cooperate in legal transactions, but shall also reject 
collaboration, “if it cannot be aligned with his obligations, especially if his cooperation is 
requested for such legal transaction, which is against law, or aims at bypassing the law, and 
which has a prohibited or unfair objective”.29 Should the public notary notice a concerning 
condition during his proceedings, but has no reason for rejecting cooperation, he shall draw 
the attention of the party by indicating the condition of concern in the document. If the 
party objects to the inclusion of this warning in the document, the public notary also rejects 
cooperation in the transaction.30
It is worth taking some time at this point, since it was an often-mentioned argument in 
foreign currency credit trials that the contracts embedded into a notarial document are 
invalid, because they contain unfair contractual conditions. 
In case of loan agreements denominated in foreign currency, the debt was established in 
foreign currency, and the debtor’s payment obligation in forints depended on the exchange 
rate fluctuation of the forint and the concerned foreign exchange relative to each other. 
Point III.1 of the Curia’s uniformity Decision 6/2013 stipulates that with these contracts 
the exchange rate fluctuation is a risk factor influencing the amount of instalment rates, 
the bearing of which by the debtor was offset by a more favourable transaction interest and 
lower instalment rate compared to the HUF loans. 
“Since Acts DH1 and DH2 entered into force debtors most often declare the unfairness of the 
contractual term placing the exchange rate risk on the debtor, with reference to the Curia’s ci-
vil law uniformity decision 2/2014 (…)”.31
Since the unfairness of a given contractual condition should be examined in regards to the 
contracting date, unfairness can be established if it can already be shown at contracting that 
it is unilaterally and unjustifiably disadvantageous for the contracting party appealing against 
it. During the period however when the foreign currency loan agreements were created, the 
future development of the exchange rate fluctuation of HUF compared to the CHF or other 
foreign currencies, and the direction and extent of the potential fluctuation was not known 
for the debtors, financial institutions and, of course, public notaries. Based on the above, the 
argument does not hold that the public notaries collaborated, e.g. in the preparation of contracts 
contradicting good practice due to the shifting of the exchange rate risk on the debtor. Even if 
subsequently – after involving many negotiation days and numerous experts – the court rates 
a contractual condition unfair we still cannot state in general that public notaries collaborated 
in preparing contracts, regarding which “they exactly knew that the material was incorrect.” 
29 Public	Notary	Act	§	3.	Section	(1)
30 Public Notary Act 3. Section (2)
31 Katalin SZEGHŐ: “Foreign exchange lawsuits” with the eye of a judge. Gazdaság és Jog, 12/2015. 7. (Under 
DH1 the author means Act XXXVIII of 2014, and under DH2 means Act XL of 2014.)
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2. 2. 2. The educational and information obligation of public notaries during document 
editing 
A question tightly related to the previous topic is how far the information obligation of a public 
notary extends in the document editing procedure with transactions, the details of which the 
parties did not agree on in front of a public notary. Namely, it is undoubted that the foreign 
currency credit agreements were not worded by the public notaries, but banking jurists, and 
these contracts were the drafts for directly enforceable notarial documents prepared based on 
them. This is why the otherwise completely erroneous idea spread, according to which: “the 
public notaries (…) authenticated the credit agreements written by banks…”. This wording is 
incorrect, because a public notary does not authenticate the contract based on a signed private 
document, or draft provided to him by the client, but embeds it into a notarial document, and 
only does so if it can be the subject of a document that can be directly enforced.32
Based on the above, therefore, in regards to private documents already prepared and 
provided at the public notary’s disposal, the public notary investigates whether it includes 
enforcement tools, i.e. is there a place for direct enforcement based on the notarial document 
prepared	 based	 accordingly.	 Regarding	 the	 above,	 §	 23/C	 of	 Act	 LIII	 of	 1994	 on	 court	
execution (hereinafter referred to as: ExAct.) is authoritative. 
When preparing the notarial document, the notary public is also responsible for 
confirming the party’s transaction abilities and entitlement, as well as his real intention. 
During the document editing procedure, therefore, the public notary practically asks such 
questions from the clients, by which it becomes clear whether they have transaction signing 
ability and are accountable, eligible for participating in the transaction or not, and also if 
they are aware of the essence of the legal transaction, which in case of foreign currency cre-
dit transactions was already concluded previously in a private document. Additionally, the 
public notary shall also notify the client about the rights and obligations the client has based 
on the notarial document, and the legal consequences of signing the document. Based on 
my experience, clients initially were not clear on one of the essential legal consequences of 
the notarial document containing commitment, that it could be directly executed, and by 
far not clear on what this legal consequence actually meant. 
Therefore, the public notary provides information for clients about this and similar legal 
topics related to the concerned document, based on which they could consider whether 
to sign the document or not. The public notary “may examine contradiction to law, or an 
intention to bypass that and the existence of other nullity reasons, as well as some provision 
leading to legal dispute, if they are unambiguous from the document, or the circumstances 
following the reading out of the document.”33
I have to say that based on the information I provided, not a single client decided to make 
a directly executable declaration contained in a notarial document regarding the signed loan 
agreement in a private document, and to waive the borrowing of the loan. 
32 The	classic	authentication-related	procedure	of	public	notaries	is	regulated	by	§	137	of	the	Public	Notary	Act,	
which is not identical with either the issuance of transaction documents, nor of attestation certificates.
33 Lőrinc ASBÓTH-HERMÁNYI: The informative and educational obligation of public notaries. Közjegyzők 
Közlönye (Public Notary Journal), Special edition 2013, 14.
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In addition to the above, it is important to note that the informative obligation of public 
notaries never include such questions, which require specific competent knowledge in the 
transaction. Namely, it never includes answering such financial-economic types of questions, 
such as, for example, the financial risk the signing of the foreign currency loan agreement 
has for the debtor.34
2. 2. 3. The reading out of the document 
Based on the Public Notary Act, public notaries shall prepare the documents by observing 
formalities specified by law. When we mention observing formalities, one of the most 
important requisites of formality is the reading out of the notarial document in front of the 
parties participating in the legal transaction, the waiving of which is only allowed by law in 
exceptional cases.35
In connection with foreign currency credit transactions, another argument in lawsuits by 
debtors is that the public notary did not read out the document, consequently it is formally 
invalid.36
As I have already mentioned in the introduction, this study is a personal work, and when 
I elaborate on the topic of reading out, I would like to emphasize it. It is important for me to 
34 ASBÓTH-HERMÁNYI: i.m. 14.
35 According	to	the	Public	Notary	Act	§	120	section	(2):	“The read out of the notarial document prepared based 
on the provided written draft by the parties with the exception of the text of the amendment made to the draft 
and any supplements, if the legal persons acting with legal representatives declare in front of the public notary 
in unison that they learned about the document draft, therefore they are requesting the waiving of the reading 
out of the document. The waiving of the reading out does not concern the fulfilment of other obligations specified 
in connection with the preparation of the notarial document. The waiving of the reading out is not allowed, if 
any of the parties is a person listed in §124 points a)–c).” In addition, according to the regulations which were 
effective until 31 December 2017, the same rules apply to parties entering into a subsidized credit agreement 
(mortgage credit agreement) based on a separate provision on state subsidies for housing purposes.
36 In its Decision no. 73.Pf.632.870/2018/4 the Court of Justice of Budapest established based on the expert opinion 
of a judicial linguistic expert and the statements of witnesses, that concerning a notarial document prepared in 
2008 – containing a loan agreement denominated in foreign currency and its insurance contracts – the plaintiff 
successfully proved that the acting deputy public notary did not read out the 30-page contract package in its entirety. 
The verdict also included, that the document does not contain the starting and finishing times of the reading out 
either,	even	though	based	on	the	Public	Notary	Act	§120	section	(1)	d)	it	should	have	been	recorded.	Beyond	the	
fact that I consider the verdict ungrounded from several aspects, it is especially striking that based on a document 
that was prepared in 2008, the acting colleague is also accounted for a provision effective from 1 July 2015: the 
registration of the starting and finishing times of the read out. Such direction of the verdict is concerning, because 
for example the explanation by the linguistic expert requested in the given case is also considered as belonging to 
the read out, although the explanations regarding the transaction do not belong to the read out, and its duration 
is not included in the duration of the read out. Furthermore, the debtor declared in the public document of 2008, 
that the deputy public notary read out the document in front of him, however, the court assessed it as the successful 
evidence for not reading out, that the respondent along with the deputy public notary witness could not prove that 
the read out took place, although it is proven by the notarial document itself. In addition, the court established the 
necessary read out time completely out-of-touch from practice and real life in 2 hours and 40 minutes, although the 
read out of a 30-page document could only last this long if a reason arises from the person of the client – e.g. hard 
of hearing, or has an interpreter –, or in the circumstances, which extends the duration of document editing.
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state that the reading out of the document is a warranty rule from the aspect of public notary 
operations. Personally, I fully understand the aspirations of clients to “get out of” listening to 
the reading out, and I am aware that the reading out of an often more than 30-page document, 
which is hard to understand and is full of special legal and economic words – a few parts of which 
do not concern the given transaction of the client at all – does not seem realistic. Therefore, I 
created my own practice that, on one hand, I “tailored the duration of the read out to the client”, 
i.e. I adjusted the speed of the read out to the extent to which the client’s personal circumstances, 
habits and competence in his own transaction required detailed explanation. On the other hand, 
I also made sure to give particular attention to a few important sections – e.g. the method of 
redemption, the reasons for termination listed in the contract, and the obligations of the client in 
general. My document editing procedure has not changed in this respect to this day. 
The parties may also submit a draft to the public notary for the preparation of documents, which 
the public notary may include in the notarial document with unchanged content, and in case the 
contracts entered in a private document are unilaterally or bilaterally confirmed, the contents of the 
private document become the part of the notarial document word-for-word. In the vast majority, 
those transactions were presented to public notaries, in which the obligors of loan agreements 
denominated in foreign currency and their insurance contracts made a unilateral declaration of 
liability in front of the public notary. Thus, the contracts were not prepared by the public notary, 
and the legal transaction did not emerge by being embedded into a notarial document, but they 
were already created in the form of a private document. Accordingly, the clients could have enough 
time to understand the details of their contracts independently, and based on the information 
provided by the associates of the credit institutions it was not the reading out of the document that 
made the essence of the transaction clear to them. If during the document editing the public notary 
had a suspicion that the client was not aware of the essence of his own transaction, it might qualify 
as a concerning circumstance, based on which the rejection of cooperation might be grounded. 
Regarding this however, I never had to decline cooperation in foreign currency transactions. 
I believe that by carefully extending the scope of exceptions, the reading out of notarial 
documents is needed, since the reading out is one of the warranty elements of the proper 
formality of notarial documents. At the same time, the reading out also has practical 
significance in providing an opportunity for clarifying the still arising questions by the 
parties before signing it, furthermore, the reading out can help to filter out countless typos 
and contradictions from the transaction documents. 
During the document editing those short, few-page templates still provide support which contain 
the essence of contracts and specifically the requisites of enforceability. Therefore, in the future, 
it might be worthwhile to create and apply such summary document templates, based on which 
execution must not be an obstacle, and the public document remains of reasonable length for the 
clients as well, further, which – as far as I know – many public notary colleagues are promoting. 
Referring back to the already referenced decision of the Budapest Municipal Court37, finally I 
have to mention that I am expressly concerned about the judicial practice of trying to investigate, by 
ordering a juridical expert in the lawsuit, whether the public notary read out the notarial document 
37 Decision no. 73.Pf.632.870/2018/4 of the Budapest Municipal Court.
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during the time the client – according to their statements – was in the public notary office. On one 
hand, I do not think the general investigation concerning how long the reading out of a document 
takes is justified, because the reading technique and speed of public notary colleagues, as well as 
the reception ability of clients vary, therefore only after the thorough exploration of the bearing of 
individual cases can we say that the reading out was waived in the concerned case. On the other 
hand, it is also important to state that the notarial document has special power of evidence in regards 
to whether the person listed in the document has made the contractual declaration at the place, in 
a way and on the date stipulated in the contract. Moreover, the declaring person also proves that by 
his signature with the exceptions listed in the Public Notary Act.38 Additionally, the presumption 
of reality is connected to the notarial document, which means that until the opposite is proven, 
the notarial document should be considered as one derived from its issuer in its entirety. Counter-
evidencing the contents of the notarial document is only applicable if law does not exclude or restrict 
it. During evidencing, the person, who is arguing the contents shall prove that the notarial document 
is not authentic, or the facts incorporated in the document do not exist. At the end, referring back 
to the described legal case, my standpoint is that the debtor as respondent and the public notary 
witness cannot possibly prove that the document was read out, shall not be assessed as the reading 
out did not happen, while the doubted notarial document itself proves the fact of the reading out. 
3. Document editing dilemma related to the attestation 
of the termination of contracts and the attestation of 
other enforceable requisites by a notarial document 
In regards to notarial documents, we distinguish between transaction documents and 
public notary attestation documents (public notary certificates). The attestation documents 
– inspecting it from the aspect of foreign currency loan transactions – play a prominent 
role on one hand upon the cancellation of contracts, and on the other hand during the 
attestation of other dates and conditions by a public document, without which the basic 
notarial document (i.e. transaction document) could not be directly enforced. The legal 
consequence of direct enforceability may be attached to the transaction document, if it 
meets	the	conditions	contained	in	§	23/C.	of	the	ExAct.	Based	on	the	ExAct.	§	23/C	section	
(1), a document is enforceable if it includes a unilateral or bilateral commitment regarding 
the service and consideration, the names of the entitled and the obligor, the subject, quantity 
(amount) and legal title of obligation, as well as the method and deadline of payment. 
It might also happen that when the contracting parties agree on the details of their contract 
it does not include all enforceability requisites yet, as the fulfilment of obligations undertaken 
in the contract depends on events or other conditions, which will happen at an unforeseeable 
future date. Regarding the above, the referenced law says: “If an obligation depends on the 
supervention of a condition or date, enforceability also requires that the supervention of the 
condition or date is certified by a public document.”39 It is important to mention, that this 
38 According	to	the	Public	Notary	Act	§117	section	(3):	“The party and other interested persons sign or initial the notarial 
document at the end. If he is not able to do so, his signature is substituted by the signature of the public notary.”
39 ExAct.	§	23/C	Section	(2)
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“attestation document” does not need to be a notarial document. In certain cases, the other 
document may be: a property deed, birth certificate, court decision or even a personal ID 
that may be suitable for certifying the supervention of the condition or date. 
The transaction document, i.e. the document to be equipped with an enforceability clause 
must	by	all	means	 include	 the	elements	contained	 in	§	23/C	section	 (1).	The	public	notary	
certificates or other notarial documents only serve the purpose to certify the supervention of a 
condition or date required for ordering enforcement. However, it is also important to highlight 
that during the interpretation of the aforementioned law article and the procedure for the 
ordering of enforcement numerous legal disputes took place concerning the acceptability of 
usable documents, and consequently, different public notary practices were formed. 
Regarding the foreign currency loans contained in notarial documents, the following must be 
highlighted. The loan agreements contained in regular notarial documents certainly include that 
the referenced bank provides a certain amount of money under the legal title of the loan to the also 
referenced debtor, and the debtor shall pay it back with interest, by the specified deadline and by 
means agreed upon by the parties. In case of a unilateral declaration of liability, the debtor’s related 
unilateral declaration that based on the loan agreement signed with the bank he shall pay the loan 
with interest back to the bank is contained in the notarial document. In case of a loan borrowed in 
Hungarian forints and to be paid back in forints in one lump sum, in cash, results in a simple formu-
la. If a loan agreement was embedded in a public document, or based on a loan agreement created 
in a private document the debtor made a declaration of debt or a unilateral declaration of liability, 
and the debtor does not perform on the date following the repayment deadline, the proceedings for 
ordering enforcement regarding the document can be initiated in front of a public notary. 
In contrast, a loan transaction denominated in foreign currency is a complex equation. 
The lender disburses the loan registered in foreign currency in forints, and the debtor shall 
also pay it back to the lender in forints, but the amount to he repaid greatly depends on the 
exchange rate fluctuation of the concerned foreign currency compared to the forint, thus 
it cannot be specified in advance. These transactions are also characterised by the debtor 
typically paying the loan back to the lender in instalments, therefore the contractual term in 
most cases says that if the debtor defaults by one single instalment, the entire debt becomes 
enforceable and the lender may terminate the loan agreement. Therefore, it is obvious that 
according to the strictest interpretation, even the transaction document prepared in regards 
to the simplest loan transaction denominated in foreign currency could not include the 
enforcement	requisites	contained	in	§	23/C.	section	(1)	of	the	ExAct,	however,	they	can	be	
substituted by attestation documents.40
40 According	to	Act	LXXV	of	2011	(hereinafter	in	this	sentence	referred	to	as:	Act)	§1	section	(1)	related	to	a	loan	
agreement regarding a foreign currency loan, the public notary document template containing a declaration of 
debt (unilateral declaration of liability) applied in connection with credit agreements concerning omnibus accounts 
based on the provisions of the Act and registered at the Lender – by its nature regulated in the Act – contained 
even less enforceability requisites, since at the time of contract amendments neither the actual amount of the loan 
disbursed based on the omnibus account credit, nor the payment obligation concerning its repayment (the amount 
of the instalment rates, or the number and maturity (duration) of instalment rates was possible to be defined.
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In regards to the issuance of attestations and their utilization in the proceedings regarding 
the ordering of enforcement, a law interpretation question most often only arises in two 
topics in practice: in regards to the embedding of terminations in a notarial document, and 
the attestation of the amount of liabilities.
3. 1. Law interpretation problems arising in connection with the 
attestation of terminations
Concerning the requirement of incorporating the termination into a public document, 
already seemingly contradicting views were formed in legal practice before the scope of 
competence of public notaries was extended by the proceedings for ordering enforcement.41 
And, since during their proceedings in their new scope of competence the public notaries 
– adapted to their own procedural order – tried to satisfy the established judicial practice, 
therefore initially they had to perform thorough research on numerous questions to form 
correct practice. 
It can be mentioned as an example that the Supreme Court in its Decision no. BH 491 
of 2002 stood by incorporating the termination into a public document. According to 
the standpoint in Case Law no. EBH 2008/1786 published in provisions of principle, 
however the adding of the enforcement clause to the public document, the incorporation 
of termination into the public document shall not be claimed, and the public document 
attesting the announcement of the termination is sufficient. Even though the contradiction 
between the two decisions is only apparent, since the standpoints serving as their bases are 
different, in Case Law no. EBH 2008/1786 the acting court arrived at the conclusion that for 
the termination to take effect the notarial document, in which the lender declares that he 
delivered the termination to the debtors in the given time by presenting the return receipts 
in front of the public notary and attaching them to the document, is efficient. However, one 
cannot agree with this standpoint, since as Tamás Ujvári public notary phrases it in one 
of his publications: “(…) the reason the declaration of the person applying for enforcement 
cannot be accepted for ordering enforcement, as then the public documentation attestation 
specified in § 23/C. section (2)of the ExAct would become mere formality.”42
While ordering the enforcement proceedings by public notaries, the following procedure 
was established in regard to incorporating the terminations into an attestation by protocol: 
the lender presented the termination that was already sent to the debtor in front of the 
public notary and asked the public notary to incorporate its text into a public document, 
and also attest its repeated announcement to the debtor, and the delivery of the document. 
According to the view of some public notaries, this procedure is identical to the duplicate 
termination of the contract, which however is not possible. Based on other views, this is 
not the case here. Although the termination already came into effect by its announcement 
41 From 1 June 2010, the ExAct – inter alia – was amended that the public notary may assign the enforceability 
clause to the notarial document prepared by him.
42 Tamás UJVÁRI: The role of notarial attestations in enforcement proceedings. In: Celebratory study for the 
jubilee of the public notary profession (edited by: BÁN Tamásné TÓTH Dóra and Gábor ROKOLYA). Közjegy-
zői Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest, 2017. 381.
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in a private document, this legal impact is not attached to the second – or even multiple – 
announcement by the public notary, but the double or even multiple announcement(s) of the 
same termination has no obstacles.43
A verdict of the Curia – published shortly before concluding this study –44 may release this 
contradiction. The verdict says that “(…) the obligation to incorporate the termination into a 
public document45 cannot be derived from a legal provision. (…) the plaintiff correctly implies, 
that the legal impact of the cancellation of the contract is not attached to the subsequent 
termination in a notarial document, however, its role is anyway different: the termination 
incorporated into a public document has no transactional scope, the public notary only attests 
the fact, that the entitled person announced the contract termination, hence the maturity of 
the entire claim in front of him. (…)” 
In the topic of termination, it is also worth mentioning that initially there was no uniformly 
applied practice regarding the form of terminations by the public notaries. There were some 
declarations, i.e. declarations of termination made in the form of transaction documents, 
which had to be read out by the public notary. There were also declarations recorded in 
the form of attestation by protocol, which attestations only have to be read out if the ExAct 
specifically disposes so.46 As far as I know, today the documents on terminations are prepared 
in the unified form of attestation by protocol, regarding which in his application to cancel 
the enforcement clause the debtor may not refer to the fact that the termination without be-
ing read out is not a public document.47
It was specifically brought up in regards to foreign currency loan transactions, therefore the 
provision	is	listed	in	§45	section	(2)	of	the	Settlement	Act,	according	to	which	the	retail	 loan	
agreement could be terminated by the financial institution due to the non-performance of 
payment obligation of the consumer, with the effective date following the sending of the settlement 
according to the Settlement Act to the consumer, and its default liabilities towards the consumer 
could mature in one lump sum with the same date. According to section (3), the termination as 
per section (2) could become effective on the day following the sending of the settlement, but 
latest on 31 December 2016, if the legal and contractual conditions constituting the forfeiture 
43 UJVÁRI: i.m. 383.
44 Pfv.I.20.386/2018/4.
45 In	its	verdict	the	Curia	refers	to	§23/C	of	the	ExAct.
46 Public	Notary	Act	§120	section	(1)	d)	(The	legal	provision	reinforced	the	previous	practice	effective	from	01	
January 2008.)
47 Following the submission of the manuscript, the amendment of the Public Notary Act came into effect on 1 
January	2019.	According	to	the	amended	§142	section	(2)	of	the	Public	Notary	Act,	the	text	of	the	termination	
to be delivered by the public notary shall be read out by the public notary in front of the client: "The public 
notary incorporates the text of the declaration or notice into a protocol word-for-word, and forwards the 
document via post to the other party as registered mail, or one with return receipt, also by means specified in 
the E-administration Act. The public notary reads out the incorporated text of the declaration or notice in a 
protocol in front of the person making the declaration, and this protocol must be signed by the person making 
the declaration. The public notary gives a certificate to the party submitting the request about announcing the 
text of the declaration or notice, in which he indicates the text of the declaration or notice word-for-word, the 
name and address of the parties, the place and day, month and year of posting, and based on the request of the 
applicant, the hour as well.”
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of right for termination and fulfilment in instalments also existed towards the consumer as the 
result of the settlement. In regards to such transactions, the public notary could not proceed by 
the routine, but had to also consider that in addition to the termination the effectiveness of the 
settlement sent to the consumer had to also be certified in order to fulfil the condition, based on 
which the scope of commitment has matured, and the payment obligation has expired regarding 
the repayment of the remaining loan amount in one lump sum. 
3. 2. Law interpretation problems arising in connection with the 
attestation of the amount of liabilities 
The credit institutions still often contact the public notaries to record an attestation of facts 
regarding the amount of debt according to the debtor’s declaration of liability on a given 
date based on the bank’s registries. These attestation of facts are mostly prepared by the 
clients, based on a preliminary consent made in the transaction documents, and the banks 
usually use it with the public notaries who prepared the basic transaction document, i.e. the 
document to be enforced in the transaction. Namely, with those public notaries whom they 
can initiate the adding of an enforcement clause to the document. 
I believe that the increased demand for attestation and the preparation of such attestations 
in an attestation of facts by a public notary regarding the amount of liabilities – most often 
as part of the declaration on termination – can explained by the fact that the disbursed fo-
rint amount to the debtor upon borrowing the loan denominated in foreign currency was in 
most cases exceeded by the repayment amount by orders of magnitude, and the bank wanted 
to announce that to the debtor. With this, the information was already sent to the debtor 
in the termination, and he did not face it for the first time during the enforcement process. 
It is not disputed that the sight of the enforceable amount in case of foreign currency loan 
transactions must have had a shocking impact on all debtors, without exception. 
The principle is authoritative to all attestations, however, with the above attestations – 
containing non-verifiable data, amounts and statements for the public notary – it was especially 
prevailing that in case of attesting the making of a declaration, the entire attesting power of the 
document only concerns the fact that the declaration was made. Namely, to the fact that the 
declaring client made his declaration in front of the public notary, at the given place and time 
and with the contents incorporated in the document. The attestation document however does 
not prove that these declarations are completely true.48 This warning may even be contained in 
the notarial attestations, although it is not a mandatory element of them. 
It is also important to emphasize, because it spread in everyday speech, that public notaries are 
“the notaries of banks”, who collaborate in editing documents containing false data. Based on the 
views of plaintiffs in numerous lawsuits, that the amounts indicated in the attestation documents 
cannot be real, is exaggerated. It is indisputable, that due to the exchange rate fluctuation, the 
increased amounts registered as the remaining debt of debtors were much higher than the 
48 Viktória HARSÁGI: Preventive law protection – the document editing activity of public notaries. Közjegyzők 
Közlönye (Public Notary Journal), 3–4/2014, 41. (The author is referring to the punitive uniformity Decision 
no.1/2004 of the Supreme Court, which in its point III says, that “it does not qualify as intellectual public 
document forgery e.g. the false testifying, by which an untrue fact is recorded in the protocol, or provision”.)
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amount of loans borrowed by them. However, the representatives of banks made declarations 
about their extent in front of public notaries in full awareness of their criminal liability. 
It	follows	from	the	above	that	the	transaction	document	that	can	be	enforced	based	on	§	23/C	
section (1) of the ExAct – the foreign currency loan agreement – must reliably contain the debt 
of the debtor in a quantified amount. Consequently, based on my opinion the above attestation 
documents could only have an informative nature in enforcement proceedings. As I have already 
elaborated, the foreign currency loan agreements could not necessarily contain the precise loan 
amount to be repaid in case of the supervention of specified conditions, i.e. practically, in the 
event of the debtor’s default. The transaction documents however had to contain those principles 
of settlement, based which the amount to be paid can be calculated. The notarial documents 
prepared based on the foreign currency loan agreements defined whether the debtor had to 
pay his debt in forints or in foreign currency, and if the debtor is obligated to repay his loan 
denominated in foreign currency in forints, then at which exchange rate he had to do so. 
At the same time, it is important to note that when ordering enforcement the public notary 
is not able to examine the amount of the claim, therefore the attestation of the amount 
of outstanding liabilities has no significance regarding the enforcement proceedings. “The 
public notary ordering enforcement is only entitled and obligated to examine whether the 
amount to be claimed exceeds the amount contained in the enforcement document. There 
is an opportunity for the examination of rendered payments in the meantime during the 
enforcement proceedings (ExAct. §41) or in the lawsuit regarding the termination (restriction) 
of enforcement.”49 However, initially, the public notaries’ practice was not unified in this 
question concerning the examination of the amount to be enforced. It is a question regarding 
the ordering of enforcement proceedings that I will provide more details on in point IV. 
4. Tough decisions on ordering enforcement based on 
foreign currency credit agreements incorporated by 
public notaries into public documents
The years of 2009 and 2010 meant a turning point from many aspects for public notaries, 
because – besides introducing new scopes of competence50 – from 1 June 2010 the scope 
of entities involved in enforcement proceedings thus far was expanded by public notaries. 
According to the rules to be applied in proceedings launched after 01 June 2010, the ordering 
of enforcement by a public notary also applies to those notarial documents51 , which contain: 
49 UJVÁRI: i.m. 368.
50 Such as for example the termination of registered partnership by a public notary from 01 July 2009, the 
introduction of the registry for Partnership Declarations from 01 January 2010, as well as the proceedings 
for the order for payment and the European order for payment getting under the scope of public notaries’ 
competence from 01 June 2010.
51 In addition to ordering enforcement in connection with notarial document, the public notary also has 
responsibility regarding the issuance of the decision including condemnation made by a public notary, the 
agreement approved by a public notary, the list of costs on fees and expenses prepared by a public notary 
for performing non-contentious proceedings, furthermore, the enforcement form to be issued in case of a 
binding order for payment and a binging European order for payment.
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- the unilateral declaration of liability regarding the service and consideration, 
- the name of the entitled and obligated persons, 
- the subject, quantity (amount) and legal title of the obligation, and the means and 
deadline for performance. 
Therefore, the public notaries received the role of an authority ordering enforcement 
from this date on concerning all documents, which were previously prepared by them, and 
which had to contain the above-mentioned contextual elements. An additional condition 
for ordering enforcement based on such documents is that the claim incorporated into a 
notarial document should be the subject of judicial enforcement and the payment deadline 
for the claim has expired. 
In one of his studies, Zsigmond Balogh public notary52 said in regards to the above 
mentioned expansion of the scope of competence: “I think we can declare it as a fact, that 
Hungarian public notaries could never feel the weight of the legislative sentence like this, 
according to which: ‘Public notaries perform judicial magisterial activity as part of the 
government’s judicial activity in their scope of competence specified by law.’”53
It is a true and well-said thought, and it was already notable when it was formed that from 
this point on the public notaries will face a tough job containing numerous obstacles in this 
area of law. Later, it also surfaced that its deepest trenches were the proceedings ordering 
enforcement in connection with foreign currency credit documents. 
The task waiting for public notaries was to create their own procedures based on the 
previous practice of court, but in accordance with notarial non-contentious proceedings. 
Although the practice of the court provided a guideline for the public notaries, however, 
its comprehensive, criticism-free application was not and is still not possible, because based 
on personal law interpretation public notaries shall make decisions based on their own 
financial liability in each case.54
For the purpose of creating standard practice for enforcement proceedings, for instance, 
it should have been fixed at the very beginning which public notary will act55 during the 
proceedings	ordering	enforcement.	§23/C	of	the	ExAct.	simply	says	that	depending	on	the	
existence of formal and contextual requisites “the public notary preparing the document” 
is to add the enforcement clause to the notarial document. Guideline 29 of the Hungarian 
National Notarial Chamber (HNNC)56 fine-tuned this seemingly obvious rule, which initially 
was still causing difficulties in practice. The guideline stipulates that the notary preparing 
the document must always be understood as the notary issuing the base document. For 
instance, the notary who exclusively cooperated in the amendment of the legal transaction 
not containing new commitment, or in incorporating termination into a document, is not 
qualified as the competent notary in the proceedings ordering enforcement. 
52 Zsigmond BALOGH: The daily life of a public notary adding a clause to a document. Közjegyzők Közlönye 
(Public Notary Journal), 5/2014, 8.
53 Public	Notary	Act	1§	section	(4)
54 BALOGH: i.m. 9.
55 The public notary does not have competence to execute the enforcement!
56 Hungarian National Notarial Chamber
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The factor determining the person of the notary during the preparation of the enforcement 
clause in a credit transaction – that might even be amended several times – is whether or 
not the unilateral declaration of liability by the debtor based on the contract amendment 
or amendment incorporated into a public document contains new commitment. This rule 
has special significance in case of previously mentioned foreign currency credit agreements 
amended by an omnibus account credit, since it might happen that regarding legally 
completely connected legal transactions different public notaries order enforcement just 
because certain amendments contain additional enforceable declarations of liability. Its 
assessment is not always easy and it might even happen now that a law interpretation dispute 
arises among public notaries concerning the ordering of enforcement, in the question of 
competence. However, the vast majority is settled based on the principle of collegiality. 
This is actually needed as if, based on the above, the competent public notary to order 
enforcement is not, or not entirely, the notary who received the application for enforcement 
he shall transpose the case entirely or partially to the competent public notary. The parties 
may appeal against the decision ordering transposal. In absence of an appeal, once the 
decision ordering transposal becomes final and binding, the transposing public notary 
shall send the necessary documents to the competent public notary. If the case can only be 
partially transposed to another public notary, the receiving public notary calls the applicant 
for enforcement to submit possibly required further documents and to pay an additional fee. 
If the case is partially transposed, both public notaries shall issue the enforcement clause 
partly differently from the original claim. 
In addition to the above, other questions also had to be clarified, which were not exclusively 
arising in connection with foreign currency credit transactions.57
One of the largest problems, from the perspective of enforcements in connection with 
foreign currency credit transactions, was that the the practice of courts developed differently 
regarding the adding of an enforcement clause to the notarial documents issued for the 
monetary claim defined in foreign currency, compared to how public notaries tried to 
establish it while practising their newly acquired scope of competence. Great support was 
provided for the public notaries in this topic by the Legal Council and the Committee on 
New Scopes of Competence of HNNC. The detailed system of rules prepared by them helped 
public notaries in what to do 
(i) in case the claim in the transaction document is only defined in foreign currency without 
mentioning the currency of repayment; or 
(ii) in case the claim in the transaction document is defined in foreign currency and the 
document specifically disposes of repayment in foreign currency; or 
(iii) in case the claim in the transaction document is defined in foreign currency, but the 
document specifically disposes of the currency of repayment to be in forints, however, 
57 For those, who are interested in the topic, I recommend the FAQ published on page 65–70 of the Közjegy-
zők Közlönye (Public Notary Journal) 4/2010, the listed questions in which arose in public notaries in regards 
to the ordering of enforcement, for the possible answers to which were provided by colleagues having more 
theoretical experience in the topic. This is a good example of the knowledge sharing among public notaries, 
which by the way was always characteristic for the public notary profession.
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it does not dispose of which exchange rate to recalculate it at, or disposes of having to 
recalculate it at the exchange rate upon repayment; or 
(iv) in case the claim in the transaction document is defined in foreign currency and the 
document specifically disposes of the currency of repayment to be in forints, furthermore, 
the document also specifically disposes of which exchange rate to recalculate the claim 
at, and this date is later than the submission of the enforcement order, but it is not the 
payment date; or 
(v) in case the claim in the transaction document is defined in foreign currency and the 
document specifically disposes of the currency of repayment to be in forints, further, 
it also specifically disposes at which exchange rate to recalculate it, and this date had 
already passed upon the submission of the enforcement order; further 
(vi) in case of an enforcement request with contents contradicting the above. 
The guidelines and recommendation of the committees also included how a public notary 
acts correctly, if the applicant for enforcement has a legal representative and if he acts 
without one.58
Another problem was the question regarding the issuance of an enforcement clause with 
a different amount than that listed in the termination. This also led to creating different 
practice among the public notaries. Part of the public notaries regarding this believes 
that they should only have a clause for the enforceable document for the amount which 
matches the amount listed in the termination. According to others, this practice is wrong, 
considering that when a lender terminates a loan agreement, his claim becoming mature 
upon the termination may be the same until the date when he is requesting the document 
to be equipped with an enforcement clause, but it might also be different from this amount. 
Based on my practical experience, the amount indicated in the termination and the amount 
listed by the lender upon launching the proceeding are in most cases different. The public 
notary however is not supposed to examine this, since it is also not mandatory to indicate 
the amount that matured and expired in the termination. The public notary shall compare 
the data of the enforceable document and the data of the application by the applicant 
for enforcement, and if the applicant for enforcement indicated a higher amount in the 
application than what would be due based on the enforceable public document, the public 
notary	issues	the	enforcement	clause	differently	based	on	§19	section	(2)	of	the	ExAct.	
The initially different public notary practice leading to a phenomena is also connected to 
the above, when certain acting colleagues did not take into account that they are only entitled 
and obligated to examine the application for adding a clause to the document during the 
enforcement proceedings – within the tight boundaries of non-contentious proceedings – 
only formally regarding the existence or absence of formal and contextual requisites. Public 
notaries do not have to and shall not examine in the scope of the enforcement clause, if the 
loan agreement has been terminated in a private document by the applicant for enforcement 
58 In case of an application submitted not by a legal representative, which has a specific failure, the court (public 
notary	–	ExAct.	§)	31/E	either	supplements	the	insufficiencies	by	itself,	or	requests	the	party	to	do	so,	whereas	
wrong submissions by a legal representative shall be rejected without substantive examination.
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before the termination was incorporated into the notarial document. Furthermore, the 
public notary has also no opportunity to decide which termination is effective. Similarly, it 
also cannot be examined in non-litigation proceedings for ordering enforcement, whether 
the debtor has later revoked his declaration of liability into a notarial document, or not. It 
happened frequently, therefore I will provide more details on this in point V. 
It is important to record that over the recent period in addition to the above, additional 
practical questions could also arise in regards to adding an enforcement clause to the notarial 
documents containing foreign currency loan transactions. However, considering the topic 
of the study we are not able to demonstrate all questions which have arisen in more detail. 
5. Escape attempts by debtors from their foreign 
currency credits: complaints, withdrawals, threats 
Although due to the large number of transactions related to foreign currency lending the 
job of public notaries and the related legal problems to be solved also increased, most of 
the brainstorming, administration and unnecessary work was created by those – often 
identical – submissions which later spread widely. The persons creating these submissions 
also uploaded their document samples on the internet, so by using these the debtors – often 
instead of asking for real legal support – took their cases into their own hands and submitted 
their documents, sometimes without a specific application to the public notaries. 
One of the shortest and most courteous sample applications, contextually containing 
factual and legal mistakes is the following: “(…) Dear… Public notary, Please attach your 
authorization, based on which you contacted me in writing. As long as your entitlement is not 
proven, I consider your letter objectless. Best Regards: (…)”.59 However, there were much longer 
submissions as well, accusing the public notary of a criminal act, or being almost tragicomic. 
They include the document sample titled “Notice to certify the scope of competence”, which is 
still available on the internet and I am quoting based on below in full: 
“Case number: … Undersigned …, as a citizen of the legal Hungarian State, the Republic 
of Hungary, today I summon the authority to certify its scope of competence and right of 
jurisdiction with no delay and in itemised form, with legal arguments and the indication of 
the relevant legal provisions, based on Act CXL of 2004. 22. (1) and § 18. (1)! Also, please 
indicate those legal provisions, based on which you consider yourself an official person or 
authority! Further, please name the state, based on the behalf of which you carry out your 
above-mentioned proceedings! By providing an itemised answer on all three summons of this 
letter, please prepare your reply in your official proceedings, in an appropriate way and in the 
form of a public document, by ensuring that the formalities necessary for its authenticity are 
indicated at the right place! (name of the issuing authority, issuing person, title / position, 
handwritten signature, date, registration number, reference to this notice) ATTENTION! This 
notice is not a subject of the ExAct (Act LIII of 1994), and may not qualify as an enforcement 
59 Source: http://www.devizaados.hu/index.php/adatvedelmi-es-adatkezelesi-szabalyzat/13-
dokumentumok/212-kozjegyzonek-irhato-levelek
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excuse, or other official submission format regulated by law, and may not be forwarded to the 
court! The court has no competence regarding this notice, either to requalify it, or to reject it, 
or even to approve it, since Act CXL of 2004 makes it the responsibility of the directly acting 
authority to examine the right of jurisdiction and the applicable law, which it shall officially 
investigate in all phases of its proceedings when it is questioned! Should it not comply with 
the principle of promptness, but latest within 30 days does not comply with the clear notice 
contained in this letter, it shall be considered as a fact of evidential value, that he has no right 
of competence and has acknowledged it in the affirmative.”60
The HNNC certainly took the necessary steps when the author of the submission accused 
the public notary of committing a crime, or implying this by submitting a document to the 
public notary suitable for disgracing the reputation of the authority. Many public notaries 
still have to decide on a daily basis whether the submission they received can be assessed, 
whether it contains a real request, or it is so unclear that it is even incapable of rejection by 
a decision made in the form of formal verdict and it is efficient to be settled by a reply letter. 
In my opinion, it can generally be the factor of assessing a submission – despite any 
contextual meaninglessness – on whether it contains a substantive request regarding 
specific proceedings. If the public notary finds that the submission contains a request to be 
assessed, it is practical to make a formal decision that can be appealed, by which it addresses 
the client’s case by ensuring the opportunity for legal remedy. The method of addressing 
submissions including a request may be an informal reply letter. After a while, it should be 
limited by the fact that the considerable expenses arising from this by the public notary will 
never be compensated by anyone. Not to mention those recent cases, when the letter arrives 
at the public notary with unpaid postage, so in order to receive it he would have to take over 
the postage not paid by the client. I believe however, that the public notary cannot be forced 
to do so. 
I think the list could go on for long, as the unlucky debtors losing their housing wished to 
find the responsible person at all cost, and the easiest authority in reach “with a human face” 
was the public notary. Such clients were not even afraid to appear in groups in the public 
notary’s office with the method of applying personal pressure, and even though, as far as I 
know, no offence or crime was committed in these cases, their approach was still capable of 
scaring colleagues and hindering normal daily operations. And, when the foreign currency 
credit demonstrations started – the route of some touched on public notary offices as well –, 
there were some colleagues who were forced to keep offices closed for an uncertain time due 
to the demonstrators. 
One of the prominent types of submissions and applications with complaints – but at 
least expecting the active collaboration of public notaries – was one, in which the debtor 
contacted the public notary to ask him to prepare a public document with the public notary 
attesting that the client appearing in front of him “withdraws from the notarial document” 
that the public notary previously prepared based on the request of the client, and which 
contained all commitments to repay the client’s foreign currency loan. The “withdrawal 
60 Source: https://alkotmanyos-ellenallas.com/pub/VH_eljarasi_jogkor_igazolasa-v4-1.pdf
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from the notarial document”, or the “revocation of the notarial document” however are 
legally indecipherable, as only a legal declaration can be revoked. In many cases, the clients 
did not compose in a legally precise manner, however, based on their own statements, they 
promoted the revocation of the declarations of liability because they thought that it could 
help them to finally “get rid of" the credit. Moreover, they also hoped that if proceedings 
ordering enforcement took place against them, “withdrawing” declarations, namely those 
containing the revocation of the legal declaration would be taken into account by the public 
notary during enforcement. 
The above expectations of debtors was however to no avail. The legal declaration can be 
revoked if the withdrawal declaration is received by the person who acquired rights with the 
declaration, latest at the same time of the revoked declaration. Afterwards, the withdrawal 
of the legal declaration is only possible if the other party, i.e. the opposing party in the 
legal relationship, has also consented to it. In case the client of the foreign currency cre-
dit withdraws his unilateral declaration of liability, it only comes into force if he announces 
it to the lender; further, once he announces it and it causes the withdrawing declaration to 
come into effect, to trigger a legal impact it is also necessary that the lender consents to the 
withdrawal of the debtor’s declaration of liability in his reply. Basically, with this consent, 
it loses its effect, this makes the debtor’s unilateral declaration of liability "withdrawn". So 
the great significance that clients’ attributed to the withdrawal of their legal declarations 
regarding the repayment of their foreign currency loans was in vain, as – in absence of the 
lenders’ consent – was ultimately not capable of triggering the expected legal impact. 
For a short time, it caused disturbance in public notarial practice, how to treat such 
requests, prepare them, or refuse to participate. In the end, a reason for denying cooperation 
was not found, but since it was possible to precisely calculate the legal fate of such legal 
declarations – i.e. the declaration regarding the withdrawal of the legal declaration –, 
therefore I think it caused at least a moral dilemma for the acting public notary, whether to 
cooperate in preparing such a declaration, or not. 
Additionally, it also had to be solved – if there were some public notaries who prepared 
the public document for the withdrawal of legal declarations – how the public notary, to 
whom the client submitted it in the proceedings ordering enforcement should manage it. 
Considering that the withdrawal of the legal declaration goes beyond the scope that can be 
examined upon ordering enforcement, following the initially varying practice, a consensus 
was formed among public notaries that it is not possible to delete the enforcement clause due 
to the “withdrawn public document", or the “withdrawn declaration of liability” by the debtor. 
Due to the above, the debtor could not fundamentally count on getting rid of his credit by 
a single legal declaration – withdrawing the legal declaration in front of a public notary, 
incorporated into a public document –, the debtor had and still has a legal opportunity to 
initiate a lawsuit on terminating enforcement. 
This study does not aim at comprehensively presenting various submissions by debtors. 
The above submission samples and described story fragments were only included in this 
study because nothing could demonstrate better how the daily transactions emerging based 
on the loans denominated in foreign currency impacted the daily lives of public notaries. 
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6. Inherited foreign currency
In addition to the preparation of transaction documents, attestations by protocol, and the 
ordering of enforcement by a public notary, succession proceedings also belong to those 
notarial proceedings, in which public notaries had to cooperate in the settlement of the legal 
fate of debt – the debts remaining from foreign currency loans, among others. According to 
the provisions of Act XXXVIII of 2010 on succession proceedings (hereinafter referred to as: 
SpAct),61 succession proceedings are performed by public notaries, and if the SpAct disposes 
then the notary has competence for the given procedural action. Succession proceedings 
are such non-litigation proceedings upon which the public notary’s task is to establish the 
identity of persons concerned as heirs, as well as the legal title of succession in regards to 
the assets and material share of the inheritance by his decision regarding the transfer of 
inheritance due to death. In order to do so, he has to explore the status of facts, including for 
example the kinds of assets the deceased left behind upon death. The subject of succession 
in all cases is the property of the deceased upon death, which “is the total rights, things, 
liabilities (claims) and obligations connected to the deceased”.62
It follows from the above, that the obligation, i.e. the debt of the legato, is also the subject of 
inheritance, which is transferred to the heir. Based on experience in my work, I have found 
that heirs are generally also aware of this, and when they find out that there is a debt in the 
inheritance, they rather give up everything due to their fear that their own wealth will suffer 
from compensating the obligations of the legator and satisfying the lenders, and declare 
that they refuse succession. It is a fact that today the majority of the inheritance is almost 
certainly impacted by some credit, therefore the proportion of people rejecting succession 
over recent years has substantially increased. However, it does happen that the heir is better 
off making an agreement with the succession lender, so he can even be entitled to transfer 
the ownership title of some of the inheritance to himself. In addition, the misconception 
has spread that the debt of the legator entirely encumbers the heir, although “(…) formally 
the obligations are also borne by the heir, however, his liability regarding the whole of his 
obligations of the legato is limited for the succession cum viribus or up to its value pro viribus.”63 
This means, that the heir is only liable for debt up to the inherited succession, i.e. his portion 
of inheritance. Consequently, his own wealth is fundamentally not at risk if he accepts an 
encumbered succession. At the same time, there is no doubt that one needs to act cautiously 
when satisfying the lenders, because if the heir does not possess the objects or benefits of the 
inheritance upon the enforcement of the claim, the heir is also liable with his other assets up 
to the value of the inheritance, therefore it is recommended to manage the inheritance with 
care until the claim against the inheritance lapses. 
Additionally, the immediate refusal of inheritance is not necessarily practical as the refusing 
heir falls out of succession and will not be able to inherit anything later, even if it turns out during 
61 SpAct.	§	3.
62 Tibor ANKA: Right to succession – succession proceedings. HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó Kft., 2014. 17.
63 ANKA: i.m. 17.
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subsequent secondary succession proceedings that the legator still has an asset, the value of 
which is sufficient to settle the debts and may even be some remaining inheritance.64 Moreover, 
if the refusing heir has descendants they will inherit the inheritance if they do not exercise their 
right to refuse it. Underage descendants only have an opportunity to reject the inheritance with 
the involvement of legal representatives and the consent of the guardianship office. Due to this, 
the proceedings may take years and become unnecessarily complicated if there are enough active 
assets in the inheritance left behind by the legator that would cover the debt. 
Should the heir still refuse the inheritance, he can only do so once the inheritance is opened, 
i.e. after the death of the legator, and only until he does not specifically or implicitly waive 
his right of refusal. According to the provisions of the Civil Code, the taking possession of 
inheritance, or any other action regarding the inheritance shall be considered as waiving 
the right of refusal, which shows the heir’s unquestionable will to accept the inheritance, 
furthermore, it is also considered as waiving the right of refusal, if the heir does not make a 
declaration to decline the inheritance before the deadline set by the public notary based on the 
request of any interested parties.65 The declaration of refusal can be made in front of a public 
notary, or addressed to any co-heir, even without indicating the addressee, further, during or 
even before the succession proceedings. In case all traceable heirs – either legal or by a will – 
refuse the inheritance, it is transferred to the state as the necessary legal heir. Since the state has 
no right to refuse the inheritance, the final heir can be the state based on law. 
The question often arises by heirs as to how to refuse the debt alone. It is humanly 
understandable that no one would like to assume the burden. In these cases, however, 
the answer is a disappointing one to heirs, since it is not possible to pick and choose from 
the assets of inheritance: if someone does not wish to inherit debt, in this case – with a 
few exceptions – the entire inheritance has to be rejected. One of the exceptions from the 
prohibition of partial refusal of inheritance is the inheritance of land serving agricultural 
purposes, the related equipment and inventories, animal stock and working tools. They can 
be refused if the heir is not professionally engaged in agricultural production and by its 
refusal the heir will not be hindered from inheriting the rest of the legacy. Nor is there any 
obstacle if the heir inherits based on a testament and law as well, he may refuse the portion 
acquired under one legal title independently. 
During the succession proceedings, in addition to the refusal of inheritance, the question 
emerged regarding foreign currency credit transactions, what happens to the money which 
would have been due by the legator based on the so-called Settlement Act66. Of course, as the debt 
remaining from foreign currency credits, the amount owed due to settlement is also inherited, 
similarly to any other inheritance. There was a difficulty caused by the settlements only if the 
sending of the settlement letter based on law occurred during the succession proceedings, or 
once it was closed. In pending succession proceedings, there was no obstacle to incorporate the 
amount derived from settlement into the subject of the proceedings by the announcement of the 
64 SpAct.	§	103	Section	(2)
65 Cc.	§	7:90.	Section	(2)
66 Act XL of 2014 (Settlement Act).
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heirs. In case of succession proceedings already closed, there was an opportunity in secondary 
succession proceedings to add the amount of settlement into the items of the succession inventory. 
Should any burden occur in the inheritance left over by the legator, instead of refusing the 
inheritance, it would always be more practical for the heirs to thoroughly consider which 
is greater in the inheritance, the active assets or the liabilities. Only with this knowledge 
can they arrive at the best decision. According to my experiences, however, the heirs often 
make a rash decision without sufficient information, by which they refuse the inheritance 
encumbered by credit, including foreign currency credit. 
Summary
It may not be an exaggeration to state that the activity of public notaries can only be understood 
up-close by people who have spent a month or two in a notarial office, and who may be surprised 
by the fact that colleagues engaged in this profession in Hungary must operate with certainty 
in numerous areas of law to be able to perform their jobs at a high standard on a daily basis. By 
preparing this study, I tried to provide insight into the daily lives of public notaries: to present their 
job, dilemma, daily law interpretation hardships in various scopes of competence, as well as to 
demonstrate their subjectively experienced social judgement during a period when indebtedness 
due to loans denominated in foreign currency became a mass phenomena in Hungary. 
Public notaries have contributed to the handling of cases by concluding as well as 
amending loan transactions, and in proceedings by ordering enforcement with respect to 
documents prepared by them, and are still collaborating regarding the latter today. Since the 
debt accumulated by certain clients resurfaces in succession proceedings, often encumbered 
by foreign currency credits also belonging to the competence of public notaries, they also 
administer foreign currency credit cases in a wider sense. 
The penetration of loans denominated in foreign currency, as a social phenomenon, still has 
an impact in the professional lives of public notaries today because those debtors, who had 
enforcement proceedings launched against them, contact public notaries by serial submissions, 
due to which the solving of legal problems arising with foreign currency lending, as well as the 
closing of proceedings are still ongoing. So we can say, “the clearing of debris” might still take years. 
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1. What will be our topic, and how will it be discussed?
The economic (repayment) problems related to consumer credit became a legal problem 
around 20061 The legal disputes proliferating after the beginning of the economic-confidence 
crisis in 2008, more pronouncedly from 2011, are still ongoing at all levels of the judicial 
system with varying intensity and focus2. Therefore, the history of consumer credit lawsuits 
is not too long, and it has not been closed in any way.
When, during one of his journeys to Europe in the 1970s, the emblematic Chinese prime 
minister and foreign minister Chou En-lai was asked how he evaluated the impact of the 
Great French Revolution of 1789, according to urban legend, he answered, “It would be too 
early to say”. This wisdom3 is also true for the lessons of foreign currency loan lawsuits: Due 
to the lack of perspective and full insight, as well as because of daily involvement, a legal 
representative can today only provide a temporary, partial and subjective evaluation to those 
interested in experiences from foreign currency loan lawsuits. 
I would like to point out at the very outset that although “foreign currency lending” has 
become the main sin and the source of all evil for the public, and it is the foreign currency 
loan that kills, makes you stupid, and reduces you to destitution, statistical data show that 
repayment difficulties leading to legal disputes were not related to “foreign currency lending”, 
but generally to residential lending, more specifically to the high-level indebtedness of the 
population, as well as to the fact that, due to the economic-confidence crisis, the incomes of 
families simultaneously decreased, and their credit costs increased as a result of rising inte-
rest rates and deteriorating exchange rates.
1 This was the year when, among other things, the report of the so-called Várhegyi Committee (Expert Committee 
for the Investigation of Retail Financial Services, led by dr. Éva Várhegyi), Recommendation No. 9/2006 of the 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) on the Principles of Preliminary Information to be Provided 
to Customers and Consumer Protection for Retail Lending (see Sections 15‒19 on unilateral contract amendments), 
and report OBH 2958/2006 of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights, also focusing on unilateral 
contract amendments, were published. It was not much earlier, in December 2005, that the Hungarian Competition 
Authority (GVH) published the results of its sectoral investigation on mortgage loans, which already mentioned 
the need to examine the fairness of the general terms and conditions (see Section 39 of the Executive Summary).
2 According to the data published by the National Judicial Office (OBH), on 30 June 2018, 4,200 so-called 
“foreign currency loan” lawsuits were pending before regional courts and courts of appeal; https://birosag.
hu/sites/default/files/2019-01/dh_elemzes_2018_06_30_0.pdf. On August 31 2017, this number was 
7,450; https://birosag.hu/hirek/kategoria/birosagokrol/devizahiteles-perek-birosagokon (downloaded on 
03/01/2019) In November 2013, more than half of the cases at the Economic College of the Budapest Municipal 
Court were lawsuits related to foreign currency loan contracts. (https://birosag.hu/hirek/kategoria/az-obh-
javaslatai-devizahitel-szerzodeseket-erinto-peres-ugyekkel-osszefuggesben; download: 03/01/2019)
3 In contrast to the well-sounding legend, the gloomy reality is probably that, in his answer quoted above, Chou 
did not think of the 1789 revolution, but of the student rebellion of 1968. https://mediamythalert.wordpress.
com/2011/06/14/too-early-to-say-zhou-was-speaking-about-1968-not-1789/ (downloaded on: 03/01/2019)
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Data from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (hereinafter referred to as MNB) shows that, for 
example, in 2014, the year of the so-called foreign currency loan laws4, the difference in 
the proportion of non-performing loans within a given portfolio was not as large as public 
discourse and public sentiment suggested. 22.8% of foreign currency mortgage loans were 
overdue for more than 90 days, and this proportion was quite high among HUF mortgage 
loans as well at 13.3%. In the case of other foreign currency loans, the non-performance rate 
was 17.1%, which was not considerably higher than the non-performance rate of 14.6% for 
other HUF loans.5
Although, as described above, repayment difficulties affected consumers with HUF loans 
nearly as much as those indebted in foreign currencies, proceedings against creditors were al-
most exclusively initiated by the latter. Therefore, in this study, I refer to such proceedings as 
foreign currency loan lawsuits in spite of the fact that several issues discussed could as well be 
related to HUF lending.
2. What experience has been gathered?
Even if no final balance can be drawn, considering and evaluating experience from previous 
litigation is already useful because this will help us not to forget those lessons, for example, 
due to constantly shifting focus on new developments. 
This study does not aim to analyse in detail the points of law raised in courts or the 
economic environment of foreign currency lending. The study is specifically based on the 
litigation experience of the legal representative of a defendant (bank6). This is the perspective 
from which the subject matter is examined, and the study tries to draw, and present to the 
reader, some generalizable lessons that may be relevant for the future.
As said, both the presentation and the selection of the experience discussed here is highly 
subjective. The study does not mention, for example, that, after cases related to parking, foreign 
currency loan lawsuits have also shown that the tools and approaches currently available are not 
4 Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the resolution of questions relating to the uniformity decision of the Curia regarding consumer 
loan agreements of financial institutions is referred to as “DH1” or the Act on “unfairness”, Act XL of 2014 on the rules 
of settlement provided for in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the resolution of questions relating to the uniformity decision of 
the Curia regarding consumer loan agreements of financial institutions and on other related provisions is referred to as 
“DH2” or Act on “settlement”, Act LXXVII of 2014 on settling certain issues related to the conversion of the currency 
of certain consumer loan agreements and to the rules governing interest rates is referred to as “DH3” or Act on “HUF 
conversion”, and Act CXLV of 2015 on resolving issues concerning the HUF conversion of receivables arising from 
certain consumer loan contracts is referred to as “DH4” or second Act on “HUF conversion”.
5 See Figure V.2 of the Financial Stability Report of the MNB of November 2014. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/
penzugyi-stabilitasi-jelentes-2014-november.pdf (downloaded on: 3/1/2019)
6 The term “bank” covers all financial institutions that provide financial loans as a business activity.
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suited to manage mass litigation.7 The lack of the constitutional sensitivity of competent courts 
is not described either, although surprisingly few councils pointed out the unconstitutionality 
of the regulation curtailing the procedural rights of plaintiffs in presumption rebuttal lawsuits 
according to DH1. And even those that did were unsuccessful. It is also not discussed why the 
public prosecutor started to initiate proceedings of public interest only after settlement and 
HUF conversion according to the DH Acts and the relevant MNB investigations. 
3. Unclarified basic concepts 
Perhaps the first and most shocking experience was how little everyone knew about this field of 
expertise. At the beginning of foreign currency loan lawsuits, we were taken aback by the fact 
that areas of law such as foreign currency debt, general terms and conditions, invalidity, action 
for a declaratory judgement, which we thought were well-known to us, raised fundamental 
questions in litigation, the answers to which cannot be found in modern legal literature and 
practice. Moreover, where answers were already available, we found that bank lawyers had 
probably not placed enough emphasis on these matters in the course of drafting contracts.
3. 1. General terms and conditions
Standard contracts accelerating, simplifying and standardising the conclusion of contracts, as 
well as the legal problems arising from their use, appeared simultaneously with modern mass 
transactions. The conclusion of a large number of transactions could not be managed without 
standardising and pre-drafting contractual conditions. Due to the transaction costs arising 
from modification requests and legal and documentation risks, the amendment of conditions 
standardised by the issuing party is typically impossible. In the case of a standard contract, the 
contractual freedom of the requesting party who signs a contract with the issuing party becomes 
the freedom of concluding or not concluding the contract8. In the same way, the freedom of 
consumers in foreign currency lending also lay in the ability to decide which bank and what loan 
scheme (HUF or foreign currency financing, amount, term, APR9, etc.) should be used.
7 The figures quoted in Footnote 2 really show a significant number of cases. However, similar workloads are not unknown 
elsewhere either, and they do not lead to unmanageable difficulties. In the Hessen region alone, with a population of 6.2 
million, nearly 5,000 procedures are in progress before German courts in connection with the so-called diesel scandal 
(2018 data; https://www.lto.de/recht/justiz/j/olg-frankfurt-am-main-diesel-verfahren-anstieg-herausforderung/). In 
lawsuits related to foreign currency loans, some councils seek unnecessarily detailed evidence or suspend a procedure 
several times with reference to ongoing CJEU procedures, partly because of the practice used at second instance 
mentioned in Section 4.2, and partly due to solutions expected from higher levels. Unfortunately, this happens even if 
the subject matter of the legal action (which can no longer be amended) is not in connection with the CJEU procedure. 
In such cases, the customary verbal explanation is that unfairness should be revealed ex officio, so the given procedure 
may be relevant, irrespective of the contents of the lawsuit. The reopening of points of law that have already been closed 
is also a factor preventing the rapid processing of lawsuits. For example, 2/2012. PK Opinion v. FÍ 5.Pf.21.122/2013/10 on 
the possibility of unilateral amendments, or, for example, 6/2013 PJE and CJEU C-312/14 v. Budapest District Courts of 
the 2nd and 3rd districts 17.P.21.278/2016/8 on foreign currency loan as an alleged investment product.
8 See e.g. Péter TAKÁTS: A szabványszerződések. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1987. 10.
9 Annual Percentage Rate (APR)
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Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code (hereinafter referred to as Civil Code of 1959) contained the 
rules for General Terms and Conditions (GTC) from its 1977 novel. Even so, due to arguments 
regularly mentioned by plaintiffs, judicial practice frequently had to declare, for example, basic 
principles, e.g. that general terms and conditions did not have to be signed separately, and 
especially not on each page. They already become part of the contract by stipulating in the 
contract signed by the parties that the GTC should be applied in their legal relationship.10
On the contrary, defendants argued, for example, that the reading of GTCs by a notary 
public should be considered an individual negotiation thereof. This reasoning also failed the 
test of judicial scrutiny.11
However, the main question in the case of general terms and conditions was whether it, i.e. 
the contract itself, could be unilaterally modified by the issuer (in our case the bank) and, if 
so, under what conditions. 
3. 2. Unilateral contract amendment
The first major point of law on foreign currency loan lawsuits was related to the right to 
amend contracts unilaterally. This legal institution was not only challenged before civil 
courts. The National Electoral Committee had to decide on the certification of several refe-
rendum questions aiming to require the National Assembly to prohibit by law the subsequent 
unilateral amendment of loan contracts. The National Electoral Committee certified some 
questions of that kind, but the Constitutional Court finally annulled these decisions.12
The right to amend contracts unilaterally is a consequence of private autonomy and the 
freedom of contract, a means of ensuring the flexibility and stability of permanent legal 
relationships. The right to amend contracts unilaterally can ensure, for example, that the 
relationship between service and consideration, defined at the time of concluding the contract, 
does not change during the permanent legal relationship, despite changing circumstances. It 
also ensures that neither party has to terminate the contractual relationship due to changing 
circumstances, but it can be maintained under modified conditions.13
Discussions on the issue of unilateral contract amendments are particularly interesting 
due to the fact that the principles subsequently appearing in the uniformity decisions of legal 
practice14 and in legislation15 in this field were already known in the period before the crisis. 
In legal practice, for example, it was an established position that unilateral contract 
amendment was only possible if there was an explicit contractual provision to that effect, i.e. 
if one of the parties was granted the right to amend contracts unilaterally.16 In the field of 
financial services, this was also a consequence of the regulation applicable from the entry into 
force of Act CXII of 1996 on credit institutions and financial enterprises (rHpt. 210, Section 3). 
10 The question was hopefully finally settled by Section III.1.b) of the explanatory statement to the Civil 
Uniformity Decision of the Curia No. 1/2016.
11 BH 2012/247., BH 2013/128.
12 See AB Decisions 111‒113/2009. (XI.20.), AB Decision 975/H/2009
13 Similarly: Section [11] of Curia Pfv.I.21.135/2016/5.
14 Section 6 of PK Opinion 2/2012 and Part III, Section 2 of 2/2014 PJE
15 Subsection 1 of Section 4 of the DH1 Act
16 BH 1993/513., EBH 2001/438., see the text of the rHpt. applicable from 1 January 1997.
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Judicial practice also clearly stated that the right to amend contracts unilaterally did not 
allow the introduction of new costs, charges or other similar burdens17. Judicial practice 
also required that the reasons, circumstances and allowed contents of unilateral contract 
amendments should be stated by the parties in advance in the contract.18 It was also an 
expectation in judicial practice that the party unilaterally amending the contract should 
demonstrate the existence of the circumstances justifying the amendment.19
An arbitration award published in a journal entitled “Bírósági Határozatok” declared 
that, in the event of unilateral contract amendment, the other party should be given an 
appropriate transitional period.20 For such cases, the rHpt. already required prior notice of 
15 days already from its entry into force on 1 January 1997 (Section 210, Section 3). 
From 1 March 1999, Item d) of Section 2 of Government Decree 18/1999 II. 5. ensured, 
through the rebuttable presumption of unfairness, that the consumer had the right of 
termination if the right to amend contracts unilaterally was claimed by the other contracting 
party. In this regard, it was later disputed whether Subsection 2 of Section 292, of the Civil 
Code of 1959, according to which the debtor was allowed to repay the loan at any time before 
the expiry of the term, triggered an express right of termination. However, the Supreme 
Court required a clear and explicit stipulation of the right of termination.21
It was an established practice of the Competition Authority, already at the outbreak of the 
crisis, that service providers should ensure the symmetry of modifications, i.e. in the event 
of a favourable change in circumstances, the consideration to be paid by the consumer had 
to be reduced accordingly.22
Based on the above, it seems to be clear that subsequent legislative products cannot really be 
considered a novelty since most of the rules introduced by them were known and applied in 
legal practice already before the mass emergence of lawsuits related to foreign currency loans. 
The conditions for the lawful unilateral amendment of consumer loan contracts were first 
summarised by the Curia in PK Opinion 2/2012. However, the later legal practice of the 
Supreme Court set expectations in individual cases that actually rendered lawful unilateral 
contract amendment impossible.23 Recently, by means of its Civil Uniformity Decision No. 
2/2014, the Curia tightened the conditions previously set up by itself to an extent that they 
became unfulfillable. 
It turned out in the presumption rebuttal lawsuits, according to Subsection 1 of Section 
4 of the DH1 Act, that over the decade following 1 May 2004, there had not been a single 
financier at any point in time that could draft its general terms and conditions regarding 
17 EBH 2001/438.
18 BH 1995/414.
19 BH 1990/24. As a consequence of this principle, as the court argues, unilateral contract amendment can be reviewed 
in each specific case. For example, the Supreme Court declared in a lawsuit that the interest rate determined by 
exercising the right of unilateral amendment could not be disproportionately high (BH 1999. 176.).
20 1999/8. VB Decision
21 EBH 2009/2056.
22 E.g. 110/1995 VJ
23 Pécs Court of Appeal BDT 2013/3013. This decision was commented by attorney-at-law dr. György Léhmann, 
already deceased, saying it had destroyed foreign currency lending; https://alfahir.hu/osszedontottem_a_de-
vizahitel_szerzodest. Although foreign currency lending did not actually collapse, under such conditions 
unilateral contract amendments virtually became impossible.
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the right to unilateral contract amendment in a way that met expectations. This statistically 
improbable result was actually predictable due to the fact that the head of the Civil College of 
the Curia already stated at the press conference following the passing of PJE Decision 2/2014 
that “the most important part of the uniformity decision is the section on unilateral contract 
amendments, because very few contracts will meet the strict conditions set in it”.24
3. 3. The essence of foreign currency debt and the difference between 
buying and selling rates of exchange
It was not only the legal advisors of creditors drafting the general terms and conditions that 
were inconsequent in the use of terms for foreign currency lending, but also the legislator. 
Section 1 of Part III of the explanatory statement to Civil Uniformity Decision No. 6/2013 
actually describes the conceptual confusion that was characteristic of this issue.25 Loose 
wording, such as “booked in a foreign currency” or “foreign currency-based” loan, was 
dangerous because they could even suggest that these schemes were actually HUF loan 
contracts with a value stability provision.26
In reality, however, in contrast to the obstinate presumption of foreign currency borrowers 
dominating the media27, creditors acquired the resources for foreign currency loans in foreign 
currencies, so they did not benefit from the worsening of the HUF exchange rate. Logically, 
banks were able to offer foreign currency loans with more favourable interest rates than in 
HUF because they used foreign currency resources with lower interest rates. It is irrelevant if 
the form of acquiring the foreign currency resource was a foreign currency deposit, interbank 
lending, bond issuance or currency rate swap (so-called swap transaction).28 The bank had to 
settle accounts with the resource provider in the foreign currency, so they could not pocket 
24 https://jogaszvilag.hu/napi/kuria-az-arfolyamres-tisztessegtelen/ However, the results of those lawsuits were 
rather traumatising for legal representatives because, for example, courts did not consider the terms of unilateral 
contract amendments lawful even in cases where they reflected the regulations set forth in Government Decree 
275/2010 (XII. 15.) on the conditions for the unilateral modification of the interest defined in contracts.
25 For more on the problem of concept definition, see also Csaba NÉMETH: A devizahiteles perek joggyakorlati 
tapasztalatairól. Gazdaság és Jog, 2014. Vol. 4. 3.
26 For example, one week before the adoption of PJE Decision 6/2013 saying the opposite, this was how foreign 
currency loans were treated in Position No. 1, accepted at the professional meeting of the Civil College of the 
Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal held on 9 December 2013, as well as in a specific case by the Sze-
ged Court of Appeal; ÍH 2013/141.
27 In spite of the consistent communication of banks during the lawsuits, the population was not publicly 
informed of the actual situation. For example, on 9 November 2011, the Hungarian Banking Association 
organised a press conference for 18 economic journalists with the participation of foreign exchange experts, 
informing them that the underlying resource of foreign currency loans is denominated in foreign currencies. 
The event practically did not appear in the press at all.
28 As the Budapest Municipal Court established quite early, the actual source of the foreign currency in foreign 
currency lawsuits is completely irrelevant: “the contract does not specify the source that the defendant is obliged or 
entitled to use to cover the loan, so the plaintiffs wrongly claim that banks should be required to provide evidence 
for their banking operations related to the provision of coverage for the loan. From a civil law perspective, it is 
irrelevant to the legal relationship what kind of credit market operations the defendant pursues or does not pursue 
as this is not covered by the contract, and there is no obligation in this regard” (67.Pf.640.687/2010/3.).
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the difference between the HUF equivalent of the loan calculated with the exchange rate at the 
time the loan was granted to the consumer and at the time it was repaid, and, in the event of 
an appreciation in the HUF exchange rate, they would not have had a loss from the difference. 
In addition to economic considerations, the reconciliation of the term and foreign currency 
of the resource was also enforced by legislation and checked by the financial supervision 
authorities (HFSA and MNB) and by the auditor.29 Loans granted in foreign currencies within 
the framework of retail lending were therefore loans leading to actual foreign currency debt.
This was not changed by the fact that, according to Subsection 1 of Section 231, of the Ci-
vil Code of 1959, foreign currency debt had to be settled (paid) by both parties in HUF. 
30Accordingly, pursuant to Subsection 2 of Section 231, of the Civil Code of 1959, the parties 
had to settle accounts at the place of performance, i.e. in the branch office maintaining the 
debtor’s account, at the exchange rate valid on the day of performance. 
Although it is a premise in market economy that a trader buys cheaper than he sells for, the 
fact that the buying and selling rates were also different for foreign currencies was a surprise 
for both foreign currency debtors and the competent courts. This was probably caused by the 
fact that, on the one hand, the consumer is the seller of the foreign currency amount at the 
time of disbursement, and the buyer at the time of repayment, and, on the other hand, money 
in an account is a balance, not a physical object. Therefore, the activity of exchanging money 
between accounts (currencies) was interpreted as simple conversion. However, if we accept the 
fact, in line with the reality, that a foreign currency loan is based on an actual foreign currency 
resource, then we also have to accept that the acquisition and holding of money in the account 
(foreign exchange) is associated with costs in the same way as cash (currency). The difference 
between the two rates will cover these costs, risk, and, let’s not be shy, profit of the trader. 
In spite of the above, the Curia explained, unfortunately without giving detailed reasons for their 
position, that the use of the buying and selling rates is unfair, because (among other things) “the 
allegation in Section 1 of PJE Decision 6/2013, already referenced, is of decisive importance, saying that, 
in the case of foreign-currency-denominated loans, there is no exchange, just conversion at the time of 
disbursement and repayment. The determination of the conversion rate is necessary to ensure that the 
contract can be fulfilled. The use of different rates is not associated with any service actually provided 
to the consumer. The use of different rates generates an income for the financial institution, without 
any transparent performance, and a cost for the consumer. Pursuant to the contractual provision on 
29 Pursuant to Subsection 2 of Section 89, (2) of the rHpt, credit institutions shall ensure that their resources and 
assets are matched in terms of maturity and amount. The detailed rules for this are laid down in the implementing 
regulations then in force (e.g. Government Decree 366/2011 (XII. 30. on the determination of the liquidity level of 
credit institutions and on the regulation of the matching of foreign currency position maturity). Credit institutions 
report/reported their foreign currency positions to the central bank daily in an information provision table called 
“D01” (e.g. MNB Decree 32/2009 (XII. 1. on the information to be provided to the information system of the central 
bank, on information providers and on the method and deadlines of providing information). So-called open 
positions were sanctioned by legislation (e.g. Government Decree 244/2000 (XII. 24. on the determination of the 
liquidity level of credit institutions and on the regulation of the matching of foreign currency position maturity).
30 Béni Grosschmid, an outstanding Hungarian jurist at the end of the 19th century, was probably more 
frequently quoted by defendants in their submissions for foreign currency lawsuits than in the entire legal 
literature due to his distinction between the currency of infliction and payment.
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the use of different rates, the financial institution generates an income, as also acknowledged by the co-
defendant, without negotiating the contractual provision individually, unilaterally and unjustifiably, 
to the detriment of the consumer and generating a cost for him, without a direct service requiring 
payment, which is unfair”31. In reality, however, both currency conversion and foreign exchange 
conversion start with a calculation operation, followed by the transfer of cash (banknotes and coins) 
in the first case, and the transfer of a balance (of account) in the second case. The result of the latter 
does not appear materially, but that does not mean it is consequently not a service. 
As an explanation to why the application of a different buying and selling rate is unfair, a tribunal 
chief judge quoted to me an example, which is very illustrative but has probably never occurred in 
reality, that if a debtor taking a foreign currency loan wants to repay it immediately after disbursement, 
then he will not be able to do so because the HUF amount paid to him is not enough for performance, 
i.e. for the purchase of foreign currency corresponding to the amount of foreign currency debt.32 
However, it can also be imagined very plastically that a producer sells all his apples to a trader and 
then wants to buy them back from the trader (for example, due to a better bid) using the amount 
received. In a market economy, no one is surprised that, due to the trader’s margin, this is not possible 
since the money from the sale of the apples will not be enough to buy back the same apples. The 
principle of nominalism only suggests that one Swiss franc (or one apple) should correspond to one 
Swiss franc (or one apple), but the purchase price of the Swiss franc (or apple) is not necessarily the 
same as its selling price. However, while no one questions the legitimacy of a margin, the exchange 
rate spread is considered unfair in Hungarian legal practice related to foreign currency lending. 
In its Civil Uniformity Decision No. 2/2014, the unfairness of the application of buying 
and selling rates was derived by the Curia from the assumption that the Civil Code of 1959 
obviously referred to the official (middle) exchange rate of the MNB because “there was no 
other exchange rate within the framework of bound exchange control”. However, looking at 
the contemporary exchange rate charts of the MNB, it can be seen that the MNB also worked 
31 See judgement No. Gfv.VII.30.160/2014/5 of the Curia in the so-called Kásler-case. The consistent application 
of the legal practice denying the service nature of currency exchange would mean the end of foreign exchange 
rates because it is not possible to make a theoretical distinction between foreign exchange operations 
associated with residential foreign currency lending and corporate lending, or foreign exchange operations 
in a single consumer transaction (for example, crediting tax refunds received from abroad in a HUF account), 
because, according to the quoted explanation of the Curia, it is “just” a conversion in both cases. Cf. Szeged 
Court of Appeal Gf.III.30.239/2014 and Gf.III.30.526/2014, which claim that the unfairness of the exchange 
rate spread should also be applied to non-consumer loans.
32 The same idea also appeared in a judgement passed by the Szeged Court of Appeal in the so-called Kásler 
case one month before: “However, it is unfair to include a provision as a result of which … the debtor is obliged 
to repay a higher amount of loan than was actually disbursed by the lender" (Pf.I.20.052/2012/7.). The Sze-
ged Court of Appeal qualified the purchase and sale of foreign exchange as a virtual service, for which 
virtual consideration is to be paid; BDT 2012/2739. The Court of Appeal did not explain what that virtual 
consideration should be, but they probably did not mean virtual money (e.g. bitcoin), but a kind of folktale-
like solution such as the ringing sound of coins shaken in the hands.
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with buying and selling rates of exchange, just like today’s commercial banks33. Moreover, 
the one-tier banking system did not appear in its pure theoretical form, since the Financi-
al Institute Centre and the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank already existed and performed 
foreign exchange transactions. In 2014, the MNB no longer listed buying and selling rates, 
but, through a specific averaging of market rates, published a price for information purposes 
only, which was not even necessarily applied by the MNB in its transactions.
It is really debatable whether it is fair to modify the spread between the buying and selling 
rates during the term of the loan34 if the other party has no possibility to purchase the foreign 
currency from another (cheaper) source, or if this is prohibited by the contract. However, in 
the light of the above, it was a decision of the Curia and the legislator that it is professionally 
unjustifiable in a currency-liberalised market economy and incompatible with Subsection 2 
of Section 231, of the Civil Code of 195935 that banks had to settle accounts with consumers 
retroactively based on the (middle) exchange rate of the MNB. 
For the sake of factuality, it should be recalled that, in the case of consumer loans, it was not the 
Curia, and not even the DH1 Act, that abolished the margin of foreign exchange trade in 2014, but 
this was already done by Subsection 1 of Section 200/A of the rHpt., registered in November 2010. 
4. Just carefully! 
Carelessness and haste lead to bad results. However, politics is forced to act, and, due to 
procedural deadlines, courts do not always have enough time to find the right answers 
in terms of both derivation and result. There are several examples of the consequences of 
carelessness in lawsuits related to foreign currency loans. 
4. 1. Be careful with good ideas
According to a saying often cited in German legal literature, entire libraries become useless after 
three clarifying words by the legislator.36 However, the legislator rarely recognises his mistake. 
A refreshing exception is the new Code on Civil Procedure37, Section 167‒168 of which was 
supplemented with an explanatory statement saying that the requirement of documenting pre-
trial consultation was a useless provision: “The regulation on the requirement to attempt out-of-
court settlement on a mandatory basis according to Section 121/A of the applicable Pp. is abolished 
by the proposal because in practice it has not met the positive expectations attached to it.” 
33 For example, at the time when the final version of the Civil Code of 1959 was prepared in the competent 
ministry, according to the announcement valid on 5 May 1959, the MNB bought one rouble for HUF 2,913 
and sold it for HUF 2,957, while one US dollar was bought for HUF 11,652 and sold for HUF 11,828. Indeed, 
it can hardly be imagined that, in the era of exchange control, the MNB bought the foreign exchange, offered 
by companies on a mandatory basis, for the same amount for which it could be bought from the MNB in 
exceptional cases.
34 Cf. the facts according to the Economic Leading Decision of the Curia No. 10/2013.
35 Subsection 1 of Section 3 of the DH1 Act
36 „Drei berichtigende Worte des Gesetzgebers, und ganze Bibliotheken werden zu Makulatur”; quotation from 
the 1848 lecture of Julius von Kirchmann entitled Die Werthlosigkeit der Jurispudenz als Wissenschaft.
37 Act CXXX of 2016 on the Code of Civil Procedure.
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In cases related to foreign currency loans, this rule, which first seemed to be a good idea, 
led to a lot of unnecessary litigation and caused, if the trial was lost, considerable costs for 
plaintiffs, who were typically already in a difficult financial situation.
The draft of the new Civil Code contained a special rule overriding the provisions in 
Section 123 of Act III of 1952 (hereinafter referred to as Code of Civil Procedure of 1952) 123, 
declaratory trial. Accordingly, the party may request the court to declare the contract invalid, 
in whole or in part, even if it does not request the application of the legal consequences of 
invalidity. This provision, later included in Subsection 2 of Section 6:108 of Act V of 2013 on 
the Civil Code, for reasons that cannot be determined based on parliamentary documents 
38, was so appealing to some MPs that in 2012 the rule was also adopted, by an amendment 
through a private member’s legislative motion, to the Civil Code of 1959.39
Due to the date of the establishment of the legal relationship, the Civil Code of 1959 is 
applicable in lawsuits related to foreign currency loans, this provision made it possible for 
lawyers representing plaintiffs in such cases to initiate mass invalidity lawsuits with respect 
to the contract or, mostly for the purpose of reducing the duty to be paid, one or more 
of its provisions, without having to request the establishment of the legal consequences 
of invalidity40. Judgements admitting the claim (partly and typically in marginal issues) 
communicated a false image to the plaintiffs that, because the court established the (partial) 
nullity of the contract, their financial burdens would be reduced. However, this was true 
only in very exceptional cases. Nevertheless, such decisions proved to be an excellent marke-
ting tool for the representatives of plaintiffs (see Section VI below for more details).
Section 239/A of the Civil Code of 1959 was a trap for defendants because, as established by Ci-
vil Uniformity Decision 5/2013 of the Curia, in order to avoid the declaration of invalidity without 
legal consequences, they should have admitted the claim and requested the establishment of legal 
consequences in a counterclaim. However, if the claim is admitted, the court does not have to 
take a position on whether the contested provision is actually invalid, so it would have become 
impossible for the court to clear disputed legal interpretations. There was no other option but to 
take the risk of losing the trial, and then to start another lawsuit for the establishment of legal 
38 What could be established based on the general discussion was that the OBH opposed the amendment of the 
Act, and the Fidesz party supported it because they thought it would lead to the simplification of lawsuits; 
speech 231 by Dr. Imre Szakács on 5 May 2012. From the opposition side, Dr. András Schiffer attacked the 
proposal with the perverse logic that, in his view, it favours the banks as “these financial institutions are better 
off if they agree separately with the parties to the litigation using corrupt practices than if a final judgement 
does not only stipulate that a given standard contract contains a deceptive, unfair provision, but also that, say, 
a decision of the Curia also describes the consequences of bank contracts including unfair terms”; sitting on 23/
May/2012, speech 239.
39 Section 239/A of the Civil Code of 1959, established by Act LI of 2012, effective from 26 May 2012.
40 The already unmanageable situation was consolidated by Subsection 1 of Section 37 of the DH2 Act, which 
stated that, in the event of requesting the declaration of the total or partial invalidity of contracts within 
the scope of the Act, the plaintiff had to request the establishment of the legal consequence as well. The 
decision of the CJEU in case No. C-118/17 misunderstands this provision, based on information provided 
by the referring court pursuant to Section [53], since the applicant may claim the establishment of any legal 
consequences.
 Dr. Zsolt Lajer 257
consequences (including the declaration of invalidity).41 However, this would lead to the doubling 
of lawsuits, which is contrary to the alleged goal of the legal regulation regarding simplification. 
Also, the explanatory statement to the draft of the new Civil Code does not explain why 
the procedural rule on actions for a declaratory judgement had to be ignored. It was not 
clarified as to why it was legally acceptable that a plaintiff could only ask for a declaration 
when the declaration of invalidity necessarily results in a settlement relationship42. Indeed, it is 
obvious to all lawyers that parties who have already litigated against each other, and who have 
completely different interests, will not settle accounts voluntarily and in mutual cooperation. 
Although the purpose and rationale of the rule in Subsection 2 of Section 6:108 of the Civil 
Code Constitution remain obscure in the explanatory statement to the draft, the explanatory 
statement to Act CXX of 2009, which did not enter into force, as well as the so-called Expert 
Proposal43 already specify the reason for the provision in more detail, literally. The petitioner and 
the author refer to an alleged need for the practice and to the fact that this provision allows the 
parties to “settle their often quite complicated settlement dispute out of court flexibly and peacefully 
in order to maintain their business or other relationship in the future”. This concept is as naive 
as the continuation of the explanation is wrong, stating that “If the parties do not show mutual 
willingness, they will usually request the court anyway to establish the legal consequences of the 
invalidity in the same lawsuit". As already mentioned above, it was not in the interest of the legal 
representatives of plaintiffs to request the establishment of legal consequences, because then it 
would not have been possible to sell the (partial) success as a victory. Moreover, the defendant 
could only have asked for the establishment of consequences if he had admitted the claim. 
A view has meanwhile appeared in commentary literature admitting that the provision 
has not lived up to the expectations originally attributed to it.44
The real consequence of the provision is that the settlement of the dispute is delayed, the 
relationship between the parties deteriorates further, and, lacking an agreement between the 
parties, the number of cases increases. Ideally, the legislator should weed out this provision 
from the Hungarian legal system, similarly to the institution of out-of-court settlement 
required in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1952. 
4. 2. Be careful with EU law 
Directive 87/102/EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer cre-
dit was transposed into two legal regulations under the name consumer loan. The relevant 
provision is contained in Section 212 et seq. of the rHpt. and in Section 7 of Act CLV of 1997 
41 See e.g. the facts of case No. Gfv.VII.30.212/2018; https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/sajto/nem-tipikus-tenyallasu-
devizahiteles-perben-hozott-hatarozatot-kuria It is uncertain, however, how the declaration of validity a long 
time after the final declaration of invalidity affects additional safeguards.
42 Not including the case of declaring the partial invalidity in the case of certain clauses of marginal importance.
43 http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05949/05949.pdf The provision in question was contained in Subsection 3 
of Section 5:84 of the 2009 draft. See: Lajos VÉKÁS (ed.): Expert Proposal for the draft of the new Civil Code. 
Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 2008. 789. (explanation to Subsection 2 of Section 5:82.)
44 See: Lajos VÉKÁS – Péter GÁRDOS (ed.): Comment on the Civil Code. Volume 2, Wolters Kluwer, Budapest, 
2014. 1480.
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on consumer protection. These parallel provisions were annulled by Act CLXII of 2009 on 
consumer credit (hereinafter referred to as Fhtv.), transposing Directive 2008/48/EC.45
Between 1997 and 2000, the relevant rules of the rHpt. made loan contracts, not including 
the elements listed in Section 213, contestable. The legal consequence of incomplete contracts 
was nulled as of 1 January 2001 according to the rHpt., and nulled from their entry into force 
according to the Consumer Protection Act. 
None of the Directives underlying the Hungarian regulation made it mandatory to require 
such a serious legal consequence. For example, the Austrian law on consumer loan contracts 
from 2010 does not declare contracts invalid in the absence of mandatory content elements, 
but, in order to preserve the validity of contracts and create fair content, specifies what 
should replace the missing or wrong provision by operation of law.46
Although the extremely serious legal consequence chosen by the legislator turned out to 
be evidently mistaken in foreign currency loan lawsuits, the provision was only amended in 
February 2015.47
In addition to the transposition of EU Directives, the interpretation of EU legal practice, 
often formulated in a very complicated and elaborate manner, has also caused many problems. 
Besides the evidently differing interpretations of plaintiffs and defendants, unfortunately, 
Union courts also interpreted CJEU jurisprudence differently. 
A good example of this is the question, whether the judgements of the CJEU suggest that, in 
addition to the provisions of the General Terms and Conditions brought before the court by the 
plaintiff, courts also have to examine other provisions of the GTC ex officio? The 5th Pf. Council 
of the Budapest Municipal Court of Appeal, which has otherwise made valuable contributions48 
to the issue of Member State liability based on EU law, thought this to be the case. Accordingly, 
irrespective of the claim in the legal action, the court has to examine all the provisions of the GTC 
and, if they find a provision in it that is thought to be unfair, they have to annul the judgement 
at first instance even if, in their view, the dismissal of the action was justified with respect to the 
provisions evaluated in it: "In case No. C-397/11 ‘Jőrös-Aegon’, the Court ruled that the Directive must 
be interpreted so that the court of a Member State is obliged to evaluate ex officio the unfair terms 
of a contract concluded with a consumer …As a consequence, the Court of Appeal had to examine 
and identify where the terms of the disputed contracts contain invalid terms based on Subsection 1 of 
45 Considering that the Fhtv. applies to credit loan contracts concluded after 11 June 2010, the relevant provisions 
of the rHpt. are still applicable in lawsuits related to foreign currency loans.
46 According to Subsection 5 of Section 9 of the Verbraucherkreditgesetz, for example, the statutory interest rate 
is applicable if there is no interest or APR, or if the APR has been determined incorrectly, and it is lower than 
the APR resulting from correct calculation, the interest rates according to the lower APR must be applied. 
However, individual Member States were of course entitled to apply stricter legal consequences, cf. the facts 
of the case CJEU C-42/15.
47 See Section 5 of Act LXXVII of 2014 amending Subsection 5 of Section 16, which entered into force on 1 
February 2015. Until then, judicial practice refined the indefensible situation because it accepted that 
Subsection 1 of Section 213 of the rHpt. leaves room for determining partial invalidity, cf. Section III.5 of 
6/2013 PJE.
48 ÍH 2019/17., ÍH 2018/102.
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Section 213, of the Hpt. and Subsection 1 of Section 209, of the Civil Code”.49 As this position was not 
followed by most second instance courts, the result of second instance proceedings was dependent 
on the assignment of cases in lawsuits where the dismissal of the claim by the court of first instance 
was justified regarding the grounds of invalidity stated in the application.
Furthermore, this legal interpretation raised unanswerable questions about the scope of the 
subject of the judgement. Indeed, if courts examine the entire GTC ex officio in order to find un-
fair provisions, does a final judgement in such a lawsuit mean that all other provisions of the GTC, 
which have not been annulled, are valid as they have been judged and evaluated by the courts? 
Adopting the above position, legal actions and appeals by plaintiffs regularly contained a 
polite request, which was far from being categorical, saying that the court should identify, ex 
officio, the invalidity of the provisions not mentioned in the claim.
The Szeged Court of Appeal took the opposite view with respect to such ex-officio 
examinations: “The ex-officio identification of the cause of nullity does not mean that the court 
automatically reviews all provisions of the disputed contract regarding any further grounds 
for nullity, in addition to those mentioned by the parties”.50 The Curia joined this position: 
“You cannot deduce a plaintiff’s position that, in a lawsuit for declaring certain provisions 
of the GTC invalid (not to be retained), the court should examine the invalidity of all or any 
provisions of the GTC not mentioned by the plaintiff”.51
The above example also reveals that foreign currency loan lawsuits showed courts that the CJEU 
could be used to bring about a change in the jurisprudence of higher courts, which they considered 
to be inappropriate. For an outside observer, it seems that this was the reason why the Budapest 
Municipal Court of Appeal asked the fifth question in case No. C-51/17 and submitted a further 
claim (No. C-34/18). In case No. C-51/17, the CJEU did not confirm the obligation of ex-officio 
examination, but reaffirmed its earlier position that invalidity could only be established ex officio 
if the necessary legal and factual elements were available to the national court.52 The CJEU did not 
impose on the courts to carry out this further research.
49 5.Pf.21.122/2013/10.
50 Pf.II.20.180/2014 (BDT 2015/3361), Pf.II.21.307/2015/5: “Contrary to the position of plaintiffs, Union law 
does not require national courts to comprehensively review the contracts forming the subject of proceedings 
before it for the annulment of a contract in order to determine whether it contains unfair provisions not 
mentioned by the parties”
51 Section [11] of Gfv.VII.30.112/2015., Pfv.VI.21.978/2016/4.
52 See: Section 90 of judgement No. C-51/17. From earlier times, see e.g. Section 35 of C-243/08: “if the necessary legal 
and factual elements are available to them”. This is more or less in line with current Hungarian jurisprudence, 
according to which: “The court is only required to identify ex officio obvious instances of nullity that can be 
clearly established as facts based on available evidence. To allow the declaration of nullity, the court may not seek 
evidence ex officio.” [Government Decree No. 2/2010 (VI.28.), PK Opinion, Section 4.a]. Interestingly, the Buda-
pest Municipal Court also turned to the CJEU, but with an opposite intent, see case No. C-511/17.
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4. 3. Be careful with foreign examples 
Ripple effect or, more precisely the lack of it, was one of the favourite expressions of politicians 
in so-called socialist countries in the 1970s. They wanted to suggest that the oil crisis then 
hitting Western European countries would stop at the border. Although, indeed, the kind of 
severe fuel shortage that could be seen in the West did not appear, its economic and political 
consequences naturally did not stop at Hegyeshalom.
The same cross-border nature is also a characteristic of legal ideas. It seems that today not 
only a lawyer53 leading a debtor protection association from abroad but also the courts take into 
account the responses of foreign legal systems to problems similar to those seen in Hungary.54
Considering the different provisions of their Civil Codes, German and Austrian courts took a 
different position on whether the creditor could demand, in addition to the interest, for example 
a disbursement commission or handling charges. While the German Bundesgerichtshof 
(Federal Court) was of the opinion, for both consumers55 and businesses56 that the disbursement 
commission was an unfair fee, the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) was of the 
view that other fees, e.g. a handling charge, may also be required in addition to the interest.57
The procedure for a preliminary ruling launched for the clarification of the possible 
unfairness of charging a disbursement commission and a handling fee is in progress under 
No. C-621/17. The decision of the CJEU will have to be taken into account in all individual 
cases initiated on this subject. So the situation will be similar to that already mentioned in 
connection with presumption rebuttal lawsuits, i.e. the banking system will know whether 
the general market practice is fair after nearly ten years. 
According to the general opinion among Hungarian judges, it is not considered 
unconstitutional if the court determines the past content of a norm, even for general 
purposes, with a binding effect on all courts: “legal interpretation reveals the original content 
of the law, so in this respect a retrospective effect is not applicable".58
The fact that a different attitude may appear in the case of a market practice that has not been disputed 
for decades is well illustrated by judgement No. XI ZR 147/12 of the Bundesgerichtshof from 3 June 2014 
on so-called kick-back commissions. This was the decision where the Bundesgerichtshof stated that in 
53 For a presentation of the head of the Financial Consumer Protection Association for Financial Services 
(PITEE), the first organisation thematising the issue of the exchange rate spread as a cost, see „A jogász, aki 
rést talált a bankok pajzsán” in: https://index.hu/gazdasag/2014/07/29/lazar_denes_interju/ and „Az ügy-
véd, aki meghúzta az OTP bajszát” in: Figyelő, Issue 2016/20, pp. 20-21 (The action described here was finally 
dismissed by the Budapest Municipal Court of Appeal under 10.Gf.40.040/2017/10-II.)
54 What I mean here is not the applicable jurisprudence of the CJEU, but the jurisprudence of national courts. 
See, for example, Section of Curia order initiating preliminary ruling No. Pfv.VII.22.444/2016/11; http://hi-
telsikerek.hu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/EDE-IX..pdf
55 Judgement in case No. XI ZR 170/13
56 Judgement in case No. XI ZR 562/15
57 Judgement in case No. 6 Ob 13/16 d
58 34/2014. (XI. 14.) AB Decision, Section 96. 2/2012. (XII.10.) PK Opinion, Section 6, explanatory statement: 
“It does not violate the prohibition of the retroactive application of the law if a court declares that a clause in 
the General Terms is unfair based on the provisions of the Civil Code in force at the time of concluding the 
contract for a reason which is subsequently governed on a mandatory basis by a separate law, possibly relying 
on experience from case law.”
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the context of investment consultancy, the client should be informed of the commission received by the 
investment service provider for the sale of the instrument in any form or amount. However, because 
this complex issue was very controversial in jurisprudence, and several contradictory judgements were 
delivered, the court took the position that, in the event of a violation of this obligation in cases before 
1 August 2014, the investment service provider could invoke the existence of an error in law, so they 
could not be accused of violating the regulations; therefore, no compensation had to be paid in case 
of an unsuccessful investment. Unfortunately, there was no ripple effect with respect to this attitude.
4. 4. Be careful with self-regulation 
The Code of Conduct59 negotiated60 between the Government, the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority, the Hungarian Competition Authority and the Banking Association, 
as a kind of self-regulation61 by the market according to Act XLVII of 2008 on the prohibition 
of unfair commercial practices against consumers, was signed by 13 credit institutions on 16 
September 2009. The Code of Conduct entered into force simultaneously with the amendment 
of Section 210, of the rHpt., which means that Chapter III of the Act, containing a list of causes 
giving rise to unilateral contract amendments, was also applicable from 1 January 2010. 
The banks signing and accepting the Code also knew that the Code of Conduct was not a 
law. However, the circumstances under which it was adopted suggested that its content was also 
recognised by the regulatory authorities as lawful and consistent with the desired market practice. 
However, judicial practice did not attach any importance to the Code of Conduct 
and, overriding the consensus-based principles contained therein, virtually came to the 
conclusion that if it was not a law, it was nothing.62 Judicial practice did not even consider 
the Code of Conduct for the interpretation of legal regulations, so it lost all its importance.63
59 Code of Conduct on the fair behaviour of financial institutions granting credit to the population; https://
www.mnb.hu/letoltes/magatartasi-kodex.pdf
60 The compilation of the Code was the result of an agreement signed by the Prime Minister, the Minister of 
Finance, the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Chairman of the HFSA and the Hungarian Competition 
Authority, as well as the Vice President of the MNB, and the representatives of Hungarian banks at their 
meeting on 17 July 2009. The first draft of the Code was prepared by the HFSA by the end of July 2009.
61 “2. For the purposes of this Act i) ‘Code of Conduct’ means an agreement or set of rules created in the framework 
of market self-regulation, which determines behavioural rules in relation to a particular commercial practice or 
business sector for undertakings that undertake to be bound by the Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘compliance 
with the Code of Conduct’).”
62 BH 2012/41., 2/2012. PK Opinion
63 It is not too comforting either that Government Decree 275/2010 (XII. 15.) on the conditions of the unilateral 
amendment of contracts in terms of interest rates suffered the same fate in presumption rebuttal lawsuits. 
According to the judgments, unilateral amendments in compliance with the Code of Conduct were considered as 
unfair in the same way as those that recreated the rules of the Decree. The idea, which is in contrast to the partial 
judgment passed in the review procedure for the so-called Partiscum case (Gfv.IX.30.221/2011/6.), that contractual 
terms in line with the special rules of the Hpt. may be considered as unfair according to the Code of Conduct was 
explained in Section 2 of the explanatory statement to PK Opinion 2/2010. (For further information, see Gábor 
GADÓ: A fogyasztói kölcsönszerződések egyoldalú módosítása tisztességességének változó megítéléséről. Gazdaság 
és Jog, 2015. Issue 7‒8, p. 14 and following pages.). The practice of tribunals also represented the position that a 
contractual term containing a list of causes in line with the law can also be unfair (ÍH 2014/147).
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The legislative and regulatory authorities contributing to the drafting of the Code of 
Conduct and welcoming its adoption did not take action against this legal interpretation by 
the courts. Therefore, self-regulation, which intended to regulate the conditions for the right 
to unilateral amendment from the perspective of the banking system, in agreement with the 
government and regulatory authorities, proved to be self-deception. 
5. Limited self-reflection, limited self-expression
Perhaps the most painful experience we have to point out is that, in retrospect, the banking 
system was not really able to properly treat legitimate criticism and some professional issues 
raised in lawsuits. The attitude to the right to unilateral contract amendment and insistence 
on its unlimited exercise must be mentioned as the first problematic point.
5. 1. Excessive insistence on unilateral amendments 
I have already described my position on the right to unilateral amendment in Section 3.2. I 
would like to point out here that if a credit institution exercised unilateral contract amendment, 
for example, with general reference to a “change in interest rates on the money and capital 
markets”, it was immediately suspected to be abusing its contractual rights. However, the 
danger of amendments, which was not transparent for an outside observer, was taken seriously 
too late, because we insisted on the unquestioned practice of previous years in spite of the fact 
that its correctness was already questionable on the basis of contemporary jurisprudence. 
A good example of the lack of self-reflection and self-restraint was the creation of the Code 
of Conduct, already analysed in more detail in the previous section. Here, the banking system 
fought a comprehensive one-sided list of causes, based on which the jurisprudence described 
in Section 4.4 was predictable. Under the cause “changes in money market conditions and the 
macroeconomic environment”, the Code of Conduct allowed the unilateral modification of 
interest rates and/or fees in case of virtually any market change. 
In retrospect, it appears that less would have been more, i.e. if sufficient self-restraint 
had been used for self-regulation, the resulting rules may have been considered fair in 
examinations according to Section 209, of the Civil Code of 1959. 
5. 2. The lack of proper explanation 
Another such problematic issue, we assumed (assume?) in the lawsuits that the given acting 
council was as familiar with the points of law and the established practice as the lawyers of 
the defendants dealing with banking and collateral contracts in their daily work. Therefore, 
the defendants’ side did not explain the absurdity of the plaintiffs’ reasoning in every case. 
A good example of this is the judgement of Council 17.P of the District Courts of the 
2nd and 3rd districts, already mentioned in Footnote 7. The referenced judgement at first 
instance does not at all deal with Section 1 of Civil Uniformity Decision No. 6/2013 of the 
Curia and the decision of the CJEU in case No. C-312/14. An economic news portal even 
noted in connection with the explanatory statement to the judgement that “the lawyer of 
the bank did not express a meaningful counter-opinion or the court did not find it worth 
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discussing”.64 Indeed, it is difficult, but not impossible, to imagine that the acting council 
would not have covered these legal interpretations, which were different from its own, if the 
defendant had referred to them. 
Of course, there are certain limitations to the simple explanation of operational banking issues. 
For example, in cases where, despite having the burden of proof, the plaintiff’s claim that the APR 
indicated in the loan contract is not accurate, we are often requested to use the four basic operations 
to prove that the calculation of the APR is correct in a way that it can be understood by the court. 
According to its mathematical content, the APR is a so-called IRR (Internal Rate of 
Return) function. By definition, the APR is the so-called internal rate of return of the total 
cash flow, i.e. the interest rate at which the present value of the cash flow is 0. In other words, 
the APR is the interest rate at which the discounted amount of yields equals the aggregated 
net present value of one-off expenses. It is very difficult to calculate the APR by hand because 
it can only be done by approximation: we estimate the interest rate, use it to calculate the 
present value, and experiment further until the present value is 0 (so-called iteration). This 
is why the formula in the Government Decree does not indicate the calculation of the APR, 
but the calculation of the amount of loan reduced by the costs using the APR. 
However, the specific mathematical steps used in the function for the calculation of the 
APR and whether the debtor understands the mathematical apparatus behind the result of 
the calculation is not relevant to the validity of the contract. Similarly, it cannot be relevant 
to the decision on invalidity whether legal representatives are able to explain to the court the 
operation of the function in plain language, using the four basic operations. 
Therefore, the requirement of “understandability” in financial mathematics is often just 
an illusion. I sympathise much more with the pragmatic attitude which, as also suggested 
in Section 6 of the explanatory statement to PK Opinion 2/2012, assumes that in the case of 
loans and other banking operations, the use of certain technical terms without a detailed 
explanation is inevitable in the contract.65 If the given term is not known to the other party, 
due to its obligation to cooperate, it is obliged to indicate this fact and ask for an explanation 
of the term, or possibly look for an answer to the question by itself or seek expert help before 
signing the contract. If someone fails to do so, this negligence will deprive him or her of the 
possibility of later professing not knowing the term. This real-life attitude was handled, for 
example, by Council Pfv.I of the Curia for treating the term “annuity loan”, which simply 
means that the instalments to be paid by the debtor are always identical, but there is a 
constant shift within these in the repayment rate of principal and interest in favour of the 
former.66 The facts mentioned in connection with the APR are also true here, namely, that 
it is not relevant to the validity of the contract what specific mathematical steps are used for 
the calculation of the annuity, and whether the debtor, the legal representative, or even the 
court understands the mathematical apparatus behind the result of the calculation. 
64 https://azenpenzem.hu/cikkek/megis-befektetes-volt-a-devizahitel/3439/ (15/2/2019)
65 This is an attitude of the court manifested in individual decisions. See e.g. Szeged Court of Appeal BDT 
2013/2889.
66 Pfv.I.20.945/2016/14. and Pfv.I.20.030/2017/6.
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Although it is not closely related to the experience discussed here, the absurdity of insistence 
on the requirement of “understandability” in certain situations is well illustrated by the fact that, 
partly due to the lack of “understandability”, settlements with banks after unilateral contract 
amendments that were declared unfair had to be carried out using the following formula:67
It is not only because of the position often expressed by foreign currency borrowers, but 
probably also due to the lack, or at least inadequacy, of explanation by defendants that it is not 
possible to get rid of the stereotype that, through foreign currency lending, banks passed on 
foreign currency risk to the debtors. Without any income denominated in a foreign currency, 
such debtors actually bear (suffer or enjoy) the effects of exchange rate changes, depending 
on the direction of change. However, this is not based on the “viciousness” of banks, but on 
the provisions of Subsection 1 of Section. 231, of the Civil Code of 1959, i.e. the decision of the 
legislator. It was not (foreign currency) creditors who passed on some sort of risk that should be 
borne by them to (foreign currency) debtors, but, due to the specific nature of foreign currency 
debt, foreign currency debtors bore that risk from the outset by operation of law. Nevertheless, 
the inflammatory use of the phrase “pass on”, which encourages a condemning moral judgement, 
seems to be ineradicable from communication in foreign currency loan lawsuits. 
In this field, it would have been useful to continue the lectures on foreign currency lending at 
the Hungarian Academy of Justice, an institution responsible for the further training of judges. 
For example, it was explained to the participants already at the first lecture that it was pointless 
to ask the bank to demonstrate it had actually acquired the currency provided as a loan, since 
banks acquire refinancing at portfolio level, rather than at the level of individual loans.68 As an 
analogy, a greengrocer cannot prove with an invoice containing an identical quantity that he 
has purchased one kilo of potatoes specifically sold to a given buyer, because he did not actually 
buy the quantity purchased by the given buyer from one or more wholesalers, suppliers, but his 
entire stock. Unfortunately, after the lectures, the Hungarian Academy of Justice was attacked 
so intensely that the lectures held on 10 July 2012 were not continued.69 Perhaps it would have 
been a better solution if representatives of foreign currency debtors had also been invited later 
to ensure that the accusation of one-sidedness can be averted. Of course, it was justified to 
doubt whether an effective dialogue would have developed at such a meeting. 
5. 3. Fear of coordination 
The third problem was the low level of coordination among defendants. At the time when the interest 
groups of foreign currency borrowers appeared and gained ground, there was initially some rivalry 
67 Complete explanation: https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/arfolyamres-atszamitas.pdf ; https://www.mnb.
hu/sajtoszoba/hirek-2015-juniusig/a-magyar-nemzeti-bank-modszertani-iranymutatasa-a-fogyasztoi-
szerzodesek-arfolyamres-semmissege-miatti-atszamitasahoz (15/2/2019)
68 See e.g. the Decision of the Financial Arbitration Board (FAB) of 17 January 2013: “Financial service providers 
manage a comprehensive mass of assets, rather than the loan of each client individually. Loans are not 
refinanced on an individual basis, but at portfolio level, meaning that a specific contract cannot be associated 
with a specific refinancing contract."
69 See, for example, the following websites: http://ahazapartja.hu/?p=1344, http://hitelesmagyar.com/index.
php/forum/12/19621-birokepzo-akademia-a-bankszovetseg-oktatja-a-birakat ; http://komlomedia.hu/10-
belfold/1489-ez-mar-europa-a-bankszovetseg-oktatja-a-birakat
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among them. At the level of the legal representatives of plaintiffs, however, there was coordinated action 
from the outset. As a consequence, the templates for their documents instituting the proceedings 
were supplemented with each other’s arguments for invalidity, and, after each successful case, the 
judgements concerned became known to the others almost immediately. Where the plaintiffs achieved 
even just partial success, the judgement was already referred to at the next hearing of all cases. 
Contrary to the above, coordination and the exchange of information was and remained 
haphazard on the side of defendants. In my opinion, the reason for this is that, during this period, 
the Competition Authority conducted several cartel proceedings against banks and imposed 
fines amounting to billions of HUF even in the most unjustified cases such as the so-called “Bank 
Data” case. Presumably, this was the attitude that deterred the side of defendants from sharing 
with others the decisions passed in their own cases and their legal arguments used in litigation. 
6. Business is business70
I have the impression that lawsuits related to foreign currency loans are now partly driven by the 
interests of the legal representatives monopolising these cases, and not only by the actual needs of 
the debtors in a difficult situation. Nevertheless, they were significantly set back in launching new 
lawsuits by the formalist lower court practice applied in connection with the introduction of the 
new Code of Civil Procedure, and the obligation to pay a fee for rejected claims until November 
2018. However, today there are already standard claims that are accepted by the majority of courts.
At the beginning of litigations related to foreign currency loans, some well-meaning and 
excessively committed lawyers took control of the legal disputes of consumers in a difficult 
financial situation. One of the legendary lawyers in lawsuits related to foreign currency 
loans was György Léhmann, a colleague from Siófok who has since died, who considered the 
representation of foreign currency borrowers a worthy cause, rather than business.71
However, other types of legal counsels and lawyers also soon appeared among representatives, who 
put a lot more emphasis on possible revenue. It goes without saying that a legal representative performs 
his work for remuneration.72 However, work should not be autotelic, it should be useful for the client. 
A notary’s certificate of facts is a good example of useless litigation and the situation where all victories 
in lawsuits (even those partial) trigger further litigation and a mass modification of claims. 
In the case published under No. BDT 2015/3420, the Debrecen Court of Appeal declared 
that “the clause in the consumer contract stipulating that the consumer’s debt is certified by 
an official deed issued by a notary public based on a unilateral statement of the contracting 
70 In this chapter, due to the protection of personality rights, I will not use footnotes for all claims, but that does 
not mean that I could not document examples from my own practice based on official records.
71 See e.g. https://www.sonline.hu/somogy/kozelet-somogy/devizaperek-150-ugyved-vedi-az-allamot-
lehmannt-kihagytak-568397/
72 To be more precise: Unfortunately, this is still not natural for courts. For example, in one of our winning cases, where 
we took part in five hearings and filed seven submissions, the Budapest Municipal Court charged a court cost of HUF 
12,500 + VAT, which is a 25% development compared to the judgement of the Székesfehérvár Municipal Court delivered 
one year earlier. In these cases, the costs of the second instance procedure were similar. Today, this amount of money is 
not enough to repair a dripping tap. Unfortunately, similar examples could be mentioned at all levels of courts.
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party was unfair”.73 However, irrespective of the fact that this clause is declared invalid by 
the court, by operation of law, the bank has the possibility of filing a notary’s certificate 
of facts regarding the debt of the debtor according to its records and thereby ensuring the 
enforceability of the loan or pledge contract included in the official deed.74 Therefore, such a 
judgement only has some marketing value, without any tangible advantage for the debtor. 75
As far as court costs are concerned, it was much more favourable to (partially) win a lawsuit 
initiated due to partial invalidity in a trial for the termination of enforcement than in a declaratory 
trial.76 This is because in such trials it was not possible for the court to apply any other legal 
consequence (e.g. the declaration of validity) than the termination of the enforcement procedure. 
Therefore, the reason for the failure of some foreign currency borrowers to pay their debts was 
not financial incapacity, but, presumably encouraged by their lawyers, the intention to refer to 
the alleged invalidity of a clause of the loan contract after the termination of the contract and 
the commencement of enforcement. This is the way some GTC lawsuits became enforcement 
lawsuits. This possibility was abolished by the legislator only from 1 January 2017 by requiring 
the initiation of a lawsuit according to Section 370/B of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1952.
From 2014, the legal position of the debtors’ representatives suddenly changed due to the 
statutory treatment of the grounds for invalidity guaranteeing the success of the plaintiff 
(see DH Acts). Previously, even the amount of loan specified in the contract was claimed to 
be a general contractual term unilaterally determined by the defendant (bank). Afterwards, 
however, even the conditions of unilateral amendment were seen as provisions individually 
negotiated between the parties because the acceptance thereof by the court would have made 
it possible to exclude the contract from the scope of DH Acts.77
Various client acquisition events were organised to offset the trend of filing lawsuits, which became 
less pronounced after settlement and HUF conversion. Dunaújvárosi Hírlap, for example, reported 
the following on 22 September 2015: “A presentation was held for people in a difficult financial situation 
in the building of Dunaújváros Chamber. The representative of a lifestyle consultancy firm from Bu-
dapest said their company had a large number of lawyers and a great deal of litigation experience 
73 The Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal delivered a similar judgment in cases No. ÍH 2017/132 and BDT 
2017/3629, and then, presumably taking into account Economic Leading Decision 1/2018, developed it further 
in its decision No. BDT 2018/3813. The jurisprudence of Courts of Appeal was not uniform. For example, the 
Győr Court of Appeal passed a contradictory decision; Pf.IV.20.243/2016/5/I., Pf.IV.20.027/2017/4.
74 Subsection 2 of Section 112 and Item g) of Subsection 1 of Section 136 of Act XLI of 1991 on notaries public. 
According to CJEU Decision No. C-32/14, this type of enforceability was not contrary to EU law.
75 Perhaps it would be useful in such cases, taking into account the second sentence of Subsection 1 of Section 3 
of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1952, to declare that the legal dispute was not in the interest of the plaintiff 
because its legal position did not change in the event of winning the lawsuit. Cf. ÍH 2018/57. Decision Head I, 
BDT 2018/138. Decision Head II.
76 For the resulting legal issues, see the Summary Report of the group of the Curia in charge of jurisprudence analysis: 
https://kuria-birosag.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglalo_velemeny_1.pdf downloaded on: 07/04/2019
77 The same purpose was served by reference to the non-existence of contracts or to the withdrawal from 
contracts (or from the statement acknowledging the debt). In this regard, however, lawyers in charge of these 
cases quickly recognised that Section 239/A of the Civil Code of 1959 made it possible to launch an action for a 
declaratory judgment only in the event of referring to invalidity. In the event of reference to the non-existence 
of a contract, the Curia also applied the principle of proper exercise of the right; BH 2018/230.
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in this field. This includes cases in which individuals or companies took bank loans denominated in 
a foreign currency but disbursed and repaid in HUF. Based on what has been said, the problems of 
foreign currency loan contracts are far from being solved. According to the charts presented here by 
the consultancy firm, the legal packages for rescuing foreign currency borrowers result in a reduction 
of the instalment by maximum fifteen per cent, but support from the company’s lawyers may yield a 
reduction of up to fifty-six per cent. Based on the presentation, the keyword is litigation! It is only a 
final court judgement that can declare all or some of the provisions of contracts concluded with banks 
null are void or motivate the bank to consider a contract as non-existing, to remove the mortgage 
from the property, or to terminate an enforcement procedure. … this is the only way that credit or le-
asing transactions can be definitively resolved in the case of existing, closed, terminated or enforced 
contracts. Without litigation, there is no chance whatsoever since the customer is not in a negotiating 
position against the bank, and the bank will not restore the lawful situation without litigation.”78
The acquisition of clients through events with an inflammatory purpose under the age of 
awareness-raising is also taking place in modern media. All you have to do is have a look at 
so-called debt relief videos posted on media sharing websites and read the comments below. 
Inflammatory language also infiltrates claims and other submissions by plaintiffs. It is not 
unprecedented that, as in one of our ongoing cases, the plaintiff, in his amended claim, 
makes references to the fact that, in addition to the abuse of office, the head of the Civil Coll-
ege of the Curia could even have committed the crime of genocide. 
A fresh example of encouraging litigation with inflammatory language was the way victory 
was communicated after the decision of the CJEU in case No. CJEU C-118/17. The representatives 
of foreign currency borrowers inform viewers about their legal interpretations, which I think is 
incorrect, in videos uploaded to YouTube.79 The lawyer, who initiated the preliminary ruling as a 
judge and who now deals with lawsuits related to foreign currency loans today, comments on the 
decision in his statements published in the press that foreign currency debtors are now released 
from currency risk and expresses his hope that this decision will no longer be contradicted by the 
supreme courts,80 reinforcing the false, but maybe for some people lucrative narrative that foreign 
currency borrowers are victims of collusion between courts and banks. 
78 Pages 1 and 6. Available: http://duol.hu/gazdasag/devizahiteleseknek-1727632, lat download: 7/4/2019. The 
presenter’s name is indicated by three dots (…), but it is shown in full in the original article. According to press reports, 
other advisors were also promoting themselves through various presentations: https://24.hu/belfold/2019/03/06/
ep-valasztas-toroczkai-laszlo-mi-hazank-mozgalom-devizahitel-gulya-tibor/ last download: 7/4/2019. The inte-
rest groups dealing with the problems of foreign currency lending also take care of the political representation 
of the issue. The “A Haza Nem Eladó Mozgalom” movement, which has already become a party, led by Árpád 
Kásler, entered the 2014 elections in several districts; http://hir6.hu/cikk/92964/kozel_100_valasztokeruletben_
indul_kasler_arpad_partja In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the candidate of Jobbik was Andrea Damm, 
described by the president of the party as a kind of Jeanne d’Arc for foreign currency borrowers; https://mandiner.
hu/cikk/20141216_devizahiteles_ugyvedet_indit_a_jobbik_veszpremben last download: 7/4/2019.
79 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpp4S3eZFiM&t=10s and https://www.youtube.com
 watch?v=ohfY693Utwg&t=92s Excessive pleasure seems to be inappropriate in the same way as earlier in case 
C-51/17, because the CJEU reiterated a principle that had been recognised for decades, stating that a national 
law conflicting with EU law should not be applied by courts; e.g. case 106/77, the Simmenthal case. However, 
such improper application of law had not been prevailing practice even before that. See also: https://kuria-
birosag.hu/hu/sajto/kuria-kozlemenye-az-europai-unio-birosaganak-dunai-ugyben-hozott-hatarozatarol.
80 E.g. interview in Klub Radio https://www.klubradio.hu/archivum/reggeli-gyors-201912-heti-adas-2338, 
from 66:50
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This was not the first time the internet was used by lawyers dealing with foreign currency 
lending. For example, a representative calling himself “Dr. Kevin” tried to stand out from 
the crowd by publishing judgements with comments like “Kevin the Emperor humiliates the 
bank” on his website, which is unavailable at the time of writing this article.81
However, the business opportunity in cases related to foreign currency lending was not 
only recognised by some colleagues specialised in the legal representation of debtors. In 2014, 
presumption rebuttal lawsuits with the Hungarian State as the defendant also entrusted law 
firms with its representation at the market price.82 In each lawsuit, the legal argumentation put 
forward by the lawyers of the defendants was almost literally the same, and presumably centrally 
compiled, but this did not prevent them from claiming court costs amounting to millions of HUF 
in each case. However, the courts did not find the claim for court costs reasonable in any of the 
cases, and only a fraction of the costs claimed was awarded.83 Of course, this does not necessarily 
mean that state lawyers did not get the full amount of the charged fee from their client.84
In these cases, the Hungarian State also tried to maximise its revenue when it consistently 
imposed the obligation to pay the highest amount at all procedural levels for lawsuits for 
which no subject matter value is otherwise determined.85 However, even this revenue was 
insufficient to cover the amount of HUF 2 billion 360 million allocated to state lawyers.
Incidentally, the highest hourly fee in presumption rebuttal lawsuits also appears in the 
legal representation of debtors. One of the lawyers charges half of this amount only for each 
started page of his submissions, but, in one case, he put forward a submission with 70 pages 
(HUF 25,400 * 70 = HUF 1,778,000).86
7. Outlook
At the beginning of litigations related to foreign currency loans, I naively assumed that the 
legal issues arising in the lawsuits would be definitively clarified in about two years and, 
from then on, the outcome of lawsuits would be more or less predictable, or maybe only the 
questions of evidence would be different. 
81 Web address: www.drkevin.hu See also https://hirtv.hu/panaszkonyv_adattar/alarcos-ugyved-1405488.
82 CHSH Dezső & Partners, Kovács, Barborják & Partners, Dr. Rátky & Partner, Réti, Antall & Partner and 
SBKG Law Firm took care of legal representation in lawsuits, while Jurasits Law Firm performed coordination 
tasks. https://hvg.hu/hetilap.hetnapgazdasag/201434_beindult_devizaperek; https://www.napi.hu/ma-
gyar_vallalatok/ki_nem_talalna_mennyit_kolt_a_devizaperes_ugyvedekre_az_allam.585948.html; 
about conflict of interest in the case of some firms: https://magyarnemzet.hu/archivum/belfold-archivum/
osszeferhetetlen-ugyvedek-4007443/ and https://magyarnemzet.hu/archivum/vezercikk/devizahiteles-
perek-ugyvedei-4006150/ last download: 07/04/2019
83 See e.g. https://magyarnemzet.hu/archivum/vezercikk/devizahiteles-perek-ugyvedei-4006150/ last 
download: 7/4/2019.
84 There was a trial where five “state lawyers” were sitting in front of me. It cannot be ruled out that the hourly 
account attached to their invoice contained the period of preparation and attendance at the hearing for all five 
of them.
85 Subsection 1 of Section 8 of the Subsection 2 of Section 13, Subsection 2 of Section 15 of the DH1 Act
86 In addition to the fee payable for the number of pages of the written text, he also charges an hourly fee of 
25,400 HUF as litigation cost, as well as an additional success fee amounting to 10% of the subject matter 
value.
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Taking into account the legal and tactical turning points in the history of lawsuits, I would 
no longer dare to predict when foreign currency loan litigation would come to an end and 
when there would be no more legal disputes. Perhaps it is only possible to make a list of 
conditions under which there is some hope for solving the problem. 
The first and most important condition is that the financial and thus the housing situation 
of debtors in a difficult, often hopeless, position should be improved. In the current labour 
market situation, this does not seem to be impossible, but even so it could hardly be realised 
without active state participation, such as a tenancy program, or even the fundamental 
revision of the rules for private bankruptcy.87
If the first condition is met, the willingness to initiate lawsuits may diminish by itself, 
but it must also be ensured that the “industry” settled on foreign currency debtors is not 
excessively motivated to persuade those concerned to launch more and more (partial 
invalidity) procedures.88 This can be supported by defendants formulating their legal 
arguments in as plain language as possible and in a compact form. The role of the courts 
may be to use a rapid decision-making process through a strict trial schedule. Thus, for 
example, they may evaluate plaintiffs’ legal arguments that are already known and have 
been rejected several times quickly and decisively, already at first instance, or even at the first 
hearing,89 and apply the method of annulment at second instance only to a limited extent. 
Furthermore, the chambers of lawyers have to take action against those members who do 
not provide their clients the required information on the chances of winning, the impact of 
winning on payment obligation, and the financial risk they face if the lawsuit is lost.90
Although I have criticised the legislator several times before, I must admit it was the 
correct decision to reflect on the judicial practice then already routinely applied to unilateral 
amendment right and exchange rate spread in a legislative, general-normative form. The 
future role of the legislator may be to respond quickly to similar situations and not to delay 
corrective action for years, as was done in connection with the legal consequences of the 
lack of mandatory content elements in consumer loan contracts or the clarification of the 
relationship between declaratory and enforcement proceedings.
87 Act CV of 2015 on debt settlement for private individuals
88 I am unfortunately pessimistic in this regard. On the one hand, foreign case law shows that unfair clauses in 
general terms of contract prove to be an inexhaustible source, and there will always be one or two elements in a 
contract or in the terms and conditions of banks that qualify as invalid. On the other hand, the existing clientele 
can be easily mobilised if there is a new “hit”. For example, the German case law presented in section 4.3 did not 
lead to mass litigation. Due to the antecedent, a similar decision would result in a flood of lawsuits in Hungary.
89 My experience was that even the least well-founded claims were accepted under the Code of Civil Procedure 
of 1952, and several hearings were typically held to find out the exact subject matter of the claim only. The 
opposite can often be observed during the New Code on Civil Procedure. Now it is not the difficulties of 
interpretation arising from the complicated structure and infinite length of the claims that prolong each 
lawsuit, but, quite the contrary, the fact that the party who acts personally, probably due to the simple 
acceptance procedure, initiates the lawsuit with minimum content based on Section 247, of the Act on Civil 
Procedure, and the legal representative presenting the usual argumentation appears only later. As a logical 
consequence, the defendant is unable to submit an adequate counter-petition for the claim.
90 Perhaps it is natural to require that this information should be at least as detailed as it is expected by the legal 
representatives concerned in the case of declarations of risks by banks.
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1. Introduction 
A defining moment – equally for borrowers, lenders, regulators and supervisory authorities – in the 
history of retail mortgage lending, after the regime change in Hungary, was the period of foreign 
currency lending2. These types of transactions were typical of the Hungarian retail mortgage market 
between 2004 and 2010. During these years, a portfolio of significant size had been built in Hunga-
ry. The excelling size of retail foreign currency loan portfolio has been addressed extensively, even in 
economic literature: “At the end of the first half of 2010, the debt of Hungarian households totalled nearly 
HUF 10,600 billion3 (equalling 40 per cent of the GDP). Within this, foreign currency debts amounted to 
approximately HUF 7,300 billion  4(28 per cent of the GDP), which totals two-thirds of the total portfolio... 
Foreign currency loans achieved this high share in the portfolio in the second half of 2008, since then their 
share has been substantially stagnating and slightly decreased. More than 90 per cent of foreign currency 
loans are debts denominated in Swiss francs while 7 per cent is denominated in Euro.”5
These phenomena undoubtedly had and have national features – in particular those involving 
crisis management tools –, however, it should be noted that foreign currency lending was not 
exclusively a Hungarian speciality: "…During 2011, the share of foreign currency loans within the 
retail loan portfolio in the different countries was the following. 90 per cent in Lithuania, 80 per cent 
in Serbia, 60 to 70 per cent in Latvia, Romania, Croatia and Hungary, 40 per cent in Bulgaria and 
Poland, 30 per cent in Austria, and interestingly or perhaps not interesting, nearly zero in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. This was the share of foreign currency loans within the retail loan portfolio 
in 2011, in Central Eastern Europe. Within this share of foreign currency loans, the share of Swiss 
franc loans was strikingly high in Poland, when compared to Austria and Hungary.”6
This seven-year period of the Hungarian lending history, that provides lessons even today, has 
already been analysed in several professional approaches and in a demanding manner. This study 
envisages tracing back the events – in specifically legal aspects – from their outset in 2004 until 2010. 
Our analysis focuses on the contracting practice and legal interpretations surrounding the then 
legislative environment, as well as the then trends, to find legislative and official solutions, by trying to 
form based on this a notion of the key features of the legal way of thinking characteristic of this period. 
The key driving force of this effort is the experience that the development of law – both in 
the area of legislation and of the application of law – during the time that has passed since 
the shock caused by the foreign currency credit crisis and the time of borrowing, unwittingly 
distorts the opinion of the present day about the conditions of that time. The period chosen 
2 The study uses the expression “ foreign currency lending” basically to define retail foreign mortgage lending, 
and by following the everyday language, it does not make a distinction between the terms “loan” and “credit”.
3 This is equal to ca. 33 bn EUR.
4 This is equal to ca. 23.74 bn EUR.
5 Tamás BALÁS – Márton NAGY: A devizahitelek átváltása forinthitelekre. (Conversion of foreign currency 
loans to forint loans) Hitelintézeti Szemle, 2010. Vol. 5. 416.
6 See: András Simor’s oral information. In: Minutes of the meeting of the Sub-committee of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Justice and Procedures investigating to identify the causes of retail 
foreign currency indebtedness between 2002 and 2010 and to establish the possible responsibility of the 
government held on 3 November 2011, page 13. Available on the internet: https://www.parlament.hu/biz39/
bizjkv39/AIB/A412/1111031.pdf
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to be subject matter of the research entails also that the intended consequence of this study 
does not wish to describe the legal instruments applied during crisis management in order 
to manage the social level insolvency nor the extensive experience of lawsuits characteristic 
of the crisis. Separate studies in the volume are dealing with all these.
It is important to emphasize that the foreign currency loan crisis on the borrowers’ side 
has, in many cases, experienced a trauma endangering even livelihood, while at the lenders’ 
side, for the banker generation concerned, it brought about the traumatic experience of 
a crisis thus far unknown in size and loss. All these inevitably create for each concerned 
party their respective truth – influenced by the involuntary self-certification of their roles. 
Examining the legal aspect does not even require establishing the truth, it is only intended 
for sophisticated opinion by formulating a tone. 
2. Legal principles 
There had been no example for foreign currency lending within the scope of retail mortgage 
lending either during the socialist era of exchange controls or in pre-WWII lending practice. 
Despite this, the legal basis of foreign currency lending – i.e. in a currency other than the 
domestic legal tender – was clear and confident in dogmatic terms. 
Correct establishment of the legal basis of foreign currency loan agreements rests on two pillars: 
a)  On the legal rules of loan agreement 
During	 the	entire	 term	of	 the	period	examined,	Act	 IV	§	523	of	1959	on	 the	Civil	Code	
(hereinafter: 1959 Civil Code), effective with unchanged content, provided for the 
content of the loan agreement. This set out that contracting parties mutually undertake 
a payment obligation vis-à-vis where it is the lender’s obligation to disburse a loan, 
while the debtor’s obligation is to repay that amount, i.e. the principal and accrued inte-
rest, as well as any other fees and charges associated with the loan. With respect to the 
debtor’s payment obligation, the unconditional character of repayment obligation is a 
fundamental rule. The underlying reason for this is that the lender itself had already met 
their obligation, i.e. had disbursed the loan to the debtor and the borrowed money must 
be paid back, thus, based on Paragraph (1) of Section 301 of the 1959 Civil Code, the 
debtor is obliged to pay default interest even if he excuses his delay. 
 These regulatory principles became of key significance within the scope of foreign 
currency lending, as under the pressure of mass payment difficulties the question 
arose at society level why only debtors must run the risk of changes during the term. 
Approaching this dilemma from the legislation, the answer is clear: “Risks associated 
with a loan are always borne by the debtor in legal terms: the deterioration of his living 
condition, reduction of his income, increase of the costs of living, increase of market in-
terest level, etc. are all changes, which although make it difficult to meet his contractual 
obligations, do not discharge thereof.”7
7 István GÁRDOS – András NAGY: A devizahitel jogi alapkérdései. (Basic legal questions of foreign currency 
loan) Hitelintézeti Szemle, vol. 2013/5. 376.
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b)  On the rules of repaying a cash debt 
 Section 231 of the 1959 Civil Code – which had not changed during the period under 
examination either – set out an additional provision of key significance with respect to 
foreign currency loans. According to this 
•	 a	cash	debt	shall,	unless	otherwise	agreed	by	the	parties,	be	repaid	in	the	legal	tender	
of the place of performance, furthermore 
•	 a	debt	specified	in	a	different	currency	–	i.e.:	not	in	the	domestic	legal	tender	but	in	a	
foreign currency – shall be converted on the basis of the exchange rate prevailing at 
the place and time of payment. 
This regulation specifies essentially the difference between the denominated currency and 
the paid currency which is a special and important feature of cash debt. “If money was always 
made from the same material everywhere, the sum of a cash debt could be established as ‘two 
kilograms of money’. If money was always made from the same material everywhere and in a 
uniform size and with the same inscription, i.e. in technically homogeneous individual items, a 
cash debt could be specified also as: ‘100 pieces of money’. However, as none of these assumptions 
hold, and this was not the case in the past and will not be in the future either, a cash debt or its 
sum cannot be specified differently as giving the amount in any of the type of goods, the equivalent 
of which will be the amount payable (generalissimum). This type of good whose value is equal to 
the amount to be paid by the debtor may be a specific currency, e.g. 100 dollars, or may be (which 
is the most common case) a given amount of the currency in which, expectedly and according to 
the normal course of economic life, repayment will occur (e.g. 570 pengő), eventually it can be any 
other type of good, gold, grain, etc. (e.g. debtor owes the counter value of 30 q wheat).” 8
By means of the above definition, we may draw two conclusions with respect to the 
Hungarian legislation: 
- in the loan agreement parties could validly specify the cash debt not only in forints 
but also in any other foreign currency (the currency in which payment obligations 
are to be met = denominated currency);
- debts specified in foreign debts – unless otherwise instructed by parties – must be 
repaid in Hungary in forints, converted at the exchange rate valid at the time of 
repayment (the currency in which the payments are actually made = paid currency). 
Fundamental proposition of this regulation is that parties are free to specify both the 
denominated currency and the paid currency. From this, specifying the currency of the debt, 
i.e. the denominated currency is a mandatory element of such an agreement, while parties 
are not obliged to provide for the paid currency. If they fail to provide for that, the debt must 
be repaid in accordance with the legislation (but certainly, there is no obstacle to specify in 
the loan agreement forint as the paid currency, but in the absence of this the legal effect is the 
same). If parties specify the paid currency as a foreign currency other than the Hungarian 
legal tender – be it with respect to the disbursement, repayment or both – that would also be 
a valid disposition (called an enforcement clause effective in a foreign currency).
8 Viktor BÁTOR: Pénztartozás. Kamat. (Cash debt. Interest.) In: Károly SZLADITS (ed.): Magyar Magánjog. 
Vol. III. Budapest, 1941. 242.
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In the history of Hungarian foreign currency lending – obviously in close connection with 
unprecedented legal thinking that evolved in the absence of legal practice – a special and 
inconsistent use of terminology had evolved. At the level of practice, this meant primarily the use 
of the terms “foreign currency based loans” and the “purely foreign currency loans”. By the end 
of 2010, but much more in the period following our examination, i.e. after 2010, this terminology 
popped up also in legislation in the form of “foreign currency based loans” and “loan recorded 
in foreign currency or loan granted in foreign currency and repaid in forints”9, as well as “foreign 
currency credit” or “foreign currency loan not qualifying as foreign currency based loan”.10 
These definitions are considered foreign currency based loan (which, based on the 
frequency of its occurrence, represented the main category) where the payment obligation 
of both parties are specified in a foreign currency (denominated) – primarily in Swiss francs 
or euro – but debts must be typically repaid (paid off) both in the case of disbursement and 
repayment in forints. By contrast, in the case of the use of terminology for a foreign currency 
loan, not only denominated currency is a currency other than forint, but disbursement and/
or repayment must be effectively made also in this currency. 
The main flaws of these definitions are identified as follows: 
(i) instead of specifying the debt they only provide for its recording by the lender, and 
(ii) use the currency for meeting the lender’s disbursement or the debtor’s repayment (paying 
off) obligation as an essential element. 
Indeed, it is irrelevant to the classification of the legal relationship that one of the parties 
records a debt or in which currency the parties are obliged to repay their debts. As regards 
the foreign currency loan as a special type of loan agreement, exclusively denominated 
currency, i.e. the currency in which the parties specified the cash debt in the concluded loan 
agreement, is of legal significance. If the loan amount is determined in a currency other 
than the forint, which can be clearly identified from the contract, the foreign currency legal 
relationship has been validly established regardless of how the parties record the cash debt, 
and in which currency – possibly in a different currency – parties are required to repay their 
thus determined debt. 
After October 2008, i.e. the outbreak of the crisis, several legal disputes arose in connection 
with foreign currency loan agreements leading progressively to mass litigation. However, 
in the period examined, the lawfulness of the legislative framework and the contractual 
practice developed based on this was not questioned regarding the fundamental issue of 
foreign currency lending. As regards the fundamental issue, however, we should have a brief 
9 See: Paragraph (4) of Section 261 of Ptk 195 effective between 14 August 2010 and 31 December 2010, Section 
200/A of the old Hpt effective as of 27 November 2010, and Item 1. of Paragraph (1) of Section 1 of the Act 
LXXV of 2011 and Paragraph (4) of Section 13 of the Act XL of 2014, respectively.
10 Paragraph (2) of Section 13 of the Act XL of 2014, Item d. of Paragraph (1) of Section 2 of the Act LXXV of 
2011
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look also at the period after 2010, because as the crisis deepened and the interest conflicts 
erupted, the lawfulness and validity of even the contract type became disputed.11
The order of magnitude of a society level problem is well indicated by the fact that finally 
at the end of 2013, the Civil Department of the Curia had to pass a decision as uniformity 
panel,12 inter alia on the following matters: 
a) What is the content of foreign currency based loans (a foreign currency based loan is 
a foreign currency loan or a forint loan)? 
b) Are contracts concluded based on the construction of foreign currency based loans 
valid or invalid contracts (i.e. do they infringe legislation, are they manifestly in breach 
of accepted principles of good ethics, are they unfair contracts, are they usurious 
contracts, or do they feature defective intention, meaning are they misrepresented 
contracts, or contracts concluded as a consequence of deception or mistake? 
The answers formulated by the Curia in its uniformity decision were already evident for 
most of the legal practitioners, but disappointing for those involved as debtors. Namely, the 
Curia made it clear that the foreign currency based loan agreement in itself, due to the fact 
that the debtor must run the exchange rate risk as the consideration for the more favourable 
interest rate, is not in breach of law nor is manifestly in breach of accepted principles of 
good practice, is not a usurious contract, is not aimed at impossible service and is also 
not a misrepresented contract. Thus, it was not the Curia who disputed the validity of the 
contractual basic construction. 
3. Problem definition 
3. 1. The perception of foreign currency lending 
An important question in the history of foreign currency lending is: what actually was the 
problem? At the level of common experience two totally opposing but clear answers can be given: 
(i) there was no problem with foreign currency lending during the period between 2004 and 
2008. In fact, in the period after the accession to the European Union13 full of hope, it meant 
11 An example for this is inter alia Péter Róna’s presentation at a conference on 1 February 2013: “Foreign 
currency loan is not a loan, because the loan means lending a specified amount which the debtor must repay 
with specified conditions. On the contrary, in the case of foreign currency loans we do not know the amount to 
be repaid because this amount is calculated on the basis of a foreign exchange rate. For this reason, the borrower 
does not know the extent of the obligation he has undertaken, neither for the entire term nor meanwhile during 
the repayment of the loan.” See: https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130201_Rona_Peter_A_devizahitelezes_miatt_
az_all - time of last downloading: 09 October 2018
 or the interview given by Viktor Orbán prime minister in Kossuth Radio on 5 July 2013: “A fundamental legal 
question is, for which as a national I’m also expecting an answer, whether foreign currency loans are defective 
products.” https://www.penzcentrum.hu/hitel/orban-hibas-termek-e-a-devizahitel.1036995.html - time of 
last downloading: 09 October 2018
12 Uniformity decision No. 6/2013 of the Curia of 6 December 2013 of certain questions of principle that arose 
in the legal proceedings related to foreign currency based loan agreements
13 The Accession Treaty was promulgated in Hungary with Act XXX of 2004, which entered into force on 1 May 
2004.
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a “smart solution” by means of which housing and consumption could be increased – with 
low interest rates – in the wider population which brought the hope of welfare within reach. 
Additionally, lenders were absolutely satisfied, as both the rate of portfolio increased and the 
profit content of the foreign currency lending ensured all-important growth for them. 
(ii) In the period between 2008 and 2010, foreign currency lending had become a synonym 
for the loan operation representing societal trauma and causing severe crisis. The 
unexpected exchange rate increase and its sustained continuation that started in October 
2008, as well as the massive,14 and in many cases, unbearable retail debt increase resulting 
from it provided a scapegoat for banks offering foreign currency based loans in the wider 
population. Besides this, the banking system has thus far suffered unimaginable losses, 
and by 2010 the situation even threatened financial stability.15
Approaching the issue from a professional point of view, it is evident that quite a diverse and 
complex answer can be given, affecting a number of branches, which has already been revealed 
in a diverse manner by studies elaborated so far. We are in a difficult situation even if looking for 
an answer to the question as a legal professional, because in legal disputes associated with foreign 
currency lending the partial or full invalidity of such contracts has been raised in multiple aspects. 
The “foreign currency lawsuits” that presented in high number and diverse reasons for invalidity, 
the uniformity decisions surrounding these lawsuits and besides these, the legislature’s number 
of measures to amend acts all indicate that several legal problems could be identified here. 
In my view, however, in examining the legal features of this type of contract there is a single 
underlying problem: exchange rate risk! This kind of risk is an inseparable element of this contract 
type, which fundamentally distinguishes it from other loan operations. The increase of indebtedness 
based on the exchange rate risk and the social dimensions thereof is the fundamental reason for, 
and at the same time, the explanation to the Hungarian credit crisis. And although during the 
period of the crisis a number of other legal issues emerged in connection with the foreign exchange 
lending – most importantly the unfairness of unilateral contract amendment –, these otherwise 
important issues, however, cannot be identified as the features of foreign exchange loans.16
The exchange rate risk, as a relevant element of foreign currency lending, should be 
examined in detail from two aspects: 
➢ the legal nature of exchange rate risk, and 
➢ from the point of view of the lender’s obligation to provide information on the 
 exchange rate risk. 
14 BALÁS – NAGY: opus cit 422. “Currently millions of people have a foreign currency loan, out of which 
approximately 1 million have mortgage loans.”
15 BALÁS – NAGY: opus cit 416. “From 2004, the extremely dynamic retail foreign currency lending tightened the 
efficiency of monetary policy, while the high ratio of foreign exchange portfolio that had been built up to that 
time has become the source of financial stability risks.”
16 The issue of differing exchange rates (so called spread) emerged as a special legal issue that can be linked with 
foreign currency loans. This however had insignificant importance in the development of the crisis and the injury 
to the interests caused, thus it cannot be deemed as an essential problem. The debate was closed with Section 3 of 
the uniformity decision No. 2/2014 of the Civil Department of the Curia, according to which: “The application of 
a different exchange for the purposes of repayment of the loan (selling rate) to that used for the advancement of the 
loan (buying rate) is unfair because the financial institution does not provide any service directly for the consumer, 
therefore it is an unjustified cost for the consumer. These clauses are furthermore unfair because the economic reasons 
for their application are not clear, not intelligible and not transparent for the consumer.”
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3. 2. The legal nature of exchange rate risk 
3.1.2. Antecedents 
As a preliminary point, in order to recall the way of thinking typical of the period, the 
reasons that could explain undertaking such a new risk – which was essentially unknown 
for a wide range of borrowers – at the debtors’ side17 should be examined. It is important, 
however, to point out that a legal examination cannot give a full answer to the reasons of the 
emergence of risk appetite, it only can identify aspects fed into it. 
An important circumstance for the debtors could have been – which can also be identified 
through legal regulation – the defining experience of borrowing in the period directly preceding 
the foreign exchange lending, i.e. forint-based housing lending with state interest subsidy. The 
2000 to 2003 period of this programme represented such a “golden era”, where the eligibility 
criteria for the subsidy allowed wider participation of households. In these years, due to the 
level of state subsidy, forint mortgage loans were available for all housing purposes – even for 
the purchase of occupied housing for investment purposes – with low interest rates. This prog-
ram, which included two types of state interest rate subsidy18, has significantly increased retail 
borrowing and made the prospect of growth a reality for many. The government decision that 
brought about the material reduction of subsidies at the end of 200319, which introduced a 
significant tightening both with respect to subsidised loan purposes and the level of subsidy, put 
an end to this process. However, the desire to take on low interest loans certainly did not vanish. 
Another important circumstance, which can also be identified through analysing legislation, 
was the liberalization of foreign exchange administration, which occurred just two years 
before the actual commencement of foreign currency lending.20 This move, as a symbol of 
17 There is no doubt that the motivations of the supply side, i.e. lenders, was at least as important in the foreign 
exchange lending coming to this dimension. We are, however, not addressing this aspect in this study, as that 
is fundamentally not reasons of legal nature.
18 The two types of State aid were, on the one hand, the mortgage bonds interest subsidy introduced with the amendment of 
Council of Ministers Decree No. 106/1988 (XII. 26.) on housing aid, which entered into force on 1 February 2000; and on 
the other hand the supplementary interest subsidy. The interest rate subsidy linked to mortgage bonds could be provided 
by the credit institutions issuing mortgage bonds, while the supplementary interest subsidy could be provided by any 
credit institutions to the borrowing debtors. The gradual extension of the supplementary interest subsidy was realised 
through Government Decree No. 12/2001. (I. 31.), in force as of 12 February 2001 and as amended from time to time.
19 Government Decree 221/2003. (XII. 12.) on the amendment of Decree No 12/2001 on State Aid for Housing 
entered into force on 22 December 2003.
20 Item n) of Paragraph (1) of Section 6 of the Act XCIII of 2001 on the Abolition of Foreign Exchange Restrictions 
and on the Amendment of Certain Related Acts repealed Paragraph (3) of Section 231 of the 1959 Civil Code. 
According to the repealed rule of 1959 Civil Code: “The legal regulations on foreign exchange shall determine 
the cases in which it is actually permitted to stipulate or make payment in foreign currency or gold.” As a result 
of this amendment – after a long time –, debt could be lawfully denominated in foreign currency.
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rapprochement with the European Union21, has brought about an actual change in everyday 
life, which has created a promising yet unknown opportunity for all actors in the economy.22
The third reason to be mentioned is the initially realistic promise of the introduction of the 
euro, although it did not take a legal form, but was clearly present in public thinking. According 
to the unanimous statements of the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and Central Bank 
Governor prior to the actual commencement of foreign currency lending in 2004: 
“16 July 2003 – Hungary wishes to introduce the euro as of 1 January 2008 – Péter Medgyessy, 
Prime Minister, said on Wednesday. In order to achieve this goal, the Government would pursue 
a rigorous economic policy, with which the Governor of the Central Bank also agrees. The 
Prime Minister emphasised that the introduction of the euro is a national matter. As a single 
currency, the Hungarian euro will embody the economic results of Europe, its introduction 
will result in new jobs, low inflation, economic growth, it assumes the elimination of exchange 
costs and an increase in investments. According to Csaba László, Minister of Finance, the 
introduction of the euro will result in a massive cost reduction for companies and an expected 
increase in investment. By 15 August this year, the Government will submit the final pre-
accession program to the EU, the so-called PEP, and by the end of September it will present 
the budget bill to Parliament. Hungary intends to join the ERM II exchange rate regime of the 
European Union as soon as possible in May 2004. Zsigmond Járai, President of the National 
Bank of Hungary, said that the central bank supports the introduction of the euro on 1 January 
2008 and agrees that a rigorous economic policy should be pursued to achieve this goal.”23
From this apparently solid starting point, by the middle of the period the promise of the 
introduction of the euro had become uncertain, but we still could count on it as a reality: “21 
September 2005 − it is feasible to introduce the euro in 2010 − said János Veres as a response 
to the announcement of Zsigmond Járai Central Bank Governor on the day before, stating that 
introduction of the euro in 2010 was impossible.”24
However, by mid-2008 it became clear that the introduction of the euro would not be a 
reality in the foreseeable future: “Both the Government and the central bank renounced to 
set the date for the introduction of the euro this year. It is expected that the announcement of 
Hungary's target date for the introduction of the euro will be delayed to early 2009”.25
21 According to the preamble of Act XCIII of 2001: “As a consequence of the establishment of the market economy, 
completing the convertibility of the forint, the Parliament, in order to prepare for the accession to the European Union, 
establishes a law on the abolition of foreign exchange restrictions and on the promotion of the free movement of capital.”
22 “The fact that the Hungarian population was particularly insensitive to this risk is partly due also to the fact 
that in past decades it did not even have the possibility to learn or discuss or experience exchange rate risk 
in a country with exchange controls.” See: Oral information of Zsigmond Járai In: Minutes of the meeting 
of the Sub-committee of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Justice and Procedures 
investigating to identify the causes of retail foreign currency indebtedness between 2002 and 2010 and to 
establish the possible responsibility of the government held on 3 November 2011, page 18. Available on the 
internet: https://www.parlament.hu/biz39/bizjkv39/AIB/A412/1111031.pdf
23   https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/00000000004C9BA8  - time of last downloading: 07 October 2018
24 http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/hirek/hazaihirek/20050921veres.html  - time of last downloading: 07 October 2018
25 http://www.kisalfold.hu/belfold_hirek/elkepzeles_sincs_az_euro_bevezeteserol/2062028/  - time of last 
downloading: 07 October 2018
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3.2.2. Determining exchange rate risk 
As explained above, the essential feature of a foreign currency loan is that the parties do not 
specify the cash debt in the legal tender of the place where the contract is concluded, but in a 
different currency. In Hungarian modern foreign currency lending, predominantly Swiss franc, 
and to a lesser degree euro and Japanese yen were used as the so-called denominated currency. 
The contractual practice showed a difference in what the parties chose for the paid currency – 
which does not significantly affect the foreign currency loan nature of the contract. According 
to generally accepted contractual practice, the paid currency was the forint for both parties 
(foreign currency based loan). Thus, the lender also fulfilled (disbursed) its obligation in forint 
and the debtor also repaid it in forint. However, as a rarer solution, we could also encounter 
a practice where the parties applied an enforcement clause effective in a foreign currency 
(foreign currency loan) for the debt settlement, i.e. they specified as paid currency not the fo-
rint but the same currency as the denominated currency. In both cases, however, it can be 
stated that if the borrower's income (eg salary) was generated in forint – which was obviously 
the situation in most cases – despite the contractual difference in the denominated and paid 
currencies, the exchange rate risk was borne by borrowers to the same extent. 
In the case of foreign currency based loans, the forint amount required for foreign 
currency repayment was transferred by the debtor to the bank. However, the debtor of the 
foreign currency loan converted the forint amount required for – and equivalent to the 
– foreign currency repayment to the currency specified for the repayment and paid this 
foreign currency amount to the creditor as repayment. The direction and extent of exchange 
rate changes from time to time are objective circumstances which are independent of both 
parties involved in the loan agreement. The current exchange rate at each moment of the 
maturity shows the value of the paid currency in the denominated currency. 
It is also important to emphasise, in relation to exchange rate risk, that it is not a condition 
of the foreign currency loan that the parties may define in the loan agreement. Thus, it is not 
part of the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) expressing the ratio of the total costs of the loan 
to the total loan amount. This essential feature of exchange rate risk was first defined by the 
legislature in the so-called APR decree26 effective from 1 February 2005. 
In practice as a general rule, in the case of foreign currency lending, both parties, i.e. the 
creditor bank and the borrowing debtor, were required to meet their respective payment 
obligations in forint, so they bore the exchange rate risk – to a significantly different degree 
but in theory in the same way. For both parties, this risk-taking was not based on a separate 
contractual clause in respect of their own debt, but was an obligatory result of determining 
the currency of the debt. 
26 According to Paragraph (1) of Section 13 in effect between 1 January 2005 and 11 June 2010 of Government 
Decree 41/1997. (III. 5.) on the calculation and publication of the index on deposit interests, yield of securities 
and annual percentage rate: “The Terms and Conditions, Public Disclosure, and Offering posted by the Finan-
cial Institution in its business premises shall include prominently the APR, with the addition that: a) the APR is 
determined by taking into account current conditions and current legislation and may change in the event of a 
change in the conditions, b) the value of the APR does not reflect the exchange rate risk of the loan; c) the value 
of the APR does not reflect the interest rate risk of the loan.”
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3.2.3. The debtor’s exchange rate risk 
The content of this risk is that the effect of the exchange rate fluctuation between the 
disbursement of the loan and its repayment in instalments over a typically long term is 
exclusively at the debtor's expense/benefit. The weight of this risk for the debtor is that 
the direction and extent of the exchange rate is unpredictable, thus inevitably creating a 
speculative situation, and in addition, this uncertainty persists throughout the entire term. 
According to the approach regularly formulated regarding the debtor's exchange rate risk – 
still present in Hungarian judicial practice27 – the creditor transferred the exchange rate risk to 
the debtor (imposed on the debtor) by means of the contractual terms applied by it. In my view, 
however, according to the correct interpretation it is not the creditor bank who transfers the 
exchange rate risk of the repayment to the debtor, since this risk has not even arose for it, but in 
the case of this type of credit transaction this risk is conceptually always borne by the debtor. 
“Foreign currency debt necessarily entails exchange rate risk, i.e. the uncertainty about the amount 
of domestic currency required to settle foreign currency debt at the time of settlement (irrespective 
of whether the debt is paid in forint or in any foreign currency). The debtor of a foreign currency 
debt, unless his position is hedged in some way, inevitably exposes himself to this risk, due to the 
nature of the transaction. It is irrelevant from the point of view of the debtor's obligation or the 
legality of the transaction whether he has correctly or mistakenly predicted the future development 
of the exchange rate, and made overall a good choice or lost by opting for the currency of the debt”.28
Examining the contractual practice of foreign currency lending by Hungarian banks 
typical for the period covered by this study, it can be clearly established that there was no 
clause on transferring the credit risk of the loan repayment to the debtor. So there were no 
clauses in the model contract we reviewed29, thus there was no clause which would have read 
as follows: “The Parties agree that the exchange rate risk arising from the repayment of the 
foreign currency loan will be borne by the Debtor instead of the Lender.” Such a clause would 
obviously have been pointless and unnecessary, so it was not applied. 
However, the question arises as to how the regulation regarding the debtor's exposure to 
this very important risk can then be caught in foreign currency loan contracts. The presence 
of this risk in contracts can only be shown indirectly from the following two aspects: 
•	 in	determining	the	denominated	currency	of	the	debt	in	foreign	currency	and
•	 among	the	rules	on	repayment	obligations.	
27 Question 2 (fragment) of the decision No. 20030/2018/6 of the Buda Central District Court dated March 21, 
2018, initiating the European Court of Justice's preliminary ruling procedure: "Is it possible to consider fair, 
i.e. clear and understandable, in terms of economic consequences, the contractual term imposing the exchange 
risk on the consumer drafted on the basis of a statutory obligation to provide information that is necessarily 
formulated in general terms (as a general contract term applied by another professional contractor and not 
agreed upon individually) that does not explicitly include a notice that the exchange rate has no upper limit in 
the loan agreement …” - http://hitelsikerek.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/11.-EDE.pdf - last downloaded: 
12 October 2018
28 GÁRDOS –NAGY: opus cit 377.
29 The contractual practice was analysed on the basis of the model contracts made available by CIB Bank Zrt., 
Erste Bank Hungary Zrt., K&H Bank Zrt., Raiffeisen Bank Zrt., Takarék Kereskedelmi Bank Zrt. (formerly 
known as FHB Bank Zrt.) as well as UniCredit Bank Zrt. In the case of provisions quoted literally from the 
model contracts, the name of the bank applying it is not indicated on their request. 
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Typical examples of contractual clauses using foreign currency as denominated currency 
are the following: 
 a)  In the case of a foreign exchange based loan 
The Bank provides to the Debtor(s) a loan of ………………… CHF, i.e. …………………… 
Swiss franc for secure financing of the Debtors, taking into account the Debtor(s)’ request that 
for the purpose set out in Section I.2 of this contract, the Bank shall meet the financing needs 
for …………………… .forint, i.e. …………………. forint explicitly through CHF settlement.”
-~-~-~-~
“The Parties agree that with the property (properties) (hereinafter: Property) collateral 
indicated in this section, the Bank shall grant Debtors the following Loan (hereinafter: the 
Loan) to meet the financing needs specified in the Application:
A) Amount of financing needs_ ……………. HUF, i.e. ……………… forint
B) Recording currency of the Loan: Swiss franc (CHF),
C) Loan Amount: ………… CHF, i.e. ……………… Swiss franc
D) Number of instalments: ……”
-~-~-~-~
b)  In the case of foreign exchange loan 
“1.1 The Bank shall, under the terms of this contract (censorship number: ………………., cre-
dit number: ……………………..), open a CHF / EUR, i.e. Swiss franc / euro credit line (Credit 
Line) and grant thereunder the Debtor – for the purpose of buying a home – a loan, and the 
Debtor is obliged to repay the loan and all its charges according to this contract. 
1.2. The Debtor acknowledges that the maximum amount of the Loan available under the 
Credit Limit is the foreign currency counter value of the forint amount of the portion of the 
purchase price set out in Section 2 at the Bank's buying rate applicable to private individuals 
and valid on the day of loan disbursement, but not more than the Credit Limit. 
1.3. If the foreign currency counter value of the portion of the purchase price according to 
Section 2 calculated in accordance with Section 1.2. is less than the Credit Line, the unused 
portion of the Credit Line will be cancelled on the day the loan is disbursed.”
-~-~-~-~
c)  In the case of a combined model contract 
“2/a. Amount of financing needs for this loan:
…….. HUF, i.e. ………….. forint 
(in the case of home purchase, maximum the last portion of the purchase price according 
to the purchase contract, in the case of loan refinancing the amount of the outstanding debt)
2/b. Loan Amount:   
Alt. ....,- CHF, i.e. .…… Swiss franc.
Alt. …,- EUR, i.e .…… euro
Currency of disbursement: Alt: forint Alt: euro Alt: Swiss franc
(in the case of a home purchase, the disbursement must be made in the currency of the 
purchase contract)”
-~-~-~-~
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The typical contractual provisions applied to the obligation to repay foreign currency debt 
were as follows: 
a)  In the case of foreign exchange based loan 
“The Debtor is obliged to fulfil his payment obligations determined in the currency of the 
Loan by transferring their forint counter value to the Creditor's forint account number: 
…………. The Debtor shall pay the forint counter value of the payment obligation no later 
than on the due date of the debt, at the repayment rate specified by the Creditor and published 
in accordance with the Business Regulations, in a manner that the forint counter value is 
available on the above account at the latest on the due date. The Creditor shall convert the 
Debtor's payments on the date of crediting them to the above forint account, at the repayment 
rate of the relevant currency valid on that day and determined by the Creditor to the recording 
currency of the Loan, and shall credit it to the account intended to keep record of the Debtor's 
foreign currency repayments, and shall account it as repayment on the due date – in case of 
late payment on the day of the actual payment – in foreign currency.”
-~-~-~-~
b)  In the case of foreign exchange loan 
“The repayment of the loan and the payment of interests are made in the annuity instalments that 
include the repayment of principal and interest due, in the currency of the loan according to Section 1.1.” 
-~-~-~-~
c)  In the case of a combined model contract
"The payment of the loan and the currently effective interest rate in case of forint repayment 
shall be effected in such a way that the Bank shall debit the Bank Account with the amount 
of the forint counter value of the loan and interest on the due day of payment. In the case of 
repayment in foreign currency, the Bank shall debit the Foreign Currency Account with the 
amount of the loan and interest on the due date of payment. 
In order to pay the loan and interest (the repayment instalment) – taking into account the 
exchange rate to be announced on the due date of the payment – the Debtor / Co-Debtor(s) is 
(are) obliged to arrange for the payment in a timely manner, at the latest until 2:00 pm. (two 
o’clock in the afternoon) on the due date of the payment.
In the case of forint repayment, the loan and the currently effective interest rate shall be 
converted into forint at the so-called cash foreign exchange selling type rate announced by the 
Bank on the day of actual payment.”
-~-~-~-~
On the basis of the examined model contracts, it is clear that the exchange rate risk arising 
from the repayment of the foreign currency loan was borne by the Debtor without any 
restriction, but the extent of this risk was not at all indifferent for the creditor. On the basis of 
the creditworthiness assessed and established by the creditor during the credit assessment, 
the bank also knew that the solvency of its client with income in forint was ensured only up 
to a certain exchange rate. Therefore, the possibility of converting to forint as a special risk 
management tool emerged in the contracting practice which was due to both parties. A good 
example of this is the following contractual clause: 
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“The Bank shall be entitled to convert the Debtor’s Debt denominated in foreign currency on the 
accounting date of interest period, from which it shall notify the Debtor in writing 15 days prior to 
the expiry of the relevant interest period. After the conversion, the Bank shall keep the Debtor's entire 
Debt in forint. The conversion to forint shall be made by applying the buying exchange rate of the 
Swiss franc / forint determined by the Bank for retail clients on the accounting date of the interest 
period. The Debtor shall also be entitled to initiate the conversion of the Loan into forint at least 15 
days prior to the accounting date of the relevant interest period. If the Bank approves such conversion, 
it shall take place under the conditions set out in this section, with the Debtor being obliged to pay 
the Bank the conversion fee specified in the List of Conditions at the latest on the day of conversion.”
3.2.4. Exchange rate risk of the creditor 
The content of the exchange rate risk borne by the creditor is that the exchange rate fluctuation 
during the period between the conclusion of the contract and the disbursement of the loan 
in forint falls on the creditor. This risk shows significantly different characteristics compared 
to the risk borne by the debtor and is characterized by the following: 
a) Risk of the feasibility of the credit: 
 This risk arises from the fact that the realization of the typically specified credit 
goals (e.g. buying a home, loan refinancing) is a circumstance important also for 
the lender, which can significantly influence primarily the value of the mortgage 
based on real estate collateral. To achieve these credit goals, the debtor needs a 
specific forint amount, which cannot be precisely determined in the case of a foreign 
currency based loan, as it depends on the value of the exchange rate on the day of 
the disbursement and may as well be lower or higher than the desired amount. The 
following contractual provisions had been applied to manage these risks: 
 “The Parties agree that if, due to a change in the exchange rate between the time of the 
conclusion of this contract and the disbursement, the amount of the Credit Line is less 
than the foreign exchange counter value of portion of the purchase price according to 
Section 2 calculated at the Bank's buying rate applicable to private individuals and valid 
on the day of loan disbursement, the Bank may disburse the difference to the Debtor even 
beyond the amount of the Credit Line. The debtor in turn undertakes to repay also the 
loan amount above the Credit Line in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in 
this contract, furthermore to pay the agreed interest, handling fee and other fees, expenses 
and charges also for this amount. The debtor undertakes to sign the amendments to 
the contract limited to the changes necessary for the increase of the loan amount upon 
the Bank's written initiative within 10 days of the Bank's written request. The debtor 
acknowledges that a breach of this commitment constitutes a serious breach of contract.”
-~-~-~-~
 “In case of refinancing a loan with a credit institution, if the forint counter value of the 
present loan – due to the changes in the exchange rates announced by the Bank – does 
not provide sufficient coverage for the debt according to paragraph I/1., the Debtor / 
Co-Debtor (s) shall pay the Credit Institution the outstanding amount from their own 
resources at the same time as this loan is disbursed, and to prove the completion of such 
payment to the Bank in the manner and at the time specified in the seventh indent of 
paragraph II/8.1.”
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b) Risk to the sustainability of real estate coverage 
 This risk arises from the fact that banks could apply mortgages on real estates located in 
Hungary as a cover for foreign currency mortgage lending. The value of these properties and 
the repayment that they ultimately secured could be determined and interpreted in forint. 
Thus, although the extent of mortgages was determined in the currency corresponding 
to the denominated currency, the real estate collateral with a value independent of the 
exchange rate fluctuation of the forint was able to serve as cover only to a certain exchange 
rate level. The contractual clauses for managing such risk were the following: 
 “If due to a large change in the CHF/HUF exchange rate /a change of at least 5% / (taking into 
account also the potentially changed real estate market conditions), the value of the real estate 
provided as collateral no longer provides the Bank with adequate coverage, then the Debtor shall 
be obliged to provide the bank with sufficient additional collateral within 30 calendar days.”
-~-~-~-~
 “If the ratio of the counter value of the principal debt of the Debtor outstanding in 
foreign currency calculated at the forint exchange rate published by the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank for the current currency of the Loan and the value of the collateral value 
specified in this Agreement exceeds at least by 10%, i.e. ten percentage points, during 
the term of the Loan.... %, i.e.… per cent, i.e.… per cent,30 the Debtor shall be obliged to 
provide a first-rank mortgage on another property located in the territory of Hungary 
(providing additional collateral) and accepted by the Lender within 30 days, i.e. thirty 
calendar days from the Lender’s first call by concluding a mortgage contract.”
Based on the contractual practice presented, it is clear that foreign currency lending and 
the inseparable exchange rate risk can be clearly described from a legal point of view, its 
legal nature can be clearly defined. However, it is also evident from the practice of the period 
from 2004 to 2010 that although the parties tried to deal with the possible effects of exchange 
rate risk with a number of contractual clauses, it was not possible to eliminate its actual risk 
within the framework of loan agreements. 
3. 3. Obligation to provide information 
The legal assessment of the information provided on the exchange rate risk by creditors to 
debtors can be defined as the most important and most lengthy legal dispute.31 This issue 
leads us to the fundamental question of foreign currency lending that arose (also) in Hun-
gary: is it fair or unfair contractual practice to provide foreign currency loans at the debtor's 
exchange rate risk? 
30 The quotient of the coverage limit according to the approving loan decision and the collateral value of the 
collateral must be indicated.
31 The issue was also addressed by the Consultative Board – set up by the President of the Curia and composed 
of representatives of judges of the Courts of Justice at different levels of the country dealing with such cases 
–, dealing with issues of invalidity in connection with foreign currency lending, inter alia at its meeting held 
on 10 October 2018. A memorandum of the meeting is available at: http://kuria.birosag.hu/sites/default/files/
konz_testulet/sajtokozlemenyc-51.17_masolata_0.pdf – last downloaded: 13 October 2018
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An essential requirement, also in terms of the valid conclusion of the loan agreements, is for 
the parties to be aware of the essential content of their contracts. In the case of foreign currency 
loans, this key requirement means that the parties must be aware of the fact and significance, 
as well as the possible consequences of the speculative element arising from exchange rate risk. 
In the case of foreign currency loan agreements, as in the case of many other banking 
products, there is no balance of information between the parties. The creditor's knowledge 
of the nature of the exchange rate fluctuation and its possible consequences is much broader, 
so banks are required to provide information. The importance of the obligation to provide 
information is that the lack or omission of this obligation may – ultimately – lead to 
unfairness and, therefore, the invalidity of the contract concluded. 
However, as we have seen above, the exchange rate risk borne by the debtor is a characteristic 
feature of the foreign currency loan, it is borne without any restriction by the debtor and it 
is not passed on by the creditor. A clause that fulfils the obligation to provide information is 
included in the contract, and thus appearing as a contractual provision, must be interpreted 
– on the basis of the established judicial practice that has also been confirmed by the Curia32 
– as a general contract term or a contract term individually not negotiated, whose unfairness 
can only be examined if its contents were not clear or understandable.33
3.3.1. Regulatory background of the obligation to provide information 
In the course of reviewing the issue, we will recall the chronologically changing content of 
the relevant key statutory rules and the explanations thereto added during the legislation in 
the hopes that this method can bring us closer to the legal thinking of that period. 
3.3.1.1. The Civil Code 
To properly judge the legal obligation to provide information, we can define Article 205 (4) of the 1959 
Civil Code as a basic provision.34 According to this: “Parties shall cooperate during the conclusion of a 
contract, and they shall respect each other's rightful interests. Parties shall inform each other regarding 
all essential circumstances in relation to the proposed contract before the contract is concluded.”
Special provisions for consumer contracts which later became decisive in importance –that 
tried to provide effective legal safeguards by the establishment of the standard of unfairness 
– were included in the 1959 Civil Code with Act XXXI of 2009, entering into force on 22 
May 2009. The new standard paragraphs (4) and (5) of Section 209 of the Act read as follows: 
“ (4) A standard contractual term, or a term not individually negotiated in a consumer contract, 
shall also be regarded as unfair simply on the ground that it is not in plain intelligible language.
(5) The provisions concerning unfair contractual terms shall not be applicable to contractual terms 
that define the main subject matter of the contract or to those that determine the balance between 
performance and consideration, provided that those terms are in plain intelligible language.” 
According to the explanatory memorandum of the new provisions introduced into the 1959 
Civil Code: “Pursuant to Article 5 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in 
32 See Section 1 of PJE Resolution No. 2/2014 of the Curia
33 Article 4 (2) of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts: “Assessment of 
the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract 
nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in 
exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language."
34 The numbering of this provision, with unchanged content, has changed to (3) as of 1 March 2006.
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consumer contracts: 'In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are 
in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt 
about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail.' 
The second quoted sentence corresponds in content to Article 207 (2) of the Civil Code. In relation 
to the first sentence, the Commission of the European Communities did not accept the Hungarian 
argument and the reference to the bill submitted to the Parliament on the new Civil Code and the 
provision in question, but called the Republic of Hungary in a so-called reasoned opinion dated 
27 November 2008, to take the necessary measures to comply with the opinion within two months 
of receipt of the opinion. The amendment is intended to fulfil this obligation by incorporating the 
provision corresponding to the first sentence of the said Directive into the Civil Code, which is 
identical to the rule included in the Bill No. T/5949 [Article 5:81 (2) of the new Civil Code]. ”
Thus, the internal legislative act transposing the directive came into force at a time when 
foreign currency lending was already in crisis. Therefore, the question of the applicability 
of this rule to contracts concluded before its entry into force became a serious issue in 
subsequent legal disputes. As a conclusion to the debate, the Curia ruled that these rules 
were applicable to the entire period of foreign currency lending.35
Due to the delay in the implementation of the referenced EU directives in Hungary, it may 
not be too exaggerated to conclude that the adoption of the principles, and most importantly 
the practice of Union-level consumer protection legislation has been delayed not only at the level 
of legislation but also at the level of the application of law. Consumer protection thinking of the 
period of foreign currency lending between 2004 and 2008 crucial in terms of the establishment of 
portfolios could not be framed by EU standard, but slowly developing Hungarian lending culture. 
It is important to emphasize that civil law concepts essential in the legal assessment, i.e. the content 
requirement behind the “clear” and “understandable” information, can only be formulated with 
interpretation for the practice. In the pre-crisis period, these concepts – based on past experiences and 
public thinking characterised by optimistic catching-up expectations – meant something different in 
the everyday life of credit and were not backed by a mature legal interpretation supported by court 
judgements, which could have qualified their content. After the crisis, the expectations associated 
with these concepts have changed dramatically to the detriment of banks – obviously, in close 
connection with the search for those responsible and by using the existing information asymmetry 
as a reference. In reality, however, neither the banks considered as professional players in the market, 
nor the regulatory and supervisory authorities expected the dramatical exchange rate change.36
35 See justification to Section 1 of PJE Decision No 2/2014 of the Curia: “The fact whether the provision of the 
given contract on exchange rate risk is clear or understandable can be examined despite the fact that the vast 
majority of foreign currency based consumer loan contracts was concluded before amending the Civil Code with 
Act XXXI of 2009. With the referenced amendment in force since 22 May 2009, the provisions of the Association 
Agreement promulgated by Act I of 1994 and of the Directive already applicable also in Hungary through the 
accession to the European Union at the time of the conclusion of the contract were transposed.”
36 “According to the information provided by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority to the Curia on 31 
May 2013, during the period between 2001 and 2008, financial institutions could not foresee either the extent 
nor the direction of future exchange rate changes. During this period, the Stability Reports of the National Bank 
of Hungary did not indicate significant exchange rate fluctuations.” - citation from Section III/3 of the Curia’s 
6/2013. uniformity decision.
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3.3.1.2. The Act on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises 
Special regulation of financial services during the period under examination was included 
in Act CXII of 1996. (hereinafter referred to as: CIFE). Article 203 of the CIFE initially set 
out the relevant information requirements as follows: 
“(1) A financial institution shall unambiguously and clearly inform its present and future 
customers on the conditions of using the services provided by the financial institution 
as well as on any amendments of these conditions.
(2) A financial institution shall post the information described in Subsection (1) at an easily 
accessible place in the customer area of its premises, and shall make it available to 
customers free of charge when requested. Furthermore, where services are also provided 
in electronic commerce, the aforementioned information shall be made available to 
customers continuously by way of electronic communications in easily accessible format.”
The first CIFE amendment related to the information provided to customers came into 
force on 10 July 200437 with the insertion of two new paragraphs:
"(5) Prior to entering into a contract, the financial institutions is obliged to inform clients if 
some law other than Hungarian law is to be used for settling legal disputes in connection 
with the contract or if Hungarian courts are not vested with exclusive jurisdiction.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed, credit institutions shall supply the information referred to in 
Subsections (1)−(5) in the Hungarian language.”
According to the explanatory memorandum to this provision: “The law supplements and 
clarifies consumer protection regulations. It clarifies that customer information should be 
provided primarily in Hungarian, ...”
The next amendment of the relevant provisions of CIFE was amended38 with effect on 1 
January 2005. This amendment already brought about a targeted regulation explicitly for 
foreign currency lending, adding two additional paragraphs to Article 203 on information:
"(6) In the case of loan contracts with retail customers for granting foreign currency loans 
and that involves a right to purchase on a real property, the financial institution shall 
expressly specify in the contract the risks to which the client is exposed, and the client 
shall verify acknowledgement by his signature.
(7) The risk disclosure statement specified in Paragraph (6) shall include
a) in the case of a contract for granting foreign currency loan, the description of the 
exchange rate risk and its effect on the instalment,
b) in the case of a contract including a right to purchase on a real property, the manner 
and consequences of exercising the right to purchase, the manner of establishing the 
purchase price, of notifying the client and of the settlement by the financial institution, 
as well as the fact whether or not a grace period is granted to the client, during which 
the client may sell the property, and if so, the term of such grace period.” 
37 §17	of	Act	XLVIII	of	2004
38 §30	of	Act	LXXXIV	of	2004
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The reasons for this change were: “The amendment to the consumer protection provisions aims 
to provide better and more thorough information to customers. Since the beginning of 2004, 
the portfolio of foreign currency loans has dynamically expanded due to lower interest rates 
compared to forint loans. At the same time, in the case of changes to the exchange rate, the 
foreign currency loan also entails significant risks, the repayment instalments may increase, 
which should be brought to the attention of consumers in a separate risk disclosure statement.”39
The last amendment40 affecting the period under examination, effective from 1 September 
2008 and defining customer information already as customer protection, has also tightened 
foreign currency lending. This amendment also set content requirements for the risk 
disclosure statement as follows: 
“Customer protection”
"§ 203 (4) In the case of loan contracts with clients qualifying as consumers for granting 
foreign currency loan and that involves a right to purchase on a real property, the 
financial institution shall expressly specify in the contract the risks to which the client 
is exposed, and the client shall verify acknowledgement by his signature.
(5) The risk disclosure statement specified in Paragraph (4) shall include
a) in the case of a contract for granting foreign currency loan, the description of the 
exchange rate risk and its effect on the instalment,
b) in the case of a contract including a right to purchase on a real property, the manner 
and consequences of exercising the right to purchase, the manner of establishing the 
purchase price, of notifying the client and of the settlement by the financial institution, 
as well as the fact whether or not a grace period is granted to the client, during which 
the client may sell the property, and if so, the term of such grace period.”
The related explanatory memorandum did not give specific reasoning to the provisions cited. 
From the above changes in the rules of the CIFE, we can observe the constantly tightening regulatory 
requirements. However, the law laid down content requirements only on the verge of the crisis (from 1 
September 2008) with the creditor’s information on the exchange rate risk – that is, the risk disclosure 
statement. The banking practice mapping these regulatory changes into the contractual practice of 
foreign currency lending could then have assumed, with good reason, that standard of information 
applied following the entry into force of the individual amendments ensures the requirement of 
legal operation for them. However, legal interpretation in the post-crisis mass litigation has set the 
regulation of Directive 93/13/EEC – published in the Civil Code – as the same standard for banks for 
the entire period by assigning to it the content requirements according to post-crisis thinking. 
3.3.2. Consumer perception 
For the correct legal assessment of the obligation to provide information in foreign currency lending, 
the requirements for the consumer as a party entitled to protection must also be defined as an important 
39 Reasoning	for	§	30	of	Act	LXXXIV	of	2004	on	the	Amendment	of	Certain	Financial	Laws	to	Supplementary	
Supervision of Financial Conglomerates.
40 Paragraphs (4) and (5) of Section 35 of Act XLVII of 2008
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circumstance. These requirements can be based on the legal definition of the “consumer”, the specific 
feature of which is, however, that it is filled with content collectively by the legislature and the law 
enforcement party. “The appropriate level of protection is thus determined by normative-generalisation 
modelling on the part of both the legislature and the law enforcement party. It is fortunate – but there 
are only a few examples of this, and especially in EU legislation – when the legislature itself defines in the 
explanation to the law the consumer profile which the law enforcement party can start from in practice. 
It is more typical that the law enforcement party fills the consumer definition with content without giving 
the regulator specific instructions on which consumer model to choose when applying the legal norm. 
However, this definition has been filled with real content by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
by elaborating a system of expectations for defining the level of protection due to such a person.”41
The definition of “consumer” applicable for financial services – thus for foreign currency lending 
– was introduced into CIFE by the Act XLVII of 2008 on the Prohibition of Unfair Commercial 
Practices against Consumers effective as of 1 September 2008.42 This is essentially identical to the 
definition in Directive 93/13/EEC.43 However, following this step that can be deemed a starting point, 
although the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence44 has already tried to fill this definition with 
content in the previous period, the interpretation of the law applicable to foreign currency lending 
was not available until 2010. A new interpretation of the law emerged only in the period well after 
the crisis in the case law of both the Court of Justice of the European Union45 and the Curia46. 
On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that although Directive 93/13/EEC, thus its 
definition, also functioned as a valid legal norm during the period in question neither the 
Hungarian legal system nor the judicial practice destined for developing this perfected the level 
of protection due to consumers, which could have served as a clear and unambiguous benchmark 
for credit institutions providing foreign currency loans. Thus, unfortunately, the consumer 
protection standard of the expected information obligation related to exchange rate risk 
crystallized not during the period of concluding foreign currency loan contracts but afterwards. 
It is also worth examining how retail borrowers qualified subsequently as consumers could be 
characterized based on the CIFE definition during the period of raising foreign currency loans. The 
importance of this is consumer protection itself is a requirement for consumers to have a general level 
of awareness, be reasonably observant and circumspect. As opposed to this, the financial knowledge 
of foreign debt borrowers was extremely low: “The familiarity with terms important for taking up 
foreign currency loans (currency, exchange rate, APR) is low. Interviewees have indicated that the level of 
their knowledge regarding borrowing is weak / moderate. 40% of young adults with independent income 
41 Rita SIK-SIMON: Fogyasztókép és szabályozás. (Consumer profile and regulation) MTA Law Working Papers, vol. 2016/2. 2.
42 See Annex III, Part III. Section 4 of CIFE: “Consumer: a natural person acting for purposes other than his or 
her self-employed activity and economic activity.”
43 Article 4 (2) b) of Directive 93/13/EEC: “consumer: any natural person who, in contracts covered by this 
Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;”
44 “A milestone in the current case law of the European Court of Justice is the Gut-Springenheide case of 1998, in 
which the Court 'set in stone' the applicable average consumer model. The decision is based on the 'reasonably 
well-informed, reasonably observant and circumspect average consumer', where the word ‘average’ refers to the 
level of information, attention and intelligence.” SIK-SIMON: opus cit 13.
45 See Judgement of the European Court of Justice, No. C-26/13 (Kásler-case)
46 See section 1 of the Curia’s 2/2014. uniformity decision
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o are not aware of the existence of the Central Credit Information System (CCIS) (KHR, 
formerly BAR) 
o 35% of them are unable to distinguish the main features of forint and foreign currency 
based loans, 
o at least a quarter of them are unable to judge or judge incorrectly the impact of changes 
in financial conditions on the repayment instalment of foreign currency based loans”47
Tájékozódás a hitelkonstrukció részleteiről 
és költségeiről
Gathering information about the details 
and costs of the credit construction
18−30 éves hitelfelvevők körében (n=335) Among 18−30 year old borrowers (n = 335)
Vissza Back
Viszonylag alaposan tájékozódott az egyes 
konstrukciók részleteit és díjait illetően
Was relatively well informed about 
the details and costs of the individual 
constructions
Apró részletekre kiterjedően 
áttanulmányozta a bankok ajánlatait
Studied bank offerings in details
Csak a hasonló termékek legfontosabb 
jellemzőinek nézett utána
Only checked the most important features 
of similar products
Nem nézett utána, mert a bankok által 
kínált termékek hasonlóak
Did not check, because the products offered 
by the banks were similar
Nem tudja/Nem maga intézte Does not know/Did not arrange for it 
personally
Nem válaszolt Did not answer
47 See: Andrea Máger Deputy Director of the MNB on 23 May 2007, page 9 of the presentation titled Increasing 
Retail Exposure - Low Financial Knowledge - Lessons from a Research held at the Retail Finance Conference. 
Available on the internet: https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/20070522-23-mager-andrea-1.pdf
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Pénzügyi változások hatása a deviza alapú 
hitelek havi törlesztő részletére
Impact of financial changes on monthly 
repayment instalments of FX-based loans
Önálló jövedelemmel rendelkező 18−30 
évesek körében (n=705)
Among 18−30 year olds with independent 
income (n=705)
Növeli Increase
Nem változtatja meg No change
Nem tudja Does not know
Nem válaszolt Did not answer
Csökkenti Decrease
Forint árfolyam gyengülés a hitel 
devizaneméhez képest
Forint exchange rate weakening compared 
to the currency of the loan
Hitel devizanemére vonatkozó irányadó 
kamatláb növekedése
Increase in the reference interest rate of the 
currency of the loan
Forint alapú hitel deviza alapúvá történő 
átváltása
Conversion of forint based loan to foreign 
currency based loan
Hitel futamidő meghosszabbítása Loan maturity extension
Hitel kamatláb mérséklődése Loan interest rate decrease
Source: MNB, 2007 
3.3.3. Partial summary 
In this chapter we attempted to identify the core problem of foreign currency lending, 
the exchange rate risk and to describe the related legally relevant elements. On the basis of 
the facts and circumstances taken into account and their legal aspects, as well as everyday 
experiences, we can state that although the foreign currency lending crisis has generated 
massive disputes between borrowers and creditors, which made key issues widely disputed 
in legal terms, the real cause of the problem was not the unlawful contractual practice of the 
creditors, the deliberate or negligent misinformation of the borrowers. 
We agree with the following view from the literature: “We believe that the majority of foreign 
currency debtors were aware of the fact of the exchange rate risk, knowing that future instalments 
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would be subject to unexpected exchange rate movements. They, however, expected that the extent 
of exchange rate fluctuations would be manageable, could develop even favourably, moreover, 
would be eliminated within the foreseeable future, by joining the euro zone. Obviously, neither 
the lay borrowers, nor the financial experts have calculated with the still continuing weakening of 
the exchange rate, the deterioration of Hungary’s credit risk rating and the borrowing conditions. 
In addition, no one expected that Hungary's overall economic performance, investment and 
unemployment rates would be even worse than other countries in the region. The claim that debtors 
were deceived by the banks is therefore not true; the truth is that the circumstances evolved in a 
much less favourable way than the general expectations at the time of contracting”.48
4. Solutions to the problem 
4. 1. Predictability of exchange rate fluctuations 
The key issue in dealing with the problem of foreign currency lending is – now we know – the 
correct assessment of the exchange rate risk that inevitably accompanies it, and the limitation 
of the effects of these risks so that they do not cause a crisis of social scale and threaten financial 
stability. Therefore, a really effective tool against the foreign currency lending crisis would have 
been to prevent it and not to deal with a problem that had already arisen. 
However, the risks of foreign currency lending in Hungary could not be properly assessed 
by professionally demanding studies either. Such is the so-called Várhegyi Committee report. 
The committee, acting as a proposing entity on the basis of a government decision49, was tasked 
with reviewing the financial services and auxiliary financial services provided by financial 
institutions to the general public, in terms of effective competition and consumer protection, 
and to make proposals for the necessary government actions and the possible revision of 
relevant legislation. In its report drawn up by the end of December 2006, the Committee 
took stock of the key problems of the banking system identified then and issued a total of 17 
recommendations. The most important proposals concerning retail lending were: 
•	 positive	list	of	debtors	–	obligatory	for	all	financial	service	providers	and	all	borrowers	
to develop responsible creditor behaviour and increase consumer safety; 
•	 the	 pricing	 of	 credit	 institutions'	 products	 and	 services	 should	 be	 sufficiently	
transparent – clarification of the rules on individual customer information;
•	 re-regulation	of	unilateral	contract	modifications	related	to	interest	or	fee	components;	
•	 creating	a	code	of	conduct.
Thus, it can be seen that the main findings of the report of the Committee of Experts did 
not identify a consumer protection problem related to exchange rate risk. In the report, 
the only statement related to foreign currency lending can be found among the proposals 
for further research: “As a result of the increase of foreign currency lending, forint interest 
48 GÁRDOS – NAGY: opus cit 378.
49 Established by the Government Resolution No. 1097/2006 (X. 5.) on the establishment of a Committee of 
Experts on Retail Financial Services which also defined its tasks.
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rates reflect to a lesser degree the Hungarian banking market conditions, and more structured 
analyses would be needed, which would take into account this new factor.”50
Further exploring the professional thinking of that time, as a typical example we can cite 
that the demanding mortgage crisis analysis published on the eve of the Hungarian crisis, 
in May 2008, also contained an optimistic conclusion that “risk-based competition in Hun-
gary generated a strong increase in credit supply, maintaining the consumption ensured an 
adequate credit demand, but the over-indebtedness of the population is still manageable, there 
are no signs of mortgage crisis.”51
Although the above examples are only indicative, both the personal experiences of the 
participants of the era and the subsequent thorough evaluations confirm the important 
finding that neither the participants of the banking system, nor the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities, nor the most initiated experts expected the depreciation of the forint to an extent 
which eventually took place on a permanent basis from October 2008 onwards.52
The lack of prognosis had a decisive influence on the timing of the measures that could 
be taken to prevent the problem, since inevitably all measures could trigger a delayed effect, 
that is, were not sutable for prevention, but only post-treatment. 
4. 2. Self-regulation 
The whole period of foreign currency lending in Hungary was accompanied by an idea 
which was rooted in the legal thinking of the European Union at that time, that institutional 
operators of the financial markets are able to strengthen the consumer-friendly nature of 
market processes with regulation established by themselves and adhered to voluntarily but 
consistently. The first EU source of law on this idea – evolved before Hungary's accession 
to the EU, so it did not even have an official Hungarian translation – was the Commission 
Recommendation 2001/193/EC. This recommendation considered the voluntary accession 
to the “Voluntary Code of Conduct on pre-contractual information for home loans” as a 
desirable development direction for financial institutions. 
The Várhegyi Committee was the first to make a concrete proposal for the creation and 
introduction of a “code of conduct” as a form of self-regulation of financial services in Hun-
gary.53 In the explanatory memorandum to the Várhegyi Committee's recommendation, 
it also stated why it considered as justified at improvement, by means of voluntary rules 
instead of statutory rules, of the consumer-friendly character of financial services: “Credit 
institutions’ behaviours and procedures developed in a self-regulatory manner could provide 
50 See Report of the Expert Committee on Retail Financial Services - “9. Proposals for further research”, 
subsection 6 – page 15
51 Júlia KIRÁLY – Márton NAGY: Jelzálogpiacok válságban: kockázatalapú verseny és tanulságok. (Mortgage 
markets in crisis: risk-based competition and lessons learned) Hitelintézeti Szemle, 2008. Vol. 5. 481.
52 See Section III/3 of the Curia’s 6/2013. uniformity decision
53 “The Commission considers that the Banks’ behaviours and procedures developed in a self-regulatory manner 
can provide a more effective solution to many problems than statutory obligations. The Commission recommends 
that professional associations of credit institutions and financial undertakings to establish a code of conduct 
applicable to all their member organizations offering solutions to address consumer problems.” See Report of 
the Expert Committee on Retail Financial Services - “1. Executive report”, subsection 15 – page 4
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a more effective solution to many of the previously discussed issues than statutory obligations. 
One of the reasons for this is that financial institutions are more familiar with customer related 
problems than regulatory authorities, only their short-term interests hinder their search for 
solutions that are beneficial for consumers. Another advantage of self-regulatory behaviour is 
that they can better promote compliance than external law.” 
As noted above, the report of the Várhegyi-Commission did not identify excessive retail 
exchange rate risk and did not propose any consumer protection measures in connection 
with such. Thus, it identified the purpose of self-regulation to regulate primarily the 
unilateral contract amendment, which was the subject of the most criticism at the time, and 
which subsequently dominated legal disputes for a long time. 
The development of the importance of self-regulation in the banking sector is well illustrated 
by the fact that with entering into force of Act XLVII of 2008 on the Prohibition of Unfa-
ir Commercial Practices on 29 June 2008 defined the concept of the Code of Conduct at the 
level of law54 and assigned separate rules of responsibility to this regulatory instrument55 and 
supervisory authority powers to monitor compliance.56
By the beginning of 2009, the first experiences of the exchange rate crisis that had already 
taken place did not change the stakeholders' belief that self-regulation could offer an 
appropriate solution to the increasingly serious problems. As a result of this process – in 
which the clear expectation of both the regulator and the supervisory authorities could be 
identified –, the Principles of Fair Conduct by Financial Organizations Engaged in Retail 
Lending was drafted with the participation of the Hungarian Banking Association and dated 
September 2009. The significance of a document of great importance for the credit life of 
that time, to which a total of 276 financial institutions joined according to the data published 
by the MNB57, is the fact that its entry into force has been subjected by the signatories to the 
amendment of law with harmonised content, to the new Article 203 (6) of the CIFE58 that 
entered into force on 1 January 2010. Among the signatories of the Code of Conduct was 
also the Chairman of the Supervisory Board representing the State Financial Supervisory 
Authority in charge of monitoring compliance with the Code. 
The most important purpose and significance of this Code of Conduct was to set limits for the 
unilateral contract modifications of creditors. In addition, it also regulated a number of other 
issues, including those specifically dealing with retail foreign currency lending, as follows: 
•	 “To	undertake	upon	the	conclusion	of	the	contract	to	make	it	possible	for	the	customer	
to repay the foreign exchange loan in a lump sum in foreign currency.”59
54 See Article 2 i) of Act XLVII of 2008
55 See Article 9 (4) of Act XLVII of 2008
56 See Article 10 (2) of Act XLVII of 2008, and from 1 January 2010 Article 10 (6)
57 See https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/alairok-1301129.xlsx
58 "The financial institution shall inform the client at the latest before the conclusion of the contract, but in all cases 
in good time before the commencement of the provision of the service, in a clear and unambiguous manner, if 
it has subjected itself to the Code of Conduct, as defined in Article 2 i) of Act XLVII of 2008 on the Prohibition 
of Unfair Commercial Practices in relation to its activities covered by the contract to be concluded, providing at 
the same time free access to the Code of Conduct.”
59 Code of Conduct Section II/s.
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•	 “To	ensure	transparency,	the	effective	exchange	rates	applied	for	the	disbursement	and	
repayment of foreign-currency based loans and the differences from the central parity 
rate of the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) are to be made public.60
•	 To	allow	the	loan	refinancing	and	the	lump	sum	redemption	of	foreign	currency	based	
loans in foreign currency in addition to the possibility of their conversion to HUF upon 
request of the customer.”61
The perception of the serious problem of foreign currency lending is obviously reflected 
in these voluntary rules set for foreign currency lending, but it was – understandably – 
inappropriate to deal with the social scale conflict created by the exchange rate collapse. 
In the context of self-regulation as one of the possible problem-solving tools, it should also 
be mentioned that the Code of Conduct was later seen neither by the judicial practice62 nor 
the legislature63 as an instrument that can be suitable to resolving subsequent legal disputes. 
Based on all these findings, we can consider the following statement to be valid: “On the 
basis of the consequences, however, we can see that retail foreign currency lending in Hunga-
ry can be at the same time considered as a case study regarding the fact that retail lending can 
lead to a systemic risk level failure if market self-regulation does not work”.64
4. 3. Supervisory regulation 
Banking operation and, in particular, professional lending activity due to its high riskiness 
justifies both the market entry and operation to be subjected to state control. This important control 
function was provided by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) for the entire 
period covered by the study, the operation of which was initially governed by provisions of Act 
CXXIV of 1999. Although between 1991 and 1996 the Law on Legislation recognized the “Banking 
supervisory provision” as a mandatory legal norm,65 however, in the period under examination, the 
HFSA was already defined as a law enforcement institution, within the operation of which creating 
norms was not compatible with the tasks assigned to it. This type of instrument was first defined by 
the amendment of the Act which came into force on 6 May 2004,66 through the rearrangement of 
60 Code of Conduct III /f. point
61 Code of Conduct IV/e. point
62 “According to Section IV/5 of the Summary Opinion of the case law analysing group set up for “The assessment of 
unfairness of unilateral contract modifications in general terms and conditions applied by financial institutions 
in a consumer loan contract”: “The Code of Conduct adopted by financial institutions is not a law; the court may 
review the nullity of the conditions allowing for the unilateral contract modification contained therein.”
63 The new provisions introduced by Article 3 (1) of Act XCVI of 2010 as 210/A of CIFE – with effect from 27 Novem-
ber 2010 –, overwrote the most important provisions of the Code of Conduct on unilateral contract modifications.
64 András BETHLENDI: Egy rossz termékfejlesztésből rendszerszintű piaci kudarc. (Systemic market failure from 
a bad product development.) A hazai lakossági devizajelzáloghitelezés. (Domestic retail currency mortgage 
lending.) Hitelintézeti Szemle, 2015. Vol. 1. 7.
65 Act	XI	of	1987	on	Legislation,	51/	B.	§	“In agreement with the Minister of Justice and the Banking Supervisory 
Board, the Chairman of the State Banking Supervision may issue requirements mandatory for financial 
institutions as a banking supervision provision within the scope specified in a separate act. The banking 
supervision regulation shall be published in the Financial Bulletin.”
66 Act XXII of 2004 on Amendments to Certain Acts Concerning the Protection of Investors and Depositors
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the function of the Supervisory Board. At that time, the institution of “recommendation” emerged, 
which according to the statutory definition “... has no binding force for organizations, persons 
subject to the law, it is intended to increase the predictability of the application of law”.67
The role and function of the recommendation as the only regulatory instrument available 
to the HFSA can be defined as follows:
– “Provides a standard for financial organizations, indicating the HFSA's expectations 
regarding the enforcement of legislation
– To show the synergy arising from the knowledge of the HFSA and the financial 
organizations
– Can serve as the basis and source of the regulations of financial institutions”68
Act CXXXV of 2007 re-regulating the operation of the HFSA from 1 December 2007 did 
not bring about any changes regarding this. 
The supervisory recommendation as a market-shaping tool was also applied on the 
verge of the currency crisis. On 15 February 2008, the MNB and the President of the 
HFSA issued a joint recommendation on “Systemic risks of foreign currency lending and 
institutional and consumer protection requirements related to the prudential assessment 
and management of these risks, with particular regard to Japanese yen-based lending”. This 
professional recommendation, elaborated in detail, laid down expectations regarding (i) the 
prudent rating of customers, (ii) the application of appropriate risk management systems, 
(iii) the responsible lending practices for consumer protection, and (iv) the rules of interest 
for agency sales. The main findings of the recommendation were the following:
- “One of the major problems associated with yen-based products is that customers 
typically do not fully understand their features and the associated risks.”
- “Before concluding a contract, the financial institution is obliged to illustrate to the 
client how, in the event of a 20% fluctuation in the exchange rate and a 1% interest rate 
change the repayment instalment and its ratio to income may increase.”
- “A fundamental objective is to ensure that agents establish and use systems of interest 
and control that ensure the quality of the loans they mediate.”
- Finally, the summary of the recommendation stated: "Competition poses a risk that credit 
institutions will build up excessive credit risk exposure under the pressure for growth, 
thereby increasing systemic risks and threatening financial stability. In adhering to 
the recommendation, however, it can be prevented that the long-term costs of the risk 
increases from new constructions outweigh the short term market benefits.” 69
67 Act CXXIV of 1999 on the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, Article 9/C. (1) c)
68 See Dr. Éva Istvánovics, Directorate of Market Surveillance, Managing Director, Presentation at the Retail 
Finance Conference on 23 May 2007 on the Recommendations of the HFSA Supervisory Board, page 5. 
Available on the internet: https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/20070522-23-istvanovics-eva-1.pdf
69 See: Joint Recommendation of 15 February 2008 of the President of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, page 4
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The recommendation, in addition to showing a sense of responsibility driven by the perception of 
growing systemic risks, also indicates that it puts the development of systemic risk into the future 
and not the present. On the other hand, it has not identified outstanding concerns regarding Swiss 
franc and euro used excessively in foreign currency lending, as it has identified in the case of Japanese 
yen. We now know that, at the time of the publication of the Recommendation, foreign currency 
loans accumulated so far have become a systemic risk as a result of the exchange rate shock. 
Summarising the characteristics of the supervisory regulatory tools we can establish that we cannot 
consider the most powerful standard-setting instrument provided for the HFSA, the “Supervisory 
Recommendation”, as a possible problem-solving instrument for foreign currency lending. The 
institution of the recommendation could not be suitable for the radical transformation of market 
processes and for the substantial limitation of the established course of lending and retail loan demand. 
Moreover, the other instruments available to the HFSA, not established by law but in the course if its own 
operation, which are even more of a guiding and non-enforceable instruments, such as management 
circulars, methodological guides, were completely out of the scope of effective regulatory tools. 
4. 4. Legislation 
When examining the role of legislative instruments in foreign currency lending, two periods 
should be distinguished: 
➢ Period of prevention – this is the period from 2004 to 2008 and provides an 
opportunity to examine the measures taken to prevent the crisis, 
➢ Period of crisis management – this is the period from 2009 to 2010, and the legislative 
events of this period can be interpreted as measures to manage the crisis that has 
already developed. 
In discussing this chapter, it is important to emphasize that the numerous Hungarian 
sources of law and the wide-ranging legislative actions of the European Union could have 
influenced – directly or indirectly – the development of the Hungarian retail foreign 
currency lending from various directions and in a number of ways. Thus, without the 
necessity of completeness, we attempt to take into account the most important legislative 
actions to determine the legislative changes characteristic of the examined period. 
4.4.1. Period of prevention (2004−2008) 
As we have already established, the essential elements of foreign currency lending were 
the exchange rate risk and the creditors’ obligation to provide information related to it. 
Analysing these two elements, as a regulatory objectives suitable for the management of 
risks and the prevention of excessive risk-taking, the following can be established: 
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A) Legal limitation of taking exchange rate risk 
The legal possibility of the existence of exchange rate risk, i.e. the fact that not only forint 
but also other currencies can be validly used as denominated currency in loan transactions, 
was established by repealing Article 231 (2) of the 1959 Civil Code70 as of 1 January 2002. This 
change in legislation was a general option and not specifically intended for retail lending. Thus, 
the amendment of the 1959 Civil Code did not have the task of establishing a framework for 
such risks that can be taken by the population. This issue must be sought obviously in the 
legislation applicable to the special market for financial services. However, we did not find 
either in the legislation or the lower-level sources of law any amendment during the period 
from the emergence of foreign currency lending and its development until 2008, i.e. until the 
crisis occurred, which would have required some limitation of this fundamental risk. 
The lending practice of the period under examination was driven by the lending institutions' own 
internal risk-taking policy, which considered the so-called lending secured by collateral even with 
regard to foreign currency lending as a natural credit operation. In the course of this, it was not 
required to check the debtor's income, but only the market value of the property offered as collateral 
had to be determined. This could take place in many cases by taking the purchase price fixed in a sales 
contract as basis, and the upper limit for lending was based on that value. It is appropriate to define this 
phenomenon as a risk-based competition, which at that time did not encounter any legal constraint. 
As pointed out in the literature: “Domestic banks are also trying to maintain their profitability by 
expanding their loan portfolio with increased risk taking. The strengthening of risk-based competition 
in the domestic market will mean primarily product innovation and the easing of lending conditions.”71
B) Regulation of the obligation to provide information
As a matter of consumer protection regulation, the prior customer information obligation 
of creditors has undergone several changes during this period. As a starting point, it is 
important to highlight that, initially, even the European Union's legislation considered the 
detailed content of this issue as an obligation imposed by the voluntary rules of creditors.72
By learning lessons from this regulatory methodology, a new EU directive73 was drafted that not 
only laid down a legal obligation for creditor information74, but also defined precisely its content.75 
However, this evolution of EU law still did not provide customer information – and hence a higher 
level of awareness – about mortgage lending, since the scope of the new directive did not apply to 
the type of transaction that provided the backbone of the foreign currency lending crisis.76
Although it goes beyond the 2008 period, I would like to mention here that when transposing the new 
directive into Hungarian law, the legislature defined precise content requirements for pre-mortgage 
70 Article 6 (1) n) of Act CXXI of 2001 on the elimination of exchange restrictions and the amendment of certain 
related acts
71 KIRÁLY – NAGY: opus cit 468.
72 See Recommendation 2001/193/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on pre-contractual 
information to be given to consumers by lenders offering home loans.
73 Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC
74 See Article 5 (1) of the Directive
75 See Annex II of the Directive
76 See Article 2 (2) (a) of the Directive
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lending information (the consumer credit act distinguishes general and personal information) in Act 
CLXII of 2009 (hereinafter referred to as: Consumer Credit Act) on consumer credit in response to 
the specific tensions of mortgage loans in Hungary, arisen primarily in the field of foreign currency 
lending.77 Provisions of the Consumer Credit Act entered into force on 11 June 2010. 
However, this statutory regulation, which can be said to be rather strict and imposes a very 
detailed information obligation, has not defined any requirements for the specific risk of foreign 
currency lending or for exchange rate risk. As for personal information, it only included the 
mandatory definition of the currency of the mortgage loan.78 However, this was not of significance 
among the instruments of prevention and crisis management, since its entry into force in 2010 
– after the crisis had already broken out – clearly ruled it out. However, it is noteworthy that the 
information requirements regarding exchange rate risk have not appeared – not even for the 
future – in this key legislation on consumer protection, despite the experience already made. 
The legal obligation of the creditor to provide pre-contractual information has been de 
facto present in the provisions of both the 1959 Civil Code and the CIFE from the very outset. 
Here we recall what we have already explored only to an extent, that although there has been 
a constant tightening of regulation in this field – and obviously the regulation imposed by the 
CIFE had the most direct impact on the everyday practice of lending –, an ex post assessment 
of the compliance of the obligation to provide information in terms of content, this legislation 
has provided no legal significance. Details of the obligation to provide information with the 
right content have been defined by the still evolving judicial practice79 and legal interpretation 
of the requirements of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
4.4.2. Period of risk management (2009−2010) 
Obviously, the legislative measures of this period can only be seen as preventing the problems 
of the already concluded retail foreign currency based and retail foreign currency mortgage 
loan contracts, and were not able to eliminate the serious financial disadvantages that already 
occurred. Therefore, this era should no longer be examined in terms of the exchange rate risk 
and changes in the legal framework regarding the provision of information thereon, but it 
should be examined, on the one hand, in terms of the changes in rules for future risk taking 
and, on the other hand, in terms of the legislative measures taken to deal exactly with the crisis. 
A) Change in risk taking rules 
There has been a radical change in this area, as after having experienced the effects of the first shocks 
of the crisis and seeing the failure of banking self-regulation and supervisory recommendations, the 
Government Decree 361/2009 (XII. 30.) on the terms of prudent retail lending and the assessment 
of creditworthiness on prudent retail lending and creditworthiness was drafted. This decree 
introduced fundamental rules in the Hungarian lending market according to the following:
77 See Article 13 and Annex 3 of the Act CLXII of 2009
78 See section II/5 of Annex 3 of the Act CLXII of 2009
79 See Judgement of the European Court of Justice, No. C-51/17. Of 20 September 2018 – http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=FB11AC3452E2F1B169DE6DD805CC3468?text=&docid=205931&
pageIndex=0&doclang=HU&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=617382
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•	 As	of	1	March	2010,	the	loan-to-value	ratio	was	introduced:	the	ratio	of	the	contractual	
amount of the mortgage loan to the market value of the real estate collateral could be 
maximum 60% in the case of euro mortgage loans, while in the case of other foreign 
currency mortgage loans the maximum was 45%;
•	 As	of	11	June	2010,	purely	collateral	based	lending	has	been	abolished	and	creditworthiness	
checking and the limit established on the basis thereof have become mandatory. The 
minimum values of the limit were fixed in the Decree. In addition, a monthly repayment 
limit was set for foreign currency lending, which could be for euro loans 80% of the limits 
set by the bank for forint loans, and 60% for other foreign currency loans. 
The regulation also contained rules as restrictions – that can now be considered trivial 
–, e.g. that the value of the debt covered by a mortgage already registered in the real estate 
register should also be taken into account in the calculation of the loan-to-value ratio. The 
regulation also set forth that if the lender charges lower interest rate and lower charges for a 
preferential period or provides a grace period for commencing the repayment of principal, 
the maximum repayment instalment after the end of the preferential period should be taken 
into account when checking compliance with the lending limit. 
If we look at the regulation that introduces a significant tightening in terms of today's 
lending requirements, we could be surprised to find that the regulation did not set an 
income-based loan repayment limit, i.e. the maximum rate of a household's income that 
can be spent on loan repayment.80 In addition, a loan-to-value ratio still did not have to 
be applied to retail mortgage loans secured by state guarantees, so the high coverage risk 
remained in the case of loans granted with state guarantee. 
The definitive and categorical phasing out of foreign currency mortgage lending as a financial 
service available in Hungary was finally realised by the amendment of the 1959 Civil Code that 
entered into force on 14 August 201081. This amendment stipulated that “A mortgage cannot be 
established on a property owned by a natural person or on an ownership interest in a property owned 
by a natural person in order to secure a creditor's claim arising from the a natural person’ – not 
including sole proprietors – loan agreement recorded in foreign currency or based on foreign currency, 
the parties' provision to the contrary shall be null and void.”82 However, this measure can be treated 
as a symbolic rather than a real restriction, because by this time, foreign currency lending had 
already disappeared from the domestic lending practice. This was due on the one hand to the 
above-mentioned legal restrictions, which had already exercised their effect, and on the other hand, 
the materially changed attitude of borrowers and lenders based on their own discretion. 
B) Crisis managing legislation
In the context of crisis management legislation, the legislature made a single law in the 
2009 to 2010 period: this is Act XCVI of 2010 on the amendment of certain finance-related 
acts in order to support consumers in difficult situations due to taking loans for house 
80 Regulation for the payment-to-income ratio was introduced as of 1 January 2015, by MNB Decree 32/2014. (IX. 10.).
81 Article 81 of Act XC of 2010 on the Adoption and Modification of Certain Economic and Financial Laws
82 Article 261 (4) of the 1959 Civil Code
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purchase. With its entry into force on 27 November 2010, this amending law, by adjusting 
both the CIFE and consumer credit act, introduced a number of tightening effects, which 
have also had an impact on foreign currency loan contracts already concluded. According to 
the explanatory memorandum to the law, “The Act provides mitigation solution for those who 
are trying to help themselves in their difficult situation. The support provided to them does not 
compromise the lending system, the solution cannot shake the mortgage lending system. The 
measures take account of the fact that the credit agreement is an economic transaction that, 
although it entails risks those risks must be borne jointly by the borrower and the lender. It is 
therefore necessary to incorporate guarantees in the inequality between debtors and lenders in 
the legal relationship at several points for the protection of the debtor.”
The amendments brought about the abolition of the dual rate, the limitation of unilateral 
contract modifications, and the tightening of early payment charges and fees charged under 
other legal titles. This can be characterised as a major change. However, it is also important 
to note that in response to the significant social tensions that already existed, this law defined 
– by designating regulatory areas – the direction of crisis management as if the legislation 
would be able to help the situation of “consumers in difficult situations due to taking loans 
for house purchase”. The reality, however, was that the really serious financial consequences 
were not caused by contract modifications or the use of different exchange rates, or by the 
excessive levels of bank charges, but by the effects of exchange rate changes. These resulted 
in a dramatic rise in repayment instalments and thereby in the severe payment difficulty or 
even insolvency of many households. In this situation, this amendment to the legislation was 
not able to alleviate the fact that the changes had to be applied also to the already concluded 
foreign currency loan contracts, by which it interpreted one of the basic principles of 
legislation, the prohibition of retroactive legislation83 surprisingly permissively. 
5. Summary 
As a summary of the legal experience of foreign currency lending in the period 2004 to 2010, it 
can be primarily concluded that the subsequent interpretation of the legal environment of this 
period cannot be separated from the legal thinking of that era, which designated the range of 
interpretation of the individual legal institutions tainted by the participants' previous experiences 
and expectations that can be subsequently overridden, but was then considered legitimate. Thus, 
it could have happened that for long years, in Hungary, retail indebtedness in foreign currency 
would have been a great solution –surrounded by strong public consensus – that was a key means 
in terms of the available well-being for borrowers, spectacular credit and income growth for 
creditors and for the overall macro economy in terms of catching up with Western Europe.84
83 According to Article 12 (2) of then effective Act XI of 1987 on Legislation: “The law may not impose an 
obligation before the date of its promulgation and may not declare any conduct unlawful."
84 “In Hungary, the fast-moving credit growth that has started since the transition to the market economy is mainly 
explained by the catching-up process. Boissay et al. [2005], Backé et al. [2006] and Kiss et al. [(2006] showed that 
a large part of credit growth in most of the new EU member states, including also Hungary, can be explained by 
macroeconomic fundamentals.” See: KIRÁLY – NAGY: opus cit 477.
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The significant change in circumstances, the never-before-expected weakening of the fo-
rint has stunned both the professional and lay participants, and society faced a problem 
on a scale of which the solution meant an unprecedented challenge for all concerned. 
Unfortunately, the scale of the problem did not change the basic attitude of finding solutions, 
which can be described as follows: “The parties to the transaction are driven by thousands 
and thousands of considerations on the conclusion of a transaction, from which the party, 
after the unpredictable disadvantage or advantage has emerged, only presents those that are 
expedient to eliminate this disadvantage or to maintain the advantage.”85
The immense retail foreign currency debt resulted not only in individual tragedies, but also 
in losses that shook the banking system. As a clear consequence of this, as is always in a conflict 
between parties, there has been mutual finger pointing, in which the law has become a tool, 
and everyone has tried to substantiate their respective truth with a legal argument. In the case 
of escalating disputes of exceptional size, a simplified casting of the weak and to be defended 
consumer against the “evil” bank has become accepted. This simplified search for truth, while 
understandable at an everyday level, is not suitable for identifying the real responsibilities and 
their share. Meanwhile, perhaps the most shocking result of this process – if only temporarily 
– was the loss of trust which is an inevitable element in a balanced bank-customer relationship. 
However, beyond the bitter experiences of the crisis, events also offer an opportunity to 
examine whether or not these types of shocks can be prevented by the legal system and, if 
so, how. Today, we already know that, between 2004 and 2010, neither the basically under-
informed borrowers nor the credit institutions destined for business success were suitable 
for assigning the risk limits of lending, as a particularly risky financial service. Although the 
legal system has been long looking at financial markets as an area to be strictly regulated in 
terms of foreign currency lending, however, the legislature’s recognition has only occurred 
as a result of an extraordinary shock caused by a crisis. I do not think that borrowers will 
be much more prudent and lenders much wiser in the present. The prerequisite for the non-
recurrence of the foreign currency lending crisis can therefore be the deterrent effect of the 
constraints set by a much more advanced regulatory environment.
85 BÁTOR: opus cit 261.
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1. Introduction 
The exposure of households (consumers) to foreign currency and foreign currency-based 
debts stem from events that occurred more than a decade ago. Following the general 
elections of 2002, the government discontinued the popular state-subsidized forint loans in 
2002 referring to budgetary reasons. As a consequence, the households opted for low inte-
rest rate foreign currency loans rather than for costly forint loans.1
In Hungary the conditions prevailing at the time of concluding the foreign currency 
consumer loans changed substantially after 2008 due to the effects of the unfolding 
international financial and economic crisis. In fact, whereas the Hungarian forint depreciated 
significantly, the euro and the Swiss franc appreciated strongly. 
In 2008 90% of new consumer loans in Hungary were foreign currency-based. In the period 
between 2006 and 2009 foreign currency lending assumed such proportions that it became a 
danger for the entire Hungarian economy. The foreign currency loan portfolio of households grew 
from HUF 2,000 billion at year end 2006 to HUF 6,000 in early 2009. When the new government 
took office in 2010, foreign currency loans represented 50% of the country’s external debt.2
As of 2010 the government sought to address the problem through effective legislation. 
The aim of the comprehensive action was to phase out household foreign currency loans as 
well as to help households hit by foreign currency debts. 
In what follows I will highlight three key amendments to Act LIII of 1994 on Judicial 
Execution (referred to as Judicial Execution Act) that were adopted to attain the government’s 
objectives as stated above. The first amendment dates from 2014, the other two from 2017. 
Before however describing these amendments, I will briefly present some of the government’s 
measures that had preceded the 2014 amendment of the Judicial Execution Act and aimed at 
assisting foreign currency debtors. 
2. Background
Due to serious exchange rate fluctuations, from the autumn of 2008 the number of new 
foreign currency loans dropped, at the same time the instalments of existing foreign currency 
loans were rising sharply. In order to tackle the situation, on 6 November 2008 the Ministry 
of Finance signed an agreement with eleven credit institutions playing a major role in the 
area of retail foreign currency lending. The agreement provided for instruments to mitigate 
the burdens of paying the increased instalments associated with the huge fluctuations of 
the forint’s exchange rate. The credit institutions undertook to extend the repayment period 
without charging extra costs at the debtor’s request and they also committed to convert 
foreign currency-based credits into forint-based loans. Moreover, the debtors who got into 
a difficult situation through no fault of their own could request the temporary relaxation of 
their repayment obligations. The agreement also provided for the flexible treatment of the 
prepayments of loans denominated in a currency other than the forint. 
1 A detailed description is available in: BODZÁSI Balázs: A devizahitelezés korszaka Magyarországon. Fontes 
Iuris, 2015/1. sz., 7-8.
2 http://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/fogyved-kockazati-2011h1.pdf
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At the beginning of March 2009, Parliament adopted the act on government guarantees 
for home loans.3 This enabled the Hungarian State to provide a guarantee for the capital and 
interest payments due under the bridge loans available to vulnerable debtors. 
The government first interfered with the Judicial Execution Act during the next year in order 
to give a hand to debtors experiencing hardships. The amendment4 consisted in adding a new 
section5 to the transitional provisions of the Judicial Execution Act on the postponement of 
the enforcement of evacuation orders until 15 April 2015. These provisions, however, had to 
be applied also to the ongoing enforcement proceedings in which the evacuation of property 
was not executed until the entry into force of the amendment.6 The amendment stipulated 
that postponement of the evacuation of properties would be governed by the provisions7 of the 
Judicial Execution Act regulating the eviction moratorium during the winter season. 
To help home debtors, the government and the Hungarian Banking Association agreed 
on a Home Protection Action Plan consisting of 5 points in May 2011. This included the 
introduction of a fixed exchange rate scheme, stricter conditions for foreign currency home 
lending, the extension of the home protection interest rate subsidy, gradual and limited 
auctioning as well as the establishment of the National Asset Management company. As for 
the government resolution on the strengthening of the situation of foreign currency debtors8, 
it set up a short-term action plan to mitigate the problems related to foreign currency debtors. 
The government submitted to Parliament its legislative proposal in June 2011 on fixing 
the exchange rate of the repayment of forex loans and on the forced foreclosure procedure of 
residential property, which entered into force on 30 June 2011 upon its adoption.9 The objective of 
fixing the exchange rate was to temporarily mitigate the effect of the fluctuations of the relevant 
currencies and thereby render the situation of foreign exchange debtors predictable. For those 
participating in the scheme, the act fixed the repayment exchange rate of the Swiss franc-based 
loans at 180 forints, of euro-based loans at 250 forints and of yen-based loans at 2.5 forints for a 
grace period not exceeding 60 months. The creditor offered a special forint mortgage loan, that 
is opened a special account to collect the difference between the fixed rate and the actual market 
rate of the repayment. This loan was covered by the same residential property that was used for 
the foreign currency-based loan and it could not expire earlier than the foreign exchange loan. 
During the application period of the fixed rate, the Hungarian State as guarantor was liable for 
100% of the debts accumulated on the special account. Following the application period of the fi-
xed exchange rate it remained liable for 25% of such debts as fallback guarantor. 
In order to give social protection to defaulted debtors, the act prohibited the auction of the affected 
real estates until 1 July 2011, that is it declared a moratorium on auctions. Besides this moratorium, 
the act also set forth that owing to the quota system on forced foreclosures that also regulated 
auctions, the enforcement of home debts could only take place gradually even after this date. 
3 Act IV of 2009 on government guarantees for home loans
4 Act LXXXI of 2010 on the amendment of Act LIII of 1994 on Judicial Enforcement
5 Section 303 of the Judicial Execution Act
6 The amendment entered in force on 11 August 2010 and postponed real estate eviction until 15 April 2011.
7 Section 182/A of the Judicial Execution Act
8 Government Resolution 1191/2011. (14 June) on strengthening the situation of foreign currency debtors
9 Act LXXV of 2011 on the fixing of exchange rates used for repayments of foreign exchange-denominated 
mortgage loans and the administration of the forced sales of residential property
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On 15 December 2011 the government concluded an agreement with the Hungarian Bank-
ing Association that required credit institutions to extend and to further ease the foreign 
exchange cap scheme until the end of 2012 for debtors.
The government decree on housing interest subsidy10 was adopted in the framework of 
the Home Creation Programme of the government. Provided that certain conditions were 
fulfilled, subsidies could be applied for. By passing the act amending certain laws related 
to household protection11, Act CXII of 1996 on credit institutions and financial enterprises 
(former Act on Credit Institutions) was also amended. Thus, the government enabled foreign 
currency mortgage debtors to repay their loans at preferential rates. 
Special mention should be made of the acts of 2014 (the so-called DH Acts) among measures 
aimed at settling the situation of foreign currency debtors. Owing to the act (referred to as 
Act DH)12 , the provisions of the Civil Law Uniformity Decision 2/2014 of the Curia became 
applicable to all foreign currency debtors without the necessity of taking legal proceedings. 
First and foremost, it helped avoid hundreds of thousands of lawsuits for the declaration of the 
nullity of the so-called exchange rate margin. Additionally, Act DH1 established a rebuttable 
presumption of the unfairness of contractual clauses providing for the opportunity to amend 
the contract unilaterally, as well as laid down special provisions for managing pending actions 
related to foreign currency loans. It is also worth noting that in Decision 34/2014 (14 Novem-
ber) the Constitutional Court rejected the initiative of judges to establish that Act DH1 was not 
in harmony with the Fundamental Law of Hungary and to annul it. 
The subsequently adopted Settlement Act (Act DH2)13 established the settlement obligation 
of financial institutions towards consumers. The settlement procedure concerned altogether 
3.6 million consumer loan contracts and resulted in the payment of around 750 billion 
forints representing claims from consumers. As a result of settlement, the outstanding 
principal debt decreased and the monthly instalments were reduced by 25% on average.14
This was followed by the Conversion Act (Act DH3) that was closely linked to previous 
government measures and was in line with them.15 The Act laid down the criteria, legal 
technique as well as the procedures of conversion into forints for residential mortgage loan 
contracts to which the settlement applied and for financial leasing contracts for real estate. 
The act furthermore set forth that consumer loan contracts affected by conversion into forints 
should be governed by the new contractual terms defined in the Fair Banking Act (Act DH4)16.
The acts on foreign currency loans required the amendment of the Judicial Execution Act. 
The purpose of the present paper is to provide an overview on how legislation adopted to 
settle the situation of foreign currency debtors impacted on the rules of judicial enforcement. 
10 Government Decree No. 341/2011 (29 December) on housing interest subsidy
11 Act CXXI  of 2011 on the amendment of certain laws related to home protection
12 Act XXXVIII of 2014 on settling certain issues relating to the uniformity decision of the Curia in respect of 
consumer loan contracts entered into with financial institutions.
13 Act XL of 2014 on the rules of settlement regulated in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on settling certain issues relating 
to the uniformity decision of the Curia in respect of the consumer loan contracts entered into by financial 
institutions, and certain other provisions.
14 http://www.mnb.hu/sajtoszoba/sajtokozlemenyek/2015-evi-sajtokozlemenyek/az-elszamolas-es-
forintositas-mind-az-orszag-mind-az-adosok-helyzeten-erdemben-javitott
15 Act LXXVII of 2014 on amending Act CLXII of 2009 on credit provided for consumers and other related acts.
16 Act LXXVIII of 2014 amending Act CLXII of 2009 on consumer loans and certain related Acts.
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3. The Significance of Judicial Enforcement 
In one of its early decisions the Constitutional Court underlined that: „Respect for court 
rulings, the execution of final court decisions -including the application of legitimate 
enforcement- belong to the constitutional values related to the rule of law. If the enforcement 
system is weak and easy to circumvent, that will inevitably lead to the underestimation of court 
decisions, to legal uncertainty, to the decline of legal consciousness, to the infringement of the 
principles of rule of law. Combatting such a menace is apparently a matter of constitutional 
interest for citizens, society and the State.”17
The passage quoted from the CC decision highlights the fact that the adequate functioning 
of the system and procedures of judicial enforcement is an essential matter with respect to 
the rule of law and the entire society. 
Laws are mostly obeyed through voluntary compliance.  In the absence of this, the norms 
based on social consensus must be enforced by the State’s coercive power. Judicial execution 
is one of these coercive proceedings. Judicial execution is necessary to enforce the decisions 
of courts and of other dispute resolution bodies (e.g. public notaries) as well as to recover 
claims based on enforceable decisions and certain acts.18
Civil procedural law governs two sets of procedural rules: litigious and non-litigious 
proceedings. Judicial execution belongs to non-litigious proceedings and it aims to give 
effect to state pressure in the interest of enforcing the rightful claim of the party seeking 
enforcement. In the meantime, state pressure may only be used if the debtor fails at voluntary 
performance. 
Despite the fact that the public perception of the role of executors (bailiffs) is far from being 
favourable, it should be stressed that executors exercise extremely important tasks of public 
authority by enforcing final court decisions. This important public authority, the competent 
and effective regulation of the enforcement proceedings as well as the regular inspection of 
the executors’ activities confer a heavy task and responsibility upon the legislature. 
The enforcement proceedings must in any event meet two essential principles: the 
protection of the debtor/the obligated party on the one hand, and on the other the respect 
of the interests of the party seeking enforcement/the creditor as well as the effective 
enforcement of the claim.19 These principles should be upheld by complying with the strict 
rules laid down in legislation, and in particular the Act on Judicial Execution. 
The period of „Socialist enforcement law” before 1990 used to be characterized by low-
efficiency enforcement proceedings. This can mainly be attributed to the fact that Socialist 
law sought to use the power of persuasion to convince debtors to perform claims. It is evident 
therefore that a shift occurred towards the principle of the protection of debtors.20
After the political changeover a plethora of economic actors entered the scene, resulting in 
an increased number of contractual transactions concluded between them, of the resulting 
legal disputes as well as that of the parties failing to perform their obligations on a voluntary 
basis. This required defining new procedures and setting up new structures after 1990. 
17 CC Decision 46/1991 (10 September)
18 VIDA István: A bírósági végrehajtás. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1978. 381.
19 SZILBEREKY Jenő - NÉVAI László: Polgári eljárásjog. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1976. 652.
20 KENGYEL Miklós: Magyar polgári eljárásjog. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2012. 652.
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Parliament adopted the Act on Judicial Execution in 1994.  Owing to the Act, the rules on 
enforcement proceedings were further developed and the structures of enforcement were 
radically transformed to comply with the rule of law. 
The Judicial Execution Act of 1994 created the institution of independent judicial officers 
as the general organizational form of judicial enforcement. In the new structure, the body 
in charge of execution was separated from the court structures, and the Minister of Justice 
was charged with its supervision. The status of the judicial executor could (and can still) 
be regarded as a sui generis legal institution in the newly created structure. In fact, the 
judicial executors perform their activities of public authority as entrepreneurs (employed by 
a registered company) distinct from the institutions of state power in their stricter sense. The 
legislature therefore permanently seeks to ensure that that the control and state supervision 
of judicial executors should also be performed within a strict legal framework. 
4. The Position and Role of Judicial Enforcement
In order to be able to assess the social and economic significance of judicial enforcement, its 
position within the enforcement system needs to be identified. 
Judicial enforcement is a civil non-litigious procedure in which the court or another 
body authorized to enforcement implements the sanction targeting the performance or the 
granting of an obligation by way of material coercion.  
 Civil non-litigious procedures have been regulated in Hungary since 1881 in a separate 
act21. Thus, in judicial enforcement procedures material coercion may be applied to ensure 
that the person liable for payment or other behavioural commitments performs his 
obligations. 
The claim to be enforced during the procedure can either be material or criminal. In 
the case of material claims execution might either target the recovery of financial claims 
or the performance of the defined action. Both the recovery of financial claims and the 
performance of the defined action can be achieved under a judicial or administrative 
enforcement procedure. 
Enforcement may be carried out by either penitentiary or material execution. Within 
material execution a further distinction can be made between single (singular) execution 
and universal (total) execution. The single execution procedure concerns certain property 
items, property elements and property rights of the debtor and does not affect the debtor’s 
legal personality. Universal property execution by contrast seizes the whole property of 
the debtor in order to satisfy the claims. As a consequence of total execution, the debtor 
operating as a legal entity also loses its legal personality. Typical cases of total execution are 
winding-up procedures. 
In Hungarian law, single execution may be conducted in three ways, namely by:22
a) judicial enforcement,
21 Act LX of 1881 on enforcement procedures
22 NÉMETH János - VIDA István: A bírósági végrehajtás magyarázata. KJK-KERSZÖV Jogi és Üzleti Kiadó 
Kft., Budapest, 2004. 120.
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b) administrative enforcement, and
c) direct enforcement.
Two types of direct enforcement may be distinguished:  
a) direct judicial order of garnishment23 , and
b) direct judicial notice24.
Direct enforcement is carried out by bodies that do not qualify as either judicial or 
administrative authorities. In the event of direct enforcement, the claim may only be settled 
by deduction from amounts – like wages and other remuneration – due to the debtor. 
Deduction is not ordered by the executor, but by the court. Employers for instance might be 
entitled to deduct sums from the wages and other remunerations of the employee up to the 
rightfully claimed amount.25
As regards their purpose, enforcements might be further grouped into safeguard 
enforcements and claim satisfaction enforcements. The aim of safeguard enforcements is to 
secure the enforcement of the claim at a later date. It can be applied in cases when although 
the conditions for claim satisfaction enforcement are not met, it appears likely to the creditor 
(entitled party) that the satisfaction of its claim at a later date is at risk. The goal of claim 
satisfaction enforcements, by contract, is the immediate and full enforcement and satisfaction 
of the claim. In accordance with the Judicial Execution Act, safeguard enforcements may be 
ordered by means of issuing a financial claim or applying a specific restriction.26 
The basic aim of judicial execution is to enforce the creditors’ claims that have not yet been 
honoured by the debtor. Each of the provisions pertaining to the enforcement procedure were 
designed to create a balance between two mutually recognizable interests: those of the claimant 
and the debtor. It should be underlined, however, that creditors’ claims do not only constitute 
claims of financial institutions. The debtor’s real estate property could be subject to auctioning 
and eventual evacuation due to failure to meet other private law claims like child support, public 
utilities fees and amounts owed to private individuals. Therefore, debtors could be constrained to 
leave their residential property due to failure to pay their bank loans. If the debtor did not request 
payment by instalment or did not pay back the amounts owed, the evacuation of real estate 
property could take place in the framework of an enforcement procedure ordered on any grounds. 
5. Temporary Extension of the Eviction Moratorium
Among the measures aimed at settling the situation of foreign currency debtors and affecting 
enforcement procedures, Act XVII of 2014 amending Act LIII of 1994 on judicial executions 
should be first mentioned. The amendment entered into force on 16 May 2014. By virtue 
of the Act, residential property evacuations were postponed until the period following the 
23 Section 24 of the Judicial Execution Act
24 Section 28 of the Judicial Execution Act
25 NÉMETH - VIDA: i.m. 185.
26 Section 185 of the Judicial Execution Act
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expiry date of the evacuation moratorium to be defined in a separate act that was to settle the 
situation of foreign currency debtors.27 This separate act was to be called the Settlement Act. 
Owing to this amendment, the period of the eviction moratorium was actually extended. 
28Rather than modifying the principal rules on the period of the eviction moratorium, 
the amendment extended the moratorium until a specific date in the future. In fact, the 
amendment was included in the transitional provisions of the act, after the expiry of which 
the principal rule of the Judicial Execution Act was applied anew. 
Pursuant to the amendment of the Judicial Execution Act, the postponement of the evacuation 
of residential property was applied to transactions in which the debtor’s residential property was 
subject to enforcement due to debts arising from a foreign currency loan contract. After the entry 
into force of the act although the bailiff was entitled to implement an enforcement action and 
could auction residential property, he could not take measures to evacuate residential property. 
6. Staying of Enforcement Procedures 
In accordance with Act DH1 the enforcement proceedings associated with claims arising from 
consumer credit and loan contracts as well as financial leasing contracts (hereinafter referred to 
as consumer loan contracts) were staid.29 These provisions of the act were to be applied as of 26 
July 2014, that is pending enforcement procedures were staid as of 26 July 2014 by virtue of the law. 
There were two exceptions to these rules in cases when the enforcement procedure initiated 
to collect the claim originating from the loan contract was under suspension on the day of the 
entry into force of Act DH1. One of the exceptions was when the debtor was granted instalment 
payment, the other being when the employer or the organ disbursing the remuneration 
confirmed that the deduction was registered and taking other measures was neither possible 
or necessary. In these cases, the enforcement procedure could not be stayed automatically, 
but only at the debtor’s request. These two cases were therefore exceptions from the automatic 
staying effect imposed by the act. Although it was possible to have the enforcement procedures 
stayed even in these cases, this was subject to the action and request of the debtor.30
Staying as a notion had been unknown to enforcement procedures before the entry into force of 
Act DH1. Thus, stayed enforcement procedures constituted a separate sui generis  category within 
the realm of enforcement proceedings. Staying implied that in enforcement procedures initiated 
to collect the claim originating from the loan contract pending on the day of the entry into force 
of Act DH1 no action or measure could be implemented until the date specified in the separate 
act (Settlement Act),  irrespective of the phase of the procedure in question.  Furthermore, the 
statements made by parties and other interested parties also became ineffective. All time limits 
were suspended until the date specified in the act and commenced again thereafter.31
27 Section 303 of the Judicial Execution Act
28 At the time of the entry into force of the amendment, the eviction moratorium lasted from 1 December to 1 
March
29 Section 17(2) of Act DH1
30 Section 17(2) of Act DH1
31 Section 17(3) of Act DH1
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After the entry into force of Act DH1 the obstacles had been removed from submitting 
an enforcement request and thereby from initiating the enforcement procedure. Apart 
from initiating the procedure, however, no other procedural actions or measures could be 
implemented and no valid statements could be made either. Requests for enforcement could 
be submitted, since failure to do so might have jeopardized the enforceability of the claim 
due to the time limitation, but the bailiff could not implement procedural actions and thus 
could not ensure the enforcement of the claim either. In fact, by virtue of the provisions of 
Act DH1 once the enforcement procedure was initiated the claim did not expire due to the 
interruption of the time limit. 
Judicial executors were required to record the enforcement case as interrupted if no 
measures or procedural actions were taken in accordance with Act DH1. The staying of 
enforcement procedures was also applicable to other enforcement procedures initiated 
against the debtor to collect claims if the procedures concerned asset(s) seized during the 
procedure associated with the consumer loan contract.32 This included cases initiated to 
enforce other claims joined by the pledgee. 
In selling the assets seized during the enforcement procedure associated with consumer 
loan contracts, the executor had to take into account one of the key principles of the Judicial 
Execution Act, namely graduation,33 as well as the determination of seniority.34 As the bailiff’s 
hands were tied with regard to the asset, he could not implement measures relative to the 
sale of assets not associated with the consumer loan contract, one of the reasons being that 
pursuant to Act DH1 he could not divide the amount in the enforcement case associated with 
the consumer contract loan, satisfy the creditor as well as have the foreclosure removed from 
the record. It is important to note, however, that the debtor could not spontaneously pay the 
amounts owed during the staying period. At the same time, the claim of the creditor increased 
gradually during the staying period to the degree defined in the enforcement order. 
The entry into force of Act DH1 resulted in the massive staying of enforcement proceedings. 
In these cases, the executor could not take any measures, including the implementation of 
real estate property evacuation. 
It was obvious, however, that this state of affairs could not be maintained for a longer 
period. As a matter of fact, the parties seeking enforcement – and not just the holders of 
consumer loan contracts– could not access their claims. Debtors, on the other hand, could 
not pay their debts even if they intended to do so due to the stayed enforcement procedures. 
Also, debtors did not honour their other payment obligations, either. They could be sure that 
as a result of staying affecting all enforcement procedures, the auctioning and the evacuation 
of their seized real estate property will not take place for some time. All in all, payment 
discipline became considerably poorer. 
32 Section 17(5) of Act DH1
33 Section 7 of the Judicial Execution Act
34 Section 165 of the Judicial Execution Act
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7. Resumed Enforcement Procedures 
The Settlement Act set out the detailed rules on bank settlement following the termination 
of lawsuits based on Act DH1. The Settlement Act required financial institutions to comply 
with their settlement obligations and it also set out the rules of resuming enforcement 
procedures stayed on the basis of Act DH1. 
The financial institution was obliged to send the statement of settlement to the debtors 
with regard to all consumer loan contracts as required by the Settlement Act. The financial 
institution was obliged to send a notification to the executor on having sent the settlement 
statement to the debtor within 30 days and was also required to send the settlement statement 
to the executor at the same time. Following this, the executor was required to resume the 
previously stayed enforcement procedure within 60 days. In accordance with the Settlement 
Act the enforcement procedure was stayed until the 30th day following the notification by the 
financial institution. As a consequence, the executor could not resume the procedure until the 
30th day following the notification, but then was obliged to resume it within 60 days. 
The only exception to the above requirement was a case in which the financial institution did 
not notify the executor. In such cases the procedure could be resumed after 31 December 2016 
at the latest. Thus, all enforcement procedures resumed after 31 December 2016 at the latest.
The provision on the final deadline was necessary because thereby it was ensured that 
possible omission of the financial institution could not prevent resuming enforcement 
procedures against debtors. In the event that the financial institution failed to comply with 
its obligation to notify the executor in accordance with the Settlement Act, the enforcement 
procedure was not stayed any longer after 31 December 2016, but the case was suspended 
from this date. The executor therefore registered the case as suspended from this day, that is 
the deadlines and the limitation started again while other enforcement procedures resumed. 
Enforcement procedures were resumed with the procedural step at which they had been 
stayed. The executor therefore did not always resume the procedure by implementing the 
evacuation of the real estate property. 
Act XVII of 2014 amending the Judicial Execution Act postponed the implementation 
of the evacuation of residential property to the period following the date of the eviction 
moratorium specified in the Settlement Act.35 Taking into account the eviction moratorium, 
the evacuation of the residential property laid down in Section 303 of the Judicial Execution 
Act could resume within 30 days of notifying the executor or at the latest after 31 Decem-
ber 2016. It is worth noting in this context that Section 303 applied only to already sold 
residential property. Evacuation could only occur when the property had been sold. It 
should also be kept in mind that Section 303(9) of the Judicial Execution Act applied to a 
narrower scope of contracts than Act DH1 or the Settlement Act. The scope of application 
of Section 303 of the Judicial Execution Act did not extend to consumer loan contracts not 
secured on mortgage. In these cases, as a general rule the evacuation of residential property 
35 Sections (1) and (4) of the Settlement Act
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could be completed nearly immediately after notifying the executor about the settlement. 
Nevertheless, the eviction moratorium had to be kept in mind in such cases, too. 
The above shows that the impact of Act DH1 and the of Settlement Act on enforcement 
procedures was rather significant and went beyond the foreign currency debtors’ enforcement 
cases. In fact, the acts had the effect of staying every enforcement procedure against foreign 
currency debtors, and as a consequence often no returns were realized in these cases for a 
long time. At the same time the amount of the claims was increasing continuously since the 
acts stipulated only with respect to the limitation period that no further deadlines would be 
set. These acts did not allow for voluntary performance by debtors within the framework of 
enforcement procedures, with the exception of agreements on instalment payment and the 
confirmation of deductions originating from the period preceding their entry into force. 
All in all, while the effectiveness and efficiency of enforcement procedures decreased, the 
amount of the claims increased. 
8. Further Measures to Improve the Situation of 
Debtors 
8. 1. The Introduction of Personal Bankruptcy 
The settlement of foreign currency loans, the exchange rate peg, the conversion into forints, 
as well as the staying of enforcement procedures all helped to address the problem of 
severely indebted households. The government nevertheless believed that further measures 
were needed to restore the solvency of certain groups. The Personal Bankruptcy Act was 
devised to assist foreign currency debtors and other debtors in serious difficulty. (Private 
Bankruptcy Act).36 The Act entered into force on 1 September 2015 and introduced a brand 
new legal instrument in the Hungarian legal system. 
The Personal Bankruptcy Act provided for settlement procedures in order to have the 
debts of individuals with payment difficulties settled within a regulated framework and 
thus restore their solvency. The legal instrument, however, did not seek to save either the 
population groups that had incurred multiple debts or those who were much wealthier than 
the average. 
The personal bankruptcy procedure could only be initiated on a voluntary basis. Insolvent 
debtors had to consider at their own discretion the benefits associated with the procedure as 
well as the obligations to be undertaken in exchange for them. 
The legislature intended to prevent the situation of debtors and the family members living 
together with him from becoming economically unfeasible by means of a settlement framework 
that could be joined voluntarily. In many respects this procedure was more advantageous for 
debtors than either the enforcement procedure or the non-procedural enforcement of the 
real estate secured on mortgage. Families with payment difficulties were granted protection 
against bankruptcy already in the early stage of the settlement procedure. That is, they were 
36 Act CV of 2015 on the debt settlement of natural persons
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protected from enforcement procedures, non-procedural forced sales during the procedure 
and could initiate the settlement of their debts with help from the State. 
If a private bankruptcy procedure is successful, the debtor can get rid of a significant part 
of his debts within a reasonable time and by co-operating with the creditor, he might even 
be able to keep his residential property. If the debtor makes payments during the five-year 
repayment period in an orderly manner and the creditors access the minimal return defined 
by law, the court may exempt the debtor from paying the remaining debt. 
8. 2. Provisions ensuring the debtor’s housing during the enforcement 
procedure
Simultaneously with the entry into force of the Private Bankruptcy Act, the Judicial Execution 
Act was complemented with a provision requiring the party seeking enforcement with respect 
to residential real estate properties (holiday homes) and their buyers at auctions to notify 
the local notary. Pursuant to this amendment, as of 1 September 2015, the party seeking 
enforcement was obliged to notify the notary of the locality in which the property is situated 
about the seizure of the property.  As for the buyer at the auction, he was required to notify the 
notary of the locality in which the property is situated about the evacuation of the residential 
property. As of 1 July 2016, this notification requirement has been transferred to the executor.37
The legislature thus sought to ensure that the debtor and his family owning residential 
property (a holiday home) would only be obliged to leave their property if the notary has 
attempted to provide them with housing within the available limits. This amendment 
primarily supports debtors who are not able to initiate a private bankruptcy procedure.
 
8. 3. Ensuring the sale of residential properties at the highest possible 
price during the enforcement procedure 
The amendment of the Judicial Execution Act for the further protection of debtors that 
entered into force on 21 March 201738 specified that in the case a residential property is 
auctioned in an enforcement procedure initiated to collect the claim arising from the 
contracts concluded with the consumer, the valid purchase price should reach at least the 
property’s valuation price. In fact, the party seeking enforcement may only take over the 
property at a price corresponding to the valuation price. By introducing the amendment, the 
objective was to have seized property sold at as high prices as possible and also to realize the 
highest possible returns on existing claims. At the same time, this measure did not only take 
into account the protection of debtors, but the interests of the parties seeking enforcement 
as well by setting as an objective the realization of the highest possible returns on the claims. 
It should be stressed that the scope of claims arising from contracts concluded with 
consumers is larger than that arising from consumer loan contracts affected by Act DH1 or 
the Settlement Act. As a consequence, the limit relating to the minimal sale price affected a 
significant proportion of enforcement procedures. 
37 Sections 138/C and 154/A(11) of the Judicial Execution Act
38 Act XIV of 2017 amending Act LIII of 1994 on judicial execution.
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In accordance with Section 147(3) of the Judicial Execution Act in force as of 21 March 
2017: „A valid purchase offer for residential property can only be made at a sum corresponding 
to minimum 70% of the starting auction price -or a sum corresponding to the starting auction 
price for enforcing claims arising from contracts concluded with a consumer -if this is the 
debtor’s sole residential property, he dwells here and he was staying here for the 6 months pri-
or to initiating the enforcement procedure.” 
Therefore, if the enforcement procedure was initiated to collect a claim arising from a 
contract concluded with a consumer, the residential property may only be sold minimally at 
its starting auction price (valuation price). In the absence of these conditions, the residential 
property can only be sold at minimally 70% of the starting auction price. If, however, the 
real estate does not qualify as residential property pursuant to Section 147(4) of the Judicial 
Execution Act, it can be sold at minimum 50% of the starting auction price (valuation price). 
The rule on the higher minimum selling price laid down by the Judicial Execution 
Act decreased the number of successful auctions and sales after its entry into force. As a 
consequence of fewer auctions and sales, the number of evacuations also diminished. Thus, 
the amendment had a direct effect on evictions, too.  
Due to the increase of the market price of real estate, the marketability of properties during 
enforcement procedures has remained at the same level in certain parts of the country, while 
in other parts it has lessened. The marketability of real estate properties in Budapest and its 
agglomeration as well as in big cities has not fallen, enabling a number of the parties seeking 
enforcement to benefit from the new rules. This is also advantageous for debtors, since return 
on their debts is realized at the highest possible rate. Moreover, their property could be 
purchased at such a high price that they might even be entitled to some money from the sales. 
As a result of the fact that the amendment increased the minimum price of residential property 
as defined by the act to 100% of the valuation price, the marketability of properties located in 
small settlements dropped considerably. As the property would not sell, any debtor in possession 
of such a property had greater chances of staying in the property for an indefinite period without 
repaying his debts. This situation does clearly not encourage a debtor not wishing to perform 
voluntarily to repay his debts or sign an agreement on instalment payments. 
As established in the Judicial Execution Act, these new provisions should be applied in 
ongoing enforcement proceedings in such a manner that they should be observed when 
announcing the next auctions.39 In addition, the new rules should also be applied to cases in 
which the auction had been announced prior to the entry into force of the amendment, no 
valid purchase offer was available on the date of the entry into force.
As a result, the executor was obliged to examine without delay for each announced auction 
whether a procedure had been initiated to collect the claim arising from the contract concluded 
with the consumer. In case such procedure had been already launched and the case involved 
residential property, moreover the above conditions are jointly met, he was required to delete the 
announcement from the Electronic Auction Surface. Besides notifying the parties of the deleted 
announcement, he was required to make a new announcement in line with the amended rules. 
39 Section 306/X(1) of the Judicial Execution Act
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The amendment also provided for numerous options for making a purchase offer inferior 
to the valuation price during the auction of a residential property for which a claim was made 
in an enforcement procedure arising from a consumer contract. This happens if one year has 
passed since the publication of the announcement of continuous auction with regard to the 
residential property and it has still not been sold. In this case a valid purchase offer can be 
made at 90% of the starting auction price (valuation price) at the next announced auction.40
Importantly, these new provisions were not foreseen for a transitional period, they are in 
place even today.
8. 4. „Walking away” during  the enforcement procedure
The amendment of the Judicial Execution Act that entered into force on 21 March 2017 
enabled parties (the debtor and the party seeking enforcement or in the case of more than 
one enforcement, all the parties requesting enforcement) to agree on auctioning the property 
at a lower price. Such price is the proportion of the starting auction price (valuation price) 
agreed by them at which a purchase offer can be made. The Judicial Execution Act does not 
set any floor, but leaves the parties free to define the amount of the minimum price. The 
parties can thus divert from the principal rule (100%, 70%, 50%). 
The property announced for auctioning at this minimum price may be auctioned 
successfully at a price that constitutes more than 100% of the starting auction price (valuation 
price). As a matter of fact, bids can be made above the minimum amount decided upon 
by the parties, there is no ceiling in this respect. The parties merely agree on the amount 
of auctioning at a lower price, but cannot predict the amount of the maximum bid at the 
closing of the auction. 
One of the key new elements of the amendment is that in such cases following the successful 
auction of the property and the division of the amounts resulting from the auction between the 
parties seeking the enforcement, all the remaining debts of the debtor are cancelled vis-a-vis 
the parties requesting enforcement. This is the so-called walk away option that had not been 
regulated in Hungarian law before the amendment of the Judiciary Execution Act. It should be 
emphasized that this option is not only available with regard to debts to financial institutions. 
Owing to the introduction of the walkaway option, the debtor may get rid of all his debts 
after the auctioning of his residential property by the power of law. This typically occurs 
when the sale of the debtor’s property was - perhaps repeatedly – unsuccessful,  but the 
debtor wishes to free himself of the debt. An additional condition, however, is that the 
parties seeking enforcement should also be willing to agree with the debtor. 
8. 5. Extension of the eviction moratorium 
The rules on the winter evacuation moratorium was amended by the legislature as of 11 
November 2017. In accordance with the amendment,41 the Judicial Execution Act put off 
the implementation of the evacuation of the residential property in case the obligated 
40 Section 159(8) of the Judicial Execution Act 
41 Act  CXXXV  of 2017 on the amendment of Act LIII of 1994 on Judicial Execution
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party/debtor is a natural person for a period following the period between 15 November 
and 30 April (this replaced the period between 1 December and 1 March laid down in the 
former provision). As a result of the amendment the eviction moratorium was extended. 
The legislature thus offers help to the debtors during the most critical winter season. The 
amended provision was to be applied to enforcement procedures pending on the date of its 
entry into force in which the residential properties had not been evacuated yet. 
It is essential to note with respect to the amendment that whereas the former extension 
of the eviction moratorium had been transitional, this amendment is not transitional and is 
not linked to any deadline. 
The time period of the eviction moratorium affects the successful selling of residential 
properties during the enforcement procedure, the return on claims as well as the debtors’ 
willingness to pay. In fact, in many cases it entails that the buyer at the auction may only take 
possession of the purchased property after a longer period of time following the auction. 
It is to be noted, however, that the period of the eviction moratorium does not need to be 
considered in the course of evacuating every property.  An exception is made in the case of 
vacating arbitrarily occupied dwellings, if a disciplinary fine was imposed on the obligated 
party, or if the obligated party is not a private individual. 
A further important aspect is that statistical data on property evacuation and the transfer of 
possession do not necessarily coincide with data on evictions. In accordance with the Judicial 
Execution Act, evacuation of the property occurs also if the debtor leaves the property on a 
voluntary basis and if the property had been empty at the time of selling. In the latter case 
evacuation or the transfer of possessions does not take place through police intervention. 
Therefore eviction really means the evacuation of property through police intervention. 
9. Summary 
As of 2014 the Hungarian legislature has been devising measures that have quickly 
and efficiently addressed the legal consequences of the unfairness of contractual clauses 
included in consumer loan contracts that affected a large group of consumers. During 
settlement by legislation of the issues related to consumer loan contracts, one of the essential 
considerations was the protection of the consumer who was unfamiliar with economic and 
financial processes and was deemed as the weaker party in representing his interests. In line 
with these considerations, the rules with regard to enforcement proceedings laid greater 
emphasis on the protection of debtors in the last few years. The vast majority of enforcement 
procedures related to the acts on foreign currency loans have either been resumed or closed. 
The number of enforcement procedures which are currently in the suspension phase due to 
staying is insignificant.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of the study is to examine domestic foreign exchange denominated lending, primarily 
in respect to housing loans. The analysis also covers the period before the proliferation of foreign 
exchange credits and the period following their successful phase-out. The focus on property loans 
is justified by the fact that, although foreign exchange credits were present in a substantial volume 
in both personal credits and vehicle loans, the property market is an important factor for several 
national economic reasons. On the one hand, property credit generally incurs repayment obligations 
for households for decades, on the other hand housing is the most important asset of most households. 
Due to the above, the redemption of credit and the fluctuation of the property’s value permanently 
and significantly influences the disposable income, and the financial standing of households.
Further to this, the quality of long-term property loans fundamentally influences bank 
lending. Should borrowers not be able to fulfil their payment obligation in time, this can 
lead to an increasing necessity for the banks to build up reserves, due to which their lending 
ability is reduced. The high proportion of bad credit can therefore reduce lending for a long 
time, and through this reduce demand in the economy as well.
The availability of property loans is also decisive in respect to demand on the property market, 
which also influences the amount of newly built homes, and consequently the renewal rate of the 
housing stock as well. An adequate supply of new housing is also important in respect to labour 
mobility, since a failure to provide proper housing means that the labour flow into certain regions 
will lead to increasing prices, which further limits mobility. The availability of affordable and good 
quality housing is also important in respect to demographic processes. Namely, if the majority of 
household income is tied up in high housing costs, or only poor quality housing can be provided, or 
it is far from work opportunities and not cost-effective, this reduces the tendency to have children.
During the period following the political and economic changes there were three 
periods when housing credit boomed. First, in the early 2000s, thanks to the introduction 
of subsidized (HUF) housing loans in a high interest rate environment. Soon after the 
substantial reduction of subsidies, foreign exchange lending took over the role of HUF loans, 
which dominated the credit market up until the crisis. Afterwards, the volume of lending 
fell again, and following the successful management of the inheritance of foreign exchange 
credits in several stages, the opportunity to increase housing credit was opened up again. 
In the following sections, we will first review the long-term lending trends and the 
property market, then we will address the period after the change in the political system and 
the introduction of housing loans, followed by the proliferation of foreign exchange credits. 
Finally, we will compare the current period to the foreign exchange credit boom period.
2. Long-term trends in housing construction
By analysing the period since 1960 it can observed that the first big housing construction boom 
was in the 1970s, when nearly 90 thousand dwellings were built on average annually. On the 
one hand, it was a result of family policy measures introduced in 1973, and on the other hand it 
was a period when the more populous generation, i.e. the people born during the Ratkó-period 
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(born in the 1950s) reached the age when they were able to have their own families. The rising 
number of births was followed by an increase in the number of constructed new homes (Fig. 
1). Family policy measures also contributed, as they eased the access to housing by providing 
rented flats – owned by the local governments – for families with three or more children within 
a fairly short period of time, and interest-free or subsidised loans for newly married couples. In 
addition, families could also apply for a housing subsidy if they committed themselves to having 
children later. If children were not born, the subsidy was capitalized as part of the credit. It must 
be noted, however, that a substantial number of the homes built during this period were in big 
blocks of flats produced in a so-called house factory style, which means that these residential 
areas were too congested and therefore less comfortable. Following this peak period, the end of 
the demographic peak was followed by a moderation in the number of constructions.
According to estimates based on international experience, the 26,500 flats built on average 
annually after the change in the political system between 1990 and 1999, were not enough to achieve 
an acceptable rate of renewal. Based on the estimate by the MNB conducted in 2016, the number of 
annually built new dwellings necessary to maintain the quality of housing was nearly 40 thousand 
(MNB, 2016), which represents an annual renewal rate of roughly 1 per cent. The 0.6 rate of the 
1990s fell significantly short of this figure. If we add that the number of dwellings per household 
in Hungary is lower than the Eurozone average, and that the existing housing stock of the 1990s 
was quite amortized, and fell behind the Western-European standard in terms of comfort, energy 
efficiency and in other respects too,2 then the number of new housing construction needed to 
increase the quality of housing considerably exceeded the estimate of 40 thousand. 
Besides the state subsidy and the demographic processes, the demand side of the housing 
market in a market economy was primarily influenced by the long-term income expectations 
of households, their net financial situation and credit market conditions. Consequently, 
following the change in the political system, during the transformation crisis ‒ as a result of 
deteriorating lending conditions due to decreasing household income and high inflation as 
well as decreasing subsidies ‒ the number of housing construction plummeted and reached 
its nadir in 1999 with less than 20 thousand units built (Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Long-term development in the number of new dwellings completed (pieces)
Source: KSH
2 Based on the figures of KSH, only 74.1 per cent of flats had water-flushing toilets (water closets) while only 
78.3 per cent had bathrooms in 1990.
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The next wave of the housing boom was initiated by the introduction of subsidised 
housing loans in 2000, followed by more beneficiary conditions the following year. However, 
the subsidies fell considerably in 2003, therefore lending fell again until the proliferation of 
foreign exchange credits about a year later. 
As a consequence of the phase-out of foreign exchange credits after the crisis, the outsourcing 
of credits and the number of housing construction decreased again. 2013 represented the 
lowest point, when just over 7 thousand flats were built in a year, and it was not until 2017 that 
the number of homes constructed every year rose above 10 thousand again.
3. The antecedents of the appearance of foreign 
exchange credits
 
3.1. The property market and lending environment following the change 
in the political and economic system
Following the change in the political system household income decreased and weak lending 
failed to support the demand side of the housing market. Consequently, compared to 1990, 
by the end of the decade the volume of housing loans had dropped substantially. It also 
played a role that subsidised housing loans provided by OTP (the biggest bank in Hungary) 
before the change in the political system were mass-redeemed at the beginning of 1991. In 
addition, the reduction of the volume of housing credits was the consequence of high inte-
rest rates – due to double-digit inflation –, which along with the uncertain income situation 
of households became a substantial obstacle to an increase in housing loans. (Figure 2.)
Figure 2: The volume of property loans and their year-on-year change in the 1990s (Billion HUF,  
and year/year, per cent)
 
Source: KSH
During most of the 1990s, as a consequence of the weak demand in the property market – 
due to lower housing credit volume, decreasing real wages and employment – housing prices 
decreased in real terms despite the fact that fewer new homes were being built (Fig. 3). Lower 
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unemployment was explained by the fact that the participation rate was falling faster than 
employment, because after losing their jobs, many people left the labour market altogether.
Figure 3: The development of housing prices, net real wages, employment and housing loans (1992=100)
Source: KSH, MNB
3.2. The period of subsidized forint loans
Despite the low quality of housing, the demand for new homes was still weak at the end of 
the 1990s as a result of high interest rates and the uncertain income outlook of households. 
In this situation the Government attributed paramount importance to helping households 
to acquire suitable homes. It therefore changed its housing policy in 2000, by which it sought 
to achieve its goal by, on the one hand, promoting the construction of municipality rental 
flats, and on the other hand by subsidizing housing loans. We will discuss only the latter. 
Two housing support programmes were launched: the interest rate support for credits 
financed by mortgage debenture (resource-side interest rate subsidy) and the supplemental 
interest rate subsidy (asset-side interest rate subsidy). The aim of the subsidies was to make 
the housing credits payable during a relatively short period, when interest rates and inflation 
were high. (Tárki, 2004)
The essence of the asset-side interest rate subsidy is that part of the transaction interest rate 
charged by banks is paid from the budget, therefore the credit borrower is only burdened by 
the interest rate reduced by the subsidy. The size of the subsidy was linked to the reference 
yield of government securities, hence with the moderation of inflation and bond yields the 
amount of the subsidy also decreased. Since the measure did not bring the expected credit 
growth the subsidy was increased by 2 percentage points bringing down the maximum inte-
rest rate to be paid by the borrower to 6 per cent in autumn 2001. The subsidised loans could 
only be used to purchase or build new homes.
The resource-side subsidy was more important, as it could be utilized to purchase both 
new and used dwellings. The essence of this was that it provided an interest rate subsidy 
for the mortgage debentures, and therefore provided liquidity to the banks at a low cost. 
In January 2000, the subsidy was established at 3 percentage points, which was increased 
in several stages to the interest rate of the mortgage debenture plus 2 percentage points by 
February 2002. However, the subsidy could be a maximum of 10 percentage points. As a 
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result of increasing the resource-side subsidy and maximizing the transaction interest that 
could be charged to the borrowers, the interest rate of subsidies loans decreased from 11.5 
per cent to 6 per cent in two years. (Figure 4.)
In addition to subsidizing housing loans, personal income tax credit also grew considerably, 
and the tax credit was extended to the payment payable after credits used on used dwellings 
in addition to newly built ones. 
The number of new housing loans – following the establishment of the upper limit of the 
transaction interest at 6 per cent in February 2002 – started to increase faster. After an HUF 153 
billion increase in 2001, new lending amounted to HUF 493 billion in 2002, and the banks provided 
HUF 825 billion in housing loans the following year. The credit boom was promoted by the pent-
up demand since the change in the political system, and the low credit volume before the boom. 
Figure 4: The volume of household property credit (percentage)
Remark: the vertical lines and the numbers above them represent the rate of the maximum transaction 
interest and the date of modification, in the case of resource-side subsidies and the purchase of used 
homes (JK: Mortgage debenture interest rate, ÁRH: Government bond reference rate).
The proportion of housing loans compared to GDP rose from around 1 per cent in 2000 to 8 per cent 
by the end of 2003. At this time, the amount spent on the interest subsidy of housing loans exceeded 
0.7 per cent of GDP. If the volume of HUF loans had continued to increase with the same dynamics 
as in the second half of the year and assuming the same subsidies as in early 2002, then by the end of 
2008 the cost of the interest subsidy would have increased to an estimated 1.8 per cent of GDP.3
However, in addition to the increase in the subsidy amounts increasing interest rates and budget 
deficits also forced the Government to cut interest subsidies. In June and December 2003, the subsidies 
and the amount of assumable credit were both decreased. Due to the austerity measures carried out in 
2003, the pace of HUF loan disbursement decreased and their volume started to decline in early 2006. 
3 Since the vast majority were resource-side subsidized loans within the beneficial credits, which could also be used for 
purchasing used housing (PAPP, 2005) we made our calculations using the interest rate conditions of this subsidy. The 
growth of the housing loan volume was almost entirely realized in the construction of state subsidies (SZALAY-TÓTH, 
2003), hence we calculated that 100 per cent of the property loans disbursed in the quarter concerned were subsidized.
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The long-term solution would have been to reduce inflation and make market housing loans 
accessible. The creators of the housing subsidy system were aware of this, since the basic idea of the 
system was to make housing loans affordable for a wider range of the population for a temporary 
period, until market interest rates would become lower with the reduction of inflation (Tárki, 2004). 
However, because of the high budget deficit and the shifting of the band of the forint’s crawling peg 
in 2003, and because of the overall 600 basis points interest rate increase implemented partly as a 
consequence of this, achieving the aim of low interest rates became increasingly difficult to realise. 
4. The period of foreign exchange credits
Due to the permanently high budget deficit and the partially powerless, partially faulty 
monetary policy, state subsidized loans became unsustainable. On the one hand, the high de-
ficit limited the budget’s room for manoeuvre, and on the other hand the deficit contributed 
to keeping inflation and interest rates at a high level. In parallel with the reduction in interest 
rates, the amount of interest subsidies would have decreased and after a while they would 
have been stopped. However, during the period prior to the elimination of the subsidy, not 
only did interest rates not decrease, but instead kept on increasing, since the base rate rose 
from 6.5 per cent in January 2003 to 12.5 per cent by the end of the year. This led to the 
fact that, due to the changes made in subsidies in December 2003, the high interest rates of 
property loans became unaffordable for many. 
To maintain their profitability in this environment, the banks had developed a new 
product, the foreign exchange-based mortgage loans, which they started to offer to clients. 
The substantially lower interest rates seemed quite beneficial to clients, so the foreign 
exchange credits quickly became very popular. By 2005, they had taken over the role of 
HUF loans, thanks to which in the four years prior to 2008 a significant amount of foreign 
exchange credit was disbursed (Fig. 5).
Figure 5: New HUF and foreign exchange credits, and the CSOK (moving average of 4 quarters, billion HUF)
Source: KSH, MNB
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4.1. The risks of foreign exchange lending 
The boom in foreign exchange lending meant a fairly large risk, which in addition to the 
bank and the borrower involved in the transaction, also jeopardized the stability of the 
banking system and the real economy.
On the borrowers’ side, one had to take into account the foreign exchange and the inte-
rest rate risk. With foreign exchange credits the banks shifted the entire foreign exchange 
risk to the borrowers, moreover, they could freely alter the spread (the difference between 
the buying and selling price of the foreign currency), which could further increase the 
borrowers’ payment obligations. In the absence of proper regulations, the banks could also 
unilaterally change the interest rates, which they did during the crisis. 
Despite the banks theoretically shifting the foreign exchange and interest rate risk to the 
borrowers, the foreign exchange credits still presented some risks for the banks as well. The 
value of the property offered to the banks as collateral could have fallen sharply, from which the 
borrowers were not able to pay their increased obligations – due to the exchange rate depreciation 
and the interest rate increase. The reason for this is that the properties sold by the banks in large 
numbers pushed the prices down on the market, which was also aggravated by the general 
economic downturn that was most likely felt at such times. Due to the reduced value of the 
property offered as collateral, the banks were not paid their claims and would suffer losses. 
During the crisis, the way the banks reacted further increased the risks, since they reacted 
to the growing number of borrowers in default by increasing the interest rates and the 
foreign exchange spread. Consequently they shifted the losses stemming from the growing 
proportion of clients in default to those still solvent. However, this made keeping up with 
higher payments impossible for even more borrowers.
When there is a mass proliferation of foreign exchange credits the increasing payments also 
pose a risk to the national economy. Lower consumption due to the higher credit payments 
has a negative impact on GDP, which is further worsened by the consequently decreasing 
employment and wages. If a lot of households are not able to pay the banks in time as a result 
of higher payments, then due to the smaller risk-taking ability of the banks, credit supply is 
also moderated, which paired with a reduced credit demand due to the deteriorating income 
status of the population cuts down the disbursement of credits.
On top of that, the increasing proportion of non-performing loans – in the absence of 
adequate measures – can collapse the financial system, which would have caused a huge loss for 
the economy. In order to prevent the above, substantial budgetary resources might have been 
needed to re-capitalize the banks, which could have led to a sudden rise in the government 
debt. Unlike some other countries, Hungary managed to avoid this, partially because the 
financing of foreign owned banks was provided by their parent banks, and partially because 
the nationally owned OTP started its aggressive move on the foreign exchange credit market 
fairly late. Regardless of the above, three banks with domestic ownership received state 
subsidies in 2008 from the credit provided by the EU and the IMF: OTP Bank, FHB Bank and 
the Hungarian Development Bank (MFB). The aim of the financial aid was to assure market 
participants of the stability of these banks, by thus reducing their risk. Since the situation of 
these financial institutions remained stable, they have already repaid the subsidy. 
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A further risk is that as governments have to recapitalize banks, their debt also increases 
which results in a higher risk premia of government securities, therefore increasing the interest 
rate on government bonds and reducing their price. If the financial sector owns a substantial 
amount of government securities, due to declining bond prices it suffers a loss on those bonds. 
This potentially increases the capitalizing need of banks even further, which results in more 
national debt and even higher yield on the government securities. This in turn leads to a 
vicious circle, which mutually deteriorates the situation of the banks and the state budget. This 
risk did not impact the Hungarian banks, as they owned only a small amount of government 
securities, and due to the IMF credit, the government did not have to issue bonds for a while. 
4.2. The period of the proliferation of foreign exchange denominated credits
Foreign exchange credits increased without a pause up until the crisis even though the risks 
were already known in the early stages. The Hungarian National Bank (the MNB) warned 
about the effect of increasing payment burdens due to the depreciation of the exchange 
rate from 2004, of which credit borrowers were generally not aware (MNB, 2004). In 
addition to the MNB the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (PSZÁF) also issued 
warnings, however, neither of them had efficient tools based on legislation to slow down the 
disbursement of foreign exchange credits. They therefore primarily relied on informing the 
public and were obliged to trust the self-regulating mechanism of the banks. 
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that there was lending competition between the 
banks in order to increase profits and market share, so lending conditions became easier 
during the boom period. The banks eased their requirements regarding the loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio, the income-related expectations towards borrowers had also decreased, and 
the involvement of credit intermediaries working for commission also obviously pushed the 
consideration of risks into the background in favour of the short-term profit interests. 
The agreement between the MNB and the Government in 2003 – as a result of which the base 
rate grew by 600 basis points in less than 6 months – may also have been responsible for the high in-
terest rates on HUF loans, the consequently higher amount of interest rate subsidies, and therefore 
the proliferation of foreign exchange credits. Before this rapid increase in the base rate the MNB 
kept the base rate high despite the appreciation of the forint at the end of 2002, and intervened 
several times on the foreign exchange market to prevent the strengthening of the Hungarian 
currency. Then in the summer of 2003 the MNB – to the great surprise of the market – together 
with the Ministry of Finance announced the depreciation of the exchange rate band of the forint, 
by which they discredited the inflation targeting regime, since it was clear that the objective of the 
measure was not to maintain price stability, but rather to stimulate the economy. This unexpected 
measure by the MNB and the high budget deficit together led to the rapid depreciation of the fo-
rint, to which the MNB reacted by raising the base rate by 100 base points to 12.5 per cent on 11 
June, 8 days later by 200 base points and by another 300 base points in November. 
However, the greatest responsibility for the rapid proliferation of foreign exchange credits is 
held by the Government. On the one hand, increased deficit due to excessive fiscal loosening 
and high government debt can be blamed for the increased risk premium of HUF loans and 
for the high inflation, which also raised nominal rates. This was the reason why HUF loans 
lost their competitiveness against foreign exchange denominated credits. In this situation, 
the Government could have proactively regulated households’ rate of indebtedness in 
foreign exchange, since only the government had the opportunity to bring in new legislation 
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in order to intervene. However, they did not act, as the growth of foreign exchange credit 
substantially contributed to economic growth; therefore, its short-term limitation was not 
in their interest. The problem was worsened by the fact that as a result of the strict monetary 
policy, the forint was stuck at the powerful edge of the flotation band and the Government’s 
communication – which despite several imbalances in the economy promised the fairly 
quick introduction of the euro – created the false illusion for households that in a few years 
the exchange rate risk of their foreign exchange credits would be substantially reduced. 
However, in parallel with lending – partially in conjunction with and partially independent 
from it – other imbalances also formed in the economy, which later substantially exacerbated the 
effects of the global financial crisis. These were the considerable budgetary and external deficits, 
which were established in parallel with the increasing rate of foreign exchange credits (Fig. 6). 
The latter can also be associated with the credit boom to a significant degree. The balance of 
payment deficit in the early 2000s was primarily financed by non-debt generating FDI inflow. 
However, in the years that followed, the improvement in the income outlook of households and 
companies – partly in conjunction with the high budget deficit – promoted consumption beyond 
the actual incomes and investments beyond savings, which resulted in an increased BoP defi-
cit. The shortfall was financed with foreign loans, the majority of which were channelled by the 
banks in the form of foreign exchange credits to the market participants. 
In contrast, the increased budget deficit was caused by the loose fiscal policy involving most 
items in the budget, which included transfers to households, the reduction of taxes and one-off 
expenditures (mainly motorway construction) and subsequently increasing debt and interest 
expenses.4 The amount of the deficit became especially notable from 2002, when it rose to almost 
9 per cent of GDP and the high deficit was sustained until an adjustment made due to the effects 
of the global financial crisis. With the considerable external and internal imbalance, the economy 
started to over-heat in 2005 and was characterized by obvious capacity limits by 2006 (MNB, 2018).
Figure 6: Budgetary position in the ratio of GDP (percentages)
Source: KSH, MNB
4 OHSORGE-ROMHÁNYI, 2007
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4.3. Rebalancing of the economy
It was already clear before the crisis that the twin deficit was unsustainable, so the government 
had to start fiscal consolidation. Without it the market would have eventually forced a rebalancing. 
Although in 2007 the budgetary deficit was somewhat reduced, there was no comprehensive 
and considerable adjustment before the crisis, so the market forced it in the end. The crisis – in 
accordance with the scenario that can be anticipated based on previous experience – triggered the 
growth of interest rate premia on domestic assets which resulted in the substantial depreciation 
of the forint and increasing yields. The depreciation of the exchange rate helped to reinstate the 
external balance by reducing internal demand. This however caused a substantial real economic 
sacrifice, which was worsened by the high foreign exchange debt. On the one hand, household 
consumption was negatively impacted by growing monthly payments on loans and higher inflation 
due to the exchange rate depreciation. These negative effects were further exacerbated by decreasing 
employment and the reduced real value of government transfers. On top of that, a great many 
companies were also indebted in foreign exchange, so the depreciation of the exchange rate impacted 
them negatively too, which reduced their output and investment expenditures. The reduced income 
of the private sector and the growing uncertainty hindered the demand for credit, due to which 
both the corporate and household sectors turned into net lenders. Thirdly, the abundant external 
financing opportunities which were in abundance for banks before the crisis also disappeared, and 
the increasing non-performing loan (NPL) ratio deteriorated the capital position of banks, which 
also reduced the credit supply. Lastly, the cost of financing government debt also increased due 
to the high proportion of foreign exchange debt within the government debt and growing inte-
rest rates. Because of the substantial reduction of consumption and investment expenditure by the 
private sector, imports fell significantly, which substantially improved the external balance.
Besides the above, an external factor also contributed to the rebalancing of the economy, 
namely that in the EU budgetary cycle between 2007 and 2013 the transfers to Hungary from the 
EU increased considerably, which had a beneficial impact on the external financing position of 
the country. The moderation of the profit and profit transfers of foreign-owned companies also 
helped to reinstate the external balance. Compared to the region, the recession in Hungary was 
worsened by the fact that while at the beginning of the crisis the fall in external demand in the 
other countries of the region was paired with high government demand, external and internal 
demand fell simultaneously in Hungary from as early as 2007 due to the tightening of the budget.
4.4. The necessity to solve the foreign exchange credit problem
Despite the adjustment of the imbalances in the BoP and the budget, the foreign exchange cre-
dit problem would have held back economic growth in the long-run in any case if it had not been 
dealt with in a proper way, therefore the situation had to be addressed. The reason why foreign 
exchange credits held back growth is that a weak HUF exchange rate in the long run risked lowering 
household consumption for one or two decades due to the high burden on households’ balance sheets 
in respect to credit. Moreover, uncertainty related to the exchange rate forced foreign exchange cre-
dit borrowers to build additional reserves, so the high savings rate lowers demand from the private 
sector even more. Low demand reduced the growth of employment and wages, which as a second 
round effect made it even more difficult for households to cover monthly credit payment obligations, 
increases new credit disbursement and hindered the economy’s recovery from the crisis. 
Another problem is that foreign exchange credits also restrict the room for manoeuvre in monetary 
policy. This is underlined by the fact that in order to offset the setback of external demand during the 
 Gergely Rezessy 333
crisis, the interest rates should have been reduced, however, in October 2008 the MNB had to hike the 
base rate by 300 basis points to protect the forint. The excessive depreciation of the forint would have 
further heightened the payment burdens of households, enterprises and the Government, which 
all became indebted in foreign exchange, and would have increased the HUF value of the foreign 
exchange debtors’ debt. Moreover, during the economic recession, not only was the reduction of the 
interest rate risky due to the foreign exchange credits, but the efficiency of the monetary policy was 
also reduced. The stimulating effect of an interest rate cut would have been tamed by the fact that 
due to the depreciation of the forint, the demand by those with foreign exchange credits would have 
decreased, while the credit supplying ability of banks would have also deteriorated due to the foreign 
exchange receivables in their balance, i.e. the weakening of monetary transmission. 
It has already been noted that foreign exchange credits caused significant losses not only 
to households, but also to the banks. Due to the increasing NPL ratio, the banks’ revenues 
decreased, and they had to build reserves for potential losses stemming from NPLs, which tied 
up the majority of their capital. Consequently, the banks were not able to take further risks 
without substantial recapitalization, therefore credit supply fell, which made the economy’s 
setback even more severe. Bank lending can be stimulated in several ways, including making 
borrowers solvent again and clearing the banks’ balance sheets from bad assets, to which the 
settlement of the foreign exchange credit problem contributed to a great extent.
The negative effect of the crisis on the property market must be noted. The sudden collapse of 
lending and the economic downturn significantly lowered the number of newly built dwellings, and 
consequently the annual renewal rate of the housing stock too (Fig. 7), which even in 2018 did not 
reach the level before the crisis, and was still extremely low by international comparison. However, 
without solving the foreign exchange credit problem, the revival of lending in recent years could 
also not have got underway, and the increase in housing construction would have been even slower. 
Figure 7: The number of new dwellings and the annual renewal rate of the housing stock (Thousand 
pieces and per cent)
Source: KSH 
Despite the settlement of the foreign exchange credit problem, the weak economic 
environment that lasted for several years negatively impacted construction as well. Since 
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government and private investments fell alongside the housing market demand, the out-
put of the construction industry was reduced by 30 per cent between 2005 and 2010. Due to 
the downturn of construction capacities deteriorated as well, which was also reflected in the 
migration of labour. The replacement of deteriorating capacities during an extended crisis 
takes longer and requires more effort, than after a temporary recession: it is more difficult 
for example to attract back workers who have gone abroad than those who have stayed in the 
country during a temporary recession. Therefore, because of the crisis the potential output 
of the construction sector also presumably decreased, which contributed to the capacity li-
mit that can be experienced currently.
4.5. Measures taken to address the foreign exchange credit problem
In order to prevent long-term negative effects, the Government had to find a solution for the 
problem created by the foreign exchange credits. As a first step, it basically made the disbursement 
of new foreign exchange credits impossible by tightening the regulations, then in order to moderate 
the burden on borrowers it made the application of the central exchange rate for redemption 
obligatory (the bank’s central exchange rate, in absence of that of the MNB). Furthermore, the 
Government entered into an agreement with the Hungarian Banking Association in Decem-
ber 2011 and among other things enabled non-performing borrowers to convert their credit to a 
more favourable forint loan, which, however, fairly few people utilized at the time.
To mitigate the problem of foreign exchange credit borrowers, the Government introduced 
several other measures. On the one hand, it provided the option of early repayment, under 
which nearly 170 thousand borrowers’ HUF 370 billion debt was written off. The benefit was 
due to the fact that, for example, Swiss franc loans could be paid back by early repayment 
at an exchange rate of HUF 180 instead of the approx. HUF 250 market rate of the time. 30 
per cent of the losses derived from this could be deducted by the banks from the bank tax. 
On the other hand, an exchange rate cap was introduced to subdue the impact of exchange 
rate fluctuation, which also included written off debt (the interest obligation over the fixed 
exchange rate was eliminated, half of which was born by the government and half by the 
banks, but the banks were able to deduct it during the process of financial accountability). 
By the end of 2014, 186 thousand foreign exchange credit borrowers had signed such an 
agreement. Thirdly, the borrowers who were forced into the most difficult situations were 
protected by the Government’s extraordinary dislodgement moratorium effective until 16 
September 2015 to prevent them from ending up on the streets. Fourthly, the National Asset 
Management still represented a solution for insolvent foreign exchange and forint borrowers. 
The Asset Management purchases the properties of insolvent borrowers, so families can stay 
in their homes by paying a discounted rent. More than 40 thousand properties were offered 
to the National Asset Management by the end of February 2017, so it provided housing 
for roughly 150 thousand people. According to the agreement signed with the EBRD the 
amount of housing purchased under the programme was extended by 10 thousand, and was 
expected to reach 35 thousand by 2018.
Despite the numerous measures supporting borrowers, it had become obvious by 2014 that 
the economic leadership had to find a solution that would be able to solve the problem once 
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and for all by phasing out the foreign exchange credits that were shackling both households 
and the economy. At the same time, the conversion into forints could only be considered under 
a healthier banking system, stable macroeconomic fundamentals and in a lower interest rate 
environment than the one that was in effect upon borrowing the credit, since the incorrectly 
timed settlement and phase-out might very well have been damaging to the economy.
The turning point was represented, on the one hand, by the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court as of 28 February and 24 March 2014. Based on the joint interpretation of these two 
decisions, in the case of family housing being endangered and credit institutions abusing their 
dominant power, Parliament was empowered to exceptionally alter the content of bilateral ci-
vil agreements. On the other hand, the European Court passed a resolution on 30 April 2014 
allowing Hungarian courts to examine the unfairness of the foreign exchange credit agreements. 
Afterwards, in its decision of 16 June 2014, the Curia stipulated that the exchange rate gap was 
unfair in all foreign exchange credit agreements, and established that the contract modifications 
of retail loans – until they were proven otherwise – did not satisfy the legal provisions.
Based on the legal regulations accepted after the decision of the Curia, in March−April 2015 the 
banks had to reach a settlement with their clients who had borrowed foreign exchange credits on 
the unfair exchange rate gap, and arrange the reimbursement of overpayments due to the unilateral 
contract modifications with each client. Some two million current and ex-debtors received settlement 
letters from their banks. The debt of Hungarian families was mitigated by a total HUF 734 billion, 
and their payments were reduced by an average 20‒25 per cent (HUF 20 thousand/month). 
Hence the conversion of the substantially reduced foreign exchange credit volume could 
be handled by the MNB. The only possible option for such a conversion amount was the 
utilization of the foreign exchange reserves. The adequacy of this solution was eventually 
also justified by market reactions.
Based on the act passed by Parliament on 25 November 2014,5 the conversion of housing 
and untied mortgage credits into forints took place in early 2015. The conversion was made at 
the market exchange rate, considering that based on the decision of the Curia the exchange 
rate risk was the fundamental feature of the foreign exchange credits, therefore it burdened 
the client. The conversion rate was the lower value between the market rate of 7 November 
2014, or the average of the official MNB rates between the announcement of the Curia and 
7 November. In the case of the Swiss franc it was HUF/CHF 256.47 (period average), and in 
case of the Euro HUF/EUR 308.97 (the rate as of 7 November). 
The conversion into forints technically took place simultaneously with the reimbursements, 
but the exchange rate of foreign exchange credits was already fixed on 1 December 2014 at 
the pre-defined levels. 50 per cent of household credits, some HUF 4,100 billion were foreign 
exchange credits at the end of 2014. Following the conversion of mortgage loans into forints 
their ratio fell below 7 per cent so they amounted to only HUF 500 billion. Considering that 
the amount of reimbursements did not have to be converted, roughly HUF 3,000 billion was 
needed to convert the retail mortgage loans into forints (approx. EUR 10 billion). 
5 Act LXXVII of 2014
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The beneficial effects of the conversion of mortgage loans into forints were already tangible in 
the short-term: thanks to the exchange rate being fixed at the end of December 2014, which was 
the “antechamber” of the conversion, the drastic depreciation of the forint against the Swiss francs 
in mid-January 2015 did not increase the burden on borrowers and the risks of banks any further. 
Consequently, the previously substantial national economic risks related to retail credits could not be 
realized. At the same time, for example, Croatia and Poland were not in such a beneficial situation. 
In these countries indebtedness in foreign exchange, mainly in Swiss francs, was also causing major 
problems, but the settlement of the foreign exchange for borrowers was not at such a progressive stage 
as it was in Hungary. The borrowers in Swiss francs had to repay 15 per cent more in Croatia and 
nearly 10 per cent more than a year before, due to the strengthening of the Swiss franc. In Hunga-
ry, a debt increase of some HUF 400 billion would have been caused for households if the conversion 
into forints had not taken place, which would have meant payments of 10 per cent higher on average. 
However, the foreign exchange credits other than mortgage loans continued to carry an exchange 
rate risk. The appreciation of the Swiss franc in January 2015 resulted in increased burdens for 
borrowers with foreign exchange-based consumption credit. Following the conversion of foreign 
exchange mortgages into forint, the Government looked for a solution for the conversion of the 
remaining vehicle and consumer loans into forint as well. Although the volume of these loans 
(HUF 305 billion) was considerably lower than the volume of mortgages, considering that the 
number of these contracts exceeded 240 thousand it impacted a substantial number of households.
Parliament passed the act regulating the conversion of foreign exchange vehicle and 
consumer credits on 22 September 2015.6 Based on the Act, the conversion into forints 
took place on the effective market exchange rate from 19 August 2015. However, it was 
also established that the almost HUF 31 billion debt caused by the difference between the 
exchange rates applied for the mortgage loans in November 2014 (256.47 HUF/CHF) and 
in August 2015 (287.22 HUF/CHF) would be assumed by the banks and the government 
from clients at 50−50 per cent. (The banks could deduct the expenses due from their tax 
obligations.) In the case of Swiss franc loans, the measure meant a payment reduction of 
10‒11 per cent. For a client with an average Swiss franc vehicle credit, the capital part of the 
debt was reduced by some HUF 318 thousand. 
With the conversion of personal and vehicle credits into forints, the retail foreign exchange 
credits were completely phased out in Hungary. In 2009, the ratio of foreign exchange credits was 
still 71 per cent in the entire retail credit volume, and by the end of 2016 it was reduced to 1 per cent. 
Based on the impact of Government measures since 2010, the population’s debt was reduced by a 
total of HUF 1,400 billion, a part of which was financed by the banks, and the other part by the budget 
(early repayment: HUF 370 billion, accountability: HUF 734 billion, debt relief due to NET purchases: 
HUF 270 billion, second conversion into forints: HUF 30 billion, exchange rate cap and state inte-
rest subsidy: HUF 20 billion). Furthermore, thanks to the “fair bank” act  the interest rate risk was 
significantly moderated, since the interest rate of loans was not permitted to increase without a reason. 
6 Act CXLV of 2015
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5. Comparison of the credit boom before the crisis and now
The credit cycle before the crisis was characterized by high forint interest rates due to sizeable 
inflation and a strict monetary policy. It prevented households from taking large volume 
HUF loans at market interest rates, so the alternative was provided by subsidized loans 
and foreign exchange credits. In contrast, the low external inflation environment in the 
current cycle, and the consequently loose monetary policy paved the way for unsubsidized 
HUF loans at market rates. In this sense, the current boom of lending brings less risk, as it 
does not burden the budget and foreign exchange rate fluctuations are not hazardous either. 
Furthermore, in 2013, the MNB received legal authorization to create an act on regulating 
the disbursement of credits, therefore it is not only able to influence the credit market 
through proposals, but also through regulations. 
Using the available tools – e.g. by deepening the mortgage market and reducing the long-
term interest rates –, the MNB can support borrowers with favourable conditions when they 
take out credit. Additionally, by creating the so-called debt brake regulations it guarantees 
that even in cases when interest rates increase, borrowers do not get into trouble with their 
payments. Thanks to the above, the macro-prudential tools of the MNB will most likely be 
able to prevent the next crisis coming from the financial sector (see the box).
Box: The MNB’s tools to support healthy lending
Partly to restart lending, from 2012 the MNB substantially eased its monetary policy: 
first it reduced the base interest, and later it restructured the available toolset (reduction 
of reserve requirements, restructuring of the priority tool/asset), and finally launched 
various new programmes (including: the Credit for Growth Programme, MNB swap 
tenders providing HUF liquidity, interest rate swap tenders with monetary policy 
purposes, and the Mortgage Buying Programme). However, it is important to note that 
the MNB did not try to promote the irresponsible disbursement of credits, and defined 
numerous measures to prevent a repeat of the risky lending of the 2000s. 
The MNB made advances in two key areas in order to foster sustainable retail lending. 
On the one hand, new loans could only be disbursed under certain conditions as a result 
of the so-called debt brake regulations, on the other hand it launched programmes, which 
made credit with long interest rate periods, i.e. 5 years or longer cheaper for the banks, 
thus promoting more stable payments.
Debt brake regulations
According to the MNB Decree No. 32/2014. (10. IX.) (hereinafter referred to as: Decree) 
new loans could only be disbursed if the currently effective regulations regarding the 
debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios were met.
According to the debt-to-income ratio (hereinafter referred to as: DTI) the payment 
may not exceed the defined percentage of the certifiable income. Hence, the DTI 
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substantially reduces the indebtedness of clients and defines separate regulations for 
non-forint or foreign exchange or foreign exchange-based credits, which are a lot lower 
than the values applicable for HUF loans, thus compensating the risk of foreign exchange 
credits. In addition, from 1 October 2018, the DTI considers the length of the credits’ in-
terest period, which motivates households to take credits with more reliable payments. 
From this date on, the maximum debt-to-income redemption for credits with shorter 
duration decreased, while it was unchanged in the case of credits with a longer duration.
Table 1: The maximum ratio of credit payments to income (per cent)
The other index introduced by the Decree is the loan-to-value ratio (hereinafter 
referred to as: LTV), which limits the amount of credit to a certain proportion of the 
collateral.
In the case of the most frequent HUF mortgage credits, the amount of the credit may 
not be more than 80 per cent of the collateral, however the regulation here also considers 
in which foreign exchange the amount was disbursed, and separate conditions apply to 
financial leasing and vehicle financing.
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Table 2: Maximum disbursement by property or vehicle coverage in the ratio of the collateral value (per cent)
It is important to note, that debt brake regulations also have their limits, as such 
situations might arise when this precaution does not help either. For instance, the LTV 
might also prove insufficient during a long-term property price depreciation period, as 
the debt might exceed the value of the property, by reducing the willingness to pay the 
monthly payments. The income of a borrower might quickly fall to zero in the case of 
a labour market shock, which can make the borrower non-performing. An imbalance 
similar to the crisis of 2008 might simultaneously reduce the price of property and cause 
major unemployment. The debt brake regulations may not provide protection in all 
situations, but it can be expected that they will mean proper reserves for the majority of 
borrowers and banks during an unexpected shock.
Increasing the ratio of credits with a long interest rate duration
Thanks to the low proportion of retail foreign exchange credits, they will almost 
certainly not cause any difficulties for households or the banking system in the near 
term. However, due to the high proportion of credits with variable interest – especially 
in the currently growing interest rate environment – they may cause substantial risks. 
Therefore, the MNB introduced incentive measures both on the credit supply and credit 
demand sides to reduce the price of credits with long-term fixed interest rates.
At the end of 2017, to facilitate the long-term fixing of the low interest rate environment, 
the MNB decided to introduce a monetary policy-based interest rate swap with 5 and 10 
years duration, paying variable interest rates (hereinafter referred to as: MIRS). The aim 
of the MIRS was to flatten the yield-curve and make the low interest rate environment 
of short-term securities visible in long-term securities as well. The MNB made MIRS in-
terest rate swap transactions to the value of HUF 300 billion on a quarterly basis. The 
programme promoted the interest rate reduction of long-term government bonds, retail 
and corporate fixed loans. Under the MIRS, the MNB paid 6 months’ BUBOR to the 
credit institutions, and the credit institutions paid fixed interest rates to the MNB. In 
September 2018 the MNB decided on the gradual phase-out of the programme, with the 
last tender being held in December 2018.
In addition to the above, for more than a year from the end of 2017, the MNB pursued 
a mortgage debenture-buying programme, within the framework of which it purchased 
securities up to 50 per cent of the Hungarian mortgage debenture stock. The primary 
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aim of the MNB’s programme was to help credit institutions increase their interest rate 
periods on mortgage loans.
Overall, the MIRS and the mortgage-buying programme achieved its goals: the interest rates 
of long-term fixed loans considerably declined and the mortgage debentures market grew.
To achieve an easier comparison of credits with longer interest periods, the MNB 
established the Certified Consumer-Friendly Housing Loan label in 2017. Those HUF 
based housing loans can be offered under this label, in which the amount of interest rates, 
expenditures, and the duration of credit assessment and disbursement do not exceed the 
limit defined by the MNB and the loan’s interest period is at least three years. In addition 
to the above, the MNB created a website, where certified housing loans can be compared, 
making the selection easier, and thus making the competition fiercer on the mortgage 
market. Nowadays, almost two-thirds of newly disbursed mortgages with an interest 
period in excess of 3 years are Certified Consumer-Friendly Housing Loans.
Currently, the biggest risk is represented by the capacity constraints in the construction 
sector because of strong demand which pushed up prices. The credit boom before the crisis 
and also this time led to increasing house prices. However, in the early 2000s, following the 
termination of subsidized forint loans, property prices did not increase any further in real 
terms during the disbursement of foreign exchange credits. This was probably due to the 
fact that growing demand was matched by a growing number of housing constructions. In 
the current credit cycle, increasing credit disbursement is accompanied by rising property 
prices, but it is questionable whether the rise in prices will stop when both household income 
and the volume of credit are rising. This is because after the crisis housing construction fell 
to an all-time low, and it would have been from here that a significant increase would be 
needed to provide sufficient housing supply to stop the increase in prices. (Figure 8.)
Figure 8: The development of housing construction and house prices (Thousand pieces and 2001 Q1=100)
Source: KSH, MNB
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The expansion of the housing supply, however, is limited by construction capacities, which can 
also be observed in labour and raw material shortages. In 2013, in parallel with the increasing 
performance of construction, the number of people in work also started to rise, so by the first 
half of 2018 it had reached its peak before the crisis (Fig. 9). The limitations of further growth 
are indicated by the rapid growth of the vacancy rate, which is now at an all-time high, and also 
the dynamic increase in real wages (Fig. 10). In the meantime, the per capita value added per 
construction employee approached the level prior to the crisis. Although by regional comparison 
there is room for improvement, it is likely that without a serious structural reconstruction, there 
will be no significant efficiency reserves in the sector. Besides private sector demand, public 
investments tie up construction capacities, which is partially fuelled by the amount of EU 
transfers, but projects financed from the national budget also represent a substantial portion.
Figure 9: Employment and value added in  Figure 10: Vacancy ratio and real wages in  
Construction (Thousand people and percentage)  construction  (percentage)
 Source: KSH   Source: KSH
The budget deficit is currently lower than during the previous credit cycle. While between 
2004 and 2007 the deficit was 7.2 per cent on average, between 2012 and 2017 it was reduced 
to 2.2 per cent. The difference between the two periods, however, is a lot smaller if we 
consider the amount of resources received from the European Union, which was 1 per cent 
of GDP in the previous period and 3.9 per cent in the latter. With corrections made for this 
difference, the current budget balance corresponds to a 5.1 per cent (=2.2 + 3.9 − 1) deficit, 
which means considerable demand from the fiscal side.
Following the decline of public investments financed by EU transfers in 2016, they started 
to grow again and this tendency will continue in parallel with the increase in incoming 
EU transfers. In the meantime, household and corporate investments, which were at a 
historical low even by regional comparison a few years ago, started to increase (Fig. 11). 
Given the favourable household income and the high volume of credit disbursement, the 
growing construction demand may continue. This is supported by the fact that there is room 
to increase the housing credit volume of households, since the credit-to-GDP ratio is low 
both historically and by international comparison (Fig. 12). Therefore, demand seems to be 
demonstrating recovery in all three sectors at the same time. 
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Figure 11: Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP (percentage)
Source: KSH
Figure 12: Household debt-to-GDP ratio by international comparison (percentages)
Source: KSH
The bottlenecks created on the supply side however limit further growth. The increasing costs 
due to the labour shortage can already be seen in the increasing housing prices. Based on the 
survey by the MNB taken among market players, the most important limiting factors are the 
labour shortage in construction, the crowding out effect of state projects, and the uncertainty 
around the discounted VAT rate of new housing (MNB, 2018b). The price increase could be 
moderated if demand increases more gradually over a longer time period, as then the supply 
side would more likely be able to adapt. On the other hand, the disintegration of construction 
capacities can be prevented if governmental investments are realized in the period when demand 
from the private sector is lower. To even out the fluctuations of demand, it might be helpful to 
delay non-productive governmental investment, which does not promote the extension of the 
supply side capacities, in the current situation when the private sector’s activity is brisk.
Due to the simultaneously high private and public demand, the economy will soon become over-
heated, making it necessary to tighten monetary policy sooner. The rising interest rates impact 
Enterprises
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the budgetary position unfavourably due to the high national debt-to-GDP ratio and decelerating 
economic growth. To prepare for that, it would be practical to moderate the budget deficit and 
the national debt in the current situation so that the government is not forced to apply austerity 
measures nor a higher interest rate environment. Lower debt will reduce the cost of debt financing 
through both the lower amount of debt and risk premia now and in the coming years. It is also 
important, that from a lower debt level there will be room to increase the debt level later if necessary.
6. Summary
The previous boom of lending was accompanied by notable imbalances. The introduction 
of subsidized HUF loans was justified by high inflation and the permanently low level of 
housing construction. This system could have been justifiable, however, if it is in effect for 
a temporary period until inflation and interest rates were moderated. However, this had 
been impossible due to the continuously high budget deficit in the 2000s and the excessive 
consumption financed from foreign credit. Under such circumstances when subsidised 
HUF loans were phased out, they were soon replaced by foreign exchange credits. These 
substantially increased the already existing imbalances in the economy and heightened 
the shock to the economy during the crisis. The hardships were made even worse by the 
fact that foreign exchange credits reduced the monetary policy’s ability to moderate the 
consequences of the crisis. In the absence of proper problem management, foreign exchange 
credits could have slowed down economic growth for a long time through the low credit 
supply of the banks.
Compared to the previous credit cycles, the currently low short- and long-term interest 
rates, as well as the proper regulation guarantees that households can finance their housing 
purchases with market-based HUF loans at an acceptable level of risk. Consequently, the 
situation on the financial side is more reassuring than before. The risk of the current period 
is caused by the fact that, due to the bottlenecks emerging in construction, the housing 
supply is not able to keep up with the elevated demand due to the population’s improving 
income situation, despite the possible moderation of the latter by regulating the cre-
dit outflow. Excess demand is increased by the substantial government investments that 
are stretching construction capacities in addition to the investments in the private sector. 
Tight supply leads to rising property prices, which on the one hand stimulates speculative 
purchases, and on the other hand makes the purchases by people searching for real housing 
purposes increasingly expensive. An additional risk is that if the currently high external 
demand decreases, the income of households will also decline, therefore in this situation 
the budget should temporarily increase demand, but it will only have a limited opportunity 
to do that, given the high debt level. To prevent the above problems, it would be advisable 
to reduce the budget deficit and the national debt in the currently favourable environment. 
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Introduction
Shortcomings in financial consumer protection were identified by experts as one of the root causes of 
the 2008 economic crisis. The intense development of financial consumer protection began after the 
crisis, so it is not only a key priority for Hungary, but also a new challenge for the European Union. 
Hungarian governments were also under pressure to find an optimal solution for foreign currency loan 
contracts, which put hundreds of thousands of Hungarian households in a near-bankrupt situation. 
In 2011, a Risk Report by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority stated the following: 
“From 2003, foreign currency loans and loans denominated in foreign currencies started to become 
increasingly widespread: By 2011, 55% of the assets of banks and 70% of residential real estate mortgage 
loans were foreign exchange assets, denominated in Swiss francs for the majority of residential real 
estate mortgage loans. After the crisis, partly due to the loss of jobs and partly due to the weakening of 
the HUF exchange rate, an increasing number of debtors were unable to pay their monthly instalments.” 
I divided the state measures aiming to support foreign currency borrowers into three groups: 
- The nature of measures specifically aimed at supporting foreign currency borrowers in a difficult 
situation became more and more direct in parallel with the worsening of the situation, which 
is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, while the first step in 2008 was “only” an agreement 
with major banks in Hungary to provide relief to struggling debtors and act more flexibly when 
evaluating their needs, after 2011 the methods of HUF conversion were already prescribed by law.
- Another group was constituted by consumer protection measures and laws aiming 
to regulate the banking sector so that banks should provide adequate information to 
consumers about the risks associated with loans and the characteristics of the loans offered.
- The third group includes measures for the improvement of people’s financial literacy. 
Without such measures, regulations regarding the obligation of the banking sector to 
provide appropriate information would, in many cases, be insufficient in themselves 
because households should be enabled to assess the risks associated with loans and 
make more sound financial decisions than before.
In my study, I will analyse the financial consumer protection measures taken by the 
Hungarian government between 2009 and 2017. My analysis also examines the extent to which 
such measures contributed to the support of foreign currency borrowers in a difficult situation.
1. The main causes of the emergence of foreign 
currency lending in Hungary and the development of 
the crisis situation
In Hungary, foreign currency lending started to grow at an increasing pace after 2003. 
Foreign currency loans as loan products provided by banks, however, appeared already in 
the early 2000s, initially mainly in the field of motor vehicle financing. 
The foreign currency-denominated financing of housing loans started to become popular after 
2004. One of the identified root causes thereof was the abolition of state support for housing loans. 
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Besides the abolition of state support, another major reason identified in relevant literature was that 
the interest rates in foreign currency financing were a lot more favourable (compared to HUF loans).1
Figure 1 shows the development of the average interest rates of HUF-, euro- and Swiss 
franc-denominated housing and consumer loans:2
Figure 1: The development of the interest rates of HUF and foreign currency loans3 4
The price advantage of foreign currency loans against HUF loans is clearly visible for both 
housing loans and consumer loans. While the average interest rate of HUF-denominated 
housing loans was consistently above 10% in the period concerned, Swiss franc- and euro-
denominated housing loan interest rates, with the exception of 2009, were approx. 5% to 6% 
and rather even lower. The difference is even more spectacular in the case of consumer loans. 
With the spread of foreign currency loans and loans denominated in foreign currencies, 
the population were increasingly exposed to changes in exchange rates, and, because 
households did not typically realise their income in foreign currencies, even a slight increase 
in exchange rates resulted in significant additional burden on them. 
The rise in foreign currency lending, which was characterised by lower interest rates than HUF loans, 
was also a consequence of the low level of financial literacy and risk awareness of the population. Decisions 
on the currency of a loan were made mostly on the basis of interest rates and monthly instalments, and 
the risks associated with exchange rate fluctuations were often not taken into account. The increase in 
the volume of foreign currency loans was also partly caused by the fact that some households would not 
even have been creditworthy for a HUF loan due to their low income as compared to the higher HUF 
instalments, so the only option for them was foreign currency-denominated financing. 
Figure 2 shows the development of the volume of residential HUF and foreign currency 
loans and the ratio of foreign currency loans:5
1 T. BALÁS - M. NAGY: A devizahitelek átváltása forinthitelekre. Hitelintézeti Szemle, Budapest, 2010/5. sz. 416-430.
2 Edited internally using statistical data from the website of the National Bank of Hungary.
3 For a long time, experts were careful about Japanese yen-denominated lending due to the unpredictability and vulnerability 
of the yen exchange rate.  Although in 2007, several credit institutions already offered Japanese yen loans, according to a 
survey by hitelnet.hu in 2013, “approximately one in 25 foreign currency borrowers requested Japanese yen-denominated loan 
financing”. Considering the fact that, on the one hand, no database was available on the development of the interest rates of 
Japanese yen-denominated loans and, on the other hand, a comparison of the development of EUR and CHF interest rates 
with HUF interest rates is sufficient to understand the reasons for the spread of foreign currency lending, this study will not 
present yen interest rates. https://hitelnet.hu/jelzaloghitel/hogyan-fizetik-torleszteseiket-most-a-jenhitelesek
4 The volume of EUR-denominated loans declined significantly after 30 June 2010; therefore, fluctuations in 
the available interest rate databases are so high in terms of average interest that the data could no longer be 
interpreted. For this reason, the graphs show the EUR interest rates only until 30 June 2010.
5 Edited internally using statistical data from the website of the National Bank of Hungary.
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 Figure 2: The development of the volume of residential HUF and foreign currency loans and the 
ratio of foreign currency loans 
In 2008, the volume of residential foreign currency loans increased to over HUF 7,000 
billion from HUF 600 billion in 2003, meaning that 70% of the total amount of loans was 
exposed to exchange rate fluctuations. 
Figure 3 shows the development of the exchange rates of euro and Swiss franc:6
Figure 3: The development of EUR and CHF exchange rates 
6 Edited internally using statistical data from the website of the National Bank of Hungary.
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The first critical situation where state intervention was already inevitable arose at the end of 
2008. At that time, the all-time high in the volume of foreign currency loans was accompanied by 
a situation in which the EUR exchange rate came close to, while the CHF exchange rate exceeded, 
the highest level of the previous five years. Although exchange rates temporarily dropped 
afterwards, they started to grow again in the third quarter of 2009. The fact that the volume 
of foreign currency loans did not increase between 2009 and the end of 2011 (there was even a 
slight fall) was already due to a shift to HUF loans. This was due partly to the first measures of 
the government (state) to support foreign currency borrowers, and partly to the more conscious 
financial thinking of the population. At the end of 2011 and in the first half of 2012, the EUR and 
CHF exchange rates rose again, causing such a critical situation, mainly due to the high volume of 
foreign currency-denominated housing loans, that active state intervention was already inevitable.
The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) and the National Bank of Hun-
gary (MNB) drew attention to the risks of foreign currency-denominated loans already in 
2008, when the population was informed about the risks of Japanese yen-denominated cre-
dit schemes. In their joint recommendation, the institutions pointed out that:
- Due to increasing market competition, financial institutions in Hungary face 
increasingly high financial risks;
- Also due to increasing market competition, financial institutions tend to ease their 
credit conditions to attract more clients; 
- They develop increasingly risky schemes (in order to keep loan interest rates low);
- For a significant part of housing loans, the amount of coverage is already only slightly 
higher than the amount of the loan; and
- 90% of new residential loans is denominated in a foreign currency.7
However, because only one in 25 foreign currency loans was actually denominated in 
Japanese yen, such a “targeted” warning was not necessarily effective even if its content was 
generally valid for other foreign currencies as well.
2. The importance of financial consumer protection 
and financial literacy
Consumer protection is a complex interdisciplinary phenomenon, situated somewhere in 
the boundary area between modern economics, sociology and law. The aim of consumer 
protection law is to achieve an equilibrium between two players of the market, i.e. the 
consumer and the provider. 
After the change of regime, the Hungarian economy underwent a fundamental change with 
the emergence of private ownership, which resulted in a significant and long-term change in 
the share of the public and private sectors in the production of Hungary’s GDP. Accordingly, 
the financial environment of business and entrepreneurial activities also changed. Firstly, 
7 ht tps://w w w.napi.hu/magyar_val la latok/devizahitel-veszelyekre_f igyelmeztet_az_mnb_es_a_
felugyelet.360264.html (downloaded on 2/10/2018)
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market-economy frameworks based on the roles of the state as a provider-supervisor, as well as 
a taxer and source-creator were established and became more conscious instead of the former 
paternalistic approach. Secondly, a financial-advisory-provider sector was also created and is 
constantly evolving. Thirdly, the consumer goods and services market was also established, and 
the associated financial services required a kind of knowledge that society was not prepared for. 
In the residential sector, the lack of knowledge in the field of financial products and services was 
primarily reflected in the readiness of the population to take risks in excess of their actual financing 
capacity and, consequently, in excessive indebtedness. As it became evident during the 2008 economic 
crisis, these processes also exerted an adverse effect on the development of the financial sector, as they 
prevented the spread of innovative financial and service schemes and forced providers (banks) into 
excessive risk competition, resulting in increasing stability risks for the entire financial market.8
The concept of financial literacy evidently needs to be defined to get closer to financial 
consumer protection. Financial literacy as a concept appeared in the United States as early 
as the turn of the century. It was aimed at increasing residents’ financial literacy in order to 
establish a market for financial products.9 At that time, the improvement of financial literacy 
essentially meant the transfer of knowledge about financial products. 
However, the period that had elapsed since the turn of the century led to significant 
innovations in the field of not only consumer items, but also products offered by the 
financial sector. The 1980s represented the beginning of a large-scale wave of innovation 
in the segment of financial products. The financial products developed at that time were 
already so complex that the real risks associated with them were difficult to assess even for 
professionals dealing with financial matters on a daily basis (e.g. securitisation, unit-linked 
insurance). Consciously following financial events day by day is far from customary among 
average consumers, so the financial awareness of a large proportion of society turned out to 
be far from the level required for the safe use of available financial products. 
In emerging economies, there was an increasing need to mitigate the micro- and 
macroeconomic risks associated with financial behaviour. The need for the dissemination of 
financial knowledge first emerged in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Defining the concept of financial literacy is of key importance. Studies conducted in the 
field of financial literacy have always provided a definition for financial literacy depending 
on their objective, target group or research topic. Hung et. al. identified nine important 
components of financial literacy:10
– Financial knowledge;
– Understanding financial processes;
– Ability to apply financial knowledge and experience gained;
– Knowledge of financial relationships and definitions;
– Ability to make informed financial decisions;
– Knowledge of basic financial concepts;
8 Á. CZAKÓ - I. HUSZ - Z. SZÁNTÓ: Meddig nyújtózkodjunk? - A magyar háztartások és vállalkozások pénz-
ügyi kultúrájának változása a válság időszakában, BCE Innovációs Központ Nonprofit Kft., Budapest, 2011.
9 Z. BIEDERMANN: Az amerikai pénzügyi szabályozás története, Pénzügyi Szemle, 2012, 337-354.
10 HUNG, A. A. - PARKER, A. M. - YOONG, J. K.: Defining and Measuring Financial Literacy, Labor and Population, 2009. 7.
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– Ability to make simple (basic) financial decisions;
– Ability to make informed and conscious decisions; and
– Knowledge of basic financial concepts.
In Hungary, the National Bank of Hungary was one of the first institutions to develop a comprehensive 
definition including several elements of the concept of financial literacy: “A level of financial knowledge 
and skills that enables individuals to identify and acquire, and then also understand the basic financial 
information necessary for them to make informed and prudent decisions, and to make decisions 
accordingly, assessing the potential future financial and other consequences thereof.” (MNB, 2008). 
The State Audit Office also formulated their own definition of financial literacy: “Finan-
cial literacy does not primarily mean the knowledge of banking products and risk-taking 
behaviour but a level of financial knowledge and skills that enables people to identify and 
acquire, and then also understand the basic financial information necessary for them to make 
informed and prudent decisions, and to make decisions accordingly, assessing the potential 
future financial and other consequences thereof. At the most basic level, financial literacy 
means that an individual is able to plan and control his or her own finances and budget.”11
The development of financial literacy is in the common interest of all economic actors. Leora F. 
Klapper from the World Bank says the greater the financial literacy of a society, the greater the available 
savings in the country.12 Furthermore, research conducted under World Bank coordination emphasises 
that the financial literacy of the population also contributes to the stability of the financial system. 
It is also a fundamental interest of institutions mediating financial services to develop a financial 
literacy since it contributes to increasing private sector savings and thereby to the improvement of 
their creditworthiness. Creditworthy clients represent a low-risk source of income for the sector. 
The development of a financial literacy is also in the interest of the state, because the 
existence of a higher-level financial literacy means less effort is required for redistribution 
and stabilisation, which has a beneficial effect on the competitiveness of the country. 
The OECD and G20 countries also recognised that the development of financial education and 
literacy is a priority nowadays. The OECD issued a recommendation collecting financial education 
best practices as early as 2005.13 In 2008, the OECD organised an international cooperation called 
International Network for Financial Education (INFE), where member states, authorities and non-pro-
fit organisations could work together on this important issue. The first results of the research conducted 
by INFE in 110 countries were summarised in a guideline issued in 2012, entitled Financial Education 
in Schools.14 Based on the further development of the research, another guideline was created in 2014, 
already addressing public institutions and the civil sector, which applies to financial education.15 This 
guideline points out that there is no good practice that is applicable to everyone, but a kind of educational 
cooperation must be established between the parties, which is fruitful for all member states. 
In Hungary, the institution participating in the worldwide OECD survey on financial 
literacy was the State Audit Office. 
11 http://www.asz.hu/tanulmanyok/2014/az-allami-szamvevoszek-szerepe-a-penzugyi-kultura-fejleszteseben/
t366.pdf (2/10/2018)
12 KLAPPER, L. - LUSARDI, A. - PANOS, G.:  Financial Literacy and the Financial Crisis, Netspar Discuss 
Paper, DP03/2012/007, 2012. 3.
13 OECD Recommendation on Principles and Good Practices for Financial Education and Awareness, 2005
14 OECD/INFE High-Level Principles on National Strategies for Financial Education, August 2012
15 OECD/INFE Guidelines for Private and Not-For-Profit Stakeholders in Financial Education, November 2014
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3. Measures aimed at supporting foreign currency borrowers
I previously divided Hungarian state measures aimed at supporting foreign currency 
borrowers into three groups. While direct actions were aimed at achieving instant or ra-
pid results, actions to improve consumer protection and financial awareness can only be 
expected to exert an influence in the longer term. In the following section, I will present the 
measures according to the grouping described above.
Measures / laws aimed at 
providing direct support
Consumer protection 
measures / laws
Measures to improve the financial 
awareness of the population
06 November 2008: Government 
agreement with 9 major banks
2 March 2009: Bridging loan 
with state guarantee
25 October 2010: Mandatory 
application of the middle 
rate, regulation of charges 
for prepayment and extended 
maturity term
20 June 2011: Fixing of exchange 
rates for repayment, limitation of 
forced sales
19 September 2011: Final 
repayment at fixed rate
14 August 2011: Social Housing 
Construction Programme (Ócsa)
05 December 2011: 
Establishment of the National 
Asset Management Company
19 March 2012: Repeated fixing 
of exchange rates for repayment
25 November 2014: Mandatory 
HUF conversion of mortgage-
based foreign currency loans 
(unless debtor requested 
unchanged plan with proper 
justification)
22 September 2015: HUF 
conversion of other foreign 
currency loan contracts
14 December 2019: 
Regulation of the content 
of loan contracts and the 
provision of adequate 
information to consumers
1 January 2010: HFSA 
is authorised to act as 
the financial consumer 
protection authority
July 2011: Establishment of 
the Financial Arbitration 
Board
04 July 2014: Regulation 
of the types of exchange 
rate used for the HUF 
conversion of foreign 
currency disbursements and 
repayments
07 November 2011: 
Determining an upper limit 
for loan interest rates
01 January 2015: 
Introduction of a debt brake 
(MNB)
1 October 2018: Tightening 
the debt brake
2007: Economic and financial 
education was included in the 
National Core Curriculum
2008: Establishment of Money 
Compass Foundation
2014: Financial Navigator 
Booklets
2017: National strategy for 
the improvement of financial 
awareness
2018: Adoption of the first 
two-year Action Plan for the 
implementation of the strategy
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In Hungary, the responsibility for the crisis situation affecting foreign currency borrowers 
cannot be clearly and unilaterally assigned to either “party”. The responsibility of households 
lay in the fact that their consumption needs were often not in line with their financial capacities. 
Also, their financial and market knowledge was insufficient to evaluate the offers of banks, 
assess the real risk associated with them, and subsequently make an informed decision on 
borrowing (or non-borrowing). The main responsibility of the banks was that they did not 
reveal the real conditions of loans in their communication, failed to inform clients about the 
real risks associated with foreign currency loans, and clearly subordinated their operation to the 
acquisition of competitive advantage and market expansion, as already evidenced by the sale of 
foreign currency loans as a product. Furthermore, the responsibility of the state should also be 
borne in mind regarding whether or not it intervenes as a regulator in the relationship between 
banks and borrowers, which is basically a classic demand/supply market relationship.16
3.1. Government measures aimed at providing direct support to foreign 
currency borrowers
3.1.1. Agreement signed with banks on 6 November 2008 
In order to mitigate the impact of the “first shock” caused by the sudden rise in exchange 
rates at the end of 2008, the Government signed an agreement with nine commercial banks 
on 6 November 2008 to ensure that:17
- At their request, allow debtors to decrease their instalments free of charge in the 
event of a significant rise in the monthly amount of instalments by extending the 
repayment period;
- At the request of the debtor, and based on the decision of the credit institution, credit 
institutions convert loans denominated in a currency other than HUF free of charge 
until 31 December 2008, and ensure comparability between the realistically expected 
total repayment amounts for foreign currency- and HUF-denominated loans to 
support an informed decision;
- For debtors who got into a difficult situation for reasons beyond their control, particularly 
in the event of an unexpected loss of job, at the request of the debtor, repayment 
conditions may be temporarily eased at the discretion of the credit institution;
- Credit institutions flexibly manage prepayments for loans denominated in currencies 
other than HUF until 31 December 2008. 
By the end of 2008, 6,200 people took the opportunity provided through the agreement. 
1,200 people requested an extension of the repayment period, 4,100 applied for the 
prepayment option, and 900 converted their loans into HUF.18 However, this was only a 
negligible part of all loan contracts.
16 CS. LENTNER: A lakossági devizahitelezés kialakulásának és konszolidációjának rendszertani vázlata, 
Pénzügyi Szemle, Budapest, 3/2015.
17 OTP Bank Zrt., Raiffeisen Bank Zrt., FHB Jelzálogbank Nyrt., Erste Bank Hungary Nyrt., Kereskedelmi és Hitel-
bank Zrt., MKB Bank Zrt., CIB Bank Zrt., UniCredit Bank Hungary Zrt., Magyar Takarékszövetkezeti Bank Zrt.
18 https://www.portfolio.hu/finanszirozas/bankok/valsagkalauzt-indit-a-kormany.109748.html
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3.1.2. Act IV of 2009 on government guarantees for home loans 
The National Assembly adopted Act IV of 2009 on government guarantees for home loans on 2 
March 2009. Pursuant to this Act, anyone who lost his/her job after 30 September 2008 was allowed 
to request a bridging loan by 30 June of the following year to repay a housing loan. Borrowers facing 
difficulties with repayment could request this option from the bank for two years, and the Hungarian 
State assumed a joint and surety guarantee for 70% to 80% of the instalments and interests. Another 
condition for the bridging loan was that HUF 10,000 from the monthly instalment of the housing 
loan had to be paid by the borrower, and the rest could be covered by the bridging loan. When the 
two-year term of the bridging loan expired, payments had to be made until the expiry of the residual 
maturity. The law was amended in June 2009 to allow also those people to take a bridging loan who 
were not unemployed but were in such a bad financial situation with their families that they were 
unable to pay the original instalments. According to the explanatory memorandum to the bill, the 
amendment had to be made because, from the date of the entry into force of the Act, only 300 people 
took the opportunity to take the bridging loan with state guarantee.19
If someone was unable to pay their instalments even in this way, local governments acquired 
a pre-emption right to purchase the residential units, which they could finally lease to the 
debtors under more favourable conditions than usual on the market. Based on a survey 
conducted by the National Bank of Hungary, the number of properties offered for auction 
was less than 3,000 between September 2008 and May 2009. According to data and estimates 
provided by banks, approx. 15 per cent of clients with a delay of more than 90 days were 
actually subjected to foreclosure, which resulted in 5,000 to 6,000 foreclosures per year.20
3.1.3. Government Decree 136/2009 on support for persons in crisis (VI. 24.) 
By adopting Government Decree 136/2009 on addressing the crisis for the improvement of the 
socially critical situation of families on 24 June 2009, the Government established a so-called 
Crisis Management Fund, with an initial capital of HUF 1 billion, sourced from the extra pro-
fit of the four largest Hungarian energy suppliers in the previous year. This allowed families with 
temporary difficulties due to the global economic crisis to apply for one-time, non-reimbursable 
aid with a maximum amount of HUF 50,000 or, in cases worthy of special consideration, HUF 
100,000. The programme took place between 1 August and 30 November 2009.
3.1.4. Act XCVI of 2010 on the amendment of certain finance-related acts in order to 
support consumers in a difficult situation due to taking housing loans 
The National Assembly adopted Act XCVI of 2010 on the amendment of certain finance-
related acts in order to support consumers in a difficult situation due to taking housing loans 
on 25 October 2010. Among other things, this Act introduced the mandatory application 
of the middle rate, maximised the amount of prepayment charges, and prohibited creditor 
banks from charging fees and costs due to the extension of the maturity term (if the maturity 
was not extended within five years). 
19 https://24.hu/fn/gazdasag/2009/11/09/tobben_kaphatnak_athidalo_kolcsont/ (downloaded on 01/10/2018)
20 http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/21507 (downloaded on 1/10/2018)
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3.1.5. Act LXXV of 2011 on fixing the exchange rate used for the calculation of the 
instalments of foreign currency loans and the forced sale of residential properties 
The National Assembly adopted Act LXXV of 2011 on fixing the exchange rate used for the 
calculation of the instalments of foreign currency loans and the forced sale of residential 
properties on 20 June 2011. Its purpose was:
- To address the problem arising from foreign currency lending over the previous 
period at the level of the entire society; 
- To temporarily mitigate the significant exchange rate fluctuations of individual 
currencies and thereby make the situation of those with a foreign currency loan more 
predictable; and 
- To prevent the simultaneous mass sale of residential properties and the resulting 
detrimental effects on the real estate market. 
The Act required financial institutions to apply a fixed exchange rate for a certain period 
of time when converting the monthly instalments of foreign currency loans into HUF. This 
fixed exchange rate was HUF/CHF 180 for Swiss francs, HUF/EUR 250 for euro and HUF 
200/JPY 100 for Japanese yen. 
A prerequisite for applying the fixed exchange rate was the conclusion of a so-called collective 
account loan contract. This was a separate account to accumulate the client’s debt that he/she 
had not paid back to the bank due to the difference between the actual and statutory exchange 
rates. The duration of the payment relief was maximum 36 months from the conclusion of 
the collective account loan contract, with a maximum expiry date on 31 December 2014. If 
requested by the financial institution, the Hungarian State was responsible as a joint and surety 
guarantor for 100% of the debts arising from the collective account loan during the period of 
the fixed exchange rate. (In addition, the State was responsible as a simple guarantor for ma-
ximum 25% of the debts arising from the collective account loan existing at the closing date of 
the fixed exchange rate after the closing date of the fixed exchange rate.)
The above option was offered by the banks to all eligible clients, but only a small number 
of clients used this option. This was mainly caused by the high level of HUF interest rates at 
the time, meaning that the conversion into HUF did not result in lower instalments.21
In addition to the possibility of applying the fixed exchange rate, the Act also regulated the 
forced sale of real estate and required that:
- Until 1 October 2011, it was only allowed to make a sale and publish an auction 
advertisement on the electronic auction platform operated by the state tax authority 
if the obligor had previously agreed to the sale personally by means of a written 
declaration submitted to the state tax authority, or if the mortgage secured a liability 
arising from a housing loan contract, in which the amount of the loan was higher 
than HUF 20 million at the time of disbursement, and the commercial value of the 
residential property in the housing loan contract was higher than HUF 30 million, or
21 L. KOVÁCS: A devizahitelek háttere. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 3/2013. 183-193.
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- From 1 October 2011 to 31 December 2014, creditors were only allowed to initiate 
the forced sale of the collateral property which was designated for this purpose in 
accordance with the law. 
The number of properties designated for forced sale could not exceed the so-called 
statutory forced sale quotas defined for each county and for Budapest. Accordingly, the ratio 
of the number of residential properties designated by the creditor for sale in the counties and 
in the capital between 1 July 2011 and 1 October 2011 could not exceed 2% of the number of 
total residential properties registered as the collateral of the creditor, 2% again in the fourth 
quarter of 2011, followed by 3%, 4% and 5% until the end of 2014. 
3.1.6. Act CXXI of 2011 on the amendment of certain acts related to home protection 
The National Assembly adopted Act CXXI of 2011 on the amendment of certain acts related 
to home protection on 19 September 2011. Perhaps the most important provision of the 
Act was the amendment of Act CXII of 1996 on credit institutions and financial enterprises 
(hereinafter referred to as “old Hpt”). Pursuant to the amendment, in the event of final 
repayment under a foreign currency-denominated loan contract using a collateral based on 
residential property mortgage or a state guarantee, financial institutions had to apply the 
exchange rates HUF/CHF 180 for Swiss franc, HUF/EUR 250 for euro and HUF 200/JPY 
100 for Japanese yen when determining the HUF amount of the final repayment. 
Final repayment at a fixed exchange rate was possible (in addition to several other 
conditions) if a written request was submitted by the borrower accordingly by 30 December 
2011. The borrower was also required to agree to the final repayment of the debt arising from 
the bridging or collective account loan directly related to the foreign currency-denominated 
loan affected by final repayment. The financial institution was not allowed to charge any 
reimbursement or other fees in connection with the final repayment.
Considering the fact that the acts aimed to support foreign currency borrowers facing 
difficulties often resulted in situations where the debtors (or other participants of the 
transactions) would normally have had to pay duty or tax, the Act included several 
amendments determining duty or tax exemption for related transactions. 
About one-fourth of clients took the opportunity of final repayment at a fixed exchange 
rate. A quarter of them partly financed their final repayment from a new HUF loan. This 
option was typically attractive to those who had reserves and/or were creditworthy; this 
measure was obviously beneficial for them. Looking at the issue from the side of banks, it 
was precisely the best quality and most creditworthy debtor clientele that disappeared from 
the portfolio, resulting in a one-off loss and the fall of profitability in the sector.22
22 KOVÁCS: i.m.
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3.1.7. Government Decree No. 1279/2011 (VIII. 10.) on the Social Housing Construction Programme 
On 14 August 2011, in its decision on the social housing construction programme to support 
foreign currency borrowers, the Government announced the construction of detached 
houses with differentiated floor areas depending on family size that: 
- Allow home gardening on plots of 1,000 m2; 
- Incorporate complete, state-of-the-art and energy-efficient utilities; 
- Can be operated with low overhead costs and are equipped with energy efficient 
technologies, and 
- Allow public employment and own work contribution. 
The Government appointed Ócsa, a settlement near Budapest, as the location of the pro-
ject, where they planned the construction of 80 to 100 houses of 40m2, 200 to 220 houses 
of 50m2, 80 to 100 houses of 60m2, 35 to 55 houses of 70m2 and 20 to 25 houses of 80m2. 
Finally, only the first 80 houses of the residential community were actually built, which are 
still used by residents. Initially, the Hungarian Maltese Charity Service also helped families 
moving into the houses in community buildings.
3.1.8. Act CLXX of 2011 on ensuring housing for natural persons incapable of meeting 
their payment obligations under their loan contracts 
The National Assembly adopted Act CLXX of 2011 on ensuring housing for natural persons 
incapable of meeting their payment obligations under their loan contracts on 5 December 2011. 
The purpose of adopting this Act was to help natural persons who were unable to meet their 
instalment obligations (despite other measures) and primarily to provide them with housing. A 
central element of the Act was the establishment of the National Asset Management Company.
The National Asset Management Company purchased and utilised the property serving 
as the home of the debtor. The most common way of utilisation was letting out the property 
(typically to the former owner). However, it was also possible to initiate the free transfer of 
the residential property to local government ownership. The National Asset Management 
Company bought the property offered by the debtor for sale if: 
- The debtor qualified as a socially deprived person; 
- The debtor’s registered place of residence was the relevant residential property on 28 
September 2011 and afterwards continuously; 
- The debtor raised at least two children eligible for family allowance in the household; 
- The debtor didn’t have any other housing options; 
- There was a mortgage on the residential property for the benefit of a financial 
institution, which was established on 30 December 2009 under a mortgage loan 
contract, and the mortgage loan contract was secured only by the given property; 
- The commercial value of the residential property was below HUF 15 million in Budapest 
and in towns with county status and below HUF 10 million in other settlements; 
- When the mortgage loan contract was signed, the amount of the loan was not higher 
than eighty per cent of the commercial value of the residential property determined 
at the time of disbursement of the mortgage loan; 
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- The residential property was designated for forced sale by the financial institution 
with mortgage rights; and
- All financial institutions with mortgage rights on the residential property have agreed 
to transfer ownership of the residential property to the State and have accepted part of 
the purchase price be paid by the National Asset Management Company in exchange 
for waiving any other claims on the debtor.
The purchase price of the residential property was 55% of the commercial value of the 
associated mortgage loan contract if the residential property was located in Budapest or in 
a town with county status, 50% if in another city, or 35% if in a village. When signing the 
sales contract, the National Asset Management Company granted the right of repurchasing 
the property. If, simultaneously with the conclusion of the sales contract, the National Asset 
Management Company signed a housing rental contract with the debtor, the lessee was obliged 
to pay the agreed rent to the National Asset Management Company on a monthly basis.
3.1.9. Act XVI of 2012 on the amendment of Act LXXV of 2011 on fixing the exchange rate 
used for the calculation of the instalments of foreign currency loans and the forced sale of 
residential properties 
The National Assembly adopted Act XVI of 2012 on the amendment of Act LXXV of 2011 
on fixing the exchange rate used for the calculation of the instalments of foreign currency 
loans and the forced sale of residential properties on 19 March 2012. From 1 April 2012, the 
amendment reopened the possibility of fixing the exchange rate for consumers with foreign 
currency loans and foreign currency-denominated real estate leasing schemes. 
The fixed exchange rate was HUF/CHF 180 for Swiss franc, HUF/EUR 250 for euro and 
HUF/JPY 2.5 for Japanese yen. Similarly to the previous scheme, credit institutions registered 
the difference between the instalments calculated with the actual and fixed rates in a so-called 
collective account during the period of exchange rate fixing, split into two parts (capital and 
interest). However, the exchange rate difference for the two parts had to be paid for the capital 
component only, because the Hungarian State undertook to pay the exchange rate difference 
for the interest. The law also introduced the concept of “highest exchange rate”, which was 
intended to ensure that excessively high exchange rates should not impose an additional 
burden on families with foreign currency loans or on the state. The highest exchange rate was 
HUF/CHF 270 for Swiss franc, HUF/EUR 340 for euro and HUF/JPY 3.3 for Japanese yen.
As an important prerequisite for the use of exchange rate peg, the HUF amount of the 
foreign currency loan calculated with the exchange rate applied at the time of disbursement 
could not exceed HUF 20 million, unless the debtor lived in a common household with at least 
three children in the residential property serving as collateral for the foreign currency loan.23
This programme was a real help for about 40% of eligible clients.24
23 ht tps://w w w.mnb.hu/archiv um/Felug yelet /root/foolda l /fog yasztok na k /f izetesi_nehezsegek /
arfolyamrogzites#Miként működik az új árfolyamrögzítés és hogyan vehető igénybe? (downloaded on 
23/9/2018)
24 KOVÁCS: i.m.
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3.1.10. HUF conversion of mortgage loans 
The National Assembly adopted Act LXXVII of 2014 on settling certain issues related to the 
conversion of the currency of certain consumer loan contracts and to the rules governing interest 
rates on 25 November 2014. This required financial institutions to convert into HUF all foreign 
currency debts or debts existing on the basis of consumer mortgage loan contracts denominated 
in a foreign currency (interest, fees, commissions, other costs). The average exchange rate of the 
given currency as officially quoted by the National Bank of Hungary between 16 June 2014 and 7 
November 2014 or the exchange rate quoted on 7 November 2014 (whichever was more favourable 
for the consumer) had to be used as a conversion rate. The interest rate on converted HUF loans 
had to be linked to the three-month BUBOR and the original interest surcharge had to be applied, 
which could not be less than 1%, but could not exceed 4.5% for a consumer mortgage loan contract 
for housing purposes and 6.5% for a consumer mortgage loan contract for non-housing purposes.
The law made it possible to leave the loan contract unchanged if explicitly requested by the 
debtor, and if the debtor could demonstrate that: 
- He/she had a regular income in excess of the expected instalment in the given 
currency, or 
- The remaining term of contract would expire on 31 December 2020 at the latest, or 
- The interest calculated for HUF conversion based on the Act exceeded the interest or 
interest surcharge initially calculated.
3.1.11. HUF conversion of motor vehicle and personal loans 
The National Assembly adopted Act CXLV of 2015 on resolving issues concerning the HUF 
conversion of receivables arising from certain loan contracts on 22 September 2015. The scope of 
the Act covered those still effective foreign currency-denominated loan contracts that had not been 
previously involved in HUF conversion and that had not been provided on the basis of mortgage 
registered on the property. Pursuant to the Act, financial institutions were obliged to convert 
foreign currency receivables into HUF (both from existing and already terminated contracts) 
using the exchange rate officially quoted by the National Bank of Hungary on 19 August 2015.
3.2. Financial consumer protection measures
3.2.1. Regulation of the content of loan contracts and the provision of adequate 
information to consumers 
The National Assembly adopted Act25 CLXII of 2009 on consumer credit on 14 Decem-
ber 2009. This included, among other things, rules for the following fields to protect the 
interests of borrowers: 
- Commercial communication on loans;
- Information to be provided before a loan contract is signed;
- Form and content requirements for loan contracts;
- Obligation to provide information on changes in the costs of loans; 
- Prepayment.
25 Act CLXII of 2009 transposed Directive 2008/48/EC into Hungarian law
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As part of the rules on commercial communication, the Act required credit institutions 
to indicate the value of the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) prominently with the Hungarian 
abbreviation, with an accuracy of one decimal place. If, in addition to the value of the 
Annual Percentage Rate, communication contained a loan interest rate or numerical data 
regarding any other consideration (fee, commission, cost), then these had to be presented 
clearly, concisely and prominently, with a representative example. 
It was also stipulated that, prior to concluding the contract, the creditor had to inform 
the consumer, on paper or other durable medium, about several parameters of the loan as 
required by law. A copy of the loan contract, the content of which was regulated in detail 
by the Act, had to be provided to the borrower and, during its term, the creditor had to 
inform the consumer free of charge about his/her debt at the request of the borrower or, for 
mortgage loans, once a year. The repayment table had to indicate separately the amount of 
instalments, the frequency and conditions of repayment, and any other consideration items 
for each instalment. If the interest or any other consideration was changed, the consumer had 
to be informed in writing before the entry into force of the amendment. Such information 
had to cover the expected amount of instalments becoming due after the modification and, 
if that leads to a change in the number or frequency of instalments, such change too.
The Act stipulated that the consumer always had the option of (partial or final) prepayment. 
However, the creditor was entitled to ask the borrower for reimbursement of its related 
reasonable costs. This means prepayment did not have to be free of charge, but, as a rule 
of thumb, its charge could not exceed one, or half a per cent of the prepaid amount. In the 
case of a mortgage loan, the maximum prepayment charge was two per cent of the prepaid 
amount, while in the case of loan contracts financed on the basis of a mortgage deed it was 
two and a half per cent of the prepaid amount. 
As far as misleading financial advertisements are concerned, the Hungarian Competition 
Authority acts as a consumer protection authority against financial service providers. A 
clear requirement for advertisements and commercial practices intended for consumers is 
that the consumer should be able to form a realistic picture of the given product. 
3.2.2.Granting consumer protection power to the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority
In 2008, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights conducted an investigation 
to find out to what extent the enforcement of consumer rights of citizens using financial 
services could be guaranteed by the relevant regulations and by the competent public 
bodies.26 The Parliamentary Commissioner considered it important that as many of the 
relevant state bodies as possible, including the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice 
and Law Enforcement, the then Director General of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority (HFSA), the Director General of the National Consumer Protection Authority, 
and the commissioner responsible for the “New Order and Freedom” program be involved 
in this extremely important issue.
26 OBH 1600/2008. (downloaded on 30/09/2018)
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Therefore, prior to publishing his report, he contacted these public institutions in 
connection with several questions, among other things the violation of the rules on residential 
loan contracts, the unilateral amendment of contracts, the information practices of financial 
institutions, the transparency of contractual conditions, the practices for collecting 
receivables, the institution of residential bankruptcy, the procedures of conciliation bodies, 
responsible lending, and the consumer protection activities of the HFSA and the National 
Consumer Protection Authority. 
The Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights examined the enforcement of consumer 
rights related to financial services, the relevant practices of the competent state institutions, 
and the enforcement of the right to a fair trial. 
In his report, the Parliamentary Commissioner pointed out some serious problems with 
the practice applied by the HFSA. In particular, the HFSA examined the problems appearing 
in the complaints submitted by financial consumers only in its standard audits, mostly 
incorporated in its usual comprehensive investigations, rather than within the framework 
of separate investigations. Consumer protection deficiencies were also sanctioned by means 
of decisions closing prudential investigations. According to the Commissioner, it was 
incompatible with the requirements of the rule of law that the supervisory authority did 
not act separately in individual cases. The Ombudsman emphasised that the requirement 
of acting separately in individual cases did not mean that the HFSA should or may take 
over jurisdiction for the settlement of disputes between the parties. The Ombudsman’s 
position was that the HFSA could apply the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act. 
In his report, the Parliamentary Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that it was 
anomalous from the perspective of legal certainty that the state (the regulation) imposed 
hardly any limitations on the activities of financial service providers in a dominant position 
with respect to consumer protection. At the same time, it provided consumer protection 
tools to clients in a much weaker position to a limited extent only. 
This dispute became devoid of purpose after the entry into force of Act XLVII of 2008 on 
the prohibition of commercial practices unfair vis-à-vis consumers. The new Act granted 
the HFSA the power of consumer protection authority from 1 January 2010 and resulted in 
a number of organisational changes.
3.2.3. Establishment of the Financial Arbitration Board 
The Financial Arbitration Board (hereinafter referred to as FAB) started its activity in 
July 2011 within the organisation of the HSFA, currently operating in conjunction with 
the National Bank of Hungary. The FAB is an alternative, free-of-charge dispute resolution 
forum with the task of effectively supporting the rapid, cost-effective and efficient resolution 
of consumer complaints regarding contractual relationships with financial service providers 
such as credit institutions, insurance companies and investment enterprises. The FAB is not 
an authority but a forum for consumers for the settlement of disputes as an alternative for/
prevention of lengthy, time-consuming and costly court proceedings. 
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The procedure requires the consumer to manage his/her case in the same way as in court: 
in addition to presenting their position, he/she should also support it by evidence, appear at 
the hearing, or be represented by a proxy.
The legislative objective of setting up the FAB was to evaluate consumer disputes quickly, 
efficiently and effectively, but in order to strengthen consumer awareness, the Act conditions 
the use of the FAB on the existence of conjunctive conditions:
- The consumer should make an attempt to settle the dispute directly with the financial 
service provider; 
- No other proceeding should be pending regarding the same legal dispute.
3.2.4.Regulation of loan interest rates 
Act CXII of 1996 on credit institutions and financial enterprises (hereinafter referred to 
as, old Hpt) imposed certain limitations on the APR already before the regulation, which 
entered into force on 1 April 2012. The scope of the regulation, of course, covered financial 
organisations to which the old Hpt. applied. Accordingly, in one calendar year, a financial 
institution was only allowed to grant a loan with an APR above 65% to the same client once 
a year, and the amount of the loan could not exceed HUF 250,000. In addition to the old 
Hpt, Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code. (hereinafter referred to as, the old Civil Code) also 
contained provisions on consumer loans. Furthermore, the provisions of the Criminal Code 
punish usury activities. 
The National Assembly adopted Act CXLVIII of 2011 on the amendment of financial 
regulations in connection with the restriction of credit interest rates and the annual 
percentage rate and for ensuring transparent pricing mechanisms on 7 November 2011. As 
an amendment of the old Civil Code, this Act stipulated that, unless otherwise determined 
by the parties or an exception is specified by law, the interest rate should be identical with 
the base rate of the central bank, or, between private individuals, it can be maximum 24 
percentage points higher than the base rate of the central bank. The Act also amended the 
old Hpt., stipulating that the upper limit of the annual percentage rate of the loan granted 
by the financial institution was the base rate of the central bank + 24 percentage points. An 
exception to this rule was the annual percentage rate applicable to loans related to credit card 
contracts or payment accounts, loans granted for the purchase of equipment for everyday 
use or consumer durables (not including motor vehicles), loans for the use of services, or 
loans granted under pledge; here, the upper limit was the base rate of the central bank + 39 
percentage points. The changes applied to contracts signed after 1 April 2012. 
Furthermore, in the case of mortgage loan contracts signed after 1 April 2012, the financial 
institution was no longer allowed to charge, in addition to the interest rates specified in the 
contract, any other interest-like fees or costs payable on a regular basis (if the client repaid 
the loan on time and in accordance with the contract). After the amendment, it was no longer 
possible for the financial institution to offer a preferential interest rate when concluding 
the contract. This frequently led to a situation where borrowers were unable to properly 
assess their own repayment capacity, and, after the expiry of the preferential period, could 
no longer pay the instalments calculated with higher interest rates. 
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Possibilities for changing the interest rate were also regulated. Two methods were defined 
for this purpose: 
- Pricing based on a reference interest rate: when the interest rate payable by the client 
consists of a reference interest rate and the specified interest surcharge, or 
- Fixed interest rate: when the interest rate is fixed for 3, 5 or 10-year interest periods as 
specified in the loan contract, i.e. the interest rate remains unchanged in this period. 
In the case of a fixed interest rate, the client is entitled to terminate the contract and make 
a prepayment free of charge if the new interest rate is not acceptable to him/her, but in that 
case the total amount of outstanding debt must be repaid. 
According to the regulation, a financial institution is allowed to increase the interest 
surcharge only if the client is in default of the payment of a monthly instalment for more 
than 45 days or fails to pay the property insurance for the collateral real estate for at least 
two months.
3.2.5. Regulation of the exchange rate used for the HUF conversion of disbursement and 
repayment
The National Assembly adopted Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the resolution of questions relating 
to the uniformity decision of the Curia regarding consumer loan contracts of financial 
institutions on 4 July 2014. According to this Act, it was no longer allowed for financial 
institutions to apply the buying rate of exchange for the HUF conversion of the disbursement 
and, in deviation from that, the selling rate or any other rate for the repayment of the debt. 
Instead, the official exchange rate of the National Bank of Hungary had to be used for both 
the disbursement and the repayment (including instalments, as well as any costs, fees or 
commissions denominated in a foreign currency).
3.2.6. Introduction of a debt brake
The debt brake regulation, which entered into force on 1 January 2015, consisted of two 
main pillars: 
- The income-based instalment index limited the maximum repayment burden that 
could be imposed on a client to a definite percentage of their regular, legal income, 
while 
- For covered loans, the loan coverage ratio limited the amount of loan that could be 
granted to a proportion of the collateral (e.g. value of property). 
Pursuant to the regulation of the National Bank of Hungary, the income-based instalment 
index had to be examined for all new loans in excess of HUF 200,000 (consumer loan, 
mortgage loan, motor vehicle loan, etc.). In the case of new HUF loans taken after 1 January 
2015, the income-based instalment index could not exceed 50% or, for clients with a net 
income above HUF 400,000, above 60%. These limits were stricter for loans denominated in 
euro or other foreign currencies: 25% for euro, 10% for other currencies, and 30% (euro) and 
15% (other currencies) for high-income clients. 
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For mortgage loans, the loan-to-value ratio, i.e. the ratio between the amount disbursed 
and the market value of the collateral, could not exceed 80% (HUF loans), 50% (EUR loans), 
or 35% (other foreign currency loans). These ratios were somewhat stricter for motor vehicle 
loans (75%, 45%, and 30%).
From 1 October 2018, the National Bank of Hungary modified the value of the income-
based instalment index in order to give a further incentive for the use of mortgage loans 
with a fixed interest rate. In the case of HUF-based mortgage loans accepted after 1 October 
2018 with a maturity period of over five years, credit institutions must apply the following 
limits:27
Interest period
Monthly net income Varying interest − 5 years 5 years − 10 years
10 years − until the 
end of the term
Below HUF 400,000 
(HUF 500,000 from 1 
July 2019)
25% 35% 50%
HUF 400,000 (HUF 
500,000 from 1 July 
2019) or above
30% 40% 60%
3.3. National strategy for the improvement of the financial awareness of the Hungarian 
population − National strategy and action plan for the improvement of financial 
awareness
School-based financial education in Hungary was launched under the initiative of the 
National Bank of Hungary, the discontinued Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Economic Competition Authority and several NGOs. Economic 
and financial education was also included in the National Core Curriculum in 2007. The 
goal of expanding the National Core Curriculum was to enable students to make their 
future economic decisions responsibly, aware of potential advantages and disadvantages. 
Already in 2007, initiative and entrepreneurial competence were included in the National 
Core Curriculum as key competencies, and economic and financial education appeared as 
major development areas.28 During the review of the National Core Curriculum in 2012, the 
discussion paper was also debated publicly, which resulted in a package of recommendations 
for secondary school teachers with the following key points:
– Introduction and teaching of the subject economic and financial skills; 
– Harmonisation of economic and financial skills, launch of accredited further training 
programmes, development of educational and methodological materials (theory and 
practice). 
27 https://www.mnb.hu/sajtoszoba/sajtokozlemenyek/2018-evi-sajtokozlemenyek/megjelent-az-adossagfek-
szabalyok-modositasarol-szolo-mnb-rendelet (downloaded on 02/10/2018)
28 http://epa.oszk.hu/.../EPA00035_upsz_2011_07_117-139.p (downloaded on 02/10/2018)
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The National Bank of Hungary has long been making efforts, both on their own and in 
cooperation with several institutions, to spread financial literacy. The National Bank of 
Hungary launched a programme called “For our Everyday Finances”, under the coordination 
of the Money Compass Foundation, established in 2008, involving a number of banks and 
insurance companies.29
The Financial Consumer Protection Centre, established by the National Bank of Hungary, 
has been coordinating the publication of the Financial Navigator Booklets since November 
2014. The purpose of these free information booklets is the further improvement of financial 
awareness at national level. 
The Ministry for National Economy (currently Ministry of Finance) is particularly 
interested in strengthening the financial awareness of the population in order to carry out 
its tasks regarding the stability of the regulatory system for economic and financial policy. 
Accordingly, the Government appointed the Ministry of National Economy as a Government 
Centre for the improvement of financial awareness in 2016.
On 8 December 2017, the Government adopted Government Resolution 1919/2017 (XII. 8.) 
on the adoption of a strategy for the improvement of the financial awareness of the population. 
The adopted Hungarian strategy was developed taking into consideration the OECD/INFE 
guidelines and the best international practices, also bearing in mind special Hungarian needs. 
Its evolutive nature allows it to easily adapt to the expectations arising from the rapidly changing 
environment and any new challenges appearing, e.g. digital financial services. The draft strategy 
was also reviewed by the OECD/INFE. It gave very positive feedback, emphasising that the 
Hungarian Government had been able to compile a high-quality material in a very short time. 
An important mission of the new national strategy is to set a unified national strategic 
direction for several current initiatives, which have been in progress for many years but 
support fragmented financial literacy (e.g. National Bank of Hungary, State Audit Office, 
Hungarian Banking Association, Association of Hungarian Insurers), to clarify priorities, 
and to concentrate resources expediently. The strategy also gives room for the maximum 
exploitation of synergies between state initiatives and programmes implemented by the 
non-governmental and business sectors. 
Under the coordination of the Ministry of Finance, with nation-wide professional 
cooperation (National Bank of Hungary, Ministry of Human Resources, State Audit Office, 
Central Statistical Office, Hungarian State Treasury, interest group associations and NGOs), 
the objective of the Government was achieved within one year, and a national strategy for 
improving financial awareness was developed. 
The strategy developed covers a period of 7 years, which will be broken down into two-
year rolling action plans built on one another, indicating task, institution and infrastructure. 
Its primary target group is made up of children still at school, but it uses a wide range of 
programmes to reach adults as well, and even retired persons are addressed. The action 
plans of the strategy are aimed at helping vulnerable social groups, too.
29 http://www.penziranytu.hu/mindennapi-penzugyeink-elindult-tanartovabbkepzes (downloaded on 
10/10/2018)
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The strategy defined its objectives, set its directions and identified the necessary steps in the 
knowledge of the deficiencies revealed through the surveys. Its efficiency will be measured, 
self-correction and new challenges emerging in the meantime will be incorporated into 
the implementation of the strategy in the light of results and weaknesses. The indicators for 
measuring the efficiency of the strategy were developed relying on the expertise and with the 
active participation of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. These indicators will reveal the 
effectiveness and success of the measures defined in the action plans at the end of each year. The 
seven main objectives of the first two-year action plan of the national strategy are the following:
1. Creating, strengthening and generally introducing the possibilities of real financial 
education in the public education system, introducing compulsory education with 
meaningful financial content, both in primary and secondary education. The National 
Core Curriculum, currently under preparation, offers an excellent opportunity for 
renewing the education of financial skills, directly reaching schoolchildren, the 
most responsive and important target group, and providing strong policy support 
for a national strategy for improving financial awareness. It is necessary to create 
the foundations for the financial education of teachers, child protection professionals 
and social workers. 
2. Developing conscious financial behaviour and strengthening the financial stress 
tolerance of households by improving their knowledge, confidence and attitudes 
towards financial matters. It is important that the practice of creating family budgets 
becomes widespread.
3. Establishing an approach that promotes prudent financial decisions and creating 
and making people generally familiar with institutions/infrastructures that support 
conscious financial consumer behaviour. As a key objective, the consumer should 
receive guidance for the right choice and should be able to compare competing 
financial products in the simplest and most transparent way to make an optimal 
decision.
4. It is necessary to strengthen the self-care approach of the population. In particular, 
the inclination for savings, insurance and investment related to financial goals and 
typical life situations should be increased.
5. Significantly increasing access to financial products and basic financial services and 
financial inclusion, and ensure the availability of basic financial services for those 
who are still outside the financial system (creating the conditions for basic social 
accounts). 
6. Encouraging the use of state-of-the-art non-cash payment instruments, promoting 
digital solutions, which will lead to significant savings at the level of national economy 
and further whiten the economy.
7. Promoting prudent borrowing. As a basic objective, the attitudes of the population 
should be changed; they should not seek quick financial solutions, but those that are 
carefully selected. This process will also be fostered by regulatory support for the 
development of simplified, transparent and comparable credit products.
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During the implementation of the action plan, the methods for reaching each target group 
will be chosen in a way that they function as effective communication channels: 
- Students in the school system would be reached through a special curriculum, and 
financial education should remain part of the compulsory curriculum. In addition, 
the organisation of theme weeks and summer camps can be expected, and school 
newspapers, school radio networks with nation-wide distribution will also be used.
- When trying to reach students in higher education, the autonomy of higher education 
institutions must be taken into account, i.e. they should be given the opportunity 
to provide practical financial education at their own discretion through optional 
subjects.
- The most efficient method of addressing young graduates is to organise programmes 
for last-year students in secondary and tertiary educational institutions. These will be 
constituted by events and trainings organised by employers, NGOs and professional 
associations.
- The active members of the adult population can be reached through trainings 
organised by employers, NGOs, professional associations, financial advisors, media 
campaigns, or information materials published on the website. They must be made 
familiar with the risks associated with borrowing and investment, and their attention 
must be drawn to the various types of insurance and the preferential schemes that are 
linked to situations arising from their age. 
- The action plan treats people saving money for pension purposes as a separate group. 
It is a general societal and economic interest that the population understand the 
importance of self-care, so the focus is on encouraging self-care in this target group. 
This objective can be achieved by making use of the media’s awareness-raising role 
and the expert content published on the website. 
- Pensioners can be reached through a network of clubs for retired people, the social 
security system, NGOs, and the Financial Advisory Office Network.
- Communication with “vulnerable groups” (groups of society after job loss or family 
tragedies, families with low income, people with disabilities) will be greatly helped 
by NGOs, social workers and the media, and, in order to lay the foundations for 
financial awareness, links must also be created to public employment programmes, 
which have a key role in helping public workers to enter the labour market.
A key role in evaluating the results of the strategy and completing the tasks is played 
by the National Financial Literacy Working Group, an operational inter-ministerial body 
(chaired by Secretary of State of the Ministry of Finance in charge of Finance). Members 
of the Working Group are delegated by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Human 
Resources, the National Bank of Hungary, the Money Compass Foundation of the National 
Bank of Hungary, the State Audit Office, the Central Statistical Office and the Hungarian 
State Treasury. 
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4. Summary
The role of the Hungarian State fundamentally changed after 2008 as a result of measures 
taken to address the problem of foreign currency loans. Instead of the previous neoliberal 
approach, which built on the ability of market economy to keep market players under control 
by means of self-regulation, it clearly took up a regulatory position. The analysts of Barclays 
Capital considered the measures providing support to foreign currency borrowers as a 
decent compromise with no substantial market impact and, in their opinion, the Hungarian 
Government took a middle course by opting for a solution to transfer some of the risks 
arising from foreign currency loans from households to the Government and banks, which 
does not eliminate but only shifts, in time, the burden of serious indebtedness.
Foreign currency loans were finally converted into HUF in spring 2015; the exchange 
rate was HUF 309 for euro and HUF 256.6 for Swiss franc. These rates were higher than 
those between 2002 and 2008, when the loans were taken out, but, due to the distribution of 
responsibilities, the burden could not be entirely transferred to banks.
The primary objective of the measures taken by the Hungarian State after 2008 was to 
prevent a stressful situation in a field of key importance for the residential sector (housing), 
whose potential spill-over effects would have been unpredictable. Not to mention the possible 
consequences of the situation when, on 15 January 2015, the Swiss central bank gave up the 
protection of the Swiss franc against the fluctuation of the euro exchange rate, and the HUF/
Swiss franc middle rate jumped from around 240 to 260 to over 300.30
 
Figure 4: The development of EUR and CHF exchange rates 
30 Edited internally using statistical data from the website of the National Bank of Hungary.
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The measures aimed at rescuing foreign currency borrowers in themselves would probably 
not have been able to achieve significant results, but by offering different solutions to different 
client segments, for many consumers they led to a more predictable burden or a chance to 
keep their homes.31
Although there is still a lot to do in the field of financial literacy, the situation is hopeful. 
The improvement of financial literacy is a common economic interest, which requires 
joint action by the financial sector, economic operators and the state. The lack of financial 
literacy in society is so prominent that it currently prevents rapid recovery from cyclical 
economic crises. Practice-oriented training should cover all levels of society, which will have 
a beneficial effect on people’s ability to make good financial decisions and will thus exert 
long-term macroeconomic effects. 
31 KOVÁCS: i.m.
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This study aims to present the characteristic legal problems and issues of law arising in the so-
called	‘legal	proceedings	involving	foreign	currency	loans’	initiated	or	ongoing	in	very	large	
numbers. In this context, the answers elaborated by judicial practice will be also examined. 
The areas where there is no established legal practice will be also indicated. However, we 
stress that are still a large number of legal proceedings in progress on this subject matter and 
there are many preliminary ruling proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereinafter referred to as “CJEU”). Therefore, the present study can by no means be 
considered a final summary. 
In this study, 'foreign currency-denominated loan contracts' include both foreign 
currency-denominated credit agreements and foreign currency-denominated financial lea-
sing contracts. However, these contract types are analysed separately in certain cases. 
Due to space limits, neither the procedural problems that have arisen in the context of 
foreign currency-denominated lending, nor the issues of law emerging during the execution 
proceedings are addressed, The issues arisen in the non-litigious proceedings conducted 
with regard to the settlement are not discussed, either.1
The present study does not aim to explore and present in a complex way the reasons why 
foreign currency-denominated consumer lending came into prominence and became al-
most exclusive in the period between 2004 and 2008. The present study does not aim, either, 
to examine the severe economic, social and societal problems caused by the spread of this 
legal instrument. 
1. Challenges for the court system in consequence 
of the legal proceedings related to foreign currency-
denominated lending
We believe that, in the past 40 years, the Hungarian justice system did not encounter a 
situation similar to the one caused, and still being caused, by the legal proceedings initiated 
in relation to foreign currency-denominated lending. 
One of the main characteristics of this situation is that the litigations related to the foreign 
currency-denominated loan contracts commenced many years after the conclusion of the 
contracts. These litigations aimed at establishing that the contracts have either not been 
concluded or are not valid. Therefore, the statements of claim were filed when the exchange 
rate of the Hungarian Forint had significantly and permanently weakened compared to 
the imposing foreign currency, i.e. the Swiss Franc (CHF) and, to a lesser degree, the Euro 
(EUR). This created such a situation for the borrowers that they could not or did not want 
to carry the increased burdens. The burden of the borrowers was further increased by the 
fact that more and more financial institutions started to make use of the opportunity of 
unilateral increasing the interests, charges and fees allowed by Act CXII of 1996 on Credit 
1 The settlement between the financial organisations and the consumers has taken place pursuant to Act XL of 
2014 on the Rules of the Settlement and Certain Other Issues Set out in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the Resolution 
of Questions Relating to the Uniformity Decision of the Curia Regarding Consumer Loan Agreements of Fi-
nancial Institutions.
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Institutions and Financial Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as “Old CIA”). In addition, 
almost all financial institutions have used a so-called two-level exchange rate (i.e. different 
purchasing and selling exchange rate) n the foreign currency contract scheme and also 
continuously increased the margin between the two exchange rates. 
On the one hand, the very large number of cases and, on the other hand, the al-
most simultaneous commencement of proceedings threw a challenge to the courts.2 A 
further challenge is that substantially identical contractual provisions (unilateral contract 
amendment, application of purchasing and selling exchange rates, certification of facts, etc.) 
were included in the foreign currency-denominated loan contracts in many cases due to 
their similar design. 
It is obvious that, in a situation with an unprecedented number of legal proceedings be-
ing or having been in progress, enforcing the requirement of legal uniformity has utmost 
importance. This is also underlined by the fact that even though the legal proceedings 
commenced before the different types of courts (i.e. partly at the district courts and partly at 
the regional courts) largely similar points of law arisen were raised. It was the fundamental 
expectation of both the litigious parties and the society that the courts acting in the cases 
should uniformly interpret the relevant legal norms and the contractual provisions, if 
possible. In accordance with its constitutional obligation to create legal uniformity, we 
believe the Curia has played and still plays a major role in answering the points of law in a 
uniform manner. 
In order to ensure legal uniformity at the highest possible level, the Curia has issued several 
guidelines of principle. In relation to foreign currency-denominated lending, the Curia has 
passed four civil judicial uniformity decisions (PJE decisions)3 and three division opinions 
(PK opinions).4 Two legal practice analysing groups have been set up on this subject matter. 
In order to further develop the legal practice, two5 out of the four judicial uniformity 
decisions were passed by the Civil Division of the Curia, thus giving a greater weight to the 
content within. The judicial uniformity decisions are of a high importance because their 
content is binding on the courts.6 The importance of PJE Decision 2/2014 is also increased 
2 600 actions related to foreign currency lending were filed in November and December 2013. Nearly 36,000 
cases concerning foreign currency loans were submitted to the courts between 1 November 2013 and 31 De-
cember 2016. (Source: NJO)
3 Civil decisions of principle: 5/2013. PJE decision, 6/2013. PJE decision, 2/2014. PJE decision, 1/2016. PJE 
decision
4 Division opinions: PK Opinion 2/2011 (XII.12.) on certain issues concerning the validity of consumer 
contracts (hereinafter referred to as "PK Opinion 2/2011"), PK Opinion 3/2011 (XII. 12.) on certain issues 
concerning the consideration of actions in the public interest with regard to consumer contracts (hereinafter 
referred to as "PK Opinion 3/2011"), PK Opinion 2/2012 (XII.10.) on the unfairness of the right to uniform 
contract amendment included in the general terms and conditions used by financial institutions in consumer 
loan agreements (hereinafter referred to as “PK opinion 2/2012”).
5 PJE Decision 6/2013, PJE Decision 2/2014
6 Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts of Hungary, point c) of Section 24 (1).
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by the fact that the provisions of certain acts are partly based upon this decision, which is 
sufficiently reflected by the name of the acts.7
The Curia has passed three division opinions on the subject matter being discussed. Two 
of the opinions are dealing generally with the points of law arisen in relation to consumer 
contracts, while the third PK opinion issued guidance on questions related to unilateral 
contract amendments. It must be noted that these division opinions were passed when legal 
disputes concerning consumer contracts or foreign currency-denominated lending had only 
sporadically been submitted to the supreme judicial body.8
Two legal practice analysing groups have been working on this subject matter. The result 
of the work of the legal practice analysing group earlier set up was the PL Opinion 2/2012.9 
The summary opinion drafted by the other legal practice analysing group set up in 2015, 
dealing with the application of the legal consequences of the invalidity of loan contracts 
(hereinafter referred to as “legal practice analysing group on the legal consequences of 
invalidity”) was adopted by the Civil Division of the Curia and can be read on the website 
of the Curia.10 However, given that none of the positions had a convincing majority on the 
points of law arisen and long disputed, no guidelines of principle were issues in addition to 
the summary opinion. 
Naturally, the Curia does not direct legal practice only by means of judicial uniformity 
decisions and division opinions but also through individual decision taken in specific 
cases. A number of landmark decisions have been published in the periodical called 
‘Judicial	Decisions’	(BH).	Out	of	the	case	law	decision,	one	has	been	published	as	decision	
of principle11 and two others as resolutions of principle.12 The large number of cases brought 
before the Curia made it necessary that not only one but more chambers judge in cases of 
subject-matter. The chambers handling the cases involving greater importance or recurring 
points of law strive to informally agree on their legal position. The role of Curia to unify the 
law has not been and is not limited to the instruments specified in the Act above, but has 
played and still plays a significant role in developing the positions of other bodies. 
When the number of legal proceedings concerning foreign currency-denominated lending 
has suddenly increased the legal interpretation was extremely ambiguous on many issues. 
7 Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the Resolution of Questions Relating to the Uniformity Decision of the Curia 
Regarding Consumer Loan Agreements of Financial Institutions (hereinafter referred to as “DH1 Act”), as 
well as Act XL of 2014 on the Rules of the Settlement and Certain Other Issues Set out in Act XXXVIII of 2014 
on the Resolution of Questions Relating to the Uniformity Decision of the Curia Regarding Consumer Loan 
Agreements of Financial Institutions (hereinafter referred to as “DH2 Act”)
8 This is supported by the fact that the courts could only submit 27 final judgements to the legal practice 
analysing group set up before the issuance of PK Opinion 2/2012 PK that covered the above points of law.
9 The summary opinion of the legal practice analysing group is available on the website of the Curia: https://
kuria-birosag.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/joggyakorlat_osszefoglalo_velemeny.pdf
10 https://kuria-birosag.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglalo_velemeny_i.pdf
11 Civil decision of principle P.2. of 2016
12 Economic decision of principle G.1. of 2015; economic decision of principle G.1. of 2018
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Therefore, the Conference of Heads of Civil Divisions has taken and published several 
positions concerning this topic.13 We refer to many of these positions in this study. 
In addition, the President of the Curia has established a consultation body dealing with 
the invalidity of contracts falling within the scope of acts concerning foreign currency 
loans. It has as its members judges who preside over such cases at different judicial levels. 
In addition, the senior advisers of the Curia dealing with such cases also support the work 
of the consultation body. The legal position of the consultation body has been published 
several times;14 we also refer to some of these positions. In other cases, the positions have 
not been published but the discussions have contributed to identifying the problems arisen, 
recognizing the potentially different legal positions and bringing closer the positions. 
Another characteristic of the issues of law raised by the foreign currency-denominated 
loan contracts is the well-observable direct interaction of law-making and application of the 
law. The DH1 and DH2 Acts were partly based on the PJE Decision 2/2014. The DH2 Act has 
also made a decision on a point of law, which the legal practice analysing group on the legal 
consequences of invalidity was unable to decide due to the division of opinions. 
The typical legal arguments appearing in the legal proceedings have periodically changed. 
Initially, reference was made to the invalidity of the contractual design, the obvious 
contradiction to good morals, the usury nature, the impossibility of the service in and 
fraudulent nature of the contracts. Later, it became characteristics to request that the entire 
contract is declared null and void due to the violation of provisions laid down in Section 
213 (1) of the Old CIA (typically without applying the legal consequences). This was made 
possible by Section 239/A of Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code (hereinafter “Old Civil Code”). 
At the same time, the question of unfairness of certain contractual provisions emerged 
in a significant number of legal proceedings. In this context, reference was made to the 
unfairness of the contractual provisions allowing the unilateral modification of interest, 
charges and fees, as well as the use of the two-level exchange rate (purchasing and selling 
exchange rates). They also claimed that insufficient information had been provided on 
that the exchange rate risk is borne by the borrowers.15 There is a large number of cases 
in progress related to the judgement of the unfairness of certain provisions of the notarial 
certifications of facts in the contracts and the mortgage agreements concluded for securing 
the loan agreements. 
It is typical that a few attorneys-at-law specialised in this matter represent the consumers 
in a very large number of cases related to foreign currency-denominated loan contracts. 
13 See the memorandum of the meeting on 18-19 May 2015 (published in the issue of 2015/7 of BH); the memo-
randum of the meeting on 28 September 2015 (published in the issue of 2016/1 of BH), the memorandum of 
the meeting on 9-10 November 2015 (published in the issue of 2016/1 of BH), and the memorandum of the 
meeting on 16 March 2016 (published in the issue of 2016/6 of BH).
14 See the memorandum of the meeting held on 22, 23 and 29 June 2015 (available on the website of Curia), the 
memorandum of the meeting held on 8 June 2016 (available on the website of Curia), the memorandum of 
the meeting held on 28 September 2016 (available on the website of Curia), the memorandum of the meeting 
held on 9 November 2016, and the memorandum of the meeting held on 11 October 2018. All memoranda are 
available on the website of Curia: https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/konz-ervenytelensegi
15 For more details see point 5.2.2.
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Their legal arguments are related to specific topics and formulaic without knowing and 
referring to the specificities of the given contract and the concrete contracting process. 
It is very regrettable that only a few legal proceedings of public interest have been initiated. 
Neither the prosecutor’s office, nor the – sometimes really loud – interest representation 
organisations acting for the consumers taking out foreign currency loans are active in this type 
of legal proceedings, albeit the most efficient consumer protection could be ensured by actions 
of public interest and the burden on the justice system would also be much smaller. This is well 
evidenced by the experience gained from the litigations initiated on the basis of the DH1 Act. 
2. Concepts often arising in legal disputes concerning 
foreign currency loan contracts and their legal 
interpretation by the judges
2. 1. The concept of foreign currency-denominated loan contract
Foreign currency-denominated lending became prominent in the period between 2004 
and 2008 so that the legal rules for the legal instrument were quite imperfect. This is well 
reflected by the fact that the concept and substantial characteristics of foreign currency-
denominated loan contracts were not clearly specified by an act. Therefore, the Curia had 
to define the distinctive characteristics of foreign currency-denominated loans and decide 
whether is is actually a Forint or a foreign currency loan. 
In its decision PJE 6/2013, the Curia clearly took the view that only loans where the money 
debt is imposed in a currency other than Forint are considered as foreign currency loans. Thus, 
the Curia made it clear that a foreign currency-denominated loan contract is a foreign currency 
contracts and not Forint-denominated loan contract with a clause on stability of value. 
There had been no uniform judicial practice in this matter before this PJE Decision. 
Typically, the decrees of the Court of Appeal of Szeged contained the strong argument that 
a foreign currency-denominated contract is actually a Forint contract.16 This position was 
seemed to be confirmed by the fact that the disbursement and the repayment of the loan 
was done in the Forint since the borrower wanted to satisfy his financing needs arising in 
Forint by means of the loan. However, the undisputed fact that the borrowers had to pay a 
more beneficial foreign currency interest rate rather than the relatively high Forint interest 
rate in the given period clearly justifies, in our opinion, the pertinence of the legal position 
taken by PJE. Nevertheless, the borrowers had to be reminded in several judgements of the 
simple fact that the interest rate in the loan contracts was not the same as the interest rate on 
the financial markets, but was fixed together with a spread. Therefore, this contractual inte-
rest rate was significantly higher than the interest rate of the given currency on the financial 
markets, taking into account the risk factors included in the interest rate. 
16 For instance, in its judgement no. Gf.I.30244/2012/4, the Court of Appeal of Szeged pointed out that the contract 
covers a loan accounted in a foreign currency where there is no financial movement in any foreign currency but 
the actual foreign currency exchange rate only serves as the basis of accounting. Therefore, the foreign currency-
denominated loan is a Forint loan with a clause on value stability: the borrower always needs to repay his debt 
in the Forint by converting the amount by using the actual foreign currency exchange rate.
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Another frequent argument is that the foreign currency-denominated loans are Fo-
rint loans because there was no foreign currency behind the specific loan contract or, at 
least, the financial institution had to justify that there was a foreign currency behind the 
transaction. This reasoning is still present in the litigations nowadays. Therefore, it was of 
great importance that PJE Decision 6/2013 PJE confirmed that there was a foreign currency 
source behind the loan, taking into account the rules of public law nature concerning 
financial institutions. Nevertheless, it should not and cannot be examined whether there is 
a foreign currency source behind a specific loan contract. 
The PJE Decision 6/2013 clearly stated that there were two types of foreign currency loans: 
loans with no effectivity clause (foreign currency-denominated loans) and foreign currency 
loans with an effectivity clause. The difference between the two categories was defined as 
follows: “in the case of a foreign currency-denominated loan, the debt is denominated in a 
foreign currency the lender must disburse the loan in the Forint and the borrower must repay 
the loan in the Forint, so both the lender and the borrower must pay in the Forint the money 
debt imposed in a foreign currency.” However, if both the disbursement and repayment are 
done in a foreign currency, the contact is not foreign currency-denominated, but a foreign 
currency loan contract with an effectivity clause. 
Based on the definition above, typically foreign currency-denominated loan contracts were 
at issue in the cases brought before the courts. Nevertheless, we also met with contractual 
provisions that were clearly considered as foreign currency loan contracts with an effectivity 
clause. Finally, contracts were also involved in the court cases, probably in a number higher than 
the clean-cut foreign currency contracts, where the contractual provisions obliged the borrowers 
to repay their debt in the foreign currency. However, if they did not comply with this obligation, 
the lender was allowed to collect the instalment from the Forint account of the borrower. 
There are no more points of law to be described in the case of foreign currency loan 
contracts with an effectivity clause (e.g. use of a two-level foreign currency exchange 
rate). Nevertheless, it is clear that the effects of exchange rate fluctuations are borne by the 
borrower also in the case of this contract type in the typical case where their income did not 
incur in the specific foreign currency. 
2. 2. The concepts of consumer, consumer contract and the delineation of 
the latter from non-consumer contracts
When deciding a legal dispute in legal proceedings, the fact whether a specific loan contract 
is considered a consumer loan contract may have a decisive importance. As the Curia 
pointed out in point 1 of the PK Opinion 2/2011, the court has to notice ex officio whether a 
legal relationship involved in the litigation is considered a consumer contract. 
In the case of foreign currency-denominated loan contracts, the fact whether the contract be-
ing the subject-matter of the legal dispute is considered a consumer contract is of fundamental 
importance, as other provisions of substantive and procedural law apply to consumer 
respectively non-consumer loan contracts. For instance, the invalidity or severability of a 
consumer contract has different legal consequences, taking into account certain provisions of 
the Old Civil Code, which will be detailed later. The judging of the unfairness of the provisions 
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of consumer contracts is governed by the provisions of European Union law, so we must also 
take into note the case law of the CJEU. The DH1, DH2 and DH3 Acts17 (hereinafter jointly 
referred to as “DH Acts”), as well as the Curia’s guidelines of principles previously referred to 
lay down specific provisions concerning consumer loan contracts, too. 
Therefore, in the case of doubt, the courts have to primarily take position on the issue 
whether or not the specific contract is considered a consumer contract. Taking position on 
this issue is not easy since the relevant legal provisions define the concept of 'consumer' 
differently. In addition, due account is to be taken of the EU rules and the case-law of the 
CJEU when answering this question. 
Point d) of Section 685 of the Old Civil Code18, effective from 1 July 2003, did not narrow 
down the concept of 'consumer' to natural persons acting for purposes outside their tra-
de, business or operation. The Old CIA had defined the concept of 'consumer' only as of 
1 September 2008.19 It had caused further difficulties in legal interpretation that point a) 
of Section 2 of Act CLV of 1997 on Consumer Protection, in effect during this period, as 
well as point a) of Section 2 of Act XLVII of 2008 on the Prohibition of Unfair Commercial 
Practices against Consumers, had applied different concepts for consumers. 
The concept of 'consumer' is also defined differently by the EU directives.20 Nevertheless, 
it can be concluded that, in absence of a uniform definition, the judgements of the CJEU 
have always interpreted the concept of 'consumer' for the purposes of the specific consumer 
protection legislation. 
In the case of contracts with a financial subject, the Hungarian judicial practice adopted 
the legal position that, as a general rule, a consumer can only be a natural person, taking into 
account the prior evolution of law, EU law and the case-law of the CJEU. Because if a legal 
person operating for economic purposes, typically a business association or a cooperative 
concludes a loan contract then it does so within the scope of its economic or professional 
activity. So, the Hungarian judicial practice has not accepted the minority position that a 
company may also be a consumer. Nevertheless, the relevant legal framework would have 
indisputably allowed a broader interpretation until the amendment of the Old CIA. 
On this basis, the Curia does not consider as consumer a company limited by shares with 
high a share capital or an unlimited or a limited partnership with a few thousand Forints of 
assets, either. The Curia does not attach decisive importance to the activities undertaken by 
the company or the categories of activities (pursuant to TEÁOR numbers) listed in its memo-
17 Act LXXVII of 2014 on Settling Certain Issues Related to the Conversion of the Currency of Certain 
Consumer Loan Agreements and to the Rules Governing Interest Rates (hereinafter referred to as “DH3 Act”)
18 Pursuant to point d) of Section 685 of the Old Civil Code: “Consumer means a person concluding a contract 
with an aim falling outside of the scope of his/her economic or professional activity.”
19 Pursuant to point III.4 of Annex 2 of the Old CIA “consumer means a natural person pursuing activities to 
achieve goals outside the scope of their own profession and economic activity.”
20 Pursuant to Article 2 of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (hereinafter referred to 
as “Consumer Directive”), which is the most frequently cited and applied directive one in relation to foreign 
currency-denominated loan contracts, 'consumer' means “any natural person who, in contracts covered by this 
Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession.”
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randum of association. Hence, the Curia does not consider non-natural persons established 
for economic purposes as consumers. The lower level courts typically follow this practice. 
If a natural person enters into a loan contract, the judicial practice attaches importance to 
the fact whether the natural person in question concluded the contract with an aim falling 
outside of the scope of his/her economic or professional activity, based on the wording of the 
Old Civil Code. In addition, the Curia regards the concept of the Old CIA, effective as of 1 
September 2008, as guiding, namely, it examines whether the natural person concluded the 
contract to achieve goals outside the scope of his own profession and economic activity. The 
fact that the two legal acts referred to use different concepts did not cause any difficulties. 
Often, the loan contract taken by a business association was complemented by loan contracts 
made by the various members or executive officers of the company with the aim of using it for 
corporate purposes or securing the loan taken out by the company. Even though these contracts 
were concluded by natural persons, they are not regarded as consumer contracts since the clearly 
identifiable aim of the contracts is to support the economic activity of the corporate body. 
It was raised as a question that if, in a loan contract without a specific purpose of use, one co-
debtor is a company and the other co-debtor is a natural person who is not a member or executive 
officer of the company can the contract be regarded as a consumer contract with regard to the 
latter person? According to the uniform position a contract cannot be regarded as a consumer 
and a non-consumer contract at the same time. In this case, as a rule, if one of the borrowers is 
not a natural person the contract is coherently not regarded as a consumer contract.21
If the same natural person concludes contracts for different purposes, it is possible that 
this person is regarded as a consumer and the contract made is regarded as a consumer 
contract in respect of one of the purposes while it is not regarded as such in respect of others. 
The practice of the Curia attaches importance to the information related to the purpose 
of loan and the person of borrower the lender came to know during the preparation for 
contracting or, at latest, upon the conclusion of the loan contract. Namely, the purpose of the 
loan has key importance in the determination of consumer nature. If the purpose is to support 
the objective of a sole proprietorship (e.g. purchase of commercial premises or a vehicle, e.g., 
a van, for the business), then a non-consumer contract is made. Loan substitution as a loan 
purpose does not change the purpose of the loan. So, if the original contract was not concluded 
as a loan contract for consumer purposes then the substituting contract cannot be a consumer 
contract, either. This is also true vice versa: if the original loan contract was concluded for 
a consumer or personal purpose, the substituting contract is also regarded as such.22 If the 
registration number of the sole proprietorship is indicated on the data sheet related to the loan 
request or in the contract itself, then the contract cannot be regarded as a consumer contract, 
either. A loan taken out for purchasing a business share in a limited liability company is not 
a consumer contract, either. The loan purpose cannot be regarded as independent from the 
economic activity even if the borrower does not intend to participate in the activities of the li-
mited liability company and the business share does not produce income for him.23
21 See: point 2 of the memorandum of 9 November 2016.
22 BH 2016/4/83
23 Economic decision of principle G.1. of 2015.
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Nevertheless, based on the practice of the Curia, it has no relevance if the borrower later 
proves in the legal proceedings that the loan taken out was not used for the purposes known 
at the conclusion of the contract, whether in whole or part (e.g. renovation of his house). This 
will not make the contract a consumer contract.24 It does not change the consumer nature 
of the contract, either, if it is proven later in the legal proceedings that the loan provided to 
the natural person with no attached purpose was used for his sole proprietorship. It also has 
no relevance if the vehicle purchased from the loan provided for entrepreneurial purposes 
was not shown in the asset inventory of the borrower’s sole proprietorship or if the sole 
proprietorship ceased to exist during the repayment period. 
Based on the unambiguous practice of the Curia, the nature of the contract is fixed at the time 
of contract is concluded, by taking into account the data known to the lender at that moment. The 
pertinence of this legal position is also justified by the fact that the lender had to act in a different 
way and had extra obligations when it concluded consumer loan contracts. Facts that have become 
known later do not influence the consumer or non-consumer nature of a specific contract. 
2. 3. The concept of consumer or personal loan
In addition to clarifying whether a consumer contract was established, it also has to be 
examined in the disputes concerning foreign currency-denominated loan contracts in 
litigations based on Section 213 of the Old CIA repealed effective of 11 June 2010, whether 
a consumer or a personal loan contract was made, as well as if such a contract qualified as a 
consumer or persona loan contract.25
Based on the relevant provisions of the Old CIA, it is obvious that a contract is a consumer or 
personal loan only if the contract is a consumer contract. However, qualifying the contract as a 
consumer contract is to no avail if the loan is granted for purchasing assets that cannot be regarded 
as consumer goods primarily used for personal purposes (e.g. purchase of a yacht) The judicial 
practice recognizes vehicles of average value as consumer goods primarily used for personal 
purposes. Luxury or premium category vehicles are not regarded as such by the judicial practice. 
Although such a concrete issue of legal interpretation has not arisen yet, we believe that 
the distinction to consumer loan contracts cannot be applied to personal loans, taking 
into account their legal definition. Therefore, a loan granted to a natural person for non-
economic purposes, with the aim of purchasing a real estate of really high value is regarded 
as a consumer or personal loan. 
24 BH 2015/7/197, as well as judgement no. Gfv.VII.30716/17 of the Curia
25 Between 1 January 1998 and 31 August 2008, the concept of 'consumer loan' was defined in point III.5 
of Schedule 2 of the Old CIA as follows: “consumer loan means a loan granted to a natural person for the 
purchasing or repair of consumer goods primarily used for personal, family or household purposes, or for using 
services, without making such loan attached to a specific purpose of use, and if such loan is borrowed by the 
natural person not as part of his business activity.” This provision was modified due to the legal regulation of 
the concept of consumer. 
 Between 1 January 2001 and 10 June 2010, the concept of personal loan was defined in point III.13 of Schedule 
2 of the Old CIA: “personal loan means a consumer loan or other loan that can be used by a natural person for 
purchasing, building, renovating, enlarging or remodelling homes, vacation homes or other real property and 
for upgrading public utilities.” 
382 On the issues of law arising in litigation involving foreign...
2. 4. Complexity of interests of the parties 
An interesting conclusion can be drawn from the experience gained in legal proceedings. 
Many entities clearly not considered as consumers claimed that the contract concluded by 
them is a consumer contract (consumer or personal loan contract). This happened primarily 
so that they can refer to the nullity of the contract and that EU law, the case-law of the CJEU, 
the guidelines of principle issued by the Curia on this subject-matter, as well as certain 
provisions of DH Acts also apply to them. 
However, a reverse trend could also be observed. In the case of consumer contracts 
clearly concluded by consumers, it was argued that the specific contract was not a consumer 
contract or the specific contractual provisions were individually negotiated. In this way, they 
wanted to be exempted from suspending the proceedings pursuant to Section 16 of the DH1 
Act and applying the rules laid down in Sections 37 and 37/A of the DH2 Act. 
3. The issue of the non-conclusion of contracts 
The parties started to argue in legal proceedings that the contract had not been concluded 
primarily after the entry into force of the DH2 Act. Presumably this is related to the fact that the 
provisions of Section 37 of the DH2 Act no longer applies to non-concluded contracts. In this 
case, unless otherwise provided by the law, an action for declaratory judgement only may also be 
brought before the court pursuant to Section 239/A of the Old Civil Code and the legislation does 
not even exclude the restoration of the original situation. However, it is not clarified yet whether 
the restoration of the original situation is possible at all and what it precisely means.26
With regard to the non-conclusion of the contract, the borrowers refer to reasons of form 
on the one hand and reasons of substance on the other hand.
3. 1. Non-conclusion of contracts for reasons of form
Pursuant to Section 210 (1) of the Old CIA, financial institutions were allowed to conclude 
loan contracts only in writing or in the form of an electronic document executed with a 
qualified electronic signature. We have not met any case where this requirement was violated. 
The provision in question also required that the customer be provided with one original 
copy of the contract. Based on this, the failure to deliver the general terms and conditions 
that formed a part of the contract could not result in the non-conclusion of the contract. 
It was typically referred to as a formal deficiency that the person signing the loan contract on behalf 
of the lender had not had a valid power of representation or that the parties had not been duly signed. 
Related to this argumentation, it had to be pointed out in the legal proceedings that 
the form and methods of signing authority are indisputably regulated in Section 8 of 
Act V of 2006 on Public Company Information, Company Registration and Winding-up 
Proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “CPA”) and Section 29 (3) of Act IV of 2006 on Bu-
siness Associations (hereinafter referred to as “CA”). These provisions were complemented 
by Section 47 (2) of the Old CIA, which stipulated a joint right to sign under the conditions 
26 See the summary opinion drafted by the legal practice analysing group on the legal consequences of invalidity.
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specified therein. These legal provisions did not exclude that the persons authorized to sign 
for the company delegate their power of representation by a power of attorney. 
Consequently, the loan contract was concluded even if the contract was concluded the 
purchaser of vehicle by the car dealer company on behalf of the financial institution. It 
was unambiguously declared in the decision of principle no. P2 of 2016 that the financial 
institution could validly establish a transactional right of representation in the mandate 
contract concluded with the car dealer undertaking to authorize the car dealer company 
to conclude a loan contract on behalf of the financial institution simultaneously with 
concluding the sales contract when the the vehicle was sold. And the car dealer company 
could lawfully authorize its employees to conclude the loan contract. This authorization 
could take the form of a formal authorization in writing, but it should also be considered as 
valid if the authorization was included in the job description of the employee concerned. The 
decision also stipulated that the chain verifying the creation of the power of representation 
did not have to be manifest from the contract itself. 
It happened that the employee of car dealer had signed the contract on behalf of the 
financial institution but the above chain was not proven and the employee did not hold an 
authorization from the financial institution that was legally valid pursuant to the Old Civil 
Code In such a case, the signatory of the contract acted as an unauthorised representative 
whose action could be approved by the financial institution subsequently both prior or 
during to the legal proceedings, taking into account the provisions in Section 221 of the 
Old Civil Code. The approval is not bound by formalities so the represented person could 
make his/her statement on the approval of the unauthorised representative’s action orally, 
in writing or even by conduct.27 The Curia published a decision,28 in which it stated that the 
contract had already been approved implicitly already when, based on the provisions of the 
contract, the financial institution had disbursed the loan amount to the borrower. 
Although it does not concern the non-conclusion of the contract, it might be worth 
pointing out here that frequent references were made to the fact that the general terms and 
conditions forming a part of the contract (hereinafter referred to as “GTC”) were not signed 
by the consumer and, therefore, he was not bound by the provisions therein. In this subject-
matter, the Curia has clearly taken the view that the borrower does not have to separately 
sign the GTC, forming a part of the contract (also including the business code and the 
notice), in order for it to become a part of the contract. The CJEU has confirmed this legal 
interpretation in case no. C-42/15 Home Credit Slovakia a.s. It held that the loan agreement 
does not necessarily have to be included in one piece of document, and the parties are 
required to sign all the documents if this is explicitly stipulated by national law. 
3. 2. Non-conclusion of contracts for reasons of substance
The borrowers have also frequently referred to reasons of substance as reasons for the non-
conclusion of the contracts. 
27 BH 2014/10/303
28 BH 2016/4/83
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Pursuant to Section 205 (1) of the Old Civil Code, it is fundamental to the validity of a 
contract that an agreement is reached by the parties concerning all essential issues, as well 
as those deemed essential by either of the parties. Pursuant to Section 210 (2) of the Old CIA, 
the agreement for financial services and auxiliary financial services must clearly indicate the 
interest rate, the fee and all other charges and conditions, including the legal consequences 
of late payment, and the method and consequences of enforcing the collateral obligations 
made to secure the contract. 
According to the legal practice of the Curia, a foreign currency-denominated loan contract 
is not concluded owing to deficiencies of substance if it does not contain the loan amount, the 
loan currency, the interest (although there are differing opinions in this regard) and the tenor. 
As the Curia has pointed in point II.1.a) of its PJE Decision 1/2016, there are two typical 
methods to determine the loan amount in the case of foreign currency-denominated loan 
contracts. One method is that the loan amount is determined in a foreign currency and 
it followed from other contractual provisions that the foreign currency defined in the 
contract had to be converted to the Forint at a specific time by using the foreign exchange 
rate stipulated therein, and that this loan amount had to be disbursed and repaid in the Fo-
rint. The other method of determination is that the loan amount is defined in the Forint but, 
based on the other contractual provisions, it was clear that the loan is determined, recorded 
and accounted in the foreign currency at the time specified in the contract, by taking into 
account the foreign exchange rate stipulated therein. 
These were the methods of determination considered as typical. Some financial institutions 
applied solutions where, although the loan amount had been fixed in the contract in the foreign 
currency, the maximum amount to be disbursed had also specified in the Forint, thus adjusting 
to the borrower’s loan need arising in the Forint. After concluding the contract, the loan was 
disbursed and the loan amount was fixed in the foreign currency by taking into account the 
foreign exchange rate valid on that day. Thus, the design was indisputably complex. 
Generally, it can be said that the loan amount could be determined in any way by which 
the amount of money to be made available at the time of performance of the contract could 
be determined.29
In many of its decisions,30 the Curia pointed out that the non-conclusion of a contract 
cannot be established if the borrower had received the loan amount, had not objected to it, 
started to fulfil his repayment obligations and referred to the non-conclusion of the contract 
due to the inaccurate and unclear determination of the loan amount only years later. 
Nevertheless, these legal arguments were cited in the legal proceedings not in regards to 
the non-conclusion of the contract but as a reason for the contract being null and void based 
on point a) of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA. On the other hand, the issue of the unfairness 
of these contractual provisions has also been raised. In this regard, the CJEU explained in 
its order in case no. C-126/17 Erste Bank Hungary Zrt. that the contractual provision is not 
unfair if it fulfils the requirement of plainness and intelligibility. 
29 See point I/2 of the memorandum of 28 September 2016.
30 E.g. BH 2018/8/230, as well as decision no. Gfv.VII.30559/2017/4. of the Curia (expected to be published in 
BH).
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Based on Section 523 (2) of the Old Civil Code, borrowers shall pay interest if the creditor is 
a financial institution, unless otherwise provided by the law. The interest could be determined 
as an absolute amount or by using an annual percentage. The contract was surely concluded no 
matter which method had been used to determine the interest. It is another issue that, pursuant 
to point c) of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, the loan contract became null and void in case 
the interest was not expressed as a percentage. In case the interest rate was not determined, 
the provisions laid down in Sections 232 (1) and (2) of the Old Civil Code could nevertheless 
apply (although the legal position above could be debated).31 If we accept this position then the 
contract is invalid (null and void) based on point c) of Section 213 (1) of the CIA even though 
it was concluded. No such case has come up in the practice of the Curia. 
In the practice, there were no contracts where the currency or the tenor (the latter in a 
calculable way) were not determined, so establishing the non-conclusion of the contract for 
that reason has never occurred.
The lack of any other substantial elements listed in Section 210 (2) and Section 213 (1) of 
the Old CIA does not result in the non-conclusion of a contract. 
4. Nullity (partial nullity) of the contract due to 
violation of law or evident contradiction to good morals 
4. 1. Grounds for invalidity resolved by PJE Decision 6/2013
It had been a frequent argument before the PJE Decision 6/2013 was adopted that the foreign 
currency-denominated loan contracts are evidently in contradiction to good morals, were 
usury contracts, aimed at impossible services or were fictitious contracts. The Curia clearly and 
explicitly articulated its position on these issues in point 2 of the PJE Decision 6/2013, namely, 
that arguments referring to the above grounds were not correct, hence the contracts made were 
not null and void in the absence of specific factual elements. The judicial uniformity decision 
also pointed out that, with the exception of investment loans, foreign currency-denominated 
loans did not have an investment purpose, hence the EU rules concerning investment loans 
and the provisions for information stipulated therein did not apply to them. The above legal 
position was confirmed in CJEU case no. C-312/2014 Banif Plus Bank Zrt. We do not explicitly 
return to the arguments detailed in the PJE Decision in this study. 
4. 2. Potential legal consequence of violating certain provisions of the Old CIA 
4.2.1. Violation of Section 210 (2) of the Old CIA
Pursuant to Section 210 (2) of the Old CIA, a loan contract must clearly state the interest 
rates, the fee and all other charges and conditions, including the legal consequences of late 
payment, and the method and consequences of the enforcement of collateral obligations 
securing the contract. These legal provisions are typically referred to in cases involving 
contracts other than consumer loan or consumer leasing contracts, since these contracts do 
not fall within the scope of the provisions of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA. 
31 See point I/2 of the memorandum of 28 September 2016.
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In the case of a loan contract, the lack of determination of the interest rate (if this was not even 
included in the contract in a calculable way) results in the non-conclusion or nullity of the contract.32
Contrary to Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, this Section did not require the determination 
of the annual percentage of the interest. However, in order to be able to charge the fees and 
other costs on the top of the interest rate, it is necessary that they are defined in the contract 
or the annexes forming a part thereof. Nevertheless, the lack of these does not result in the 
nullity of the contract. 
In the case of financial leasing contracts, the borrowers frequently refer to the violation of 
Section 210 (2) of the Old CIA, namely, that the interest rate was not defined in the contract 
at all or as an annual percentage. 
Based on the concept of financial leasing,33 the Curia held that the interest forming a 
part of the leasing fee is not identical with the interest stipulated in point III/7 of Schedule 
2 of the Old CIA34 As defined therein, the interest means sum of money or other yield 
payable for the use of and risks associated with the loan determined as a percentage of 
the loan amount and for a specific period of time. Even though the contract also has 
a loan element, the interest part of the leasing fee is consideration for using the asset 
for a specific period of time or, where a residual value is specified, the consideration for 
transferring the title. Therefore, the Curia concluded that the provisions concerning the 
determination of the interest in Section 210 (2) of the Old CIA apply to financial leasing 
contracts mutatis mutandis. In fact, the interest part is in the contracts being the subject 
of the legal proceedings was determined in absolute terms and in a calculable way, so the 
Curia decided so that these contracts had not violated the provisions of Section 210 (2) of 
the Old CIA and, thus, were not null and void. 
4.2.2. Assessment of the grounds for nullity in violation of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA
It was frequently referred to in the legal proceedings that a specific consumer loan contract 
was null an void for grounds set out in Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA. 
It is important to emphasize that the provisions in Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA applied 
only to consumer or personal loan contract (see point II.3.).
By referring to the wording of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, the consumers frequently 
argued that violating any of the provisions included therein resulted in the nullity of the 
contract as a whole since this was suggested by the wording of the legal provision. Having 
32 See point III.2.
33 Pursuant to point I/11 of Schedule 2 of the Old CIA, financial leasing means an operation where the lessor 
acquires the title to a real or movable property or a right representing assets under the assignment of the 
lessee for the purpose of conferring the right of the use of such asset to lessee for a specified period of time, 
provided, that it is shown in the lessee’s books. In addition to other rights and obligations, upon assignment 
of use the lessee acquired the right that it or a third party designated by it acquires the title to the leased asset 
upon the expiry of the lease period stipulated in the contract and subject to the payment of principal and 
interests of the leasing fee in full and, if included in the contract, the residual value. The parties shall stipulate 
in the contract the principal part of the leasing fee, which equals the contract price of the leased asset or right 
representing assets and the interest part of leasing fee and the repayment schedule.
34 BH 2017/4/125
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carefully examined the relevant provisions, the legal consequence of absolute nullity exists 
in only a few cases. Because if the reason for invalidity is a deficiency of the content in the 
absence of which the contract can be performed then the contract is only partially invalid. 
Pursuant to point a) of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, a consumer or personal loan contract 
is null and void if it does not include the object of the contract. The interpretation of this 
provision is supported by that Article 4 (4) of Directive 87/102/EEC for the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
consumer credit was transposed into the Old CIA. Pursuant to the Directive, “the written 
agreement shall further include the other essential terms of the contract.”
In the case of a loan contract, the determination of the loan amount, the tenor and the 
transactional interest rate constitutes the essential terms of the contract. In the case of a 
foreign currency-denominated loan contract, it is further required that the contract includes 
the currency in which the debt is imposed. As the Curia pointed out in its PJ Decision 1/2016, 
the determination of the date of conversion is not a validity requirement of the contract 
since it is ipso iure fixed on the day of disbursement pursuant to Section 230 (2) of the Old 
Civil Code, unless otherwise provided in the contract. And the legislator regulated the issue 
of the guiding currency exchange rate in the DH1 Act. It is not a validity requirement that 
the contract includes the loan amount calculated in the foreign currency where the loan 
amount is specified in the Forint, respectively the loan amount specified in Forint where the 
loan amount is specified in the foreign currency, by applying the relevant foreign currency 
exchange rate on the given day. No case was brought before the Curia, where the contract did 
not include the currency in which the debt was imposed. 
Pursuant to point b) Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, a consumer or personal loan contract is null 
and void if it does not include the annual percentage rate expressed as a percentage (hereinafter 
referred to as “APR”) and the definition and amount of any other costs that were not taken into 
consideration when calculating the APR or, if such costs cannot be precisely defined, an estimate 
thereof. A contract is invalid if it does not contain the APR or its annual rate in percentage. The 
absence of the determination the percentage of the APR alone results in the invalidity of the 
contract, but if it is a formal deficiency only, the contract may be declared valid.35
It is a different issue and causes nullity pursuant to point b) of Section 213 (1) of the Old 
CIA, if the APR was indicated in the contract in a deceptive manner that caused or was 
likely to cause the consumer to make a transactional decision that he would not have made 
otherwise (judgement no. C-453/10 Perenovica and Perenic of the CJEU).
The contract as a whole will not be null and void due to the deficiency of content mentioned 
in point b). Nevertheless, if these costs (or an estimation thereof) are not defined in the 
contract, the legal consequence is that these costs may be ignored when calculating the APR 
and the financial institution may not lawfully charge them. 
Pursuant to point c) of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, a consumer or personal loan contract 
is null and void if it does not include all the cost related to the contract, including interests, 
commissions and the values thereof expressed as percentage. 
35 Judgements no. Pfv.VI. 20.967/2015., Pfv.I. 22.111/2015., point 2 of the memorandum of 28 September 2016
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The interest in the loan contracts made by the credit institutions consists of the reference 
interest and an interest premium. In this regard, there are two typical methods of defining 
the interest in the contracts. In certain contracts, the reference interest (e.g. 3-month CHF 
LIBOR) and the interest premium were indicated separately and the aggregated of these 
two amounted to the annual percentage rate of the interest. In the other case, only one inte-
rest rate was included in the contract.36 (A change in the reference interest indicated in the 
contract cannot be regarded as an unfair contract term). 
In case the interest is not included in the contract in a calculable way and the annual 
percentage rate of the interest is not included in the contract, either, then the contract is null 
and void but the conditions for declaring the contract valid are fulfilled.37
Nevertheless, it does not result in the nullity of the contract if, in addition to the interest, the 
contract does not contain the default interest, costs and their annual percentage rate. Costs not 
included in the contract may not be charged. If this still happens, they are charged without a 
legal basis and must be ignored in the accounting between the parties. Because there is no legal 
provision that requires or makes it presumable that the parties have agreed on the payment of 
these costs. If a specific cost is included in the contract, but not as an annual percentage, this 
results in the nullity of the relevant provisions of the contract or, eventually, the unfairness 
thereof where the service for which it is the compensation cannot be established.38
Pursuant to point d) of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, a consumer and personal loan 
contract is null and void if it does not include a detailed description of the conditions and 
circumstances under which the annual percentage rate may be varied or, if this is not possible, 
information concerning such. It is obvious that a contractual provision in violation of point d) 
does not cause the nullity of the contract as a whole, but only results in the that the contractual 
provision concerning the modification of the annual percentage rate cannot be applied, i.e. 
the annual percentage rate shown in the contract becomes fixed. This provision does not have 
a practical importance any longer, having regard to Section 4 of the DH1 Act and the legal 
proceedings conducted thereafter. All unilateral contractual provisions allowing changing the 
interests, costs and fees unilaterally to the detriment of the consumers were, without exception, 
deemed unfair pursuant to the Act in question on the one hand and the provisions of the final 
judgements delivered by applying the procedure required by this Act on the other hand. 
Based on judicial practice, a specific contractual provision is null and void pursuant to the 
provision of the Old CIA in question if it does not contain the list of grounds. If the contract 
contains the list of grounds but in a way that does not fully comply with point 6 of the PK 
Opinion 2/2012 and the principles laid down on the PJE Decision 2/2014, then the provision 
of the CIA in question is not violated, but the contractual provision is unfair.39
Pursuant to point e) of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, a consumer or personal loan 
contract is null and void if it does not include the number and amount of instalments and 
the repayment dates. As explained in point IV.2 of the PJE Decision 1/2016, the contract is 
36 BH 2017/2/64
37 See point VII.3.
38 See point V.3.2.
39 BH 2016/4/83
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not null and void if the amount of the instalments is not included in the contract, but it is 
calculable. The dates of instalment payments cannot be determined only by indicating a 
specific calendar day, but also by defining them in other clear ways. 
Pursuant to point f) of Section 213 (1) of the Old CIA, a consumer and personal loan contract 
is null and void if it does not include a description of the required security. This legal provision 
only means that if a security has not been stipulated at all or clearly, then it may not be enforced. 
4.2.3. Contracts concluded without a licence 
In certain cases, the first instance courts attached importance to the issue whether a car 
dealer had acted as an agent for the lender pursuant to sub-point a) or b) of point I.12 of 
Schedule 2 of the Old CIA. In this context, the question has also arisen whether the car 
dealer has fulfilled the notification or licensing requirements required for acting as an agent. 
In the absence of the necessary licence, the nullity of a contract was established. 
The Court of Appeal of Szeged and, later, the Curia clearly took the position in many legal 
proceedings that the above circumstances should not be examined since they cannot cause 
the nullity of a contract. According to settled judicial practice, a contract in violation of the 
rules of other branches of law is invalid from a civil law perspective if the act of the other 
branch of law explicitly stipulates that the violation of the specific legal norm also results in 
the invalidity of the contract. The Old CIA required a licence from the financial supervision 
for pursuing activities for providing certain financial services, however, it did not attach the 
legal consequence of invalidity to legal transactions concluded in the absence of a licence.40
5. Nullity or partial nullity of a contract where unfair 
contract terms were applied
It is also frequent in legal proceedings that reference is made not only to a violation of the 
law, but also the unfairness of certain contractual provisions. 
There is a multi-layered regulation concerning unfair contractual clauses. Until 1 March 
2006, the Hungarian regulation was based on Sections 209–209/D and, later, Sections 
209–209/B of the Old Civil Code. This regulation was complemented by Government 
Decree 18/1999. (II. 5.) on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (hereinafter referred to as 
“Government Decree”), which was in effect until 15 March 2014. In addition to the Hungarian 
legal framework, Union law, in particular certain provisions of the consumer directive, as 
well as the case-law of the CJEU are of paramount importance. Several Hungarian and other 
Member State courts initiated preliminary ruling proceedings in this subject matter, and 
the judgements delivered in these proceedings helped develop a uniform legal interpretation 
and practice. Out of the Hungarian initiatives, the most significant ones are probably the 
judgement no. 26/13 adopted in the Kásler case (hereinafter referred to as “Kásler Case”), 
the judgement no. 483/16 in the Sziber case (hereinafter referred to as “Sziber Case”), the 
and judgement no. C-51/17 in the Ilyés case (hereinafter referred to as “Ilyés Case”). Of the 
40 Civil decision of principle no. P.2. of 2016.
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foreign inquiries, the judgement no. C-186/16 delivered in the Andriciuc case (hereinafter 
referred to as “Andriciuc Case”) can be considered the most relevant. 
The unfairness of the specific contractual provisions can only be examined only with regard 
to general terms and conditions and, in the case of consumer contracts, contractual provisions 
that were not individually negotiated. Examining unfairness is of paramount importance in 
the case of loan contracts concluded by financial institutions because one of the substantive 
characteristics of these contracts is that their provisions have not been individually negotiated. 
In the case of contracts concluded in great numbers for the same purpose, except for certain 
contractual provisions to be individually negotiated, the contracts are drafted by the financial 
institutions in advance for the purposes of concluding more contracts, i.e. blank contracts are 
concluded. Thus, the loan contract consists of individually negotiated sections on the one hand 
and parts that are not individually negotiated on the other hand. 
It is also typical that the general terms and conditions drafted by the lender, but not 
individually negotiated by the parties are annexed to the contract signed by the parties. It is 
important to emphasize that, as laid down in point III.1. b) of the PJE Decision 1/2016, the 
business code and the notice defined in Section 203 of the Old CIA are also regarded as GTC 
(hereinafter referred to as “GTC”). The contract signed by the parties and the GTC, which is 
typically not signed by the parties, jointly constitute the agreement of the parties. 
5. 1. Exclusion of the examination of unfair contract terms 
A general contractual term or, in the case of consumer contracts, a contract term that is 
not individually negotiated cannot be considered unfair if it is laid down by the law or 
determined in accordance with the requirements of the law. So, the unfairness of such 
conditions cannot be examined. (This rule appeared in Section 209/B and, later, Sections 
209/B (5) and (6) of the old Civil Code). 
The legal provision described was interpreted in point 3 of the PK Opinion 2/2012 in a way 
that this provision does not apply to legal provisions that are of a “framework nature”, i.e. they 
only apply in case the legal provisions are filled with content in the contract (e.g. a legal provision 
allowing unilateral contract amendments detrimental to the consumers should be regarded as 
such). This legal interpretation is consistent with the case-law of the CJEU, according to which 
the unfairness of contractual provisions cannot be examined that apply irrespective of the choice 
of the contracting parties or apply automatically, i.e. unless the parties agree otherwise.41
Referring to this legal interpretation, the Curia did not consider possible to examine 
the unfairness of a contractual provision literally42 or almost literally complying with the 
provisions in Section 261 (2) of the Old Civil Code, irrespective of whether the provisions 
of the Old Civil Code in question had elements that required interpretation (when can the 
satisfaction of a claim be considered to be in jeopardy or what is considered as an adequate 
security corresponding to the degree of the jeopardy). The Curia pointed out that, based on 
Section 205 (2) of the Old Civil Code, this legal provision becomes a part of the content of 
41 Point 26 of CJEU judgement no. C-92/11 delivered in case RWE Vertieb AG.
42 „If the deterioration in the condition of the pledged property endangers the satisfaction of the claim the pledgee may 
claim that the pledged property is restored or adequate security corresponding to the degree of jeopardy is provided.”
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the contract unless the parties agree otherwise. The unfairness of the contractual provision 
could be examined only if it had complemented the legal provisions.43
Notwithstanding the above, the Curia found that the unfairness of the contractual 
provision that regulated the conditions of sale out of judicial execution may be examined, 
and did establish the unfairness thereof. The Curia also pointed out that provisions of Section 
257 of the Old Civil Code44 set forth, among others, that the lowest sale price or a formula 
for calculating the sale price should be defined in the contract. Therefore, this is considered 
a framework type rule since its content has to be defined by the parties in the contract. 
The Curia ruled that all contractual provisions were unfair that authorized exclusively the 
financial institution to select valuers required for determining the lowest sale price in such 
a way that only persons contracted with the financial institution were allowed to carry out 
the valuation, without wither the law or the specific contract ensuring an effective remedy. 45
The unfairness of contractual provisions determining the primary service and the proportion of the 
service and the counterservice cannot be examined if they are otherwise clear and understandable. It 
falls within the competence of the national court to decide what qualifies as a contractual provision 
determining primary service. In its PJE Decision 2/2014, the Curia took the position that the distinctive 
characteristics of a contract, e.g. the bearing of the exchange rate risk, are considered as such. 
5. 2. Legal interpretation issues raised only by foreign currency-denominated 
contracts 
5.2.1. Use of a two-level foreign currency exchange rate 
The contractual clause concerning the purchasing and selling exchange rates was declared unfair by 
the PJE Decision 2/2014, calling upon the points made in the CJEU judgement delivered in the Kásler 
case. In turn, the DH1 Act abolished these grounds for partial nullity and settled the detriments 
suffered by the consumers in this context in the context of accounting with the financial institutions. 
5.2.2. Bearing of the exchange risk 
As explained in point 1 of the PJE Decision 6/2013, one conceptual criterion of the foreign 
currency-denominated loan contracts is that the exchange risk is borne by the consumers. 
Pursuant to the PJE Decision 2/2014, the contract is invalid in this regard only if the fact that 
the exchange risk is borne by the consumers was not clear or understandable for the average 
consumer from the contract, the risk assessment declaration or the information provided prior 
to contracting.46 The fact whether an average consumer should have been aware of its obligation 
to pay for the exchange rate change can be determined only by jointly taking into account 
43 Curia judgement no. Gfv.VII.30742/2017/8.
44 Section 257 (1) of the Old Civil Code provides the following: “The parties can agree in writing to sell the 
pledged property together before the claim to which it pertains falls due by establishing the lowest sale price or a 
formula for calculating the sale price, and a deadline from the date on which the claim falls due.”
45 BH 2018/9/256
46 The clarity and understandability of the contract term should be examined not in relation to the concrete 
consumer but from the perspective of a reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and diligent 
consumer. See point 74 of the judgement in the Kásler case (hereinafter referred to as “average consumer”).
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several documents and evidence (contract, risk assessment declaration, promotional materials 
and, potentially, the circumstances of contracting and the witness statements on what was 
said). While doing so, it must be examined whether, based on the information provided to him 
in such a way, the average consumer was aware of the fact that the exchange rate change has no 
upper limits and it should be borne by him without limitation. 
Some chambers of the Metropolitan Court of Appeal suggested that the conversion to the Fo-
rint introduced by the DH3 Act already excludes the examination of the unfairness of bearing 
the exchange risk.47 However, the Conference of the Heads of Civil Divisions, as well as the 
consultative body of judges presiding over cases involving foreign currency loans has decided, by 
a majority decision, that the provisions of the DH3 Act on converting the foreign currency loans 
to the Forint cannot have such a legal effect.48 One chamber of the Metropolitan Court of Appeal 
disagreed with this legal position and turned to the CJEU in the Ilyés case. It has, among others, 
formulated questions about this issue in its request for a preliminary ruling proceeding.
During these proceedings, the CJEU clearly took the position in its judgement delivered on 
20 September 2018, that the legal provisions adopted after contracting, hence the DH3 Act, do 
not exclude the examination of the unfairness of bearing the exchange risk. In its ruling, it has 
established, among others, that the requesting court should decide on the appropriateness of the 
information provided on the exchange risks, taking into account the circumstances of a specific 
case. In doing so, not only the formal but also the grammatical clarity is to be examined (reference to 
point 44 of the Andriciuc judgement). The information has to cover the effects a serious devaluation 
of the Member State currency or and an increase of the interest rates can exercise on the instalments. 
In the context of the question raised, the CJEU laid down the following requirements concerning 
information. Consumers should be provided with clear information as to that, by signing 
the contract, they bear a certain degree of exchange risk, which may become difficult to bear 
economically (as his income is in a different currency). Attention must be drawn to the potential 
changes in the exchange rate and the risks related to the loan taken out in a foreign currency 
(these two requirements are almost literally included in point 50 of the Andriciuc judgement). It 
must be ensured that the consumer can get to know all contract terms on the basis of information 
provided timely before the contracting (same as explained in point 70 of the Kásler judgement).
Nevertheless, the provisions in the judgement do not necessarily mean that the information 
can only be deemed appropriate if it contains calculations on how the consumer’s payment 
obligation develops in the case of certain exchange rates. The CJEU did not impose, either, the 
requirement that the bank should draw the attention to the escape currency nature of CHF or 
that the bank should provide information on the likelihood and degree of an exchange rate 
change detrimental to the consumer. (The latter two would not even have been possible). 
We believe the judgement of the CJEU means that the Member State courts should take a 
position on the issue whether the information provided fully complied with the provisions 
in the Ilyés judgement by examining the concrete contract and the circumstances of 
47 See decision no. 20.Gpkf. 44.307/2016/2 of the Metropolitan Court of Appeal.
48 See point 6 of the memorandum of 17 March 2016 and the memorandum of 28 November 2016.
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contracting. If the information fulfils the requirements in the judgement of the CJEU and 
PJE Decision 2/2014, the exchange risk is borne by the consumer. 
Nevertheless, there may be some cases when this cannot be established by reasoned 
conclusion and it cannot either be established,either, based on t he evidence that the consumer 
agreed to an exchange risk that can be specifically determined. In such a case, it can occur that, 
according to the judgement of the CJEU, an average consumer was or had to be aware of the 
exchange risk and the fact that it is borne by him even in the absence of adequate information. 
At best, he did not receive the required level of information concerning the degree of its 
occurrence. However, he knew or could know that the foreign currency interest rate is more 
beneficial than the Forint loan interest rate, which partially compensated for the exchange risk. 
So, the question may arise whether, in the absence of adequate information, the risk of bearing 
the exchange risk may be shared between the consumer and the lender and, if yes, in what 
proportion and by taking account of which aspects. However, if the bearing of the exchange 
risk cannot be shared between the parties, does this means that the consumers are obliged to 
meet their contractual obligation at the exchange rate applicable at the time of contracting? If 
yes, another question is whether, in this case, the consumers are obliged to pay the interest rate 
stipulated in the contract or the interest rate to be applied to Forint loans. 
5. 3. Legal interpretation issues raised not only in relation to foreign 
currency loan contracts 
5.3.1. Unfairness of contractual provisions concerning the unilateral increase of interests, 
costs and fees 
By further developing the provisions in the PK Opinion 2/2012, point 2 of the PJE Decision 
2/2014 and the DH1 Act and, subsequently, the legal proceedings initiated with regard to 
the provisions of this Act have settled this point of law. According to the final judgements 
delivered in these legal proceedings, none of the contract terms applied by the financial 
institutions with the above content complied with all the principles laid down in the 
decisions of principle of the Curia, in particular, the principles of clear and comprehensible 
wording and transparency. 
5.3.2. Unfairness of the contractual provisions concerning administrative costs, 
commissions and fees 
A number of financial institutions stipulated administrative costs on top of the interest, as if 
to complement it. Similarly to the interest, the administrative cost was also indicated as an 
annual percentage in the contract, however, without determining in any way the service(s) 
for which the administrative fee is payable as the consideration. 
While the administrative cost had to be paid during the whole tenor, one-off fees were also 
stipulated. It has not been specified in this respect, either. which services were compensated 
by these one-time payments although the designation of some of these potentially allowed 
drawing conclusions (e.g. disbursement commission). 
394 On the issues of law arising in litigation involving foreign...
Having explored the differing positions of the courts of appeal in this regard, as well as the 
differences of the German and Austrian legal interpretation, the Curia deemed it necessary 
to initiate a preliminary ruling proceeding to clarify the points of law arisen.49
The questions raised concern the issue whether the requirement of clear and comprehensible 
wording outlined in the consumer directive is fulfilled by a contract that precisely defines 
the amount of the cost, fee and commission to be borne by the consumer, their method of 
calculation and date of payment, but does not stipulate the services for which the given cost 
was paid as the consideration. Is it sufficient if the content of the cost can be concluded from 
its name? Does a provision regarding the costs cause a significant imbalance to the detriment 
of the consumer, where the specific contract provided in return for the cost cannot be clearly 
identified based on the contract? 
5.3.3. Contractual provision concerning the notarial certification of facts 
Many cases were brought before the Curia, in which the unfairness of the contractual provision 
concerning the certification of facts issued by a notary had to be judged. In this regard, the 
Curia did not agree with the legal position of the majority of courts of appeal that the provisions 
concerning the certification of facts regulated by the financial institutions in different ways, 
albeit more or less in the same way with regard to their substantial content, are unfair. 
The Curia pointed out in its decision of principle no. G.1. of 2018 that a contractual 
provision according to which the financial institution is entitled to establish consumer debts 
on the basis of its own records and the contracting parties are bound by the certification 
of facts drawn up in a public document and issued on the basis of such statement, does not 
constitute a legally valid declaration of debt acknowledgement. Therefore, this contractual 
provision does not change the burden of proof to the detriment of the consumer and does 
not limit, either, the statutory opportunity of the consumer to lodge a claim. This contractual 
clause is not in violation of points i) and j) of Section 1 (1) of the Government Decree. 
This legal position has been complemented with other arguments by the Curia in another 
published decision.50 The Curia has also pointed out that, on the basis of point b) of Section 
1 (1) of the Government Decree, the unfairness of the contractual provision could only be 
established if this provision entitled the financial institution to establish the appropriateness of 
its own performance. No such a meaning can be attached to the contractual provisions brought 
before the Curia. The Metropolitan Court of Appeal disagreed with the above-mentioned legal 
position of the Curia and initiated a preliminary ruling proceeding on this subject-matter.51
It is, however, worth mentioning that the case-law of the Curia52 does not exclude the possibility 
of suspending the court hearing; it did not resolve to suspend the court hearing based on the 
above-referred facts and refused the applications to have the court hearing suspended.53
49 Judgement no. Pfv.VII.22.444/2016/11; the case is in progress before the CJEU under no. C-621/17.
50 BH 2018/5/146
51 Judgement no. 13.Gf.40.337/2017/9 of the Metropolitan Court of Appeal, which is in progress before the CJEU 
under no. C-34/2018.
52 BH 2017/12/409
53 BH 2018/7/203
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6. Relationship of the specific grounds for nullity inter se 
If it is referred to in a litigation, the courts must first examine whether the contract was 
validly concluded. In case of referring to more than one grounds for nullity, the court is not 
bound by the order of grounds for nullity indicated in the statement of claim. 
As a rule, the court should primarily examine whether the contractual provision is in 
violation of the law. Nevertheless, the examination of unfairness may in some exceptional 
cases prelude the examination of violation of the law.54
7. Legal consequences
The Old Civil Code has already distinguished between the invalidity and severability of a 
contract. On the basis of the Old Civil Code, there is also a significant difference in the legal 
consequences of the invalidity and severability of a contract, which depends on whether a 
consumer or non-consumer contract was concluded. 
The Curia clearly took the position in point 2 of its PK Opinion 3/2011 that, according to the 
“directive-compliant” interpretation of the consumer directive, the relevant provisions of the 
Old Civil Code, in effect between 1 May 2004 and 1 March 2006, should be interpreted in a way 
that the legal consequence of the unfairness of individually not negotiated contract terms in the 
consumer contract, as well as the general contractual provisions is nullity, rather than voidability. 
Consequently, in the case of consumer contracts, unfairness can be claimed without any time li-
mit, as opposed to consumer contracts, where unfairness is a ground for voidability. 
According to the provisions of the Old Civil Code, in the case of an invalid contract, 
the original status could be restored or the contract could be declared valid or effective. In 
the application of the Old Civil Code, the judicial practice regarded, and still regards, the 
restoration of the original status and the declaration of a contract as valid as equivalent 
options among the legal consequences of invalidity. And if these primary legal consequences 
cannot be applied, then the judicial practice gives an opportunity to declare the contract 
effective until the ruling. In the case of foreign currency-denominated contracts, the PJE 
Decision 6/2013 unambiguously regarded the declaration of contracts as valid as a primary 
legal consequence, where the conditions thereof prevailed. 
In the case of contracts falling within the scope of the DH2 Act, the restoration of the 
original status as a legal consequence cannot be applied due to a statutory legal provision. 
However this cannot be done in the case of loan contracts falling within the scope of the DH2 
Act if we accept the legal interpretation outlined, with a minimum majority, in the summary 
opinion of the legal practice analysing group on the legal consequences of invalidity. 
The legal consequence of severability also differs depending on whether or not the contract 
is a consumer contract. Pursuant to Section 239 of the Old Civil Code, in the case of a non-
consumer contract, the contract as a whole fails only if the parties would not have concluded 
54 Point 3 of PJE Decision 2/2014.
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it without the invalid part, unless otherwise provided by the law. In the case of a consumer 
contract the contract a whole fails if the contract cannot be performed without the invalid part. 
Finally, we should refer that Section 239/A of the Old Civil Code allowed bringing a legal 
action exclusively in order to establish the invalidity of the contract, without applying the 
legal consequence of invalidity.55 However, in the case of loan contracts falling within the 
scope of the DH2 Act, this is not possible since the entry into force of the Act. 
7. 1. The need to determine the legal consequence 
Under the provision of Section 239/A (1) of the Old Civil Code, consumers could use and 
did use the opportunity to only request the establishment of the invalidity of a contract 
without applying the legal consequence of invalidity, until the DH2 Act entered into force. 
In case of establishing invalidity or severability triggering an accounting obligation, the 
provision of the Old Civil Code in question could have the consequence that, in the absence 
of an agreement, the legal consequences of invalidity had to be clarified in another legal 
proceeding, so the number of legal proceedings could double. 
In point 2 of its PJE Decision 5/2013, the Curia held that, in legal proceedings for a declaratory 
judgement under Section 239/A of the Old Civil Code, the value of the subject matter of legal 
proceedings should, as a rule, be established on the basis of the value of the consideration for the ser-
vice specified in the contract. Consequently, if two separate legal proceedings could commence, i.e. 
one for establishing invalidity and another for applying the legal consequences, it would effectively 
result in the duplication of the procedural duty determined on the basis of the contract value. 
Therefore, this would have caused undesired effects in terms of the workload of the courts, court 
expenses and enforcing the requirement of closing legal disputes within a reasonable period of time. 
Potentially, also in view of the above considerations, Section 37 (2) of the DH2 Act excluded 
the applicability of the provisions of Section 239/A of the Old Civil Code to contracts falling 
within the scope of Act. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a legal provision to the contrary, Section 239/A of the Old 
Civil Code and Section 6:108 (2) of the Civil Code continue to ensure the opportunity to file 
an action for establishing invalidity in the case of contracts with different subject-matters 
and non-consumer loan contracts. 
At the request of the Regional Court of Budapest-Capital, the CJEU took the position in 
the Sziber case in relation to the above regulation that the provisions of the DH2 Act on 
additional procedural requirements alone do not mean that the procedural rules regulated 
in the DH2 Act are detrimental to the consumers. The fact that the Act intended to shorten 
and simplify the proceedings to be conducted before the national courts in consideration of 
the large number of contracts falling within the scope of the Act and the special procedural 
situation (i.e. accounting with the financial institutions had already taken place) was not 
regarded as contrary to consumer interests. 
55 This option is also provided by of Section 6:108 (2) of Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (hereinafter referred to 
as “Civil Code”).
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Nevertheless, the above provision of the DH2 Act raises a number of legal interpretation 
issues in practice. It was raised as a question if the establishment of the non-conclusion of 
a loan contract can be requested without applying the legal consequences. In this regard, 
the answer of the legal practice is that, since the scope of the DH2 Act does not cover legal 
proceedings concerning the conclusion of contracts, actions filed exclusively to establish the 
non-conclusion of a contract cannot be excluded.56
It is obvious that if the action is brought for establishing the invalidity of a contractual 
provision, which results in the severability of the contract and, based on which, the consumer 
has not yet been and cannot be bound by payment obligation, the filing of an action for 
accounting is conceptually excluded.
Furthermore, the issue was also raised whether only the establishment of the invalidity 
of a lien contract securing a loan contract based on Section 239/A of the Old Civil Code 
could be reasonably requested by referring to that the full invalidity of the loan contract 
also results in the invalidity of the lien contract. The judicial interpretation of the law in 
this regard is that if the plaintiff claims the invalidity of the loan contract as the legal basis 
of his action then the legal proceeding should inevitably fall within the scope of the DH2 
Act. Therefore, the regulations of the DH2 Act apply to such an action.57 In case the action 
was filed by the mortgagee who is other than the personal obligor, then the personal obligor 
should also participate in the legal proceeding.58
7.2. Impossibility of the restoration of the original status 
A lively discussion has erupted on the fundamental issue whether there is a possibility to restore 
the original status in the case of loan contracts, including foreign currency-denominated loan 
contracts. The legal practice analysing group also addressed this issue but could not adopt a 
legal position which represented a sufficient majority in this issue.59 According to a not-so-
strong position, which can be regarded as the majority view with a small margin, in the case 
of obligations whose fundamental nature is use, such as a loan contract, the use or refraining 
from use cannot be undone. And the restoration of the original status is conceptually excluded 
due to the original irreversibility of the service provided. In such a case, the only option that 
can occur is accounting combined with the declaration of the contract effective until the 
ruling, i.e. the repayment of undue services, together with declaring the contract valid. 
The legislator has also decided the above point of law. Section 37 (1) of the DH2 Act 
explicitly excluded the possibility to file an action for restoring the original status in the case 
of contracts falling within the scope of the Act. It is obvious that this provision was and is 
applicable anyway if no reference to the invalidity or severability of the contract on grounds 
of unfairness was made. But, if the unfairness of the contractual provision is the reason for 
invalidity, the question has arisen whether the provision of the DH2 Act in question is in 
line with the consumer protection provisions of EU law. 
56 Point 2 of the memorandum of 17 March 2016.
57 BH 2017/1/24
58 Point 1 of the memorandum of 17 March 2016.
59 See point 3.1 of the summary opinion.
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In this regard, the CJEU gave a clear answer in its judgement delivered in the Sziber case (see 
points 53–55 of the judgement). According to the position of the CJEU, the national regulation 
precluding the restoration to the original state is, in principle, not contrary to the status where 
the consumer is entitled to request the repayment of amounts paid without a legal basis in 
an effective proceeding. It is, however, the duty of the national courts to examine whether 
effective legal protection without the possibility to restore the original status is ensured. 
By interpreting the judgement, we must conclude that the legal provision not ensuring 
the possibility to restore the original status complies with the requirement set by the CJEU. 
Declaring the contract valid or effective is suitable for placing the consumer in a position 
where he would have been in absence of the unfair term. 
7. 3. Declaring the contract valid 
Declaring the contract valid is a court decision with ex tunc effect,the objective of which is 
to eliminate the reason of invalidity causing full invalidity, namely with retroactive effect to 
the conclusion of the contract. Declaring the contract valid means a contract amendment, 
which is however different from a contract amendment pursuant to Section 241 of the Old 
Civil Code, both in terms of its conditions or period of validity.60
If required in view of the characteristics of the reason for invalidity, validity may only be 
declared simultaneously with condemnation. 
In the case of foreign currency-denominated loan contracts, the judicial practice has 
from the beginning regarded declaring an invalid contract valid as the most suitable legal 
consequence. The Curia clearly took the position in point 4 of its PJE Decision 6/2013 
that, whenever possible, the courts should strive to eliminate the reason for invalidity 
and declare the contract valid in legal disputes concerning foreign currency-denominated 
loan contracts. Because declaring the contract valid creates a situation as if the parties had 
originally concluded a valid contract. In such a case, the court eliminates the violation of 
interests caused by the reason of invalidity by amending or complementing the contract. 
In particular, it is appropriate to provide for declaring the contract valid if the contract is 
invalid only due to reasons that can be considered formal. 
To date, the Curia has declared a contract valid when the contract did not include the 
annual percentage of the interest in violation of the provisions in point c) Section 213 (1) of 
the Old Civil Code, . In its decisions, the Curia has pointed out that this deficiency causes the 
full, rather than partial, invalidity of the contract. This deficiency is, however, formal since 
the interest is determined in absolute terms in the contracts being the subject of the legal 
proceedings, so there was no obstacle to declaring the contracts valid. The Curia did not 
attach importance to whether consumer himself was able to calculate the interest; it deemed 
it sufficient that its calculability was proven. 
On the other hand, the Curia did not agree with the legal position in certain judgements 
of the Court of Appeal of Szeged, according to which the above reason for invalidity was 
60 See point II/2 of the memorandum on the conference held on 9–10 November 2015. The substantive and 
procedural conditions for declaring a contract valid were also explained in this point.
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rectified by means of the interest expressed as an annual percentage in the document drafted 
during the accounting carried out on the basis of the DH2 Act.61 However, co-validation is 
, in fact, validation, namely the case where the reason of invalidity disappears by itself (e.g. 
the changes in the meantime) or is removed by the parties themselves (e.g. by modifying the 
contract). A declaration of validity in this sense did not occur pursuant to the provision of 
the DH2 Act. In fact, the DH2 Act did not provide that the deficiency pursuant to point c) 
Section 213 (1) of the Old Civil Code is not substituted by the interest rate in the accounting. 
7. 4. Declaring the contract effective 
Declaring the contract effective is a court decision with ex nunc effect. Its aim is to eliminate 
the legal relationship based on an entirely invalid contract. In doing so, the mutually 
equivalent performances undertaken until the date of judgement are recognized by creating 
the legal basis for the performances. 
In the context of declaring a contract effective, it is possible to settle between parties 
services remaining from the period before the judgement, which are partly or entirely 
without compensation, or the principal of the outstanding instalments scheduled for the 
period after the ruling by the invalid contract giving rise to a permanent legal relationship, 
in a way which is based on the court decision itself.62
Many problems and open questions arise when a contract is declared effective. However, 
given that the Curia did not meet with such problems in its practice and this issue was not 
raised in concrete cases, this study does not address these problems and questions. 
7. 5. Limited invalidity of a contract 
Pursuant to Section 239 (2) of the Old Civil Code, in case of partial invalidity, the consumer 
contract fails only if the contract cannot be performed without the invalid part. 
In case of an unfair contract term, The typical legal consequence of the partial invalidity 
of a consumer contract is definitely that the provisions of the contract affected by invalidity 
are eliminated from the contract. So, these provisions should be regarded as if they were not 
part of the contract, while the provisions of the contract not affected by the invalidity still 
prevail and retain their legal value. Provided, of course, that the contract can be performed 
without the invalid provision.63 This is the legal consequence also when the unfair contractual 
provision did not result in a payment obligation. 
In other cases, however, the unfair contractual provision gives rise to a payment obligation 
and the consumer has already fulfilled this obligation (this has happened, for example, in 
the case of contractual provisions allowing the unilateral increase of interests, costs and fees, 
which subsequently proved to be unfair). In this case, the amount unfairly charged must be 
refunded to the consumer by applying the rules on unjustified enrichment mutatis mutandis. 
When settling accounts, the repayment of these unfairly charged amounts had to be ordered, 
61 Gfv.VII.30167/2017/6.
62 See point II/3 of the memorandum of 9–10 November 2015.
63 This is apparent from the case-law of the CJEU, for instance from the judgement delivered in joined cases no. 
C. 482/13, C-484/13. and C-487/13.
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and without a temporal effect. Namely, a practice would be contrary to EU law, which cancels 
the payment obligation of the consumer on the basis of the unfair provision from the date of 
final judgement establishing the unfairness of the contractual provision is delivered. 
The case where the contract cannot be performed due to the invalid contractual provision 
is judged in a different way. Once such case, which has since been clarified, was when 
the financial institutions unfairly applied a two-level foreign currency exchange rate in 
the contracts. In the Kásler case, the CJEU clearly took the position that the permissive 
provision of national law should become part of the contract in such a case. Accordingly, the 
DH1 Act provided for declaring the partially invalid contractual provision valid by applying 
the content defined in the Act.
Nevertheless, the judgement of the CJEU in question does not unambiguously clarify what 
is the legal consequence of a situation where a contract cannot be performed without the un-
fair contractual provision and there is no permissive provision in the national law that could 
replace the unfair contractual provision. Different legal positions exist in this regard. 
The unfairness of a contractual provision is not the only reason for the partial invalidity 
of a contract. If the contractual provision is invalid other than due to unfairness, the legal 
consequence is the elimination of the specific contractual provision from the contract in 
this case, too. It can happen, however, that the contract cannot be performed if the invalid 
contractual provision is eliminated. There is no uniform legal interpretation in this regard, 
either. This is properly illustrated by the summary opinion of the legal practice analysing 
group on the legal consequences of invalidity. The Curia does not have case-law on this subject. 
8. Relationship between full and partial invalidity
In the case of a claim for establishing the full invalidity of a contract, the court may establish 
the partial invalidity of the contract and reject the action exceeding this request if it considers 
that the conditions for establishing partial invalidity are fulfilled. 
If the action is directed at establishing only partial invalidity, but the court notices that 
this is a case of the full invalidity of the contract, it must inform the parties thereof and 
invite them to make a statement. Nevertheless, in the absence of an appropriate claim to that 
effect, the full nullity of the contract cannot be established and the claim must be rejected. 
9. Closing thoughts
It can be recorded as a fact that the courts had found themselves in a difficult, hitherto 
inexperienced situation in dealing with a very large number of legal proceedings that 
typically raise the same points of law, arrive within a short period of time, have a huge social 
impact and trigger a strong interest in the entire society. In addition, points of law have 
arisen in these legal proceedings in which the CJEU has a monopoly of legal interpretation. 
We are of the view that the courts have used all instruments guaranteed by the law in order 
to ensure potential legal uniformity. 
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The situation of the persons seeking justice and the courts was and is made more difficult 
by the fact that the consumers have tried and try to enforce their claims, whether justified 
or considered justifiable, in individual legal proceedings. Almost no action in the public in-
terest was initiated although a focused legal proceeding would be a much more efficient 
solution for pursuing a claim in the vast majority of the cases.
Given this situation, a certain degree of cooperation between legislators and practitioners 
was required, and this was carried out in some respects. Taking account of the specific 
situation, the legislator deemed it necessary to exclude the applicability of certain provisions 
of the Old Civil Code in the cases detailed in this study, which was found compatible with 
the EU law by the CJEU. 
Points of law have arisen in the cases presented in this study that required and still require 
the interpretation of the provisions of the Old Civil Code, which is in force since 1960, 
and has been amended several times. However, these questions have not been previously 
answered by the application of law, and the relevant legal literature has not done so, either. 
Final answers will be given if developing a legal position in the concrete legal proceedings 
cannot be avoided. It cannot be excluded that it will be also necessary to understand the 
legal position of the CJEU on certain matters. 
We believe it is important to stress that we must reject the false allegation of the consumer 
protection organisations that the courts had taken the side of the banks. The courts have 
aimed and aim to expertly interpret and apply the legal regulations, including the relevant 
EU law, to the best of their knowledge. 
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The conclusions from the experiences of corporate foreign currency lending may serve as 
guidelines for lending practices in the coming years. By analysing the statistics of the Hungarian 
banking sector, we will present the development of various segments of corporate lending and 
examine the correlations between foreign currency and HUF loans as well as project and non-pro-
ject loans and their risk profiles. We draw the conclusion that within corporate lending, the lending 
in foreign currency substantially increased during the years of the crisis and has become one of the 
most crucial factors in every aspect of growth. At the same time, the volume of foreign currency 
loans was significantly influenced and its quality compromised by the fact that the portfolio 
mostly consisted of foreign currency project and real estate loans, the risk for which was worse as 
compared to the other loan segments. This fact and the slow workout process typical of the projects 
considerably worsened the average risk figures of the banks’ loan portfolios in the long run as well.
1. Introduction
Over recent years, retail foreign currency loans, their risks, impacts, and possible measures were 
often mentioned in the popular press as well as in specialised literature. In the above, less attention 
was perhaps paid to the corporate sector and the experiences of corporate foreign currency lending. 
We can also find research and analysis in the Hungarian financial literature, which 
examined the foreign currency risk, the foreign currency loan-taking motivations of the 
corporate sector, and the volume and features of foreign currency lending, especially for 
the period before the crisis. At the same time, the conclusion of the crisis, the aggregated 
banking sector figures regarding the years of the crisis, and the project financing statistics 
since 2011 enable us to divide the aggregated data of corporate foreign currency lending into 
segments and examine them in greater detail than before. It also provided the opportunity 
to analyse the periods before and after the crisis. We can divide the corporate loans, which 
were thus far handled as one unit, into not only those based on foreign currency and forints 
but also project and non-project loans. A substantial amount of risk data (risk provisions, 
NPL1 values) is also available in these sub-segments, which further support the analysis. 
By processing and analysing the stylised facts of recent years and the past decade, we 
can draw new conclusions and provide answers to several important questions. How did 
the dynamics and risk figures of foreign currency lending develop before and during the 
crisis, and how did they relate to corporate loans in HUF? How was it influenced by project 
lending, and how did it influence the development of foreign currency loans and the entire 
corporate lending as well as the risk indicators of the banks’ loan portfolios? The answers 
and conclusions given to these questions would be worth linking with the results and 
conclusions of domestic research regarding previous corporate risk management attitudes 
and corporate foreign currency risk positions. The figures also indicate that the crisis came 
to an end and that 2017 was the start of a new era. Our conclusions and answers to these 
questions may serve as lessons learned for lending practices in the future in order to prevent 
the mistakes made by the financing parties in the past. 
1 Non-performing loan
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2. Summary of the literature, earlier national research
A part of the specialised literature addressing corporate foreign currency lending deals with 
the macro-economic risks of lending and their impacts and regulatory questions. Most 
specialised literature is about the risks; however, standard financial textbooks also include 
how to cluster and define foreign currency risk in multiple ways (transaction risk, economic, 
accounting risk, etc.) and how to identify and define corporate level foreign currency risk 
and open position (“mismatch”). We do not address the macro-economic, regulating factor 
nor the foreign currency risk and conclusions of other countries in this article.2
The other segment of the empirical specialised literature examines the risk exposures 
established during foreign currency lending on a corporate level. The studies have two 
directions. Those belonging to the first group analyse, from public exchange rate and rate 
of returns figures, what kind of change the foreign currency exchange rate fluctuation 
causes with respect to companies’ share prices and rates of returns, along with their 
corporate motivation and the relations of the corporate sector. This requires a time series 
for calculation, which is rarely available at Hungarian companies. The other direction of 
analysis is represented by the availability of the company databases, including company 
annual reports and the analysis of other publicly available company figures as well as the 
presentation of the results of interview surveys.3
The Hungarian studies typically belong to the second group: Several analyses were 
conducted for the periods before and during the crisis. Bodnár (2006) first presents the 
development of corporate foreign currency loans up until 2005 by presenting stylised 
facts. She presents the already clearly growing net foreign currency position; since she also 
publishes industry and real estate-related data, this is also useful information with respect 
to project financing. Afterwards, he presents the results of the interview survey taken 
among small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME). She examines the two main motives 
of indebtedness in foreign currency, the impacts of possible income in foreign currency, 
and the opportunities in the interest rate gap. Based on the results, the main motivation 
for taking foreign currency loan was the difference in interest rates. At the same time, the 
application and assessment of risk management within the company were examined, and 
it was found that a few people were aware of the impact of the exchange rate fluctuation 
on foreign currency loans and that the exchange rate risk is underestimated. A small 
proportion of companies indicated that they apply tools for risk management, typically 
only mentioning natural hedge solutions. The impact of various exchange rate fluctuations 
was also examined; therefore those companies which showed a negative result found that 
the depreciation of HUF would have an overall negative impact on the group of examined 
companies. 
In her later studies, Bodnár (2009) continued her work of 2006 (based on a new survey 
and interview data) and, at the same time, she expanded the study to large companies as 
2 A good review of topic-related specialised literature, for instance: ZETTELMEYER, 2010. and BODNÁR, 2006.
3 A good summary of the international specialised literature of both directions has been provided by BODNÁR, 2009.
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well. In addition to analysing the corporate loan structure, the question of risk management, 
application of hedging tools, and the understanding of corporate motivations are also 
important directions. Based on the conclusions, the reason for taking foreign currency 
loans remained the low interest rate; however, the larger the company was, the lesser the 
primary factor was, and natural hedge as the target came into focus. Based on the responses, 
companies still typically failed to pay attention to the exchange rate risk and considered 
risk management expensive and complicated,4 even though better results can be observed 
in large companies. Then, the study examined the impact of exchange rate fluctuation on 
companies. 
Erdész et al. (2012) and then Erdész et al. (2013) researched corporate foreign currency 
risks, the open, so-called “currency mismatch” positions in their studies, based on databases 
containing the corporate sector. After defining “currency mismatch” and the company 
rating based on it, they examined the kinds of characteristics the companies with risk 
had before the crisis and how they reacted to the crisis (for 2010) as compared to other 
companies without risks. In their analysis, they state that although 7% of companies were in 
an open position (rated based on an asset-resource structure and an export-import study), 
two-thirds of foreign currency loans belong to such companies. Relative to the benchmark 
group, the companies with a “mismatch” were larger and deeper in debt, which shows that 
they more comprehensively utilised the cheaper loan opportunity and cheaper liquidity. 
The performance of the companies with foreign currency loan was worse during the crisis, 
especially that of companies in a “mismatch” position, the creditworthiness of which 
deteriorated. The volume of foreign currency loans reduced, and this can be explained from 
both the demand and the supply side. The average duration of foreign currency loans was also 
reduced. After examining the companies, they confirmed that the foreign currency crisis 
had considerable balance-sheet impacts and corrections; therefore, the overall economic 
risk of companies in a risky position decreased. 
In her study, Vonnák (2015) continued the presentation of stylised facts of corporate 
foreign currency loan while also including risk data and NPL rates. By analysing the 
corporate database in her study, she calculated hypothetical, probability of default rates 
by concentrating on whether these rates deteriorate in the case of companies with foreign 
currency loan as compared to those with HUF loan. Based on the results, she concluded 
that the figures for the companies with loans in CHF are riskier in every respect, and these 
companies appear to be in a worse situation than companies with EUR and HUF loans. The 
companies indebted in CHF were already riskier before the crisis, when they took out the 
loan. These companies were more likely to have been domestically owned companies with 
weaker equity position and low exports. The companies indebted in CHF experienced a 
greater impact because of the fluctuation of the foreign currency rate than those with EUR 
loans, and their risk level significantly increased at the beginning of the crisis. 
By analysing company data from 2004 to 2011, Endrész et al. (2014) examined how the volatility, 
appreciation, and depreciation of foreign currencies impacted real investments and competitiveness. 
4 BERLINGER et al. address the behavioural impacts also appearing in corporate risk management, 2018.
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Based on their calculations, foreign currency lending increased the investment rates and liquidity 
before the crisis, and it was more significant in the case of smaller companies producing for the domestic 
market. However, after the crisis, along with the depreciation of the forint due to the disadvantageous 
balance-sheet impacts, the investment of companies with foreign currency loan decreased further. 
3. The development of corporate foreign currency loans 
and project loans until 2017 – stylised facts 
It is equally typical of the above domestic studies to include the development of corporate 
foreign currency loans and the presentation of stylised facts, and they also base their 
conclusions partially on these. This represents the initial position for this research. The 
stylised facts can now be presented up to 2017, i.e. after the crisis, and the results of the 
previous studies can also be explained by integrating the project-related data. 
In the next section, we will partially use the data from the above studies but primarily rely 
on the database regarding the credit institutions’ portfolio published by the MNB5 (Hungarian 
National Bank-MNB, 2018). The previous studies normally contain figures from the period prior 
to 2011, whereas the database of the MNB − at the time of the current study – includes the period 
of 2005 to 2017. The figures that provide grounds for the modern analysis and conclusions are 
available from 2011, since the data supply included project loans within corporate loan separately. 
This is important, since, thus far, the analyses did not separate corporate loans and project loans, 
although their risk profile and corporate balance sheet structure are significantly different. 
By analysing the project financing data, however, there was an opportunity to analyse purely 
corporate loans and the increasing volume of project loans, which was partially done in a previous 
study.6 This study presented and supported the fact that the weight of project financing prominently 
increased in the period prior to the crisis, while, as shown in the risk statistics of the crisis, the 
risk was higher compared to normal corporate loans, and it largely worsened the entire corporate 
bank portfolio. In the following section, we will supplement this analysis by dividing the HUF and 
foreign currency loans and associating their results with the results of previous studies.
The volume of loans provided by the banks to companies (to non-financial institutions) 
continued to increase until the crisis before decreasing between 2009 and 2016. Concerning the 
period after the start of the crisis, 2017 was the first year when the corporate loan volume started 
to rise again. At the same time, it can also be observed that the real change occurred in the volume 
of foreign currency loans. The rate of this, especially from 2003, has continuously increased, and 
this sudden growth came about in just 3 to 4 years before the crisis. At that time, the proportion 
of foreign currency loans increased from 35–40% in 2003 to 2005 to approximately 55% in 2008. 
It is an important fact that the volume of corporate HUF loans from 2006 has remained broadly 
unchanged even in the wake of the crisis and fluctuated within a small range, between HUF 
3,100 to 3,400 billion (EUR 10−11 billion). The real reduction during the crisis was caused by the 
setback of foreign currency loans, which caused a radical drop on an aggregated level. 
5 The figures include the data of credit institutions operating in the Hungarian banking system.
6 WALTER, 2017.
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Figure 1: Corporate loan volume in HUF and in foreign currency (2000−2017)
Source: Own work, made based on the database of Bodnár (2016) and MNB (2018)
In his study, Walter (2017) has demonstrated how the previous, uniformly handled corporate loan 
volume can be divided into project loan and “pure” corporate loan not containing project loans. This is 
also how we will divide the corporate loan volume while also taking into consideration the 2017 figures 
for foreign currency and HUF loans. It can be observed that neither the volume of corporate HUF loans 
nor the project loans in HUF have changed, even during the crisis. By contrast, the foreign currency 
loan volumes continued to drop until 2016, both on a corporate and a project level. Within all corporate 
foreign currency loans, the proportion of project loans can be considered as significant; this fluctuated 
from around 40–47% between 2011 and 2016 and only dropped to 35% by 2017. It is characteristic of 
the risk, duration, recoverability, and flexibility features of the two loan types. While the purely foreign 
currency corporate loan volume basically remained the same until 2017, following two large drops in 
2013 and 2014 (probably due to the more rapid balance restructuring), the foreign currency project 
loans fell at a slower but continuous rate, and their gross volume dropped each year by HUF 150 to 200 
billion. This process only came to an end in 2017. This reinforces our experience regarding the lack of 
flexibility of project structures, longer loan durations, and slower collateral exercising options. 
Figure 2: Corporate loan volume and project loans in HUF and in foreign currency (2000−2017)
Source: Own work, made based on the database of MNB (2018)
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Examining project loans, it can be observed that the majority of the project financing 
took place through foreign currency loan, the proportion of which was about 88% in 2011. 
It is interesting that the volume of project loans denominated in HUF did not decrease even 
during the crisis, unlike the foreign currency project loans. At the same time, it is likely 
that the foreign currency project loans were converted into forints wherever possible, which 
played a role in the development of project loans in HUF.
 
Figure 3: Project loans in HUF and foreign currency 
Source: Own work, based on the database of MNB (2018)
If we compare the segments within the project loan and cross-check the housing project loans 
(purchase, development) with the project loans of other industries (energetics, traffic, etc.), it can 
be observed that over half of the project loans in 2011 were real estate project loans disbursed in 
foreign currency. Throughout the years, the volume of foreign currency loans of other projects 
also reduced, and the greatest setback was still in the real estate foreign currency loans; whereas, 
the volume of HUF-based real estate project loans did not change substantially. Unfortunately, 
we have no data pertaining to the period prior to 2011 on project financing. At the same time, 
earlier studies analyse the foreign currency loans by the sector, and the real estate sector, as a loan-
taking party, appears as a separate category here. The real estate sector is typically built on projects 
and project financing; there therefore is most likely going to be a significant overlap with real 
estate projects, which appear later in a separate category. Based on the data provided by Bodnár 
(2009), in 2008, before the crisis, the loan of the entire real estate sector provided by foreign banks 
was some HUF 2,000 billion, and about 1,500 billion from that was foreign currency loan. The 
volume of real estate project loans in 2011 was around HUF 1,600 billion, with a volume of some 
HUF 1,460 billion in foreign currency project loans. The volumes of 2008 almost certainly did 
not grow between 2008 and 2011; therefore, we can rightly assume that the abovementioned 2008 
real estate sector loan volume was essentially project loans, most likely based on foreign currency 
loan. If we add to this that the entire volume of the construction industry in 2008, which was HUF 
500−600 billion, and half of it was foreign currency loan, we can also add that the majority of it 
was probably project loans. The presented figure also supports this, i.e. that the foreign currency 
loans were generally of a longer duration than the HUF loans, one of the motivations for which 
could be that the interest rate benefit can be better exploited in the long term. 
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Figure 4: Real estate and other project loans (in HUF and foreign currency)
Source: Own work, based on the database of MNB (2018)
We were able to observe that the vast majority of project loans were in foreign currency loans. 
If we examine the real estate projects, including the largest group, real estate development, 
which causes the most problems, it can be established that the proportion of foreign currency 
loans was almost 90% at the beginning of the crisis. Their volume has continuously dropped in 
the last six years and has fallen to about two-thirds, and this is one of the lending segments that 
has not been growing in 2017 either.7 It can also be observed that about half of the real estate 
development is related to office buildings and commercial properties, while the other half 
pertains to hotels, residential parks, and industrial real estate projects. Based on the business 
model and experience of the latter, real estate development is less likely to be indexed to the 
foreign exchange rate. Consequently, their foreign currency exposure can be considered high. 
 
Figure 5: Real estate development and foreign currency project loans
Source: Own work, based on the database of MNB (2018)
7 Although the volume of HUF-based real estate development project loans grew to a small extent, the ove-
rall value of real estate development projects further decreased, even in 2017, despite the positive real estate 
market developments and conditions.
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4. Risk figures in the corporate foreign currency loan portfolio
Next, we will compare the risk numbers of corporate HUF and foreign currency loans 
by analysing provisioning, the development of non-performing portfolios, and their 
correlation. Following the examination of gross loan volume, we will now present the value 
of risk provisions in the given segment and their percentage proportion as compared to the 
entire loan volume. We also have the late payment, “default” loan figures per segment. 
The regulating and risk assessment rating companies (e.g. Moody’s) define the default principles. 
These definitions might contain subjective elements as well. Generally, the 90-day late payment debt 
of a “material obligation” is considered as a default event or one that is likely to cause insolvency. Its 
exact conditions (late payment, start of legal proceedings, re-structuring) and what is considered as 
major debt are specified by the regulation in several points (CRR, 2013; Moody, 2013). Based on the 
above, we consider the over 90-day default items as non-paying or non-performing loans (NPL).
Unfortunately, we do not have timelines of equal length for the volume of risk provisions, the volume 
of non-performing reserves, and the volume of project loans. Statistics on the risk provisions built for 
corporate foreign currency loans were published from 2009; however, the same for the project loans is 
only available from 2011. With project loans in the case of non-paying, default portfolios, the division by 
foreign currency is not available. Therefore, we are unable to separate pure corporate and project loans. 
By examining the risk provisions built for corporate HUF and foreign currency loans from 2009, it 
can be observed that there were more risk provisions built for HUF-based loans at the beginning of 
the crisis than in the case of foreign currency loans, where the increasing risk (or realisation) seemed 
to occur later. At the same time, with HUF-based loans, the volume of the risk provisions changed 
little until 2015, while it sharply increased with the foreign currency loans and, by 2011, had exceeded 
the risk provisions volume built for HUF loans on the volume level. This increase in risk also appears 
in the proportions calculated compared to the entire loan volume; in a few years, the proportion of 
risk provisions with the foreign currency loans rose from 4–18% as compared to the 9–13% of HUF 
loans, which can be considered as stable (the period after 2011 presents worse statistics for HUF 
loans). It is also notable here that, in the case of foreign currency loans, the reporting of risks seemed 
to start later compared to HUF loans, where 1 to 2 years of delay can be observed. 
Figure 6: Risk provisions for corporate loans (HUF and foreign currency)
Source: Own work, created based on the database of MNB (2018)
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Figure 7: The proportion of risk provisions volume compared to the loan portfolio in the case of 
corporate loans (HUF and foreign currency)
Source: Own work, based on the database of MNB (2018)
From 2011, we can distinguish between corporate and project loans as well as the risk 
provisions built for these. The risk provisions volume basically did not change much between 
2011 and 2014 – the risk provisions rose sharply in 2009 to 2011 – and, by this time, they were 
already fluctuating in the range of HUF 800−1,000 billion. An improvement can obviously 
be seen only after 2014, which is the consequence of several factors. On one hand, it might be 
due to the improvement of credit risks, the recovery of the loan after the sale of collaterals, 
or the selling of bad loans and the writing off the actual losses. However, it is a fact that the 
risk provisions volume considerably decreased between 2014 and 2017. The various risks and 
extended handling of project financing are indicated by the fact that it was the project loan 
risk provisions that started to improve most recently. If we analyse the foreign currency loans, 
it can be observed that over half the foreign currency risk provisions are related to projects.
 
Figure 8: The volume of risk provisions by project and purely corporate loans (HUF and foreign currency)
Source: Own work, created based on the database of the MNB (2018)
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We can highlight the prominent risk of foreign currency project loans if we examine the 
proportion of risk provisions/gross loan volume. During the years of the crisis, the statistics 
of domestic HUF-based project loans is the worst; however, it is less relevant for the purpose 
of comparison since its volume is a mere fraction of the other segments (one-eighth to one-
tenth). But it still draws attention to the high project risk. The volume of purely corporate 
HUF and foreign currency loans and foreign currency project loans are roughly close to 
each other. Thus, it is more reasonable to compare these. It can be observed here that the 
worst image is reflected by foreign currency project loans (between 13–21%), which when 
compared to purely corporate loans, either foreign currency or HUF loans, exhibits a 
continuously higher proportion of the anticipated loss ratio. It only improved considerably 
by 2017 but is still worse than any other segments. The ratio of risk provisions in the other 
purely corporate loan segments is around 10% (except for the outstanding figures of 2014), 
which improved from one year to the next starting from 2014 and settled at around 5%. 
Figure 9 indicates that project financing might have had an extended negative impact on the 
banks’ balance sheets. The pay-offs, workout processes, collateral sales, and restructuring 
progress only slowly; therefore, the improvement and cleaning of the risk provisions volume 
only appears one or two years later than that of the normal corporate loans. It seems that 
within project loans, this applies even more so to foreign currency loans. 
 
Figure 9: The ratio of risk provisions volume to the gross loan volume by project and purely corporate 
loans (HUF and foreign currency)
Source: Own work, based on the database of MNB (2018)
Our analysis option is most limited in relation to HUF/foreign currency loan, corporate/pro-
ject loan, and the NPL. We can follow the NPL volume with a forint and foreign currency division 
from 2009, but we are not able to analyse it in a project/corporate respect due to the lack of data. 
With respect to the development of the NPL volume and its proportion, we can draw similar 
conclusions with respect to what we have seen with regard to risk provision building. With foreign 
currency loans, the NPL portfolio was lower at the beginning of the crisis. It then increased by 
2011 and exceeded the NPL portfolio of HUF loans. The NPL rate of foreign currency loans grew 
higher than that of HUF loans by 2012 and later reached its peak value in 2012–2013 (approx. 
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18−19%) when there was an improvement with HUF loans. Until 2016, the NPL rate of foreign 
currency loans was always higher than that of the HUF loans. It would be interesting to know how 
much of this NPL portfolio was foreign currency and HUF project loans; however, we only have 
indirect data on this. We know from previous studies (Walter, 2018) that the NPL rate of projects 
was considerably higher (over 20%) than the purely corporate NPL rate of the worst period (12%). 
We also know that 90% of the projects were foreign currency loans, with the highest majority be-
ing real estate projects. Based on this, we can safely conclude that, among bad foreign currency 
NPL statistics, the foreign currency project loans represent a major volume, and the real estate 
project loans with these have extremely bad risk values. 
Figure 10: The development of performing and non-performing (NPL) portfolios in the case of HUF 
and foreign currency corporate loans 
Source: Own work, based on the database of MNB (2018)
Figure 11: The development of NPL rates in the case of HUF and foreign currency corporate loans 
Source: Own work, based on the database of MNB (2018)
Based on the above data, it can be observed that the foreign currency project loans show 
a higher risk profile. Of course, the question that arises when linked to previous studies 
is that of the open foreign currency risk possibly being the “mismatch”. We only have 
indirect information for this, primarily from research studies carried out before 2009. In 
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his study, Bodnár (2009) calculated the concerned industries’ foreign currency-export ratio 
as compared to the overall income. Based on this, the ratio of foreign currency income, in 
comparison to the overall income of the industry in the real estate sector, was around 10% 
and was under 5% in the construction industry. Consequently, if the majority of these were 
project loans, we can declare that the majority of the real estate projects did not have foreign 
currency income, i.e. they carried an open foreign currency risk exposure. 
The reason for taking out loan in foreign currency was clearly the lower interest rate, which 
is unambiguously seen from the questionnaire surveys as well, as a general motivation. We 
know from the market transaction figures that a portion of the project loan income was inde-
xed to the foreign currency even if there was no export due to a natural hedge consideration 
(or simply due to market practice). Such projects can be the PPP’s, where the income indexing 
often contains an EUR exchange rate element, or the commercial real estate developments, 
wherein the rental price is often decided on an EUR basis. This might improve the overall 
image but, at the same time, the unfavourable and worse than average risk figures illustrate 
that the risk of foreign currency projects was still higher than the others. 
5. Conclusions and summary
The loan volume provided to companies by banks in the Hungarian market continuously 
increased from 2000 until the crisis, then gradually dropped to the 2005–2006 level between 
2009 and 2016. When we examine it in segments, it can be observed that the actual increase 
and decrease took place in the foreign currency loan volume. In contrast to the general view 
that the banks largely held corporate lending back, neither the volume of pure corporate 
loans in HUF nor the volume of the project loans in HUF changed substantially even during 
the crisis. It might be instructive for the future that the foreign currency corporate loans 
started to grow again in 2017, to a greater extent than the corporate loans in HUF, but the 
volume of project-type foreign currency loans kept on decreasing. 
The vast majority, approximately 90%, of project financing was carried out with foreign 
currency loan. Within all corporate foreign currency loans, the proportion of project loans 
can be considered substantial (40−47%). Compared to the large-scale foreign currency 
corporate loan volume reduction that took place in 1–2 years, the project foreign currency 
loans fell at a slower pace, albeit continuously during the crisis, and, moreover, kept on 
falling in 2017 as well. This supports our observations regarding the lack of flexibility of 
project structures, longer loan durations, and slower collateral exercising options as well as 
the caution, which was shown by the banking sector towards project loans and especially 
foreign currency project loans in recent years. 
More than half of the project loans were project loans that were disbursed in foreign currency. 
The largest setback occurred in foreign currency real estate projects. However, it can be observed 
from the studies pertaining to the period before 2009 that the majority of real estate projects 
probably did not have foreign currency income, i.e. an open foreign currency risk exposure could 
be experienced. More than half of the foreign currency loan risk provisions can be linked to 
projects, which again demonstrates the higher risk level of project loans. The risk provisions rate of 
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foreign currency project loans is also much worse than that of purely corporate foreign currency 
loans. The real estate-related projects compared to purely corporate loans have substantially 
worse risk figures and, since their weight within the foreign currency loans is quite high, they 
influence and worsen the values of the entire foreign currency loan portfolio. It also might be 
due to this that the loan volume of banks in the field of non-project type foreign currency loans 
increased as early as 2017, as opposed to foreign currency project loans. 
By examining the risk provisions, we have observed that there were more risk provisions 
built for HUF-based loans at the beginning of the crisis than for foreign currency loans, where 
the increasing risk (or realisation) seemed to occur later. The reasons for this would be worth 
examining in later research. It is also justified that, in case of projects, the workout process is 
extended, and it is even more applicable to foreign currency project loans, which might even 
stay in the volume for years and have an extended negative impact on the banks’ balance sheets. 
To summarise, foreign currency lending and project loans had a decisive impact on the volume 
change of corporate loan volume and risk profile. The foreign currency project loans and real 
estate project loans had the largest and most extended negative impact, which took up a large 
proportion of the bank portfolios before the crisis. The higher risk of project lending as well as the 
presence of large-scale foreign currency “mismatch” led to bank portfolios that are phased out 
slower than purely corporate loans and have a negative impact on the loan portfolios for years. 
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1. Economic environment, initial status
The regulation of credit institutions is an imperative question, which is seemingly far from the 
members of society, however, in reality they are the beneficiaries and stakeholders on a daily basis. 
An increasing number of people own bank accounts, therefore they have regular contact with a credit 
institution, but this contact may not only appear on the resource side (placing a deposit), but also on 
the asset side (taking a loan). Retail lending, especially retail housing loans were one of the major, most 
critical and most often negotiated cornerstones of the last decade, where society and finances met. 
The enabler of retail lending at the base level is the need for housing and other consumer goods. 
When taking a loan, the key decision basis of the population is the interest rate, for which the 
Annual Percentage Rate of Charge (APR) provides a guideline. However, in certain periods, the 
APR may not be considered as comprehensive support, since other understanding from the client 
is also required. The APR may not answer the lapsing of time, i.e. the changes in the interest rate 
and exchange rate environment, currently the key hazard, namely, the increasing of the interest 
and exchange rate level. Regarding retail lending, the financial knowledge and awareness of the 
client, as well as the adequate alignment of consumer protection are always key questions. Hen-
ce why several regulatory elements were established, by which information and understanding 
appear as expectations. At the same time, it is important to highlight that for years there was 
an interest rate and exchange rate environment, which caused the population to believe that, in 
fact, there was no exchange rate risk mentioned in the information provided to them, since the 
exchange rate was fluctuating in the range of 10%, between HUF 150−165 for years (the years 
of 2002 to 2008 was the period of great increase in lending in foreign currency). Substantive 
deviation from this range was not typical, and even if it happened, the exchange rate of the Swiss 
franc returned to the bottom of the above mentioned range within a short time.
Figure: CHF/HUF exchange rate 2002-2015 
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Moreover, in the beginning of the 2000s, the interest rate environment was one where the 
interest rate for HUF-based loans was explicitly high. Consequently, the population’s demand 
for such loans was also limited. Since the credit institutions are interested in satisfying 
demand, they also started product development in this direction. This was facilitated by 
the fact that there are typically affiliated banks in the Hungarian bank system, with mostly 
European parent companies. These affiliated banks were able to secure resources in foreign 
currency from the parent banks. Moreover, due to the new product, a product with a 
beneficiary interest rate was created for clients. By opening new markets, it is also true that 
the national affiliated banks could utilise the resource from the parent bank advantageously, 
which in addition to the affiliates was also enticing for the parent banks. Consequently, these 
resources were available for the national affiliated banks in the long-term and in a larger 
amount. Since lending in HUF was almost unreachable for companies and the population 
due to the high local interest rate environment, the credit institutions increasingly turned 
towards lending in foreign currency. 
The above processes resulted in the mass propagation of foreign exchange credits among 
the population, where record keeping and settlement for the clients was typically in Swiss 
francs. 
Choosing a foreign exchange credit seemed obvious to the clients, since it was clearly more 
beneficial in interest return, and as you can see in the above figure, when lending ramped 
up and the amount of retail foreign exchange credits increased between 2002 and 2008, 
there was no substantive fluctuation in foreign currency. Therefore, the awareness-raising 
regarding the exchange rate risk was not paired with a sense of experience, which might 
have oppressed the reality of the impact in the borrowers of loans. Hence, that is why the 
government responsible for regulating the financial sector and the surveillance authority 
in charge of the stability of the financial sector have decisive roles in possibly proactively, 
but at least retroactively supporting and protecting the borrowers of loans. Accordingly, 
the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the Hungarian National Bank made 
numerous awareness-raising announcements, analysis and background studies during this 
period to warn clients to be more cautious concerning the risks of indebtedness in loans 
taken in foreign currency. 
The regulator also took several steps in regards to legislation. Regarding these measures, 
starting from more accentuated awareness-raising to the risks, presenting the offset of 
exchange rate impacts and by keeping the saving of homes in sight, the most powerful 
intervention tools also appeared on behalf of the regulator.
Some of the steps outlined below target the entire scope of the concerned, and some of 
only those in the tightest situation. However, you can see with all steps that the cooperation 
of the concerned, i.e. the loan borrowers, is also required to enable the tool to efficiently fulfil 
its role and become successful. Accordingly, following the stipulation of the measures, the 
scope of the concerned, i.e. the loan borrowers, should also be indicated.
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2. Regulatory steps regarding lending in foreign 
currency – proactive measures
2. 1. General rules of information – risk exposure declaration 
During the spreading of retail lending in foreign currency – by recognising the risks and the 
related, strongest awareness-raising requirement – the first regulatory step, the introduction 
of the so-called risk exposure declaration was taken. The regulatory aim was for clients 
to receive better, more thorough and clearer information prior to taking the loan. The 
modification of Act CXII of 1996 on credit institutions and financial enterprises (hereinafter 
referred to as: old Credit Act) passed in September 2004, disposed of mandatory information 
that should be provided in case of contracts in foreign currency. 
According to the provisions that came into effect on 1 January 2005, in case of contracts in 
foreign currency signed with retail clients, aimed at lending in foreign currency, the financial 
institution should disclose the risk impacting the client in their contractual deals, with a 
signature the client verifies acknowledgement. Based on the regulation, the risk exposure 
declaration had to contain information on the exchange rate risk, as well as its impact on 
the instalments. 
This Act is still in effect and must be applied in an almost unchanged form. The rule 
according to the above is contained in Act CCXXXVII of 2013 from 1 January 2014 on cre-
dit institutions and financial enterprises (hereinafter referred to as: Credit Act) 271. Sections 
§	 (4)−(5),	 and	Act	CLXII	 of	 2009	 from	1	February	 2015	 on	 consumer	 loans	 (hereinafter	
referred	to	as:	Consumer	credit	act)	21/A.	sections	§	(1)−(2).	
2. 2. Direct informational obligation rule – Annual Percentage Rate of Charge
The modification of Government Decree No. 41/1997 (5. III.) on deposit interest, the yield 
of securities and the calculation and announcement of the annual percentage rate of charge 
(APR) targeted the proper demonstration of the costs of foreign exchange credits, which was 
also passed at the end of 2004. The modification specified the rules of defining the annual 
percentage rate of charge (APR) concerning retail loans, including foreign exchange credits. 
Although the relevant principle of the European Union did not require it, the old Credit Act 
disposed of the application of the APR also for new housing loans as a new regulation. 
According to the Government Decree, the APR had to be specified based on payments and 
instalments established in HUF as a main rule, which reflected the exchange rate differences 
applied upon disbursement and redemption (buying and selling rates). Further, the expenses 
arising in foreign currency also had to be taken into account during the establishment of the 
APR. The decree also unambiguously stipulated that in case of foreign exchange credits and 
loans based on foreign currency with the indication of APR, the clients’ attention shall be 
firmly drawn to the fact, that the value of the APR does not reflect the possible exchange rate 
risk regarding the loan. 
The modification of the Government Decree stipulated that if the advertisement includes 
the interest rate, or any expenses or instalments of the loan, the APR shall also be indicated. 
During its indication it shall also be considered, that awareness-raising should be of at least 
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equal size and appearance regarding the relation of the APR and the instalment and/or inte-
rest rate. This rule aimed at preventing those ads, which lured clients with an item taken out 
of context, e.g. the low interest rate of foreign exchange credits or of loans based on foreign 
currency. These rules also had to be applied from 1 January 2005.
The introduction of regulations and the risk exposure declaration regarding the APR and 
advertisement, which put all concerned into a more responsible and stricter consideration 
required in the decision-making position, however, did not limit the further ramp up of 
foreign exchange credits until the considerable weakening of the HUF against the EUR and 
especially the Swiss franc at the end of 2008.
2. 3. Self-regulation attempts
In conjunction with the spreading of lending in foreign currency we should also not avoid 
stating that in the first half of the 2000s, in accordance with international tendencies, the 
explicit enhancement and increasing of competition was in the foreground in contrast with 
(legal) regulation. The proposals of the Expert Committee Examining the Retail Bank-
ing Services, established in 20061, also focused on increasing competition and lending by 
stating that when regulation is required, self-regulation should be considered as primary 
against governmental regulation, and only in case of its insufficiency should the regulator’s 
intervention take place.
In order to enhance competition, the Expert Committee Examining the Retail Bank-
ing Services wished to facilitate the switching of banks and replacing loans by the clients, 
and assigned a priority role to increasing transparency (to providing information and 
the transparency of unilateral contract modifications), as well as the strengthening of 
conscious consumer behaviour. Following a longer preparation period, in order to realise 
these expectations by self-regulation, the Hungarian Banking Association approved 
several proposals and codex in 2008 regarding unilateral contract modification and loan 
replacement, and the banks’ Code of Conduct aimed at specifying the general norms 
of responsible lending came into effect on 1 January 2010. Besides self-regulation and 
regarding the regulating responsibility, we should also highlight that the regulating side, 
as well as the supervisory authority, were also present in the preparations of the Code of 
Conduct. Concerning the supervisory responsibility – although we are talking about self-
regulation –, the compliance with self-regulating elements also appeared as part of official 
control. In certain cases, the bank was risking a severe penalty if it did not comply with the 
commitments of its self-regulation. 
Regarding its contents, the mandatory information providing responsibility on the Code 
of Conduct also appeared in the Credit Institution Act, which shows the shifting of self-
regulation towards control in the framework of responsible regulator’s behaviour. In parallel 
to the above, legal regulating pursuits also intensified. As part of this, the modification of the 
Credit Institution Act by Act CL of 2009 stipulated that in case of consumer loan agreements 
the lender is only eligible to exercise its right of unilateral modification if the agreement 
1 Government Decree No. 1097/2006 (5. X.) provides for the establishment of the committee.
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contains the itemised definition of objective conditions calling for the modification, and the 
lender specified its pricing principles in writing. At the same time, these pricing principles 
were generally not public, i.e. controllable by the client, since only the supervisory board was 
entitled to check whether they comply with the legal provisions.
3. Regulatory steps regarding lending in foreign currency – 
reactive measures
3. 1. Agreement of 6 November 2008
The volatility of exchange rates was not significant until the fall of 2008. Therefore, awareness-
raising and highlighting of risks did not dissuade clients, and the taking of housing foreign 
exchange credits dynamically increased until the autumn of 2008. The turn took place 
when with the sudden change of the exchange rate, the instalments considerably increased 
overnight. This is when the regulator party took another step. 
In order to mitigate the impact of the exchange rate fluctuation, on 6 November 2008 the 
Minister of Finance and nine commercial banks signed an agreement on tools supporting 
the redemption of debtors with foreign exchange credits. According to the agreement, banks 
allowed for the extension of the duration of the loan based on the debtor’s request without 
charging an extra fee, temporarily reduced the amount of instalments for debtors, who 
were forced into a difficult situation, enabled the switching of foreign exchange credits into 
loans in HUF, and also handled early repayments flexibly. The commercial banks with the 
largest amount of foreign exchange credits and the mortgage credit institutions signed the 
agreement. Based on the original agreement, the foreign exchange credits could be converted 
into HUF free of charge until 31 December 2008. The exchange rate in this period was around 
HUF/CHF 170−180. Since the regulating tool again required the cooperation of clients, the 
success of the measure was ensured by the understanding of concerned clients, i.e. their 
understanding and judicious perception was necessary regarding new awareness-raising of 
the risk. Unfortunately, however, very few people used the opportunities contained in the 
agreement, and it impacted approximately 6,000 contracts. Out of these, the transformation 
of loans to those that were HUF-based were under 1,000, while the exchange rate of the 
Swiss franc was still near the borrowing rate, especially compared to subsequent periods.
The Hungarian Banking Association informed the Ministry of Finance on 16 February 
2009 that it had initiated the extended application of the agreement with the banks, who 
participated in the initial agreement, which was accepted by these banks. Moreover, the 
scope of engaged institutions in the program was extended by another two banks. 
The extended application and the extended scope of applying banks ultimately resulted in 
the cooperation of a higher number of clients. Thanks to this, by the end of 2009 the number 
of rescheduled contracts exceeded 61,000. 
With those constructions however, where the credit institutions only provided a temporary 
ease, following the grace period the debt burden again rose significantly, and could even 
exceed the level prior to rescheduling, i.e. the transformation to a HUF loan would have 
seemingly been the most favourable offer worth taking.
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3. 2. Responsible lending – regulation reinforcement
In the beginning of the 2000s, competition between the credit institutions and the 
considerable demand for housing loans on behalf of clients resulted in the loosening of 
lending conditions and the spreading of increasingly risky products. The size of disbursed 
mortgage loans continuously increased compared to the value of the collateral. The 
proportion of the loan compared to the collateral (LTV) was 50% to 60% on average, but 
between 2006 and 2008 the higher LTV level increased, and the proportion of loans at even 
100% also became visible. Through the permanent depreciation of HUF and the shifting of 
financing costs of the banks into loan interest, the instalment growth of households having 
foreign exchange credits increased the proportion of default loans. These processes called for 
limiting lending to prevent the over-indebtedness of retail clients. 
In December 2009, the Act CLXII of 2009 on consumer lending was approved (Consumer 
Lending Act), the primary aim of which was to transfer the provisions of the Directive 
2008/48/EC on consumer loan agreements into Hungarian law. The majority of the provisions 
of the Act came into effect on 11 June 2010, in accordance with the transfer deadline 
provided by the directive. Also due to the above mentioned process – in the framework 
of the necessary measure, extending over the regulatory scope of the directive in order to 
strengthen consumer trust –, a significant part of the regulatory measures was extended to 
mortgage loans and financial lease contracts as well.
The Consumer Loan Act specified the rating of consumers’ creditworthiness as 
the responsibility of the lender, which was not only required prior to signing the loan 
agreement, but also in case the loan amount was increased. The information required for the 
creditworthiness rating might be based on the information provided by the consumer and 
the utilisation of the loan reference service. The Act provided authorisation for the detailed 
creditworthiness rating on a government decree level. 
At the end of December 2009, based on this authorisation, the Government accepted 
Government Decree No. 361/2009 (30. XII) on the conditions of astute retail lending and 
creditworthiness rating. The aim of this provision was to promote responsible lending, 
to mitigate the risks of foreign exchange credits and to prevent the over-indebtedness of 
retail clients. According to the Government Decree, when offering a loan the client’s 
creditworthiness and creditable status shall be examined in all cases, i.e. the institutions 
do not provide loans by exclusively considering the collateral. In its internal policy the 
lending party had to indicate the means of establishing the creditable limit (the amount 
representing the maximum monthly loan instalment paying ability) for each loan type, as 
well as the income items and information, which can be considered for the calculation. In 
case of foreign exchange credits, and based on foreign currency, the creditable limit had to 
be defined lower than for the HUF limit. In case of Euro-based loans or loans in EUR, the 
creditable limit could be maximum 80% of the limit defined in HUF, and maximum 60% 
of the limit of other currencies. According to the new regulations, during the establishment 
of the creditable limit, the lending party had to take into account the client’s all known loan 
debt. 
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The Government Decree specified the maximum proportion of the loan compared to 
the collateral in case of loans secured by mortgage based on a property, loans provided for 
vehicle purchase and financial leasing. Different limits were established for HUF-based 
loans, EUR-based loans and loans in other foreign currency, considering he different risks 
related to the products.
It was a considerable regulating novelty, that it was the first time the Government 
Decree differentiated between loans in HUF and foreign exchange credits concerning 
creditworthiness. Once these limiting regulations of the Government Decree came into 
effect, the newly disbursed foreign exchange credits basically disappeared.
3. 3. Regulating the credit intermediaries 
The exposure of severe stability risks in lending in foreign currency also highlighted the fact 
that the strict regulation of credit intermediaries must not be delayed any longer. Based on 
the previous regulations, practically anyone could mediate credit without special conditions 
by the intermediaries’ specific interest in, for example re-signing or replacing loans due to 
their remuneration. 
The new regulation regarding credit intermediaries – which was filed by Act CL of 2009 into 
the Credit Institution Act –, introduced double clustering concerning mediating financial 
services. On one hand, it defined the types of financial service mediation as an activity 
(therefore introduced brokerage activity). On the other hand, it isolated the dependent and 
independent intermediaries by making the type of activity performed by the intermediary 
as primary isolation criteria, and also, if it mediates more services, whether these services 
compete with each other or not. 
In addition to the above, the old Credit Act limited the possibility of the establishment of 
intermediary chains for the sake of transparency and clear responsibility relations. At the 
same time, it forced the intermediaries to inform their clients (including their future clients) 
about on whose behalf they are acting and mediating. 
As an additional important point, the regulation with a new aspect also included the 
remuneration of intermediaries, specifically stipulating if regarding this activity the 
intermediary is only entitled for remuneration by his client, i.e. the party on whose behalf 
he is acting.
3. 4. Forced sale quota system 
Numerous regulating steps were taken, numerous positive shifting occurred, and clients 
were cooperating in an increasing number for a solution. Regarding the mitigation applied 
from the end of 2008, for instance, the number of participants grew by 61,000, however it 
was still insignificant compared to the millions of contracts. Therefore, due to the increasing 
crisis, another step was needed by the regulator. 
Following the expiration of eviction and auction moratoria introduced for temporary crisis 
management on 11 August 2010, the Parliament passed the provision on forced sale quota, i.e. 
Act LXXV of 2011 on fixing the exchange rate for the instalments of foreign exchange credits 
and the forced sale of residential properties. The aim of this was to prevent an unjustified large 
428 Lending in foreign currency from the regulator’s aspect
proportion of properties emerging at the same time on the market during the forced sale of 
properties serving as collateral for housing loans. The forced sale quotas limited the number 
of properties that could be given for forced sale on a quarterly basis by the creditors, which in 
turn also limited the number of cases possibly resulting in eviction by 2014. The aim of the 
legal regulation was to prevent mass eviction and to protect the housing market. 
The banks however avoided the auctions regardless of the quota. This is also supported by 
the fact that the number of properties actually nominated for forced sale was considerably 
lower than the amount ensured by the quota, i.e. the credit institutions were also not 
interested in forced sale. In addition to the regulations regarding risk management and 
collateral sales, the low price of the properties also contributed to the banks not fully utilising 
the opportunities provided by the quota. 
3. 5. Exchange rate cap
The loan redemption at a discounted exchange rate was introduced by Act LXXV of 2011, 
also regulating the quota system on the fixing of the instalment exchange rate of foreign 
exchange credits, and the forced sale of residential properties. Based on the Act that came 
into effect in August 2011, clients who signed a frame agreement for an omnibus account cre-
dit could pay their redemption for three years at a discounted fixed rate, and the difference 
between the redemption calculated based on the actual and fixed rate was credited to a 
sub-account, the omnibus account. Therefore, the obligation did not cease, but it meant 
a temporary reduction of the burden. This accumulated amount would have to be re-paid 
after the period of fixed exchange rate. After three years however, the accrued amount would 
have significantly increased the credit instalments, therefore this construction was modified 
from 1 April 2012, making it more beneficial for the population. 
Based on the agreement signed with the Hungarian Banking Association on 15 Decem-
ber 2011, Act XVI of 2012 modifying the exchange rate cap construction increased the 
application period of the fixed exchange rate from three years to five, and also provided 
considerable debt remission. For loans in Swiss francs, instead of the actual exchange rate 
one had to pay redemption at HUF/CHF 180 for five years, but at the latest by 30 June 2017. 
For EUR loans the fixed rate was HUF/EUR 250, for the Japanese yen HUF/JPY 2.5. The pre-
condition for utilising the fixed exchange rate was that the payment delay of debtors could 
not exceed 90 days and the amount of the loan upon receiving it could not exceed HUF 20 
million. The clients who chose the exchange rate cap only had to pay the deferred capital 
debt from the omnibus account credit, and the interest part of the omnibus account credit 
was taken in 50−50% by the banks and the budget.
The law amendment approved in 2013 eliminated the previously, several times modified 
entry deadline and the closing date of 30 June 2017 for exchange rate fixing, therefore the only 
remaining limitation was the period regarding the 60-month suspension. The Parliament 
also decided on 5 November 2013, to enable people to apply for exchange rate fixing upon 
approval who have debts over 90 days, or took a loan of more than HUF 20 million in foreign 
currency. This basically enabled all clients to exercise the opportunity and in certain cases 
the non-performing loans could also return to performing loans.
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According to the regulation, the interest rate of the amount accrued on the omnibus 
account was three months BUBOR during the application of the fixed exchange rate, and 
afterwards it had to equal the market interest rate defined for HUF loans provided for the 
same purpose as the foreign exchange credits provided by the financial institution. 
The regulation on exchange rate fixing was supplemented by Government Decree No. 
163/2011. (22. VIII) on the disproportionately high monthly redemption for loan frame 
agreement regarding omnibus account credit. Accordingly, once the fixed exchange rate 
application period was over, the monthly instalment rate of the omnibus account must not 
have exceeded 15% of the last instalment during the fixed exchange rate application period, 
at the same time the redemption of foreign exchange credits took place at the prevailing 
exchange rate. The duration of the omnibus account contract could exceed the original 
duration of foreign exchange credits by a maximum 30 years, however, it could not exceed 
75 years of age of the debtor. With this, the regulator meant to inform the client about the 
impact of the already significantly increased exchange rate, therefore keeping the burdens 
due to the instalments at an acceptable level.
The full scope of potential users was some 450,000. The number of entrants exceeded 
170,000. During the bank settlement of 2015, in case of clients with an exchange rate cap 
contract the financial institutions had to first credit the overpayment for the debt on the 
omnibus account, which strengthened the offset of future burdens. As a result of this, the 
majority of exchange rate cap contracts were terminated during the bank settlement. Out 
of the more than 170,000 contracts signed before 2015, less than 15,000 contracts remained 
and even with those a considerable reduction of remaining liabilities appeared.
Based on the Act on conversion into HUF that came into effect on 1 February 2015, the loans 
with an exchange rate cap were also converted into HUF. In the case of these contracts it had to 
be ensured that the instalment did not change until the original closing date of the exchange rate 
cap (for 60 months from its signing), and only increase by maximum 15% afterwards. However, 
in most cases the duration of the loan had to be extended for this. The burdens of debtors were 
further reduced by the fact that, in the period since the conversion into HUF, based on the general 
interest rate reduction and the provisions of the Fair Banking Act the interest rates of existing 
mortgage loans could be moderated, consequently the amount of instalments as well.
3. 6. Repayment of outstanding debts (early repayment)
The option to repay the outstanding debt in one lump sum at a discount rate was facilitated 
by Act CXXI of 2011 on the modification of certain laws related to home protection, which 
came into force on 29 September 2011. During the repayment of outstanding debts, the foreign 
exchange credits could be repaid at a discounted rate; in case of a loan in Swiss francs at HUF/
CHF 180, in the case of EUR at HUF/EUR 250, in the case of Japanese yen at HUF/JPY 2. Anyone 
could announce their wish to repay outstanding debts by 30 December 2011. The availability of 
the amount of early repayment had to be certified by 30 January 2012, and the loan had to be 
repaid by the latest on 28 February 2012. The primary target of early repayment was to reduce the 
amount of foreign exchange credits causing notable vulnerability in the country.
430 Lending in foreign currency from the regulator’s aspect
Nearly 170,000 debtors exercised the option of early repayment, and a total of HUF 1,355 
billion in foreign exchange credits was repaid. The discount resulted in HUF 370 billion 
savings for debtors. Thanks to the lower exchange rate, a debtor received an average of HUF 
2,176,000 discount. During the early repayment, HUF 313 billion loan was taken by the 
population, 25% of this was disbursed by cooperative banks. Early repayments in many cases 
took place in HUF loans. One third of early repayments was paid by replacement HUF loans.
Regarding the foreign exchange credits from the aspect of breakdown by foreign currency, the 
largest volume was the early repayment of Swiss franc loans. A total of 25.3% of these were paid 
in the entire financial sector. 92% of all early repayments resulted from the early bank repayment 
of CHF loans. 23.3% of Japanese yen loans were repaid. However, the volume here is considerably 
lower than in case of Swiss franc loans. The majority of EUR-based loans were disbursed after 
2008, above the HUF/EUR 250 exchange rate, so the majority of debtors were not eligible for 
early repayment. Accordingly, only 2.1% of loans were repaid under the program. The average 
amount of repaid loans was HUF 5.8 million at the fixed early repayment exchange rate.
On 30 September 2011, there were 750,000 mortgage foreign exchange credit debtors, 
whereas on 31 March 2012, there were only about 560,000. The volume of foreign exchange 
mortgages decreased from HUF 5,600 billion on 30 September 2011 to HUF 4,245 billion.
3. 7. Discounted conversion of default foreign exchange credits 
In the agreement signed by the Government with the Hungarian Banking Association 
on 15 December 2011, the members of the Hungarian Banking Association committed to 
convert the debt of foreign exchange mortgage debtors with over 90 days of default payment, 
reaching the amount of the minimum wage on 30 September 2011 into Forints. Furthermore, 
the banking sector also committed to simultaneously dismissing 25% of the debt, whereby 
supporting the situation of foreign exchange credit debtors, and by possibly making the 
credit redeemable again for the debtor. In the case of default obligations already cancelled 
outside the mandatory scope, certain banks enabled the conversion option on a voluntary 
basis, for which discounted conversion individuals could apply by 15 May 2012. In the case 
of compliance with the conditions stipulated by law, the financial institutions were obligated 
to convert all outstanding debts based on existing contracts by 31 August 2012. 
In the case of over 3,000 debtors, HUF 6.3 billion debt was released under the mandatory 
program. The rate of voluntary conversion (in the case of already terminated contracts) 
somewhat exceeded the volume of mandatorily converted contracts based on the estimates.
3. 8. National Asset Management
The National Asset Management Program aimed at helping the most socially deprived cre-
dit debtors, regardless of whether they took a foreign exchange or HUF loan. Nemzeti Esz-
közkezelő Zrt. (National Asset Management) purchased the real estate of the credit debtor 
at a discounted price, but the debtor could stay in the accommodation by paying a fair rental 
fee as a tenant, while the creditor dismissed the remaining amount of the mortgage credit. 
Act CLXX of 2011 on the housing of natural persons not able to fulfil their obligations 
derived from the credit agreements and regulating the operations of Nemzeti Eszközkezelő 
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Zrt. was passed by the Parliament on 31 December 2011. Only those persons were entitled to 
utilise the National Asset Management based on the regulation approved in December 2011, 
who receive an active-age provision and have at least two children. 
The Government entered an agreement with the Banking Association on 15 December 
2011, to initiate the modification of the Act in order to make the National Asset Management 
purchase the residential property of mortgage credit debtors even if they only raise one child in 
the household. Moreover, the Government committed to increase the number of apartments 
to be purchased from the previously planned five thousand to twenty-five thousand.
Helping those in need was a priority question, but at the same time the aspects of social 
fairness and the budget also had to be considered. Therefore, the establishment of the social 
criteria system became necessary by the regulator. The social conditions regarding the 
National Asset Management were specified by Government Decree No. 128/2012 on certain 
rules in connection with the operations of Nemzeti Eszközkezelő Zrt. (26. VI).
Based on this Decree, instead of the previous two children, which made people eligible for 
the family subsidy, now only one child was enough to be eligible for the program. The decree 
included people receiving housing maintenance support and also nursing fee into the scope 
of eligible persons. Thanks to the changes in legislation, the program has gained momen-
tum since September 2012.
At the same time of signing the sales contract, the Nemzeti Eszközkezelő Zrt. signed an 
unlimited rental contract with the previous credit debtor. The amount of the rental fee is 
regulated by Government Decree No. 128/2012. (26. VI), which must not be deviated from. 
According to the Decree, the basis of the payable rent is 1.5% of the residential property’s 
market value established upon taking the credit. This amount is paid by the tenant by 
dividing it into 12 months, in equal monthly amounts. By taking an example of a property 
with a market value of HUF 15 million, the rent is HUF 18,750 per month. In case of property 
with a market value of HUF 10 million, the monthly rent is only HUF 12,500. The rent can 
be increased at a rate equal to the previous year’s consumer price index.
In excess of the purchase price paid by Nemzeti Eszközkezelő Zrt., the credit debtor had 
no remaining debt towards the financial institutions, and the remaining part of the debt was 
dismissed. Therefore, the debtor could get rid of the debt under organised circumstances 
and housing also remained secured. The Act also disposes of the right of re-purchasing: the 
ex-debtor may re-purchase the apartment, if his/her financial situation changes favourably. 
From 1 January 2013, with the modification of the Government Decree of December 2012 
on the above mentioned socially deprived-based conditions, pension beneficiaries with own 
entitlement, as well as participants in the public works scheme could also join, if they satisfied 
the conditions regarding the credit agreement and the property. The legal environment and 
the prescribed system of conditions were modified several times depending on the status of 
utilisation, to ensure that the program provides support for as many deprived families as 
possible based on the opportunities. 
The program, which was previously planned for three years by purchasing 25,000 
apartments until the end of 2014, was extended. In the framework of the extended program, 
36,000 properties were involved until the end of 2018.
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4. Regulatory steps regarding lending in foreign currency – 
closing measures
In the case of all previous measures, the necessity for cooperation appeared, i.e. the debtor’s 
understanding was also needed to make the measure successful. The number of participants 
in the program was considerable until the end of 2014, however it was still not full-scope. 
Hence, the final solution in this respect was also represented by settlement and the conversion 
into Forints. 
The matrix supports the existence of the notable scope of concerned people, and the scale 
of the problem by presenting figures from the autumn of 2014. 
Matrix: The volume and number of residential loans (September 2014)
 Foreign exchange credits HUF credits
Volume 
(million HUF)
Number of 
contacts (pcs)
Volume 
(million HUF)
Number of 
contacts (pcs)
Housing loan 1,743,362 206,361 1,505,219 501,612
Home equity loan 1,583,004 256,204 440,112 158,026
Vehicle loan 154,731 112,841 82,582 93,961
Personal loan 28,882 68,307 263,595 614,309
Total 3,509,979 643,713 2,291,508 1,367,908
Remark: the banking 
system and branches.
Source: Hungarian National Bank
4. 1. The derecognition of foreign exchange credits and bank settlement in 2015 
The decision of the Curia of June 2014 provided legal opportunity for the comprehensive 
settlement of the problem. Based on the legal unit decision of the Curia (2/2014 Civil Law 
Decision), the exchange rate risk encumbers the debtor as a main rule. The unfairness of 
this provision can only be examined and established, if the contents of the contract for the 
generally informed, reasonably attentive and prudent average consumer (hereinafter referred 
to as consumer) upon signing the contract – considering the text of the contract and the 
information received from the financial institution – was not clear and understandable. If 
due to the insufficient information from the financial institution or the lack of information, 
the consumer could justifiably think that the exchange rate risk is unreal, or only concerns 
him/her to a limited degree, the provision of the contract regarding the exchange rate risk 
is unfair, consequently the contract is partially or completely invalid. Due to their nature, 
these questions cannot be clarified by the legislator, but through judicial channels.
At the same time, the Curia rated the different exchange rates applied upon disbursement 
and redemption as unfair, the same as the contractual provisions facilitating unilateral 
contract modification, if they did not meet certain basic principles (e.g.: clear wording, 
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objectivity, transparency). The Act based on the Curia’s decision, passed in July 20142, 
stipulated the nullity of the contractual obligation specifying the application of the exchange 
rate gap and established presumption for the unfairness of unilateral contract modification-
related terms. The courts could make a decision about presumption in civil proceedings.
During 2015, the banks had to settle with their clients, who took foreign exchange credits, 
about repaying the overpayment due to unfair exchange rate gap and unilateral contract 
modification. This resulted in a considerable reduction of burden for households, which also 
appeared in the decreased instalment amount. The debtors’ remaining capital debt decreased 
and also the monthly instalment obligation by an average of 25%. The instalment obligation 
of clients was further reduced by the fact that, with all credit agreements impacted by the 
settlement, fair interest rates had to be reinstated from 1 February 2015, which typically 
equalled the interest rate that was applied upon signing the contract.
Further support was provided by the conversion into Forints. The act on the regulation 
of conversion into Forints, which came into effect on 1 February 20153, guaranteed the 
conversion into Forints of housing and home equity mortgage credits. The credit of nearly 
half a million debtors was converted by the banks. In accordance with the decision of the 
Curia, the conversion took place at the market exchange rate. To avoid speculation, the 
applicable exchange rates during conversion were fixed on 7 November 2014: HUF/CHF 
256.47 (the average of the period since the Curia decision of 16 June), HUF/EUR 309.97 and 
HUF/JPY 2.163 (the official MNB exchange rate as of 7 November). The conversion into 
Forints protected the population from significant additional burden, since the conversion 
was on a fixed exchange rate in November 2014, while from the beginning of 2015, the HUF/
CHF exchange rate considerably increased. The settlement and the conversion into Forints 
occurred simultaneously.
The appreciation of the Swiss franc in January 2015 also notably increased the burdens of 
debtors having foreign exchange vehicle credit. Following the conversion of foreign exchange 
mortgage credits into Forint, the Government looked for a solution for the conversion of 
consumer loans into Forint as well. The Parliament passed the act regulating the conversion 
of foreign exchange vehicle and consumer credits on 22 September 20154, which impacted 
some 200,000 contracts. The burden due to the difference between the exchange rates applied 
in November 2014 and August 2015 for mortgage credits were assumed 50−50% (HUF 15 
billion each) by the banks and the Government from clients. Based on the impact of the 
measure, clients could sense an instalment reduction of 10% to 11% with the redemption of 
contracts, and one of the most important elements was that the debtors could get rid of the 
exchange rate fluctuation and the unreliable monthly instalments. 
Thanks to the above measures, the retail foreign exchange credits were basically 
derecognised by the end of 2015.
2 Act XXXVIII of 2014
3 Act LXXVII of 2014
4 Act CXLV of 2015
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5. Summary
The given economic environment, the emerging demand and the covering supply can be 
recognised in the forming and mass spreading of foreign exchange lending. During such a 
process, the regulator is responsible for acting proactively, then reactively, if it is insufficient. 
The principle of regulation is realised along consumer protection, thus offsetting the 
information and knowledge asymmetry between the institution and the individual taking 
the loan.
Regardless, during the history of foreign exchange credits, it was clearly proven that one 
of the pre-requisites of the success of regulatory steps is the ability to accept, i.e. whether 
the concerned scope of clients react to a step in large numbers, exercise the opportunity, or 
participate in the supporting program.
During the presented period, numerous regulatory steps were taken. The success of 
regulatory steps was growing, as the impact of the economic processes in the instalments 
informed the clients about the trend and the negative process, basically made them act. The 
sturdiness of regulatory steps also strengthened over time, while the scale of the problem 
rose to a level, where it did not only appear as a problem for the concerned parties, but the 
considerable amount of outsourced foreign exchange also increased the vulnerability of the 
entire economy. The final step was enabled in this period by the decision of the Curia, the 
regulatory steps taken as a consequence of which basically concluded the vulnerability of the 
population, the financial sector and the government due to foreign exchange credits.
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APPENDICES
ACT XXXVIII OF 2014
on settling certain issues relating to the uniformity decision of the 
Curia in respect of consumer loan contracts entered into with financial 
institutions
The National Assembly, in order to satisfy certain requirements derived from the civil law 
uniformity decision No. 2/2014 of the Curia and to prepare further measures, adopts the 
following Act:
1. General provisions
Section 1 (1) The scope of this Act shall cover consumer loan contracts concluded in the 
period between 1 May 2004 and the day of the entry into force of this Act. For the purposes 
of this Act, consumer loan contracts are credit or loan contracts or financial lease contracts, 
established between a financial institution and a consumer, based on foreign exchange 
(registered in foreign currency or disbursed in foreign currency and repaid in forints) or on 
forint, if a standard contract term or a contract term not negotiated individually, containing 
a clause under section 3 (1) or section 4 (1) became part of it.
(1a) For the purposes of this Act, consumer loan contracts mean, in addition to those 
specified under paragraph (1), foreign exchange credit or loan contracts or financial lease 
contracts, established between a financial institution and a consumer, not considered 
as based on foreign exchange, if concluded in the period between the dates referred to in 
paragraph (1), and a standard contract term or a contract term not negotiated individually, 
containing a clause under section 4 (1) became part of it.
(2) The scope of this Act shall not cover:
a) loan contracts linked to a credit card or payment account and
b) forint-based housing loan contracts with interest subsidy provided by the State.
(3) With respect to consumer loan contracts effective on the day of the entry into force of 
this Act, the obligations and rights specified in this Act shall be imposed upon or be due to 
the financial institution which is, on the day of the entry into force of this Act, the holder 
of the claim originating from the consumer loan contract. If, on the day of the entry into 
force of this Act, the claim originating from the consumer loan contract are not due to any 
financial institution, the obligations and rights specified in this Act shall be imposed upon 
or be due to the financial institution from which the non-financial institution acquired the 
claim. If the consumer loan contract terminated before the day of the entry into force of this 
Act, the obligations and rights shall be imposed upon or be due to the financial institution 
which was the holder of the claim on the day when the contract terminated. If, upon the 
termination of the contract the holder of the claim was not a financial institution, the 
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obligations and rights specified in this Act shall be imposed upon or be due to the financial 
institution from which the non-financial institution acquired the claim.
(4) If the financial institution is being wound up or liquidated, the obligations specified 
in this Act shall be imposed upon the administrator or the liquidator. The liquidator’s final 
statement of accounts, or regarding winding-up, the financial report covering the period 
of the winding-up may be drawn up if the settlement obligations specified in this Act and 
in a separate Act have been complied with. As regards settlements in procedures specified 
by a separate Act, consumers’ claims and the reimbursement claim due to the National 
Asset Management Company shall be registered and confirmed by the liquidator or the 
administrator as acknowledged claims, without a separate announcement by the creditor. If, 
in respect of a settlement obligation or related to it, a review procedure or an action specified 
in a separate Act is launched, within sixty days after the completion of the proceedings as 
specified in a separate Act, the creditors’ claims established on the basis of such proceedings 
shall be registered and the parties concerned shall be sent a confirmation of it.
(5) For the purpose of implementing this Act, the financial institutions that are involved in the 
change in the position of creditor in the consumer loan contract shall be obliged to cooperate. 
Under the obligation to cooperate, the financial institution which is the former creditor shall 
provide the data necessary to comply with this Act to the financial institution specified under 
paragraph (3). In this context, the provisions relating to banking secrecy as laid down in a 
separate Act shall not apply to financial institutions in their relationships with one another.
(6) The provisions of Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code concerning the statute of limitation 
shall be interpreted regarding claims originating from consumer loan contracts as claims 
that do not expire during the existence of the loan contract, and the limitation period shall 
commence when the contract terminates.
(7) The limitation period of the claim under paragraph (6) shall be suspended from the 
day of the entry into force of this Act until the date specified in a separate Act referred to in 
sections 3 (5) and 4 (3).
(7a) Where the claim originates from a consumer loan contract under paragraph (1a), 
the limitation period of the claim under paragraph (6) shall be suspended from the day of 
the entry into force of this provision until the date specified in a separate Act referred to in 
sections 3 (5) and 4 (3).
2. Interpretative provisions
Section 2 For the purposes of this Act:
1. consumer means a consumer as defined in point 28 of section 6 (1) of Act CCXXXVII of 
2013 on credit institutions and financial undertakings (hereinafter the “Hpt.”),
2. financial institution means a financial institution as defined in section 7 (1) of the Hpt.,
3. financial lease contract means a contract complying with the conditions specified in 
point 89 of section 6 (1) of the Hpt.
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3. Settling the exchange rate margin
Section 3 (1) In the consumer loan contract, with the exception of the individually 
negotiated contract term, the clause under which the financial institution applies the buying 
rate when disbursing the financing for the purchase of the borrowed or leased object, while 
for the repayment of the debt it applies the selling rate or an exchange rate other than the 
exchange rate specified when the disbursement was made shall be null and void.
(2) With the exception specified in paragraph (3), the clause qualified as null and void 
under paragraph (1) shall be replaced by a provision prescribing the application of the official 
foreign exchange rate of the Hungarian National Bank, both in terms of disbursement 
and repayment (including the payment of the instalment and any cost, fee or commission 
denominated in foreign currency).
(3) With respect to contracts specified in section 200/A of Act CXII of 1996 on cre-
dit institutions and financial undertakings or in section 267 of the Hpt. if, under those 
provisions, a provision on the application of the foreign exchange rate as indicated in those 
provisions became part of the contract, or the parties proceeded accordingly in the course of 
repayment, the prescription laid down in paragraph (2) concerning the foreign exchange rate 
shall only apply to disbursement in respect of these contracts and the period of repayment 
affected by these provisions.
(4)
(5) The financial institution shall be obliged to make a settlement with the consumer as 
specified in a separate Act.
(6)
4. Settling contract clauses providing the opportunity 
to amend the contract unilaterally
Section 4 (1) With respect to consumer loan contracts providing the opportunity to amend 
the contract unilaterally,  contract clauses, with the exception of individually negotiated 
terms, allowing the unilateral increase of interest, cost or fee shall be presumed unfair given 
that it do not comply with the following principles:
a) the principle of clear and intelligible drafting: its content is not clear and comprehensible 
for the consumer;
b) the principle of taxonomic definition: the conditions of the unilateral amendment of the 
contract are not defined taxonomically, that is the list of grounds is missing or there is a list 
of grounds, but it is not exhaustive;
c) the principle of objectivity: the conditions of unilateral amendment are not objective, 
therefore the party entering into a contract with the consumer has the means to induce 
the occurrence of the condition and to contribute to that and to influence the extent of the 
change which gives rise to the amendment;
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d) the principle of factuality and proportionality: the circumstances specified in the 
list of grounds do not actually affect the interest, the cost or the fee, or their impact is not 
proportionate with the extent to which circumstances have changed;
e) the principle of transparency: the consumer could not foresee under what conditions 
and to what extent he can be imposed upon further burdens;
f) the principle of terminability: the consumer is not granted the right to terminate the 
contract for the event of an amendment, or
g) the principle of symmetry: it excludes that changes which are to the consumer’s 
advantage be exploited to the consumer’s benefit.
(2) The contract clause under paragraph (1) shall be null and void if the financial institution 
failed to initiate civil proceedings within the time limit specified under section 8 (1) or the 
court dismisses the action or terminates the proceedings, except if a proceedings can be 
launched pursuant to section 6 (2) in respect of the contract clause, but the proceedings were 
not launched or the proceedings were launched but the court did not establish the nullity of 
the contract clause according to paragraph (2a).
(2a) The contract clause referred to in paragraph (1) shall be null and void if its nullity was 
established by the court in the proceeding initiated by means of an action in the public inte-
rest by the Supervising Authority pursuant to a separate Act on settlement.
(3) In cases referred to in paragraphs (2) and (2a), the financial institution shall be obliged 
to make the settlement with the consumer in the manner defined in a separate Act.
5. Standard contract terms and contract terms not 
negotiated individually and providing data in respect 
of these terms
Section 5 (1) The financial institution shall, within thirty days after the entry into force of 
this Act, examine the standard contract terms and contract terms not negotiated individually 
becoming part of the consumer loan contract (hereinafter jointly “SCT”), which contain the 
clause providing for the opportunity to amend the contract unilaterally.
(2) The financial institution shall, within thirty days after the entry into force of this Act, 
notify the Hungarian National Bank acting in its functions of supervision and consumer 
protection (hereinafter "Supervising Authority") of all the SCTs that contains a contract 
clause under paragraph (1) and shall make a statement as to whether or not it considers 
the contract clause contained therein fair or unfair. The statement to be submitted to the 
Supervising Authority shall be accompanied by the identification number of the contracts 
affected by the contract clauses and the amount of outstanding claims originating from the 
contract concerned.
(3) The financial institutions shall examine, until 30 November 2014, the SCTs becoming 
part of consumer loan contracts under section 1 (1a), which contain a contract clause 
providing for the opportunity to amend the contract unilaterally.
(4) The financial institution shall notify the Supervising Authority, until 30 November 
2014, of all the SCTs which contain contract clauses specified under paragraph (3), and 
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shall make a statement as to whether or not it considers the contract clauses contained 
therein fair or unfair; furthermore the financial institution shall make a statement as to 
whether a unilateral amendment of the contract led to the increase of interest, fee or costs. 
The statement to be submitted to the Supervising Authority shall be accompanied by the 
identification number of the contract affected by the contract clauses and the amount of 
outstanding claims originating from the contract concerned.
Section 6 (1) If the financial institution, in the course of the examination, establishes 
that any of the SCTs it applies contains a contract clause which, pursuant to the provision 
under section 4 (1), should be presumed unfair, but the financial institution is of the opinion 
that the contract clause is fair, unless otherwise specified in paragraph (2), it may initiate 
civil proceedings in accordance with the provisions in subtitle 6 for the rebuttal of the 
presumption.
(2) Regarding forint-based consumer loan contracts or consumer loan contracts under 
section 1(1a), the unfairness of SCTs published after 26 November 2010 or the amendments 
of SCTs that were published after 26 November 2010 shall not be presumed unfair pursuant 
to the provision under section 4 (1). The Supervising Authority may carry out the procedures 
under Act CXXXIX of 2013 on the Hungarian National Bank, and between 14 February 
and 30 April 2015, initiate legal proceedings by means of an action in the public interest 
ex officio. The proceedings launched by means of an action in the public interest shall be 
governed by the provisions of the Act on the rules of settlement regulated in Act XXXVIII 
of 2014 on settling certain issues relating to the uniformity decision of the Curia in respect 
of the consumer loan contracts entered into with financial institutions and on certain other 
provisions.
6. Civil proceedings
Section 7 (1) To civil proceedings under this subtitle the provisions of Act III of 1952 on 
civil procedure (hereinafter "Pp.") shall apply subject to the derogations laid down in this 
subtitle.
(2) In the civil proceedings, the defendant shall be the Hungarian State, section 3:405 (2) 
of Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code shall apply to its representation.
(3) Legal representation shall be mandatory in the civil proceedings.
(4) The court shall proceed with priority in the civil proceedings.
(5) The writ of summons and the other judicial documents in the proceedings shall be 
served by an employee of the court. The employee of the court shall serve the documents on 
working days between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. The parties shall ensure that the persons entitled 
to receive the writ of summons and other court documents are available to be served with 
such documents in that period. The court employee serving documents shall make a note of 
the service of documents, which shall in all cases contain the name of the court, the date of 
the service of the court document (year, month, day, hour and minute), the number of the 
court case and the signature of the court employee. If the service was successful, the note 
shall contain the signature of the person on whom the documents were served as well. If the 
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person entitled to receive the documents refused to receive the documents, this fact should 
also be referred to in the note. If the service of the documents is unsuccessful at the first 
attempt because the person entitled to receive the documents did not receive the document, 
the note shall also refer to this fact. If the person entitled to receive the document did not 
receive the writ of summons and all the other court documents, the court employee serving 
documents shall make a second attempt to serve the documents not earlier than at least one 
hour after the first delivery and the rules of the first delivery shall apply to that delivery. If 
the person entitled to receive the documents refused to receive the documents, the writ of 
summons and other court documents shall be considered as served on the day when servi-
ce was done. If the person entitled to receive the documents does not receive the document, 
the writ of summons and the other court documents shall be deemed as served on the day 
following the second service attempt. No request for the rebuttal of the presumption of ser-
vice may be submitted.
(6) In the proceeding, the court shall not be required to inform the parties of the facts to 
be proved in order that be capable of adjudication, the burden of proof and the consequences 
of unsuccessful evidencing in advance.
(7) The following shall not be possible in the legal proceedings:
a) intervening,
b) amending the action,
c) counterclaim,
d) staying,
e) application of section 104/A (1) of the Pp.,
f) application of section 121/A (1) to (3) of the Pp.,
g) issuing a default judgement,
h) remedy of deficiencies,
i) cross-appeal and cross review application,
j) application of Chapter XXVIII of Pp.,
k) retrial.
Section 8 (1) The financial institution’s statement of claim initiating the civil proceedings 
under section 6 shall arrive at the court 
a) within thirty days after the entry into force of this Act if the SCT clause subjected to the 
civil proceedings was applied to a foreign exchange-based credit or loan contract (registered 
in foreign currency or disbursed in foreign currency and repaid in forints) or financial lease 
contract,
b) between 5 and 12 January 2015 if the SCT clause subjected to the civil proceeding was 
applied to a HUF-based credit or loan contract, financial lease contract on 26 November 
2010 or before that,
c) between 5 and 12 January 2015 if the SCT clause subjected to the civil proceeding was 
applied to a consumer loan contract specified in section 1 (1a) on 26 November 2010 or 
before that;
the time limit shall be deemed as term of preclusion.
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(1a) If the statement of claim, in cases under paragraph (1) b) or c), was received by the 
court before 5 January 2015, it shall not be rejected on this ground, but shall be deemed as 
submitted on 5 January 2015.
(2) No excuse may be submitted for the failure to respect the time limit specified in 
paragraph (1).
(3) The financial institution shall, with the derogation specified in paragraph (3a), request, 
in the same statement of claim, the establishment of the validity of all the contract clauses 
under section 4 (1) of the SCTs the financial institution applies. In the statement of claim, 
the financial institution shall specify the period during which it applied the contract clause.
(3a) The financial institution shall, in the same statement of claim, request the 
establishment of the validity of all the contract clauses under section 4 (1) of the SCTs the 
financial institution applies, regarding which the statement of claim shall be received by the 
court between 5 and 12 January 2015. In the statement of claim, the financial institution 
shall also specify the period during which it applied the contract clause.
(4) In the statement of claim, the financial institution may request only the establishment 
of what is specified in section 11 (3).
(5) In addition to what is specified in section 121 (2) and (3) of the Pp., the extract of STCs, 
under paragraph (3), included in the same deed containing only those contract clauses that 
are subject of the request for the establishment of validity, and specifying the period during 
which the financial institution applied those, shall be attached to the statement of claim. 
In the extract, in addition to individual contract terms, the facts and evidences which, 
according to the financial institution, give grounds for what is included in the statement 
of claim. Furthermore, an electronic medium containing the statement of claim and its 
attachments in an editable format, edited by means of an IT tool shall be attached to the 
statement of claim.
(6) If the statement of claim is rejected pursuant to section 130 of Pp., the legal effects 
pertaining to the submission of a statement of claim will prevail if the plaintiff duly resubmits 
the statement of claim within five days from the rejection becoming final and binding.
(7) The court fee of the first instance civil proceeding shall amount to HUF 1,500,000.
Section 9 (1) The proceeding shall fall under the exclusive material and territorial 
jurisdiction of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court.
(2) The court of first instance, if it is justified by the complexity of the proceeding, may 
order, prior to the commencement of the hearing, that in the proceedings a panel consisting 
of three professional judges proceed. If the court referred the proceeding to a panel, later no 
single judge may proceed in the proceedings.
(3) The court shall adjudicate the action within thirty days.
Section 10 (1) The date of the hearing shall be set in a way to make it possible for the 
statement of claim to be served on the defendant at least three days before the hearing.
(2) The date of the hearing shall be set no later than on the eighth day after the statement 
of claim was received by the court.
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(3) Only such evidence that is available at the hearing and that might be suitable to prove 
the allegations presented in the statement of claim or justify the defence of the defendant 
may be taken. Evidence which is offered by the parties promptly may also be taken.
(4) The hearing may only be postponed, once, for no more than seven days, and only if it is 
necessary in order to carry out the taking of evidence offered by the parties.
(5) If the party or his representative fails to appear at the hearing for reasons beyond their 
control but submits an application for excuse, the application may be submitted on the first 
working day following the date missed at the latest. The person submitting the application 
for excuse may appeal the order rejecting the application for excuse within three days. The 
court shall refer the appeal to the court of second instance within one working day, without 
obtaining the comments of the counterparty of the party submitting the appeal. The court 
of second instance shall decide upon the appeal within three days of its referral.
(6) The court, in cases under section 8 (1) b) and c), shall examine the statement of claim 
within thirty days from its arrival and decide whether to reject it without issuing a writ of 
summons or set the date of a hearing. If the court does not reject the statement of claim 
without issuing a writ of summons, the time limit specified in section 9 (3) shall commence 
on the date when the date of the hearing is set.
Section 11 (1) In the proceeding, the court shall examine only whether the contract clause 
considered fair by the financial institution is fair in view of section 4 (1).
(2) If the court establishes that the contract clause considered fair by the financial 
institution does not comply with any of the conditions specified in section 4 (1) and therefore 
is unfair, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(3) If the court establishes that the contract clause considered fair by the financial 
institution complies with all conditions specified in section 4 (1), it shall establish that the 
contract term is fair and therefore valid.
Section 12 (1) The court may postpone the announcement of the judgment for no more 
than fifteen days.
(2) The decision of first instance, except if its announcement was postponed by the court, 
shall be committed to writing no later than within eight days from the time when it was 
taken and shall be served within three days of it being committed to writing. If the court has 
postponed the announcement of the judgment, the court shall promptly serve the written 
judgment on the parties present when the announcement is made and this fact shall also be 
included in the minutes, and parties not present shall be served with it within three days.
Section 13 (1) The time limit for appeal is eight days from the time when the decision is 
communicated.
(2) The court fee for the appeal against the judgement shall amount to HUF 2,500,000.
(3) If the appeal does not comply with the provisions of the Pp., or the applicant failed to 
comply with the obligation to pay the court fee, the court shall dismiss the appeal without 
calling upon the party to remedy the deficiencies. If there is no ground for dismissal and the 
time limit for appeal has expired in respect of all parties, or if app parties submitted their 
appeal without deficiencies, the court of first instance shall refer it to the court of second 
instance together with all the documents relating to the case no later than within three days.
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(4) The court shall adjudicate the appeal within thirty days from its referral set out in 
paragraph (3).
(5) The hearing date shall be set in a way which makes it possible for the appeal to be 
served on the opposing party at least three days before the day of the hearing. The appeal 
against the decision shall be adjudicated by the court at a hearing.
(6) The court shall set the hearing date no later than on the fifteenth day from the date 
when the documents arrive at the court of second instance.
(7) The counter appeal shall be submitted to the court of second instance at the hearing at 
the latest. The hearing may be postponed once, for no more than seven days.
Section 14 (1) The decision bringing the second instance proceeding to an end, shall be 
committed to writing not later than within eight days from the time when it was taken, except 
if the court has postponed its announcement. The decision bringing the proceedings of second 
instance to an end shall be served on the parties by the court of second instance within three 
days. The court of second instance shall return the documents to the court of first instance if 
no review application was submitted against the judgement. If the court of second instance set 
aside the decision taken by the court of first instance, the court of second instance shall send 
the documents to the court of first instance after the completion of the proceedings of second 
instance not later than within three days after the decision was committed to writing.
(2) If the court of second instance postponed the announcement of the judgment, judgment 
already committed to writing shall be served on the parties present and shall include this 
fact in the minutes.
Section 15 (1) The review application shall be submitted to the court of second instance 
having taken the decision within eight days from the date when the decision was 
communicated, or it shall be sent, in two more copies than the number of parties concerned 
in the action, by post in a registered mail.
(2) The court fee for the review of the judgment shall amount to HUF 3,500,000.
(3) If the time limit open for submitting the review application has expired for all parties 
or all the parties submitted review application, the court of second instance shall refer the 
application together with the documents of the case to the Curia without delay, but not later 
than within three days.
(4) The Curia shall carry out the review procedure within thirty days from the referral 
specified in paragraph (3).
(5) The Curia, except if deeming it necessary to adjudge the review application at a 
hearing, shall adjudicate the review application outside a hearing. The Curia, if it deems 
the adjudication of the review application necessary at a hearing, shall set the hearing date 
not later than the eighth day after the documents have been received by it. The hearing date 
shall be set in a way which makes it possible for the review application to be served on the 
opposing party at least three days before the day of the hearing.
(6) The decision bringing the review procedure to an end, except if the Curia has postponed 
its announcement, shall be committed to writing not later than within eight days from the 
date when it was taken, and served upon the parties by the Curia within three days. The 
Curia, if ordering the court of first or second instance to carry out a new procedure and 
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take a new decision, shall send the documents to the court within three days after it was 
committed to writing. If the Curia has postponed the announcement of the judgment, it 
shall promptly serve its judgment having already been committed to writing on the parties 
present and shall include this fact in the minutes as well.
7. Managing pending actions
Section 16 (1) The court, until the measure specified in a separate Act, but until not later 
than 31 December 2014, shall ex officio suspend, with the exception of proceedings initiated 
by an action in the public interest set out in section 6 (2) and proceedings regulated in subtitle 
6,proceedings the subject of which, in part or in full, is a contract clause specified under 
section 3 (1) or section 4 (1), or proceedings initiated by the financial institution against 
the consumer in order to enforce a claim originating from such a contract term. The court 
may also decide upon suspension without a hearing. Section 155 of the Pp. shall accordingly 
apply to the suspension of proceedings with the proviso that the court decision suspending 
the proceedings may not be appealed.
(2) The court, until the measure specified in a separate Act, but not later than 31 Decem-
ber 2015 shall ex officio suspend the action, with the exception of proceedings initiated by an 
action in the public interest under section 6 (2) and proceedings regulated in subtitle 6, the 
subject of which, in part or in full, is a contract clause specified under 4 (1) or a proceedings 
which was initiated by the financial institution against a consumer in order to enforce a 
claim which originates from such a contract clause, if the contract clause specified in section 
4 (1) is included in the consumer loan contract specified in section 1 (1a). The rules specified 
in paragraph (1) shall apply to suspension.
8. Derogating from the rules of Act LIII of 1994 on 
judicial enforcement
Section 17 (1) The provisions of the Act LIII of 1994 on judicial enforcement (hereinafter 
"Vht.") shall be applied subject to the derogations laid down in this section.
(2) For the purposes of this section, loan contracts mean a foreign exchange or HUF-based 
credit or loan contract, financial lease contract concluded between the financial institution 
and the consumer as a debtor or co-debtor.
(2a) For the purposes of this section, in addition to paragraph (2), loan contract means a 
foreign exchange credit or loan contract not considered as foreign exchange-based contract 
and financial lease contract concluded by the financial institution and the consumer as a 
debtor or co-debtor.
(3) In pending enforcement proceedings initiated for the collection of claims that are 
based on a loan contract (or initiated upon the creditor joining the enforcement procedure 
in order to enforce a claim originating from a loan contract), with the exceptions specified in 
paragraphs (4), (7), (8) and (10), no procedural action or measure may be taken until the date 
specified in the separate Act, the statements made by parties and other interested parties 
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shall also be ineffective; until this date, all time limits shall be suspended and after that date 
all time limit shall commences again. If there has been no procedural action or measures 
pursuant to this Act, the case shall be registered by the bailiff as a staying case.
(4) If the asset identified as coverage for the claim subject to the loan contract (hereinafter 
in this section "asset defined as coverage") was sold, before the entry into force of this Act,
a) in an auction held in a judicial enforcement proceeding, through the taking over by the 
party requesting the enforcement, or through sale other than an auction but with the effects 
of an auction, or
b) outside judicial enforcement,
in the pending judicial enforcement related to this asset defined as coverage, the legal remedy 
relating to the sale of the asset defined as coverage, and the procedural actions relating to the 
vacation or giving into possession of the asset defined as coverage, shall be taken by the bailiff 
in consideration of the provisions in section 303 of the Vht., and those may also be initiated by 
the parties and other interested parties participating in the enforcement.
(5) If enforcement was initiated against the debtor in addition to the enforcement of the 
claim specified in paragraph (3) [or commenced upon the creditor joining the enforcement 
procedure in addition to the enforcement of the claim specified in paragraph 3], in these 
enforcement proceedings, until the date specified in the separate Act, with the exception of 
the seizure of the asset and with the exception of procedural actions specified in paragraph 
(4), no measures or procedural actions may be taken with respect to the asset defined as 
coverage.
(6) The provisions of this section shall apply to those enforcement proceedings in which
a) the subject of the enforcement procedure is the enforcement of a pledge contract 
securing the claim originating from the loan contract or a declaration of suretyship,
b) the party requesting the enforcement or the debtor is the legal successor of a party to the 
loan contract or the contract securing the claim originating from the loan contract.
(7) The party requesting the enforcement and the debtor may request the establishment 
of the absence of a contract clause specified in section 3 (1) or section 4 (1) from the loan 
contract. be established. The request or application shall be submitted to the bailiff who, for the 
purposes of adjudication, shall refer that together with the documents of the case to the court 
carrying out the enforcement. The application shall be adjudicated by the court carrying out 
the enforcement according to the rules concerning the adjudication of enforcement objections.
(8) If establishing that the loan contract does not contain the contract clause specified 
under section 3 (1) or section 4 (1), the court carrying out the enforcement shall decide, in 
an order, that, upon its becoming final and binding, paragraphs (3) - (6) cannot be applied 
and the procedural actions and measures may be carried out; suspended time limits shall 
commence again after the order has become final and binding.
(9) If, on the day of the entry into force of this Act, the enforcement procedure initiated to 
collect the claim originating from the loan contract is staying because
a) the debtor was granted instalment payment, or
b) the employer (the organ disbursing the remuneration) confirmed that the deduction 
was registered and taking other measures is neither possible or necessary,
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the debtor may request the bailiff that paragraph (3) be applied.
(10) The provisions of this Act shall not prevent:
a) the debtor from paying the amount of the claim, or
b) that the termination or reduction of the claim be announced, or procedural actions or 
measures linked to the termination or reduction of the claim be taken,
c) that enforcement be ordered (the application for joining the enforcement proceedings 
be decided upon) regarding loan contacts, or procedural actions or statements related to 
ordering enforcement (to assessing the application for joining the enforcement proceedings) 
be made.
9. Derogating from the rules of the Government 
Decree on the sale of pledged liens outside judicial 
enforcement
Section 18 (1) The provisions of Government Decree 12/2003 (I. 30.) Korm. on the rules of 
the sale of pledged lien outside judicial enforcement and Government Decree 66/2014 (III. 
13.) Korm. on the detailed procedural rules on enforcing lien outside judicial enforcement 
and the suspension and limitation of exercising the right to satisfaction shall apply subject 
to derogations laid down in this section.
(2) Up until the date specified in the separate Act, pledged items securing, upon lien, 
claims originating from consumer loan contracts shall not be sold, by applying sections 257 
to 258 of Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code and sections 5:127 to 5:135 of Act V of 2013 on the 
Civil Code, and an auction notice may only be published on the Electronic Auction Surface 
following this date.
10. Final and transitional provisions
Section 19 (1) Subject to the derogation specified in paragraph (2), this Act shall enter into 
force on the day following its promulgation.
(2) Sections 1 to 18 shall enter into force on the eighth day following the promulgation.
Section 20 The financial institution shall not have the right to unilaterally increase the 
interest, cost or fee regarding consumer loan contracts as of the day when this Act enters 
into until the competent court establishes the fairness of the SCT concerned, irrespective of 
whether the financial institution has published a notice concerning a unilateral increase of 
interest, cost or fee pursuant to section 279 (8) of the Hpt.
Section 21 If the financial institution published, pursuant to section 279 (8) of the Hpt., 
the notice on unilateral increase of interest, cost or fee before 17 June 2014. and the planned 
unilateral increase of interest, cost or fee included therein took effect after 16 June 2014 but 
not later than on the day of the entry into force of this Act, and
a) no repayment was made after the amendment, the financial institution shall not enforce 
the amendment regarding the instalment to be paid and shall withdraw the notice;
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b) repayment was made after the amendment, the instalment increased due to the 
amendment shall be credited to the account of the client on the third working day following 
the entry into force of this Act and the notice shall be withdrawn.
Section 22 (1) If the application for enforcement (for adjudicating the application for 
joining the enforcement procedure) regarding a loan contract under section 17 (2) was 
submitted after 26 July 2014 and the enforcement was not ordered until 15 October 2014 
(the application for joining the enforcement procedure was not adjudicated), enforcement 
(adjudication of the application for joining the enforcement procedure) shall be ordered 
until 15 December 2014.
(2) Regarding loan contracts specified in section 1(2) of this Act provided for by Act XL of 
2014 on the rules of settlement regulated in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on settling certain issues 
relating to the uniformity decision of the Curia in respect of the consumer loan contracts 
entered into with financial institutions, and certain other provisions (hereinafter the 
“Amending Act”), proceedings suspended pursuant to section 16, at the request of the party, 
shall be continued; the court shall arrange for continuing the proceeding within thirty days 
from receiving the application.
(3) Regarding loan contracts specified in section 1 (2) of this Act provided for by 
the Amending Act, the party requesting the enforcement or the debtor may request the 
proceedings specified in paragraphs (7) to (8) of section 17 be conducted, and the application 
shall be assessed by the court with priority.
(4) Regarding loan contracts specified in section 1 (2) of this Act provided for by the 
Amending Act, the rules laid down in section 18 shall not apply as of 15 December 2014.
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ACT XL OF 2014
on the rules of settlement regulated in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on settling 
certain issues relating to the uniformity decision of the Curia in respect 
of the consumer loan contracts entered into by financial institutions, and 
certain other provisions
1. General provisions
Section 1 The scope of this Act shall cover the consumer loan contracts covered by Act 
XXXVIII of 2014 on settling certain issues relating to the uniformity decision of the Curia 
in respect of the consumer loan contracts entered into by financial institutions (hereinafter 
“Act XXXVIII of 2014”).
2. Interpretative provisions
Section 2 For the purposes of this Act:
1. General Terms and Conditions means the General Terms and Conditions as defined in 
section 5 (1) of Act XXXVIII of 2014,
2. consumer means a consumer as defined in section 2 point 1 of Act XXXVIII of 2014,
3. consumer loan contract means a contract as defined in section 1 (1) and (1a) of Act 
XXXVIII of 2014,
4. financial institution means a financial institution as defined in section 2 2 of Act 
XXXVIII of 2014,
5. financial lease contract means a financial lease contract as defined in section 2 3 of Act 
XXXVIII of 2014.
3. Principles of settlement
Section 3 (1) If a void clause under section 3 (1) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 was applied, the 
amount of the difference between the loan having been disbursed pursuant to the void clause 
and converted under paragraph (2), and the amount of the difference between instalments 
having been paid in line with the void clause and converted under paragraph (2) shall be cre-
dited to the consumer as overpayment originating from an exchange rate margin.
(2) The financial institution shall convert the amount of the loan disbursed by it and then, 
with the exception laid down in paragraph (3),the amount of instalments at the official 
foreign exchange rate, effective on the day when the settlement was made, published by the 
Hungarian National Bank. If the financial institution specifies a day for conversion in its 
General Terms and Conditions or its contracts, then the conversion shall be made applying 
the official foreign exchange rate, effective on the day of such conversion, published by the 
Hungarian National Bank.
(3) In the cases and for the period defined by section 3 (3) of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the 
official foreign exchange rate published by the Hungarian National Bank shall not be applied 
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if the financial institution applied, in compliance with the provisions laid down in Acts, a 
foreign exchange rate having become part of the contract.
Section 4 (1) If a void clause under section 4 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 was applied, the 
amount of difference between instalments paid pursuant to the void clause and calculated 
without the increased interest, interest premium (hereinafter together referred to as “inte-
rest”) cost and fee being taken into account shall be credited to the benefit of the consumer 
as overpayment originating from the unilateral amendment of the contract.
(2) The financial institution increasing the interest, cost and fee unilaterally to the rate 
specified in the contract upon terminating interest, cost and fee reduction granted for a 
period specified in advance shall not be considered as unilateral amendment of the contract 
under paragraph (1).
(3) The settlement shall be made on the basis of the rate of interest, cost and fee, which 
became part of the contract upon the expiry of the preferential period specified in the 
contract or in paragraph (2).
(4) The amount of overpayment originating from the unilateral amendment of the contract 
may not be reduced with regard to reduced interest rate, cost and fee under paragraph (3) 
even if it was due to a unilateral amendment of a contract. Section 5 (5) and (6) shall apply 
if the reduction was due to a mandatory legal provision or the fee or the cost was reduced 
simultaneously with the increase of the interest rate to the extent provided by law or while 
interest rate increased the fee or the cost was reduced.
(5) A unilateral modification of the General Terms and Conditions by which the financial 
institution amends the void clause related to the unilateral amendment of the contract 
shall not become part of the consumer loan contract having been concluded before the 
amendment.
(6) The provision of this section shall apply if the contract clause relating to the unilateral 
amendment of the contract is invalid for any other reason.
4. Rules of settlement
Section 5 (1) If, due to the nullity of contract clauses, settlements specified in section 3 
and section 4 are both to be carried out, the settlement of overpayment arising from the 
exchange rate margin and from the unilateral amendment of the contract (hereinafter 
together “overpayment”) shall be done simultaneously and in conjunction.
(2) During the term of the consumer loan contract, the consumer’s claim shall be 
calculated according to the decree issued by the Governor of the Hungarian National Bank 
upon the authorisation of this Act (hereinafter ”MNB Decree”) taking as if overpayments 
under section 3 and section 4 had been paid as prepayments at the time of overpayment, 
or if the prepayment was made after the due date, at the following due date (hereinafter 
“consumer’s claim”).
(3) The consumer’s claim, with the exception of paragraph (4),shall be, in accordance with 
the general provisions of civil law, used to settle the costs in the first place then the interest 
and finally the principal. If the consumer’s claim exceeds the debt of the consumer payable 
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to the financial institution, that shall be settled as prepayment at the date and in the manner 
specified in the MNB Decree. The financial institution subject to settlement obligation might 
unilaterally derogate from the order of settlement specified in this paragraph in favour of 
the consumer.
(4) If the consumer loan contract was terminated with the obligation to settle the claim 
originating from the contract not existing any further, the payments that were not due 
following the termination of the contract shall be settled in line with the rules on unjustified 
enrichment, according to which those shall be refunded in an amount increased with the 
base rate and for foreign exchange payments that were not due, in an amount increased with 
the money market interest rate applicable to the given foreign exchange as specified in the 
MNB Decree.
(5) The financial institution subject to the settlement obligation, in the course of the 
settlement, shall be entitled to deduct, with the exception of the reductions to promote the 
conclusion of the contract, from the amount of the consumer’s claim the reduction provided 
in the given period taking into account the date when the reduction was provided.
(6) Reduction as specified in paragraph (5) shall include all financial advantage and 
benefits based on a contract amendment, the practice of the parties in their relationship, 
mandatory legal provision or court decision, which originate from the fact that the financial 
institution provided a principal, interest or fee waiver to the consumer during the period 
of the consumer’s payment obligation or granted a preferential exchange rate, as a result 
of which the payment obligation of the consumer was reduced compared to the payment 
obligation provided for in the contract. The method of settling the reductions and discounts 
deductible from the consumer’s claim is laid down in the MNB Decree.
(7) Specifying the new instalment shall form part of the settlement.
(8) In the course of settling overpayment as consumer’s claim
a) the one-off fee or cost paid by the consumer in connection with the disbursement of the 
loan or the credit rating as laid down in the consumer loan contract,
b) the regular fee or cost paid by the consumer in the repayment periods as laid down in 
the consumer loan contract,
c) regarding prepayment, the prepayment surcharge paid by the consumer
shall be taken into account.
(9) If the consumer loan contract is terminated as a result of a loan substitution provided 
by the same financial institution and the consumer has debts toward the financial institution 
as a result of the consumer loan contract concluded for the purpose of loan substitution, the 
consumer loan shall be settled against the creditor’s claim that originates from the consumer 
loan contract concluded for the purpose of loan substitution.
5. Other rules affecting the settlement obligation
Section 6 (1) Financial institutions shall be subject to settlement obligation in respect of 
consumer loan contracts that have not terminated and consumer loan contracts terminated 
after 26 July 2009.
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(2) In respect of contracts terminated on 26 July 2009 or before, the financial institution 
shall be subject to settlement obligation if it is aware of the fact that the claim has not lapsed.
(3) The financial institution shall, at the request of the consumer, settle in respect of a 
contract terminated on 26 July 2009 or before, if the consumer proves that the assigned claim 
of the financial institution is required to be enforced against the consumer by a financial 
institution that is not subject to the settlement obligation (hereinafter “claim manager”).
(4) The financial institution shall also be obliged to settle accounts with the consumer 
if the consumer alleges and the financial institution does not contest that the claim of the 
consumer arising from this Act has not expired or this fact has been established in a final 
and binding court judgment.
(5) For foreign exchange-based consumer loan contract under section 1 (1) of Act XXXVIII 
of 2014 and consumer loan contracts under section 1 (1a) the effective date of settling 
consumer’s claim shall be 1 February 2015. For forint-based consumer loan contracts under 
section 1 paragraph (1) of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the effective date of settling the consumer’s 
claim shall be 30 June 2015.
(5a) If, in the consumer loan contract, there was a change in the position of consumer, the 
financial institution shall have to settle accounts with the consumer it is in a contractual 
relationship with at the time of the settlement.
(6) The final and binding judgment of the court concerning the claims originating from the 
consumer loan contract subject to the settlement shall be without prejudice to the financial 
institution’s settlement obligation except if the final and binding court judgment established 
the invalidity of the contract and it has not been declared valid or, for the period until the a 
decision is rendered, effective by the court.
(7) The financial institution which is not subject to the settlement obligation but is the 
holder of the seceded lien established with respect to the consumer loan contract shall have a 
joint and several liability for the payment obligation originating from the consumer’s claim.
(8) If the financial institution established a seceded lien with respect to the pledged item 
offered in respect of the consumer loan contract, the holder of the claim originating from 
the consumer loan contract shall inform the holder of the seceded lien in writing of the 
termination of the claim immediately and the holder of the succeeded lien immediately shall 
take measures to have the seceded lien deleted from the registry.
(9) If, regarding a financial institution subjected to a winding up or liquidation procedure, 
the information necessary for the settlement is not available in full, the estimation method 
defined in the MNB Decree shall be applied to the settlement.
(10) If the financial institution, not subjected to a winding up or liquidation procedure, 
which is subject to the settlement obligation does not have the information necessary for the 
settlement available in full and the financial institution is able to prove it to the Supervising 
Authority, it may proceed according to the estimation method approved by the Supervising 
Authority in respect of the consumer loan contract concerned.
(11) The Hungarian National Bank, in a consumer protection proceeding, checks whether 
the financial institution not subjected to winding up or liquidation procedure applies the 
estimation method appropriately if conditions pursuant to paragraph (10) are met.
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(12) The consumer shall have the right to request settlement within a limitation period of 
six months pursuant to paragraph (3). The starting date of the limitation shall be the first day 
of the second month following the publication on the website under section 16 (3).
Section 7 (1) If the financial institution subject to the settlement obligation assigned its 
claim against the consumer to a claim manager following the termination of the contract, 
the financial institution subject to the settlement obligation shall draw up the settlement 
under section 5 (2) on the date when the claim was assigned.
(2) For the purpose of exercising his rights originating from the settlement, the consumer 
may request the claim manager to make a settlement concerning its claim against the 
consumer according to section 5 (3), by applying accordingly section 5 (5) and (6) in respect 
of the reductions provided to the consumer by the claim manager or its legal predecessor. 
In the course of the settlement, the consumer’s claim shall be, in the amount at the time 
of assignment increased with the interest applied by the claim manager pursuant to the 
provisions of the MNB Decree from the time of assignment, taken into account.
(3) If, as a result of the settlement specified in paragraph (2), the claim manager is indebted 
to the consumer, the debt shall be settled by the claim manager; however it shall be entitled to 
apply for the refund of the paid amount to the financial institution subject to the settlement 
obligation. The claim manager may request, from the financial institution subject to the 
settlement obligation, the proportionate refund of his financial loss originating from the 
reduction of the assigned claim compared to its purchase price. If the claim manager did not 
acquire the assigned claim directly from the financial institution subject to the settlement 
obligation, all parties shall cooperate in the settlement specified in paragraph (2).
(4) The provision of this section shall apply also if the of claim manager’s claim ceased to 
exist upon satisfaction.
(5) The consumer shall have the right to enforce his settlement claim under paragraph (2) 
within a limitation period of six months. The starting date of the limitation shall be the first 
day of the second month following the service of the letter concerning the settlement on 
the consumer and prepared for the date of the assignment of the claim as per paragraph (1).
Section 8 All costs relating to the settlement shall be borne by the financial institution subject to 
the settlement obligation, or, if section 7 (2) applies, by the claim manager regarding what is provided 
for therein. The financial institution shall not be entitled to charge any additional costs and fees 
for performing its obligations laid down in this Act. The performance of the financial institutions’ 
obligations specified in this Act may not serve as grounds for a unilateral contract amendment as 
defined in Act CCXXXVII of 2013 on credit institutions and financial enterprises (hereinafter “Hpt.”)
Section 9 The staying of the limitation period of the claim originating from consumer loan 
contracts under section 1 paragraph (7) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall terminate when settlement 
is communicated to the consumer under this Act but no later than 31 December 2015.
Section 9/A Derogating from Act XXX of 1997 on mortgage loan companies and on 
mortgage bonds, in respect of a settlement under this Act the mortgage credit institution may 
purchase, from a financial institution under supervision on a consolidated basis, the claim 
against the natural person, to the obligor of which claim the mortgage credit institution 
provided a mortgage loan.
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6. Deferring rules on settlement of the consumer loan 
contract in the case of early final repayment
Section 10 (1) If the obligation to fulfil the consumer loan contract was terminated upon the 
early final repayment under section 200/B of Act CXII of 1996 on credit institutions and financial 
enterprises, the financial institution shall be obliged to settle accounts with the consumer at the 
request of the consumer submitted under paragraph (3), taking into account section 5 (5) and (6).
(2) The result of the settlement under paragraph (1) shall not give rise to payment obligation 
on the part of the consumer.
(3) The consumer may request the financial institution, between 1 March and 31 March 
2015, to provide him with a settlement. The consumer may request the settlement in 
consideration of a fee of HUF 10,000. If, as a result of the settlement, it is established that the 
financial institution has a payment obligation for the consumer, the financial institution shall 
refund the fee of HUF 10,000 to the consumer. If the consumer entered into a forint-based 
consumer loan contract for the purpose of an early final repayment, he will not have to pay 
the fee of HUF 10,000 provided that he entered into the forint-based consumer loan contract 
with the financial institution subject to the settlement obligation or with another financial 
institution, and he certifies that the purpose of concluding the forint-based consumer loan 
contract was to facilitate early final repayment.
7. Deferring rules on settlement regarding consumer loan 
contracts affected by residential properties offered to the 
National Asset Management Company for purchase
Section 11 (1) If the National Asset Management Company purchased the residential 
property offered to it by the consumer before the financial institution complied with its 
settlement obligation pursuant to this Act, the financial institution shall not have to settle 
accounts with the consumer.
(2) If the National Asset Management Company purchased the residential property offered 
to it by the consumer, the creditor of the consumer in the plan to divide the purchasing price 
may request the National Asset Management Company, until 31 December 2015, to call upon 
the financial institution, simultaneously with sending the consumer’s request to the financial 
institution, to draw up the settlement and send it to the National Asset Management Company.
(3) If the purchase price having been paid to the financial institution before the 
announcement of the settlement, with respect to the result of the settlement and the plan 
to divide the purchase price modified according to it by the National Asset Management 
Company, exceeds the part of the purchase price payable to the financial institution, 
the financial institution shall refund the amount of the difference to the National Asset 
Management Company within the deadline specified in its notice, but no later than within 
30 days. The National Asset Management Company shall be responsible for paying the 
refunded amount to creditors next in ranking based on the plan to divide the purchasing 
price.
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8. Deferring rules on settlement in the case of consumer 
loan contracts affected by the exchange rate cap
Section 12 (1) As of the period of applying the fixed exchange rate determined pursuant 
to the Act on fixing the exchange rate used for repaying foreign exchange-based loans and 
the administration of the forced sale of residential property, section 5 (3) shall be applied to 
credit facility contracts in respect of loans with collection accounts in the following way: 
after the settlement of due and overdue debts the consumer’s claim shall be settled primarily 
against the collection account and the remaining part shall be settled against the foreign 
exchange loan to which the collection account is linked. The part of the consumer’s claim 
denominated in foreign exchange which has been settled against the collection account shall 
be converted to HUF at the official exchange rate, effective on the date specified in the MNB 
Decree, published by the MNB.
(2) Pursuant to the Act on fixing the exchange rate used for repaying foreign exchange loans 
and the administration of the forced sales of residential property, the amount equalling to 
50% of the exempted claim that was refunded by the State shall be considered as a reduction 
for the purposes of section 5 (6).
(3) The application of section 5 (5) shall be subject to the derogation that the financial 
institution may only enforce the reduction provided in respect of the collection account 
when the consumer claim can no longer be settled against the collection account pursuant 
to paragraph (1).
8/A. Deferring rules on settlement regarding consumer 
loan contracts affected by bridging loans
Section 12/A (1) Pursuant to Act IV of 2009 on the first loss guarantee provided by the 
state concerning housing loans, in respect of instalments paid against the bridging loans 
and during the period of payment thereof, section 5 (3) shall apply subject to the derogation 
that the consumer’s claim shall be settled, after the settlement of the debts that become due 
or are overdue in the case of a collection account, after the settling such debts against the 
collection account, primarily against the bridging loan, and the remaining amount shall be 
settled against the foreign exchange loan to which the bridging loan is linked.
(2) The part of the consumer’s claim denominated in foreign currency which has been settled 
against the bridging loan shall be converted to HUF at the official exchange rate, effective on 
the date specified in the MNB Decree, published by the Hungarian National Bank.
9. Time limit for complying with the settlement obligation
Section 13 (1) Regarding foreign exchange-based (registered in foreign exchange or 
disbursed in foreign exchange and repaid in HUF) credit or loan contracts, financial lease 
contracts, the financial institution shall send the settlement to the consumer between 1 
March 2015 and 30 April 2015. If the civil proceeding initiated pursuant to Act XXXVIII 
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of 2014 is terminated after 1 March 2015, the final time limit for sending out the settlement 
shall be the sixtieth day following the completion of the civil proceeding.
(2) Regarding forint-based and foreign exchange credit or loan contracts not qualifying 
as foreign exchange-based and financial lease contracts, the financial institution shall send 
the settlement to the consumer between 1 August 2015 and 30 September 2015. If the ci-
vil proceeding initiated pursuant to this Act or to Act XXXVIII of 2014 by the financial 
institution or by the Supervising Authority was completed after 1 August 2015, the final 
deadline for sending out the settlement shall be the sixtieth day following the completion of 
the civil proceeding.
(3) In the case specified under section 10 (3), the financial institution shall send the 
settlement to the consumer until 30 November 2015.
(4) In the case specified under section 11 (2), the financial institution shall send the 
settlement to the National Asset Management Company until 28 February 2016.
(5) For the purposes of this section, the date of the completion of the civil proceeding 
shall be the day when the decision of the court terminating the proceedings becomes final 
and binding; and if a review application was submitted then the day of communicating the 
decision taken in the review proceedings that terminates the proceedings.
Section 14 The claim manager shall comply with the consumer’s request for the settlement 
specified under section 7 (2) within 30 days from the submission of the consumer’s request.
10. The settlement and the communication of the 
settlement
Section 15 If the domicile of the consumer is other than that indicated in the consumer 
loan contract or from the domicile last notified by the consumer, the consumer shall 
communicate his new domicile to the financial institution subject to the settlement 
obligation. The domicile shall be the address where the consumer expects mails from the 
financial institution.
Section 16 (1) The financial institution shall send the settlement, in a letter with 
acknowledgement of receipt, to the consumer, to the address indicated in the consumer loan 
contract or the address notified pursuant to section 15,. The date of sending shall be the date 
when the mail containing the settlement was stamped by the post.
(2) The settlement shall comply with the requirements as to content and form specified in 
the MNB Decree.
(3) If the financial institution has sent the settlement to all consumers concerned, it shall 
communicate this fact on its internet website within 15 days and shall simultaneously make 
this information available in all its branch offices. If the financial institution is obliged to 
settle accounts with the consumer at different dates pursuant to section 13, the disclosure 
shall be done in groupings according to the dates specified under section 13 after all the 
settlements in individual groups have been made or if no settlement is to be provided. The 
detailed requirements as to form and content of the disclosure shall be laid down in the 
MNB Decree. The financial institution’s disclosure obligation shall also arise if the identity 
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of the heir replacing the consumer is uncertain, therefore the settlement has not been sent to 
him, but the settlement has been sent to all other consumers concerned.
(4) If the financial institution is not obliged to send the settlement to any debtor, surety 
or pledger directly, the debtor, surety or pledger may request that the copy of the settlement 
be sent to him by the financial institution for information. If the person entitled to receive 
a copy has the right to contest the settlement and the financial institution has not prepared 
one, the person entitled to contest the settlement may demand the drawing up of a settlement 
according to the rules to be applied to the consumer. The person entitled to receive a copy 
who is not indicated as an addressee of the settlement but who is a contracting party as a 
debtor or lessor (obligor) shall have the right to contest the settlement. The settlement shall be 
presumed to have been served on the person entitled to receive a copy when the settlement is 
to be presumed to have been served on the person indicated as an addressee of the settlement.
(5) If the person entitled to receive a copy has the right to contest the settlement, submitting 
the request for sending a copy shall not modify the time limit for submitting a complaint 
under section 18 (1) with respect to the person entitled to receive a copy. If the person entitled 
to receive a copy contests the settlement, the rules applicable to the consumer shall apply 
in the course of the proceedings before the financial institution, the Financial Arbitration 
Board and the court with respect to the person entitled to receive a copy.
(6) The person entitled to receive a copy may submit his request for a copy no later than 
within 30 days from publication on the website specified under section 16 (3).
Section 17 (1) If the obligation to perform the consumer loan contract was terminated before this 
provision entered into force and the financial institution has a payment obligation in favour of the 
consumer upon the settlement, the consumer shall communicate the number of the account where 
the amount indicated in the settlement should be transferred to, or he shall indicate that he wishes 
to collect the amount in a branch office of the bank, in the form of cash payment. If the consumer 
has a payment account held with the financial institution subject to the settlement obligation has 
a payment account held with a financial institution under the supervision on a consolidated basis 
of which the financial institution is aware based on the transfer of data at an earlier date in relation 
to the consumer loan contract the amount to be paid shall be credited to this payment account. 
If the consumer has more than one payment account held by the financial institution subject to 
the settlement obligation, the financial institution shall credit the payable amount to the payment 
account which is held under the most favourable conditions for the consumer.
(1a) The financial institution shall take measures 
a) to effect the transfer within 15 days of receipt of the number of the payment account as 
specified under paragraph (1),
b) to credit the amount onto the account within 15 days from sending of the settlement.
(2) If the settlement is returned from the domicile indicated in the consumer loan contract 
notified by the consumer marked “address cannot be identified”, “address unknown”, 
“unclaimed”, “refused to accept”, “moved out”, “delivery obstructed” or “announced as 
deceased”, or the consumer fails to make the announcement under paragraph (1) within 
30 days, the financial institution shall manage the amount payable to the consumer on a 
separate account as a claim subject to expiry pursuant to the general rules of civil law on 
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obligations. The financial institution may not charge administration fee for managing such 
amount on the separate account and the consumer may not claim an interest on the amount.
Section 17/A. The provider of reference data shall meet its data provision obligations 
pursuant to section 15 (6) of Act CXXII of 2011 on the central credit information system, 
relating to this Act by informing the natural person of the transfer of the data and by 
concurrently sending him the settlement pursuant to section 13.
11. The review of the settlement
Section 18 (1) If the consumer disputes the settlement sent him by the financial institution then, 
with the exception under paragraph (2),he may submit a complaint to the financial institution 
within thirty days from the delivery of the settlement. If the consumer was prevented from 
submitting a complaint, the complaint may be submitted within thirty days from the elimination 
of the obstacle but no later than ninety days following the time limit for submitting the complaint.
(2) If the settlement is returned from the domicile indicated in the consumer loan contract 
or notified by the consumer marked “address cannot be identified”, “address unknown”, 
“unclaimed”, “refused to accept”, “moved out”, “delivery obstructed” or “announced as 
deceased”, the complaint may be submitted within thirty days from the consumer becoming 
aware of the settlement; if the consumer is prevented from submitting the complaint within 
thirty days from the elimination of the obstacle, but, excluding the cases under paragraph 
(4) and section 31 (2), no later than 31 December 2015.
(3) The date of becoming aware shall be
a) the tenth working day after the day when the delivery is attempted if the letter is 
returned with the marking: “unclaimed”,
b) the day when delivery is attempted if the document is returned with the marking: 
“refused to accept”,
c) the thirtieth day following the publication on the website specified under section 16 
(3) if it is returned with the marking: “address cannot be identified”, “address unknown”, 
“moved out”, “delivery obstructed” or “announced as deceased”.
(4) If the publication on the website specified under section 16 (3) takes place after 31 
December 2015, the complaint pursuant to paragraph (2) may not be submitted later than 
within sixty days following the publication on the website.
(5) If no complaint is submitted pursuant to paragraphs (1) to (4), the content of the settlement 
shall be deemed as accepted by the consumer. After it, the settlement may not be contested.
Section 19 (1) If the financial institution has not settled accounts with the consumer 
and, according to the consumer, the financial institution is subject to settlement obligation 
pursuant to Act XXXVIII of 2014 or this Act, the consumer may submit a complaint to 
the financial institution. The complaint may be submitted not later than within sixty days 
from the publication on the website under section 16 (3); if the consumer is prevented from 
submitting the complaint, within thirty days from the elimination of the obstacle, but, 
excluding cases under paragraph (2) and section 31 paragraph (2), no later than 31 Decem-
ber 2015.
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(2) If the publication on the website pursuant to section 16 (3) took place after 31 Decem-
ber 2015, the complaint under paragraph (1) may not be submitted later than within sixty 
days following the publication on the website.
Section 20 (1) To the submission and administration of the complaint under section 18 and 
19 shall the provisions of the Hpt. on the administration of complaints and the provisions of 
the MNB Decree on complaint management shall apply subject to the derogations laid down 
in section 21 (1) and (1a).
(2) If the person having the right to contest the settlement submits a complaint to the 
financial institution concerning the settlement which is already subject to a complaint 
proceeding before the financial institution, the financial institution shall administer the 
complaints jointly. The time limit for administering the complaint shall commence at the 
time of receipt of the complaint arriving later.
(3) If the person having the right to contest the settlement submits a complaint to the 
financial institution regarding a settlement which is already subject to an ongoing action 
before the Financial Arbitration Board or the court, the financial institution shall inform of 
it the Financial Arbitration Board or the court no later than within eight days.
(4) In the case specified under paragraph (3), the financial institution shall also inform the 
Financial Arbitration Board or the court, of 
a) it having prepared a new settlement based on the complaint, or
b) having rejected the complaint.
(5) In the case specified under paragraph (4) b), the financial institution shall also inform 
the Financial Arbitration Board of when its statement was served.
(6) The settlement may not be contested for a reason which has already been decided upon 
by the Financial Arbitration Board or the court in a final and binding decision.
(7) If the person entitled to contest the settlement submits a complaint for the same 
reason as was used by someone else as grounds for contesting the settlement concerned, it 
is sufficient for the financial institution to inform of its former position the person entitled 
to contest the settlement when providing its position; and if complaint has already been 
remedied then the financial institution shall provide information of it to the person entitled 
to contest the settlement, with simultaneously sending him a copy of the new settlement. If 
the settlement is contested for a reason which has already been decided upon by the court in 
a final and binding decision, the financial institution shall also provide information thereof.
Section 21 (1) Section 288 (8) of the Hpt. shall not apply; if the complaint is rejected, 
the consumer, if he maintains the statements included in the complaint, shall initiate 
the proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board within thirty days from the delivery 
of financial institution’s statement. If the consumer was prevented from submitting the 
application, the proceedings shall be initiated within thirty days from the elimination of the 
obstacle but no later than within six months following the service. The financial institution 
shall inform the consumer of it in its response and shall provide the mailing address of the 
Financial Arbitration Board.
(1a) The complaint shall only be submitted in writing and the financial institution shall be 
obliged to respond within sixty days from its receipt.
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(2) Rules of Act CXXXIX of 2013 on the Hungarian National Bank (hereinafter “MNB 
Act”) on the proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board shall apply subject to the 
derogations laid down in this Act.
(3) When initiating proceedings at the Financial Arbitration Board, the consumer, in its 
application, shall also include an explicit request that the Financial Arbitration Board 
a) establish that the settlement contains the erroneous data or calculation error referred 
to by the consumer, establish the right calculation, and order the financial institution to 
implement that, or
b) establish that the complaint was not late, therefore the rejection of the complaint was not 
justified, therefore the financial institution is obliged to examine the merits of the complaint 
in the proceeding for handling complaints and to implement the complaint proceedings in 
line with the applicable rules, or
c) establish that the financial institution is obliged to make a settlement according to Act 
XXXVIII of 2014 or this Act and oblige the financial institution to make the settlement.
(4) In the course of the proceedings initiated in the application specified under paragraph 
(3) c), the Financial Arbitration Board may only examine the prevalence of conditions under 
section 6 (2) and (4) in respect of limitation period.
(5) In the application the following shall be included:
a) in the case specified under paragraph (3) a), the erroneous data or calculation error and 
the reason therefore,
b) in the case specified under paragraph (3) b), the reason why the complaint was not late,
c) in the case specified under paragraph (3) c), the reason why the financial institution is 
obliged to make a settlement pursuant to Act XXXVIII of 2014 or this Act,
and the underlying documents shall be attached.
Section 22 (1) The Financial Arbitration Board shall adjudicate the application under 
section 21 (3) proceeding in a three-member panel, in a written procedure with the proviso 
that it may hold a hearing if it deems that justified by circumstances. The panel shall decide 
in a decision in which it approves the settlement agreement or provides for an obligation 
or shall dismiss the application and terminate the proceedings. The panel shall dismiss the 
application and terminate the proceedings also if the application is not suitable for the case 
to be decided upon on the merits.
(1a) In the case specified under section 20 (3), the Financial Arbitration Board shall 
suspend its proceedings. The duration of the suspension shall not be included in the time li-
mit of the proceeding. The proceedings may be continued, if
a) the financial institution rejects the complaint and within thirty days from serving the 
statement of the financial institution, the person entitled to contest the settlement does not 
initiate the proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board and forty days have elapsed from 
the service, or
b) the person entitled to contest the settlement initiates the proceedings of the Financial 
Arbitration Board against the complaint procedure of the financial institution.
(1b) If the Financial Arbitration Board continues its proceedings pursuant to paragraph 
(1a) b) the Financial Arbitration Board shall adjudicate the applications jointly.
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(1c) The Financial Arbitration Board shall terminate its proceedings if the financial 
institution, by sending the new settlement, announces that it has drawn up a new settlement 
based on the complaint. The Financial Arbitration Board, in its decision terminating the 
proceedings, shall inform the applicant of the fact that he has the right to submit a complaint 
to the financial institution concerning the new settlement.
(2) The proceeding panel shall inform the financial institution of the submission of the 
application and simultaneously it shall send the copy of the application to the financial 
institution. In the notice, the proceeding panel shall call upon the financial institution to 
declare, within fifteen days, in its response as to the legality of the consumer’s claim, and 
send the settlement having been provided for the consumer, together with the underlying 
data, on an electronic medium in the manner and format specified by the Financial 
Arbitration Board. The proceeding panel shall also call upon the financial institution to 
send its response directly to the consumer, and if there is a settlement proposal, it should 
communicate that by the deadline specified in the notice at the latest. If the parties conclude 
a settlement agreement, the financial institution shall inform the proceeding panel of this 
fact and shall send the signed settlement agreement within eight days. After receiving the 
written settlement agreement, the panel shall approve of it if it complies with legal provisions.
(2a) If the proceeding panel holds a hearing, it shall inform the parties in writing of the 
hearing date in due time after receiving the response under paragraph (2) but no later than 
eight days before the hearing.
(3) Neither the applicant, nor the financial service provider may submit an objection of 
lack of competence regarding the proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board either in 
the response or at the hearing.
(4) The decision of the Financial Arbitration Board providing for an obligation shall oblige 
the financial institution concerned even if it has not made a general or ad hoc submission.
(5) If the person entitled to contest the settlement requests the proceeding of the Finan-
cial Arbitration Board in a complaint submitted for the same reason as the one for which 
someone else has already contested the given settlement and in respect of which
a) the Financial Arbitration Board has made a decision for which no court proceedings 
was not initiated in due time, or
b) the court has made a decision,
it is sufficient for the Financial Arbitration Board to only refer to this fact when rejecting 
the complaint.
Section 23 (1) Section 116 (1) of the MNB Act shall not apply; the consumer and the 
financial institution, after the proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board, may apply for 
the setting aside of the decision in a non-contentious proceeding pursuant to sections 24-29.
(2) Section 116 paragraph (2) of the MNB Act shall apply subject to the derogation that, in 
addition to section 116 (3) of the MNB Act, the consumer and the financial institution shall 
also have the right to apply for the setting aside of the decision providing for an obligation 
also for the proceedings’ non-compliance with the legal provisions of this Act. No retrial 
shall be possible.
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Section 24 Unless otherwise provided by sections 25 to 29, the rules of Act III of 1952 on ci-
vil procedure (hereinafter “Pp.”) shall accordingly apply to the non-contentious proceeding 
subject to the derogations originating from the specificities of the non-contentious civil 
proceedings.
Section 25 (1) The consumer as a requesting party may initiate a non-contentious civil 
proceeding against the financial institution that makes the settlement as a requested party 
within thirty days from the service upon him of the Financial Arbitration Board’s decision 
either terminating the proceedings or establishing the correct settlement on the basis of 
the complaint under section 21 (3) a)for having the decision terminating the proceeding or 
establishing the correct settlement set aside. If the consumer is prevented from submitting 
the request, he shall submit the request within thirty days from the elimination of the 
obstacle but no later than 31 October 2016.
(2) The requesting party, in its request against the decision rejecting the application or 
terminating the proceedings, may request that the court in its decision
a) establish that the settlement of the financial institution or the decision of the Financi-
al Arbitration Board is in breach of law, set aside the decision of the Financial Arbitration 
Board which is in breach of law and oblige the financial institution to make a new settlement,
b) establish that the complaint was not late, therefore the rejection of the complaint was 
not justified, therefore the financial institution, in a complaint proceedings, is obliged to 
examine the merits of the complaint and implement the complaint proceedings in line with 
the applicable rules,
c) establish that the financial institution is obliged to settle accounts with the requesting 
party pursuant to Act XXXVIII of 2014 or this Act and oblige the requested party to make 
the settlement or
d) establish that unless the Financial Arbitration Board rejected the consumer’s request 
and terminated the proceedings due to the lack of grounds, the Financial Arbitration Board’s 
decision is in breach of law, set aside the decision and oblige the Financial Arbitration Board 
to carry out new proceedings.
(3) If the Financial Arbitration Board, in its decision, makes the correct settlement that 
is not coincides with the consumer’s request, the requesting party may ask the court to 
establish that the Financial Arbitration Board’s decision is in breach of law, set aside the 
decision and oblige the Financial Arbitration Board to carry out new proceedings.
(4) The requesting party, in its request under to paragraph (2) a) or, if the requesting party 
is the consumer, in its request under paragraph (3), may only ask the court to establish 
that the Financial Arbitration Board’s proceeding is in breach of law with reference to an 
erroneous data or calculation error which served as grounds for requesting the Financial 
Arbitration Board’s proceedings. If the requesting party is a financial institution, it may only 
base its request under paragraph (3) on facts which prove that the decision of the Financial 
Arbitration Board is in breach of law.
(5) The requesting party, in his request specified under paragraph (2) b), may only present 
reasons as to why the complaint was not late which he also used as grounds to request the 
proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board.
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(6) The requesting party, in his request specified under paragraph (2) c), may only present 
reasons as to why the financial institution is subjected to a settlement obligation towards 
him pursuant to Act XXXVIII of 2014 or this Act, which he also used as grounds to request 
the proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board.
(7) The requesting party, in his request specified under paragraph (2) d), may only present 
a reason as to why the rejection of the complaint was not justified which also demonstrate 
that the decision made by the Financial Arbitration Board is in breach of law.
Section 26 (1) The financial institution making the settlement as a requesting party may 
initiate a non-contentious civil proceeding for amending the Financial Arbitration Board’s 
decision against the consumer as a requested party within thirty days from delivery of the 
decision of the Financial Arbitration Board to the requesting party.
(2) The requesting party, in his request, may ask the court to amend the decision of the Fi-
nancial Arbitration Board and to establish in its decision that
a) the settlement is correct or
b) the complaint is late, therefore the complaint proceedings are not to be executed, or
c) the requesting party is not obliged to settle accounts with the requested party pursuant 
to Act XXXVIII of 2014 or this Act.
(3) The requesting party, in his request, may only present reasons to substantiate his 
request which he has also presented in the proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board.
Section 27 (1) The non-contentious civil proceeding shall fall under the territorial jurisdiction 
of the district court operating at the seat of the regional court having its territorial jurisdiction 
where the consumer has his domicile, and on the territory covered by the territorial jurisdiction 
of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court, the Pest Central District Court shall have territorial 
competence. In absence of domicile in Hungary, territorial jurisdiction shall be based on the 
residence of the consumer; if the residence of the consumer is unknown or is located abroad, 
the last domestic residence shall be taken into account; if this cannot be established or the 
consumer has never had a domestic residence, the territorial jurisdiction shall be based on the 
seat of the financial institution. The non-contentious proceedings under paragraph (3) d) shall 
be carried out by the court where the suspended proceeding is pending.
(2) The request shall be submitted to the Financial Arbitration Board. The Financial 
Arbitration Board shall forward the request together with the documents of the case to the 
court within eight days from the receipt thereof. The requesting party and the requested 
party shall submit the request on a form, if such a form exists pursuant to law.
(3) In the case specified under section 20 (3), the court shall suspend its proceedings. The 
suspended proceedings shall be continued if
a) the financial institution rejects the complaint and within thirty days from serving the 
statement of the financial institution, the person entitled to contest the settlement does not 
initiate the proceedings of the Financial Arbitration Board,
b) the Financial Arbitration Board announces that the parties, including the requesting 
party, have made a settlement agreement,
c) the person entitled to contest the settlement initiates the proceedings of the Financial 
Arbitration Board against the complaint procedure of the financial institution and the requesting 
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party did not initiate non-contentious civil proceedings within thirty days against the Finan-
cial Arbitration Board’s decision on rejecting the request and terminating the proceeding, or
d) the person entitled to contest the settlement initiated the proceedings of the Finan-
cial Arbitration Board against the complaint procedure of the financial institution and 
the requesting party requested non-contentious civil proceedings against the Financial 
Arbitration Board’s decision rejecting the request and terminating the proceedings.
(4) Section 155 of the Pp. shall apply to the suspension of the proceedings with the proviso 
that the court decision ordering suspension may not be appealed.
(5) The court shall terminate the suspended proceedings if the Financial Arbitration Board 
has established the correct settlement and obliged the financial institution to implement 
it and the financial institution did not initiate non-contentious civil proceedings against 
the decision of the Financial Arbitration Board. The court, in its order terminating the 
proceedings, shall inform the requesting party that he has the right to submit a complaint to 
the financial institution in respect of the new settlement.
(6) If the court is obliged to continue the suspended proceedings pursuant to paragraph (3) 
d), the court shall join the requests.
Section 28 (1) In the non-contentious civil proceeding, the court shall decide exclusively 
on the basis of the documents and data which were available during the proceeding of the Fi-
nancial Arbitration Board. No other evidence may be taken in the proceedings.
(2) Junior judges may proceed in the first instance independently, with a right to sign 
independently and may take decisions on the merits of cases in non-contentious civil 
proceedings.
(3) The court may hear the parties, if it is necessary for making a decision.
(4) In the non-contentious civil proceedings no stay or suspension shall be possible.
(5) In the out of court civil proceedings no review and retrial shall be possible.
(6) The submission of the request shall have a suspensory effect on the enforcement of the 
decision made by the Financial Arbitration Board.
(7) Regarding cases under section 22 (5), it is sufficient for the court to examine whether the 
grounds on which the requesting party initiates the court proceedings upon a complaint that 
have already served as the basis for someone else to contest the given settlement and which have 
already been adjudicated by the Financial Arbitration Board or the court in a final decision.
Section 29 The final and binding decision made by the Financial Arbitration Board in its 
proceedings and in the non-contentious proceedings under section 23 (1) in respect of the 
settlement may not be contested in any other civil proceeding.
12. The settlement, its communication and review if a 
claim manager is involved
Section 30 (1) If the settlement is made pursuant to section 7, the review of the financial 
institution subject to the settlement obligation and the review of the settlement made by the 
claim manager may be requested separately as specified under sections 18-29.
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(2) The settlement obligation under section 7 (2) shall not be affected by the consumer 
contesting the settlement prepared by the financial institution subject to the settlement 
obligation.
(3) If the settlement of the financial institution subject to the settlement obligation is 
amended as a result of the enforcement of claims pursuant to sections 18 to 29, the consumer 
may request that the claim manager amend the settlement, taking into account the new 
settlement prepared by the financial institution subject to settlement obligation. Review of 
the amended settlement may be enforced as specified in sections 18-29.
13. Certain rules on settlements with the heir
Section 31 (1) If the consumer is replaced by an heir, the rules of succession shall apply to 
the claim.
(2) In the case of probate proceedings and supplementary probate proceedings, the 
time limit commencing upon the elimination of the obstacle specified under section 18 
(2) and section 19 (1) shall be calculated from the completion of the probate proceedings 
or supplementary probate proceedings, or if the launching of the probate proceedings, 
supplementary proceedings or the fact that they have already been in progress is reported 
to the financial institution within thirty days following the publication pursuant to section 
16 (3) in a way that can be evidenced. If the probate proceedings or supplementary probate 
proceedings are completed after 31 December 2015, the complaint under section 18 (2) and 
or section 19 (1) shall be submitted no later than within sixty days from the completion of 
the probate proceedings or supplementary probate proceedings.
14. Audit procedure
Section 32 (1) The Supervising Authority shall check in the course of an audit procedure, 
specified in the MNB Act, that may be launched ex officio whether the financial institutions 
have complied with the legal provisions of Act XXXVIII of 2014, this Act and the MNB 
Decree.
(1a) The basis of the audit procedure of the Supervising Authority shall be, in particular 
the practice of the financial institution affecting a large number of consumers which, by 
not recognising the consumer contract nature of the loan contract or the financial lease 
contract, by qualifying them differently or by expressing a different standpoint regarding 
their character, aims to avoid the settlement obligation and prevent the submission of 
settlement requests.
(2) The obligations imposed upon financial institutions in respect of their conduct 
towards consumers specified in Act XXXVIII of 2014, this Act and the MNB Decree shall be 
considered as provisions for consumer protection pursuant to sections 81-89/B of the MNB 
Act.
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15. Proceedings launched by actions in the public interest
Section 32/A (1) The financial institution shall be obliged to submit to the Supervising 
Authority, within thirty days after the entry into force of this provision, with the exception 
included in paragraph (2) in the manner specified in paragraphs (3)-(8),the list of contract 
clauses included in General Terms and Conditions under section 6 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 
2014 (hereinafter “the extract of the financial institution”), which provides for the possibility 
of a unilateral increase of the interest, cost or fee.
(2) The financial institution is exempted from the obligation specified under paragraph 
(1) in respect of the types of financial services it provides in respect of which there was no 
amendment of contract after 26 November 2010 resulting in a unilateral increase of inte-
rest, fee or cost. In this case, the financial institution shall be obliged to enlist these types 
of its services, with the clear indication of the respective General Terms and Conditions, 
in its separate declaration and submit the declaration to the Supervising Authority by the 
deadline specified in paragraph (1).
(3) The extract of the financial institution shall be submitted on the form provided by 
the Supervising Authority for this purpose, including the data specified in Annex 1. The 
Supervising Authority may provide various types of forms, and legends and instructions to 
help filling in the form, which are published on its internet website. The date of publication 
of the forms shall be indicated on the website. From the date of publication, using the regular 
forms, list of codes, legend and instructions based on this paragraph shall be mandatory. 
The form shall be designed to provide enough space for the declaration. If the form does not 
comply with legal provisions, the Supervising Authority shall promptly modify it or provide 
a new form. After the publication of the new or modified form, the Supervising Authority 
shall indicate on its website that the form is new or has been modified.
(4) In the extract of the financial institution, the clauses shall be presented in a breakdown 
according to types of services and the text in force on different dates indicating the period of 
application in a way which makes it possible for the clauses to be clearly identified according 
to the date of application at different levels of regulation applicable simultaneously and in 
conjunction.
(5) In the course of preparing the financial institution’s extract, a new application period 
shall start if any amendment takes place in any document at any level of regulation, that 
is if a new document or a new provision enters into force or is applicable at any level of 
regulations irrespective of the fact whether the change has affected parts containing clauses 
providing for the possibility of unilaterally increasing the interest, cost or fee.
(6) For an interest tied to a reference, the change of the interest originating from the change 
in the reference interest rate shall not qualify as unilateral increase of the interest rate.
(7) In the information sheet attached to the financial institution’s extract, the system, 
structure and levels of regulation and their relationship shall be described.
(8) The financial institution’s extract and the information sheet under paragraph (7) shall 
also be submitted in an editable electronic format, bearing qualified electronic signature, 
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a) in an electronic mail and
b) on an electronic medium.
Section 32/B (1) If the financial institution, until the date specified in section 32/A (1), 
has undertaken an obligation, in an explicit and irrevocable declaration containing no 
conditions drawn in a notarial deed and submitted to the Supervising Authority, to make a 
settlement in respect of
a) all the consumer loan contracts pursuant to Act XXXVIII of 2014 section 6 (2) or
b) consumer loan contracts specified in section 6 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 specified 
according to the type of financial services
as regards overpayments originating from increased interest rate, cost or fees due to the 
unilateral amendment of the contract, in favour of its clients considered as consumers, 
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the financial institution shall be exempted from the 
obligation specified under section 32/A (1) pertaining to the consumer loan contracts falling 
under the scope of the declaration.
(2) The submission of the declaration referred to in paragraph (1) to the Supervising 
Authority gives rise to an obligation for the financial institution to settle accounts with 
consumers concerned pursuant to this Act within the time limit specified in section 13 (2). 
The settlement may be reviewed also pursuant to the provisions of this Act.
(3) In respect of including the declaration specified in paragraph (1) in a public deed, 
section 30/I of the Decree of the Minister of Justice No. 14/1991 (XI. 26.) IM on the fees of 
notaries public shall apply.
(4) If the scope of the declaration under paragraph (1) extends only to part of the 
consumer loan contracts on certain types of financial services, specified under section 6 
(2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the financial institution, in the declaration under paragraph (1) 
shall indicate the types of financial services concerned, with a clear indication of General 
Terms and Conditions relating thereto, the identification number of the contracts concerned 
and the amount of outstanding claims on the date when the declaration is made based on 
individual contracts concerned.
(5) Concurrently with making the declaration under paragraph (1), the financial institution 
shall publish on its website a notice that is in line with the content of the declaration 
submitted to the Supervising Authority entitled “Information pertaining to settlements 
and HUF conversion”. The notice shall include a clause according to which the financial 
institution settles the unilateral interest, cost and fee increases pursuant to the provisions 
of this Act.
(6) The Supervising Authority may not bring an action in the public interest in respect 
of the contract clauses of the types of financial services which fall under the scope of the 
declaration of the financial institution as specified in paragraph (1).
(7) The financial institution may make the declaration under paragraph (1) following the 
fulfilment its obligation set out in section 32/A paragraph (1) until the legal effects arise, 
upon the communication of the statement of claim to him, of the commencement of a legal 
action by the Supervising Authority pursuant to section 6 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014.
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Section 32/C With a view to check compliance with obligations under sections 32/A and 
32/B, an audit proceeding of consumer protection may also be initiated ex officio pursuant 
to subtitle 29 of chapter VII of the MNB Act.
Section 33 (1) The proceeding brought by an action in the public interest pursuant 
to section 6 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Budapest-Capital Regional Court.
(2) The proceeding initiated by an action in the public interest shall be governed by 
provisions in subtitle 6 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 subject to the derogations laid down in 
sections 34-36/D.
Section 34 (1) If the statement of claim of the Supervising Authority was received before 
14 February 2015, it shall not be rejected on this ground, but shall be considered as if the 
statement of claim had been submitted on 14 February 2015.
(2) The court shall examine the statement of claim within fifteen days of receipt and shall 
decide upon whether to dismiss the statement of claim or set the date of a hearing. The date 
of the hearing shall be set no later than on the fifteenth day from the examination of the 
statement of claim. The date of the hearing shall be set to allow for the statement of claim to 
be served on the defendant at least eight days before the hearing. The court shall adjudicate 
the statement of claim within forty-five days, which period shall start upon setting the 
hearing date.
(3) Section 7 (2), Section 8 (1) and Section 13 (6) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall not apply 
in the action.
(4) The personal exemption from duties of the Supervising Authority shall also apply to 
this procedure.
Section 35 (1) Instead of the provisions of section 8 (3) to (5) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 the 
provisions laid down in this section shall be applied.
(2) The Supervising Authority shall request the establishment of the invalidity of all the 
clauses in the General Terms and Conditions of a financial institution under section 6 (2) of 
Act XXXVIII of 2014 in the same statement of claim.
(3) The Supervising Authority may only request the establishment of what is set out in 
section 36 (2).
(4) Section 121 (2) of the Pp. shall not be applied in the action. In addition to what is defined 
in section 121 (3) of the Pp., the extract of the General Terms and Conditions, specified in 
paragraph (2), drawn up in the same deed shall also be attached to the statement of claim, 
containing such clauses only in respect of which the Supervising Authority requests the 
establishment of invalidity; for contract clauses the period for which the financial institution 
applied them shall also be indicated. In the extract, in addition to individual contract terms, 
the legal basis which, according to the Supervising Authority, substantiate the statement of 
claim shall also be indicated. Furthermore, the statement of claim shall be accompanied by 
the deed or its copy (extract), which is necessary to certify other circumstances to be taken 
into account ex officio, except if the data can also be proved by presenting an identity card; 
this should be referred to in the statement of claim.
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(5) An electronic medium shall be attached to the statement of claim, which contains the 
statement of claim and its attachments in an editable format, edited by means of an IT tool.
Section 35/A Section 13 (4) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall apply subject to the derogation 
that the court adjudicates the appeal within forty-five days from the starting date specified 
in section 13 (4) of Act XXXVIII of 2014.
Section 36 (1) Instead of section 11 of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the provisions contained in 
this section shall be applicable.
(2) The court in the proceedings shall only examine whether the contract clause having 
been considered unfair by the Supervising Authority complies with the criteria of fairness 
specified in section 4 (1) of Act XXXVIII of 2014.
(3) If the court establishes that the contract clause having been considered unfair by the 
Supervising Authority complies with all the conditions specified in section 4 (1) of Act 
XXXVIII of 2014 and therefore the contract clause is fair, it shall dismiss the claim.
(4) If the court establishes that the contract clause having been considered unfair by the 
Supervising Authority does not comply with any of the conditions specified in section 4 (1) 
of Act XXXVIII of 2014 and therefore it is unfair, it shall establish that the contract clause is 
unfair and therefore invalid.
Section 36/A (1) If the Supervising Authority, in the course of its proceedings initiated 
pursuant to the MNB Act until 31 December 2016, establishes that any of the declarations 
made by the financial institution pursuant to section 32/A is incomplete or does not comply 
with reality in any respect, it shall call upon the financial institution, setting a short deadline, 
to submit its complete declaration concerning the financial service to the Supervising 
Authority, in compliance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) The Supervising Authority shall terminate its proceedings pursuant to paragraph (1) in 
respect of the remedy of deficiencies of declarations under section 32/A by issuing an order 
(hereinafter “order terminating the remedy of deficiencies proceedings”), if the financial 
institution fully complies with the notice. The service of the order of the Supervising 
Authority terminating the proceedings to remedy the deficiencies shall be governed by the 
rules of the Supervising Authority on service of documents by own employee as specified in 
the MNB Act, disregarding postal service.
(3) If the Supervising Authority did not file an action in the public interest until 30 April 
2015 against the financial institution, but the data arising in its proceedings pursuant to (1) 
give grounds for it, action in the public interest may be brought pursuant to section 6 (2) 
of Act XXXVIII of 2014 within sixty days from the date when the order terminating the 
proceedings for the remedy of deficiencies becomes final and binding.
Section 36/B (1) If, at the time when the notice to remedy the deficiencies pursuant to 
section 36/A paragraph (1) was issued, there is a civil proceeding in progress filed against 
the financial institution pursuant to section 6 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 by the Supervising 
Authority, the Supervising Authority, in this judicial proceedings, may enforce its claim 
founded on the data having arisen in the proceedings pursuant to section 36/A (1).
(2) The Supervising Authority shall immediately inform the proceeding court of its 
issuing the notice to remedy deficiencies pursuant to section 36/A (1), and shall also enclose 
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the notice issued by it to remedy the deficiencies. Upon this notice the court shall suspend 
the proceeding until the order terminating the proceeding for the remedy of deficiencies 
becomes final; the court decision suspending the proceedings may not be appealed.
(3) If the court suspends the proceedings of first instance in line with paragraph (2), the 
Supervising Authority, within eight days from the date when the order terminating the 
proceedings to remedy the deficiencies become final, shall request the continuation of the 
proceedings from the court, simultaneously it may submit its request concerning changes 
in the statement of claim if it is founded by the data arisen in its proceedings pursuant to 
section 36/A (1).
(4) If the financial institution in its capacity as the defendant announces itself in the ci-
vil proceedings initiated by the Supervising Authority pursuant to section 6 (2) of Act 
XXXVIII of 2014 that any of its declarations pursuant to section 32/A is deficient due to the 
provision of erroneous data or that the declaration does not comply with the facts in any 
part, simultaneously with the announcement it shall attach the declaration relating to the 
financial service indicated in two copies, in compliance with the provisions of this Act.
(5) The Supervising Authority may amend its statement of claim submitted pursuant 
to section 6 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 within eight days after the order terminating the 
proceeding to remedy the deficiencies becomes final; within a maximum of eight days as 
specified by the court if the defendant makes an announcement as set out in paragraph (4), 
but in neither cases later than the closure of the hearing preceding the hearing where the 
decision of first instance is made. The application for the amendment of the statement of 
claim shall be accompanied by the extract of the General Terms and Conditions affected by 
the amendment of the statement of claim, included in a public deed and containing the legal 
justification for the amendment of the statement of claim.
(6) If the statement of claim is amended under paragraph (3) or the announcement is made 
by the defendant pursuant to paragraph (4), The hearing may be postponed repeatedly, if 
necessary,. The court shall adjudicate the statement of claim within a further maximum 
forty-five days from the submission of the request to amend the claim in cases falling under 
paragraph (3) and within a further maximum forty-five days from the submission of the 
announcement pursuant to paragraph (4).
Section 36/C (1) If the suspension of the hearing in the action pursuant to section 36/B (2) 
or the announcement made by the defendant pursuant to section 36/B (4) take place in the 
civil proceedings of second instance, the Supervising Authority may submit its declaration 
on the necessity of the amendment of the statement of claim within eight days from the 
date when the order terminating the proceedings to remedy the deficiencies becomes final, 
in the case of the announcement of the defendant pursuant to section 36/B (4) within ma-
ximum eight days specified by the court, but in neither cases later than the closure of the 
appeal hearing. The announcement concerning the necessity to amend the statement of 
claim shall be accompanied by the extract of the General Terms and Conditions affected 
by the amendment of the statement of claim included in a public deed, indicating the legal 
justification for the necessity to amend the statement of claim.
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(2) In cases specified under paragraph (1), the hearing may be repeatedly postponed 
as necessary with the proviso that, for the announcement of the Supervising Authority 
concerning the necessity to amend the statement of claim, based on a proceeding to remedy 
the deficiencies, the court shall make the decision of second instance within a further ma-
ximum forty-five days from the submission of the request to amend the claim or from the 
submission of the announcement by the defendant pursuant to paragraph (4).
(3) The court of second instance, based on the available data, shall set aside the judgment 
of the court of first instance, irrespective of the limitations of the review application and the 
review counter-application, in part or in full, and shall order the court to hold a new hearing 
and take a new decision, if repeating or complementing the hearing is necessary in part or in 
full due to the possibility to amend the statement of claim. The court of second instance shall 
decide upon the merits of those parts of the first instance judgment which were not set aside.
Section 36/D (1) If, at the time of issuing the notice to remedy the deficiencies pursuant 
to section 36/A (1), the civil proceedings launched against the financial institution by the 
Supervising Authority pursuant to section 6 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 have been terminated 
with a final decision, but, based on the data having arisen in the proceedings pursuant to 
section 36/A (1), the amendment of the statement of claim would be justified, the Supervising 
Authority may submit an application for retrial to the court of first instance having been 
proceeded in the case within sixty days from the time when the order terminating the 
proceeding to remedy the deficiencies becomes final.
(2) In the proceedings initiated by an application for retrial specified under paragraph (1) 
(hereinafter “retrial”), the provisions of this Act on proceedings initiated by actions in the 
public interest and the provisions of the Pp. on retrial shall apply subject to derogations laid 
down in paragraphs (3) to (5).
(3) Where this Act or Act XXXVIII of 2014 refers to the statement of claim or a claim, they 
shall be interpreted as application for retrial in the retrial proceedings.
(4) In the retrial proceeding
a) section 35 (2) and (4),
b) section 7 (7) b) and k) of Act XXXVIII of 2014, and
c) section 121 (2), sections 260, 261, 264, 266, 266/A and 267 of the Pp. 
shall not apply.
(5) In addition to what is defined in section 121 (3) of the Pp., the extract of the General 
Terms and Conditions pursuant to section 6 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 drawn up in 
one public deed shall also be attached to the application for retrial, which contains only 
such clauses in respect of which the Supervising Authority requests the establishment of 
invalidity; regarding contract clauses the period for which the financial institution applied 
them shall also be indicated. In addition to individual contract terms, the legal basis which, 
according to the Supervising Authority give ground for the application for retrial shall also 
be indicated in the extract. Furthermore, the application for retrial shall also be accompanied 
by the public deed or its copy (extract), required to certify other circumstances to be taken 
into account ex officio, except if the data can also be proved by presenting an identity card, 
this should be referred to in the application for retrial.
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(6) An electronic medium shall be attached to the application for retrial which includes 
the application for retrial and its attachments in an editable format, edited by means of an 
IT tool.
(7) The retrial shall be held within the limitations of the application for retrial.
Section 36/E Depending on the outcome of civil proceedings pursuant to sections 
36/A-36/D, the settlement pursuant to this Act shall be sent by the financial institution to 
the consumer in the period specified in section 13 (2). If the civil proceedings initiated by the 
Supervising Authority is terminated after 1 August 2015, the final deadline for sending out 
the settlement relating to the consumer loan contracts concerned shall be the sixtieth day 
from the final termination of the civil proceedings. If, based on the outcome of proceedings 
pursuant to sections 36/A-36/D, the settlement made earlier pursuant to this Act needs to be 
amended, the final deadline for sending out the new settlement in respect of the consumer 
loan contracts concerned shall also be the sixtieth day following the termination of the civil 
proceeding with a final decision.
16. Excluding the application of the rule on actions 
aiming to establish the invalidity of the contract or 
certain contractual provisions (partial invalidity)
Section 37 (1) In respect of contracts falling under the scope of this Act, the party may 
request the establishment of the invalidity of the contract or the invalidity of certain 
contractual provisions (hereinafter “partial invalidity”) from the court, irrespective of the 
reason for invalidity, regarding the application of the legal consequences of invalidity, that 
is to declare the contract valid or effective until the date when the decision is made. Failing 
that, the statement of claim and the merits of the claim, following an unsuccessful notice to 
remedy the deficiencies, may not be adjudicated. If the party requests the legal consequence 
of invalidity or partial invalidity to be deducted, he shall also indicate the legal consequences 
the court is to apply. As regards the application of the legal consequence, the party shall also 
submit an explicit claim covering the settlement between the parties and indicated as an 
amount.
(2) Given the provisions of paragraph (1) in respect of contracts covered by the Act, 
pursuant to section 239/A (1) of Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code and section 6:108 (2) of 
Act V of 2013 on Civil Proceedings, if their conditions stipulated in this Act are met, the 
statement of claim for the invalidity or partial invalidity of the contract shall be dismissed 
without issuing summons or the proceedings shall be terminated. The dismissal of the 
statement of claim without summons or the termination of the proceedings shall not apply, 
if the party also submitted a statement of claim in the proceedings other than the statement 
of claim for the establishment of the invalidity or partial invalidity of the contract; in this 
case the statement of claim for the establishment of invalidity shall be considered as not 
maintained by the party. The same shall apply to proceedings pursued after the termination 
of suspension.
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(3) If, in the proceedings in progress the dismissal of the statement of claim without 
summons shall not apply, the proceedings shall be terminated if the party in its claim 
(counterclaim) within thirty days from the service of the court’s notice to remedy the 
deficiencies fails to request the deduction of the legal consequence of invalidity or partial 
invalidity of the contract, furthermore, if the party fails to indicate the legal consequence 
he requests to apply. The proceedings may not be terminated if the party also submitted a 
statement of claim in the proceedings other than the statement of claim for the establishment 
of the invalidity or partial invalidity of the contract; in this case the statement of claim for 
the establishment of invalidity shall be considered as not maintained by the party.
Section 37/A. (1) In the course of deducting the legal consequences of invalidity, the court 
shall establish the payment obligations of the parties, basing such decision on the data in the 
revised settlement pursuant to section 38 (6), applying the rules on settlement laid down in 
this Act.
(2) After the effective date of settlement, the repayments effected up to the date when the 
decision is made shall be credited to the consumer pursuant to applicable rules.
17. Rules on suspended actions
Section 38 (1) In proceedings suspended pursuant to
a) section 16 (1) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 until a measure is taken as specified in a separate 
Act, but no later than 31 December 2014,
b) section 16 (2) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 until a measure is taken as specified in a separate 
Act, but no later than 31 December 2015
the proceedings shall be continued following the thirtieth day after the announcement of 
the revised settlement made between the financial institution and the consumer, with the 
exception of the case specified in paragraph (5). The announcement shall be made by the 
counterparty of the consumer. If the consumer is the plaintiff and the statement of claim has 
not been served on his counterparty yet, the notification obligation shall be on the consumer.
(2) If the proceeding may not be continued until 31 December 2014 pursuant to paragraph 
(1) a), the duration of suspension shall be extended by virtue of this Act until the revised 
settlement is notified.
(3) If the proceeding may not be continued until 31 December 2015 pursuant to paragraph 
(1) b), the duration of suspension shall be extended by virtue of this Act until the revised 
settlement is notified.
(4) In the case specified in paragraphs (2) and (3), the parties shall not be notified of the 
extension of the suspension, the proceedings shall be continued after the thirtieth day 
following the notification of the revised settlement made between the financial institution 
and the consumer, with the exception of the case specified in paragraph (5). The notification 
shall be made by the counterparty of the consumer. If the consumer is the plaintiff and the 
statement of claim has not been served on his counterparty yet, the notification obligation 
shall be on the consumer.
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(5) If, in respect of the consumer loan contract subjected to the suspended proceedings 
pursued pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (4), an enforcement proceeding was also initiated, 
and this enforcement proceeding is initiated in accordance with sections 41 and 42 at a date 
earlier than the date indicated in paragraph (1) or (4), the proceedings shall be continued after 
the thirtieth day following the announcement of the fact that the enforcement proceedings 
are carried out. The continuation of the enforcement proceedings shall be announced by 
the consumer’s counterparty while the consumer may announce it. If the consumer is 
the plaintiff and the statement of claim has not been served on his counterparty yet, the 
notification obligation shall be on the consumer.
(5a) If the claim originating from the consumer loan contract subjected to the suspended 
proceedings to be continued pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (4) is secured by a pledged item, 
which, until the date indicated in section 43 cannot be sold outside judicial enforcement 
and this circumstance occurs earlier than the dates referred to in paragraph (1) /or (4), the 
suspended proceedings shall be continued after the thirtieth day following the announcement 
of the termination of the ban on sale. The termination of the ban on sale shall be announced 
by the counterparty of the consumer, while the consumer may announce it. If the consumer 
is the plaintiff and the statement of claim has not been served on his counterparty yet, the 
notification obligation shall be on the consumer.
(6) The settlement shall be considered as revised, if
a) the consumer did not submit a complaint against the settlement to the financial 
institution within the time limit specified in this Act, or did not submit a complaint on 
grounds that the financial institution failed to settle accounts with him,
b) within the time limit specified in this Act, the consumer did not initiate the proceedings 
of the Financial Arbitration Board,
c) within the time limit specified in this Act, the consumer or the financial institution did 
not initiate non-contentious proceedings pursuant to section 23 (1) or the court proceeding 
pursuant to section 23 (2),
d) the decision terminating the non-contentious proceedings initiated by the consumer 
or the financial institution pursuant to section 23 (1) or the court proceedings pursuant to 
section 23 (2) has become final and binding.
Section 39 If, in the proceedings suspended pursuant to section 16 of Act XXXVIII of 
2014, an action for establishing the invalidity or partial invalidity of the contract is enforced, 
the statement of claim shall be dismissed without issuing summons, or if the dismissal of 
the statement of claim without the issue of a summons is no longer possible, the proceedings 
shall be terminated if the party in its statement of claim (counterclaim) within thirty days 
from the information provided on the continuation of the proceedings and the service of the 
notice to remedy the deficiencies does not request the application of the legal consequence of 
the invalidity or partial invalidity of the contract as set out in section 37 (1). The proceedings 
may not be terminated if the party also submitted a statement of claim in the proceedings 
other than the statement of claim for the establishment of the invalidity or partial invalidity 
of the contract; in this case the statement of claim for the establishment of invalidity shall be 
considered as not maintained by the party.
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Section 40 (1) If the parties to the action, with the exception of the proceedings pursuant 
to section 39, on the first day of the hearing after the termination of the suspension of the 
proceedings
a) conclude a settlement agreement,
b) request jointly that the action be terminated,
the court fees shall be borne by the State, beyond that each party shall bear his own costs, 
and the court shall decide upon these questions ex officio.
(2) The court fee shall also be borne by the State, with the exception of the proceedings 
under section 39,if the plaintiff, no later than on the first day of the hearing after the 
termination of the suspension of the proceeding, withdraws its claim which results in the 
termination of the proceedings. In this case, section 160(1) of the Pp. shall apply subject to 
the derogation that the plaintiff shall also have the right to withdraw without the consent of 
the defendant following the commencement of the substantive hearing, and each party shall 
bear his own costs.
(3) In the case of the termination of the proceedings pursuant to section 39, the court fees 
shall be borne by the State, beyond that each party shall cover his own costs.
(4) Section 80 (1) of Act XCIII of 1990 on duties shall also apply in the case specified in 
paragraphs (1) to (3), namely the imposed but still unpaid duty shall be cancelled or the paid 
fees shall be refunded ex officio.
18. Rules concerning enforcement procedures
Section 41 (1) Rules set out in section 17 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall not be applied 
after the thirtieth day following the notification of the fact that the settlement between the 
financial institution and the consumer was sent to the debtor, or following the notification 
referred to in paragraphs (3) or (4).
(2) The party requesting enforcement shall send the notification specified in paragraph (1) 
to the bailiff, or if the enforceable deed has not been sent to the bailiff, the notification shall 
be sent to the court, public notary ordering the enforcement, within thirty days following the 
sending of the settlement to the debtor, attaching the settlement thereto, and simultaneously 
shall take the measures the party requesting enforcement is obliged to take pursuant to Act 
LIII of 1994 on judicial enforcement.
(3) By applying the rules laid down in paragraph (2), it shall also be notified if, pursuant 
to the provisions of this Act, no settlement is to be made in respect of the consumer loan 
contract.
(4) If the party requesting the enforcement is a claim manager and the consumer did 
not request from him the settlement pursuant to section 7 (2) within thirty days after the 
publication on the website specified in section 16 (3), this fact shall be notified in line with 
rules contained in paragraph (2).
(5) Section 16 (3) of the Decree of the Minister of Justice 14/1994 (IX. 8.) IM on the charges 
of judicial enforcement shall not be applied in cases specified in paragraph (1).
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(6) The bailiff shall commence the administration of cases registered as suspended 
pursuant to section 17 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 within sixty days of receipt of the notification 
specified in paragraph (2) and its enclosures.
(7) If, pursuant to paragraph (1), the rules laid down in section 17 of Act XXXVIII of 
2014 shall no longer apply in enforcement proceedings regulated in section 17 of Act 
XXXVIII of 2014, and earlier in the proceedings the debtor was granted the option to repay 
in instalments, the debtor shall repay the instalments at regular intervals as specified by the 
rules on the permission for paying in instalments if the debtor requested the application of 
section 17 (3) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 in line with section 17 (9) of Act XXXVIII of 2014.
(8) If, pursuant to paragraph (1) the rules laid down in section 17 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 
shall no longer apply in enforcement proceedings regulated in section 17 of Act XXXVIII of 
2014, and earlier in the proceedings garnishment was effected against the debtor, if the debtor 
requested the application of section 17 (3) of Act XXXVIII of 2014 in line with section 17 (9) 
of Act XXXVIII of 2014,the necessary measures shall be taken to continue the garnishment.
(9) If the enforceable document was not issued yet when the notification specified in 
paragraph (1) was received by the court or public notary ordering the enforcement, and as 
a result of the settlement the claim of the party requesting the enforcement differs from the 
request for the issue of the enforceable public deed that has been already submitted, the party 
requesting the enforcement shall present the request for the issue of the enforceable deed as 
amended according to the result of the settlement and shall also present the settlement, 
according to the rules concerning the request for the issue of the enforceable deed and in 
sufficient number of copies; or if the claim is no longer effective as a result of the settlement, 
he shall be obliged to withdraw the request for the issue of an enforceable public deed having 
already been submitted. Failing that, the court, public notary ordering the enforcement shall 
dismiss the request for the issue of the enforceable public deed. If the enforceable public deed 
has already been issued but it has not yet been sent to the bailiff, the court, the public notary 
ordering the enforcement shall send to the bailiff the settlement submitted by the party 
requesting the enforcement as an annex to the enforceable public deed.
(10) If the enforcement case was submitted to the court, the bailiff shall inform the court 
of the notification under paragraph (1).
(11) In enforcement proceedings regulated in section 17 of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the rules 
set out in section 17 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall not apply after 31 December 2016, with the 
proviso that if up to this point in time the party requesting the enforcement does not make 
the notification pursuant to paragraphs (2) to (4), the enforcement, with the exception laid 
down in this paragraph, shall be stay pursuant to section 52 c) of Act LIII of 1994 on judicial 
enforcement (hereinafter “Vht.”). If repayment in instalments has been granted for the 
debtor, or the employer (organ disbursing the remuneration) confirmed garnishment and 
there is no opportunity for any other action or no other action is necessary, the procedural 
actions and measures may be taken with a view to a payment in instalments or garnishment.
(12) If, on sending the notification specified in paragraph (1), the enforcement has already been 
ordered, the fee for the bailiff shall be adjusted to the sum to be enforced, including the principal, 
the contribution and costs if the value of the enforcement case established in this manner is lower 
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than the sum indicated in the enforceable public deed, including the principal, the contribution 
and costs. For the purposes of this paragraph, the case shall qualify as settlement when the party 
requesting the enforcement owes to the consumer and the party requesting enforcement is 
obliged to pay that amount to the consumer pursuant to section 17 (1), and the party requesting 
enforcement includes this claim of the consumer in the claim affected by the enforcement; if the 
party requesting enforcement makes a declaration to this effect.
(13) For calculating the amount of the commission for collection, the amount by which 
the party requesting the enforcement reduced the claim to be enforced by means of the 
settlement specified in paragraph (12) may not be considered as amount collected.
(14) If the party requesting enforcement reduced the claim to be enforced by means of the 
settlement specified in paragraph (12), in respect of the amount by which the enforceable 
claim was reduced, the bailiff shall not be entitled to the amount payable to him for executing 
the enforcement pursuant to section 34 (5) of the Vht.
Section 42 (1) The vacating of the residential property defined in section 303 of the Vht., 
taking into account the provisions laid down in section 182/A of the Vht.,may be executed 
on the thirtieth day following the notification of the bailiff of the fact that the settlement 
between the financial institution and the consumer was sent to the debtor or, on the thirtieth 
day following the notification specified in paragraph (2) or (3), the notification shall be 
governed by the rules under section 41 paragraph (2).
(2) Applying the rules laid down in section 41 (2), it shall also be notified if, pursuant to 
the provisions of this Act, no settlement is required to be made in respect of the consumer 
loan contract.
(3) If the party requesting the enforcement is a claim manager and the consumer did 
not request from him the settlement pursuant to section 7 (2) within thirty days after the 
publication on the website specified in section 16 (3), this fact shall be notified by applying 
the rules laid down in section 41 (2).
(4) The execution of the vacation of the residential property specified in section 303 of the 
Vht., with respect to the provisions under section 182/A of the Vht., shall be implemented 
after 31 December 2016 at the latest.
Section 42/A In respect of enforcement proceedings based on claims originating from 
consumer loan contracts secured by mortgage lien, if the conditions specified in section 41 
and section 42 are met on 15 September 2015 or earlier than that, the time limits specified in 
sections 41 and 42 shall commence on 16 September 2015.
(2) If, in the course of enforcement, a residential property with a market value of less than 
sixty million forints was also seized, no action can be taken with a view to the sale of the 
property on the basis of which the buyers may make a valid bid. In these cases, actions with 
a view to the sale of the residential property may only be taken if the party requesting the 
enforcement and the debtor jointly request the sale of the residential property pursuant to 
section 157 of the Vht. after 15 September 2015, in the absence of such a request only if the time 
limit specified in section 104 (5) and (6) of Act CV of 2015 on the debt settlement of natural 
persons have already expired and the debtor, the co-debtor, surety or owner of the pledged 
item did not submit their request to initiate the proceeding with a view to debt settlement.
 Appendices 477
19. The application of the rules of the government 
decree regulating the sale of pledged items outside 
judicial enforcement
Section 43 (1) In the proceeding regulated under section 18 of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the 
rules laid down in section 18 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall not be applied after the thirtieth 
day after the settlement made between the financial institution and the consumer is sent to 
the debtor.
(2) In the proceeding regulated under section 18 of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the rules 
pursuant laid down in section 18 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall not be applied after the 
thirtieth day following the establishment of the fact that in respect of the consumer loan 
contract no settlement is to be made pursuant to this Act.
(3) In the proceeding regulated under section 18 of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the rules in 
section 18 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 shall not be applied after the thirtieth day following the 
establishment of the fact that the consumer did not request from the claim manager the 
settlement specified under section 7 (2) within thirty days following the publication on the 
website specified under section 16 paragraph (3).
(4) In the proceeding regulated pursuant to section 18 of Act XXXVIII of 2014, the rules 
specified therein shall cease to be applicable after 31 December 2016 at the latest.
Section 43/A In respect of proceedings regulated under section 18 of Act XXXVIII of 2014 
that are based on a claims originating from consumer loan contracts secured by a mortgage 
lien, if the conditions specified under section 43 are met on 15 September 2015 or before, the 
time limit specified under section 43 shall commence on 16 day of September 2015.
(2) If the market value of the mortgaged residential property put up for sale is less than 
sixty million forints, no action can be taken with a view to the sale of the property in an 
auction on the basis of which the buyers may make a valid bid. In these cases, actions with 
a view to the sale of the residential property may only be taken if the time limits specified 
in section 104 (5) and (6) of Act CV of 2015 on the debt settlement of natural persons have 
already expired and the debtor, the co-debtor, surety or owner of the pledged item did not 
submit their request to initiate the proceeding with a view to debt settlement.
20. Accounting rules concerning the settlement
Section 44 The amount accounted as overpayment and refunded to the consumers as a 
result of the implementation of Act XXXVIII of 2014 and this Act in respect of the previous 
financial years shall be deemed by the financial institution as a major error pursuant to Act 
C of 2000 on accounting with the proviso that derogating from the requirements specified 
in section 19 (3) and section 37 (5) of Act C of 2000 on accounting, it shall be accounted as 
extraordinary expenditures included in the expenditures pertaining to the reporting period 
of the financial year when credit (settlement), payment (refund) were dated. In respect of the 
amount accounted as overpayment and refunded in respect of previous financial years, the 
provisions under section 170 of Act C of 2000 on accounting shall not apply.
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Section 44/A In respect of forint-based consumer loan contracts, the financial institution 
shall comply with its settlement obligations towards the consumer pursuant to Act LXXVII 
of 2014 on the settlement of matters relating to the currency conversion of certain consumer 
loan contracts and interest rate rules, and this Act as of 30 June 2015 with the proviso that it 
shall include or record the impacts of the settlements in its internal registries concerning the 
client and its accounting registers by 30 September 2015,and if a civil proceeding launched 
by the financial institution or the Supervising Authority under this Act or Act XXXVIII 
of 2014 is terminated after 1 August 2015 then no later than the sixtieth day following the 
termination of the civil proceeding.
21. The prohibition of the unilateral increase of interest, 
cost and fee and special provisions on termination in 
respect of consumer loan contracts
Section 45 (1) The financial institution shall not have the right to unilaterally increase the 
interest, cost or fee until a date specified in a separate Act, but until 1 April 2016 at the latest 
in respect of consumer loan contracts.
(2) The financial institution may terminate the consumer loan contract due to the 
consumer’s failure to fulfil his payment obligation becoming effective after the settlement 
specified in this Act is sent to the consumer and the arrears of the claim of the financial 
institution against the consumer may become due in a lump sum at the same time.
(3) The termination specified under paragraph (2) shall take effect on the day following 
the sending of the settlement but no later than 31 December 2016 and if, as a result of 
the settlement, the legal or contractual conditions of termination and loss of the right to 
repayment in instalments are met in relation to the consumer.
22. Final provisions
Section 46 The Governor of the Hungarian National Bank shall be authorised, as set out 
in section 4 (7) of the MNB Act, with respect to the macro-prudential tasks, in particular 
the prevention of systemic risks and other responsibilities as specified under section 4 (9) a) 
and d), to set forth in a decree
a) the detailed rules of the settlement method and the formulas thereof,
b) the rules, method and formulas of accounting for the reductions deductible from 
consumer’s claims,
c) the detailed requirements of settlement in terms of content and form,
d)
e) the due dates of financial performance,
f) for financial institutions subject to winding up and liquidation procedure, the method 
of estimation specified in the MNB Decree in the course of settlement,
g) the requirements of disclosure on the website of the settlement in terms content and 
form, and
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h) other detailed rules necessary for the settlement and the enforcement of claims relating 
to the settlement.
Section 46/A The minister responsible for justice shall be authorised to specify in a 
decree the paper-based forms, their requirements in terms of form and content, the annexes 
that may be attached to the forms and the publication of the forms to be used in the civil 
proceedings regulated in this Act.
Section 47 (1) This Act, with the exception of paragraph (2), shall enter into force on 15 
October 2014.
(2) Sections 1 to 45 and sections 48 to 51 shall enter into force on 1 November 2014.
Section 48 (1) The provisions of this Act as amended by Act LII of 2015 on the amendment 
of certain acts to combat malpractices in the course of banking settlements (hereinafter 
“Módtv.”) shall also apply to proceedings in progress at the time of the entry into force of 
the Módtv.
(2) If, at the time when the Módtv. enters into force, the time limit pursuant to section 
18 (1) has already commenced or expired, in respect of the person entitled to contest the 
settlement not indicated on the settlement as an addressee, the time limit of thirty days 
specified under section 18 (1) shall commence on the date when the Módtv. enters into force.
Sections 49-51
Section 52
Annex 1 of Act XL of 2014
The data to be provided on the form to be submitted as the extract of the 
financial institution
1. Mandatory data concerning the entity submitting the extract:
1.1. Name;
1.2.Seat;
1.3. The telephone number, fax number, e-mail address of the proceeding organisational 
unit;
2. Mandatory data concerning the content of the extract:
2.1. Type of financial service, its designation used by the entity submitting the extract;
2.2. Period of application, year, month, day;
2.3. Levels of regulations:
2.3.1. Contract clause not negotiated individually,
2.3.2. General Terms and Conditions,
2.3.3. Business regulations
2.3.4. Other;
2.4. The designation of documents representing the levels of regulation as used by the entity 
   submitting the extract;
2.5. Relevant provisions of documents representing levels of regulation:
2.5.1. Interest-related provisions,
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2.5.2. Cost-related provisions,
2.5.3. Fee-related provisions;
2.6. The name of the indication, numbering of the relevant provision for the purpose of 
   identification within the document;
3. Other mandatory data:
3.1. Reference to the fact that the information sheet pursuant to this Act has been attached 
to the extract;
3.2. Information, warnings on the form:
3.2.1. Information on substantial legal effects,
3.2.2. Information on how to fill in the form;
4. Reference to the fact that the financial service indicated on the extract is a forint or a 
foreign exchange loan;
5. The declaration of the financial institution confirming that the content of the extract 
    complies with the regulation it applies.
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ACT LXXVII OF 2014
on the settlement of issues related to the conversion of the currency of 
certain consumer loan agreements and rules regarding interest
1. Scope of Act
1. §
(1) The scope of this Act shall extend to
a) credit and loan agreements and financial leasing agreements entered into by and 
between financial institutions and consumers which are not yet terminated on 1 February 
2015 (hereinafter collectively referred to as „consumer loan agreement”) and
b) debts arising from consumer loan agreements in existence at the time of the entry into 
force of this Act but already terminated by the financial institution and recorded by the 
financial institution or any other financial institution coming under collective regulatory 
supervision with the former as defaulted receivables
concluded between 1 May 2004 and the entry into force of Act XXXVIII of 2014 on 
the settlement of certain issues related to the Curia’s legal unity decision concerning the 
consumer loan agreements of financial institutions (hereinafter referred to as Act XXXVIII 
of 2014), in connection with which an obligation of settlement lies with financial institutions 
on the basis of Act XL of 2014 on the rules of settlement laid down in Act XXXVIII of 2014 
on the settlement of certain issues related to the Curia’s legal unity decision concerning the 
consumer loan agreements of financial institutions, and certain other provisions (hereinafter 
referred to as the „Settlement Act”).
(2) The scope of this Act shall not extend to
a) consumer loan agreements linked to credit cards or payment accounts, and
b) HUF-based consumer housing loan agreements provided with state interest subsidies.
2. Interpretative Provisions
2. §
(1) For the purposes of this Act:
a) consumer loan agreement under the effect of the exchange rate cap: the consumer 
loan agreement serving as the basis for the foreign currency loan defined in Section 1(1), 
paragraph 1 of Act LXXV of 2011 on the fixing of the amortisation exchange rate of foreign 
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currency loans and the forced sale of housing properties (hereinafter referred to as the 
„Exchange Rate Cap Act”);
b) BUBOR: Budapest inter-bank interest rate;
c) foreign currency-based loan agreement: a credit or loan agreement or financial leasing 
agreement recorded in a foreign currency or provided in a foreign currency and amortised 
in HUF;
d) foreign currency loan agreement: a foreign currency credit or loan agreement or financial 
leasing agreement not qualifying as foreign currency-based;
e) original interest margin:
ea) if the original initial interest is tied to a reference interest rate, the interest margin 
quoted upon the due date of the first amortisation instalment of the agreement or if the 
financial institution granted an interest margin discount for a pre-determined term of the 
agreement, the first interest margin to form part of the agreement after the expiry of the 
preferential period,
eb) if the original initial interest is not tied to a reference interest rate, the difference of the 
original initial interest and the arithmetic average of the three-month London inter-bank 
interest rate quoted for the given currency in the month of the disbursement of the loan 
amount;
f) original initial interest:
fa) except as set forth in fb), the interest quoted upon the due date of the first amortisation 
instalment of the agreement,
fb) if the financial institution granted an interest margin discount for a pre-determined 
term of the agreement, the first interest margin to form part of the agreement after the 
expiry of the preferential period;
g) original initial handling charge: the handling charge determined in the agreement or to 
form part of the agreement after the expiry of the preferential period;
h) original calculable interest, interest margin: the lower interest or interest margin of the 
original initial interest (interest margin in the case of agreement tied to a reference interest 
rate) and the transaction interest (interest margin in the case of agreement tied to a reference 
interest rate) applied in the given consumer loan agreement on 19 July 2014;
i) consumer: a consumer so defined in Section 6(1), paragraph 28 of Act CCXXXVII of 
2013 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as the „Cre-
dit Institutions Act”);
j) effective day: the date determined on the basis of Section 6(5) of the Settlement Act;
k) forint-based loan agreement: a credit or loan agreement or financial leasing agreement 
disbursed and recorded in HUF which may only be repaid in HUF;
l) financial leasing for real estate: a financial leasing agreement, the purpose of which is, as 
committed to a deed by the parties, the acquisition by the lessee of title to real estate from a 
third party seller;
m) mortgage loan agreement: an agreement entered into for the provision of a mortgage 
loan as defined in Section 6(1), paragraph 50 of the Credit Institutions Act;
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n) housing mortgage loan agreement: an agreement entered into for the provision of a 
mortgage loan as defined in Section 3, paragraph 22 of Act CLXII of 2009 on credit provided 
for consumers (hereinafter referred to as the „Consumer Credit Act”);
o) financial institution: a financial institution as defined in Section 7(1) of the Credit 
Institutions Act;
p) financial leasing agreement: an agreement that satisfies the conditions set forth in 
Section 6(1), paragraph 89 of the Credit Institutions Act.
(2) For the purposes of this Act,
a) amortisation instalment shall also be construed as lease fee,
b) debt shall also be construed as a debt existing on the basis of a financial leasing agreement 
(including, in particular, the financing amount and the residual value).
(3) The rules defined in this Act with respect to consumer mortgage loan agreements shall 
also apply to financial leasing agreements for real estate.
3. Common Rules of the Amendment of Consumer Loan Agreements
3. §
(1) Consumer loan agreements shall be amended as set forth herein by the force of law.
(2) Financial institutions shall draft the texts of the provisions of consumer loan agreements 
and the associated collateral agreements, mortgage agreements and independent lien 
agreements (for the purposes of this Section hereinafter collectively referred to as „mortgage 
agreements”) which are to be amended as set forth in this Act.
(3) Day of amendment of agreements
a) except as set forth in paragraphs b) and c), the day following the receipt by the consumer 
of the text of the amended provisions of the consumer loan agreement,
b) in the case of foreign currency or foreign currency-based consumer mortgage loan 
agreements – if the consumer does not avail himself/herself of the option defined in Section 
12(1) –, the thirty-first day following the receipt by the consumer of the text of the amended 
provisions of the consumer loan agreement,
c) in the case of foreign currency or foreign currency-based consumer mortgage loan 
agreements – if the financial institution notifies the consumer that he/she does not satisfy 
any of the conditions laid down in Section 12(3) –, the day following the receipt of the notice 
referred to in Section 12(4).
(4) The effect of the amendment of the agreement shall set in retroactive to the effective 
day.
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(5) Any lien and suretyship serving to secure the consumer loan agreement shall survive; 
the amendment of the agreement as set forth in this Act is not subject to the consent of the 
surety, including a state surety, and – if the obligor of the consumer loan agreement and the 
lien obligor are not one and the same person – of the lien obligor. However, their status may 
not become any more cumbersome in consequence of such amendment.
(6) If the consumer loan agreement amended under this Act was refinanced through the 
purchase of an independent lien as defined in Act XXX of 1997 on mortgage credit institutions 
and mortgage deeds or the provision of a refinancing mortgage loan, the legal relationship 
relating to refinancing shall also be amended by the force of this Act in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the consumer loan agreement amended under this Act. The forint 
amount of refinancing shall be adjusted to the amount of the debt converted into forints 
on the basis of Section 10. The contractual terms and conditions of refinancing shall be 
amended on the basis of the written notice sent by the financial institution to the mortgage 
credit institution retroactive to the effective day.
4. §
(1) The amended consumer loan agreement need not be committed to a notarial deed; the 
former notarial deed shall be valid within the boundaries of the amended content of the 
agreement.
(2) The amendment of the consumer loan agreement under this Act and the conversion 
of the debt defined in Section 15(1) into forints as set forth in this Act shall not prevent the 
notary public drafting the deed from furnishing the
a) notarial deed drafted of the consumer loan agreement,
b) notarial deed containing a declaration of unilateral commitment made by the consumer 
on the basis of a consumer loan agreement committed to a private deed, or
c) notarial deed stating the claim secured by mortgage of any kind in connection with the 
consumer loan agreement
with a clause of execution. The furnishing of the notarial deed with a clause of execution 
may only be requested in accordance with the amended consumer loan agreement and the 
debt converted into forints on the basis of Section 15(1).
(3) In the event of the enforcement of a lien outside court execution, the right of satisfaction 
may only be exercised up to the amount of the consumer loan agreement amended under 
this Act and the debt converted into forints on the basis of Section 15(1).
(4) If the executable deed has not been issued yet, the party seeking execution shall report 
the change in its claim under this Act simultaneously with the fulfilment of its obligation of 
reporting under Section 41(9) of the Settlement Act.
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(5) During the course of court execution in progress on the basis of a public deed already 
furnished with a final and absolute clause in respect of the debt referred to in Section 15(1), 
the party seeking execution shall report the change in the debt under this Act simultaneously 
with the fulfilment of its obligation of reporting under Section 41(2) of the Settlement Act.
(6) The mortgage registered as collateral securing the original consumer loan agreement 
shall continue to secure the consumer loan agreement amended on the basis of this Act; the 
mortgage recorded in the real estate register need not be amended in the event of a change 
in the currency of the debt.
(7) If the currency of the mortgage encumbering real estate which was established to 
secure the consumer loan agreement is different from the currency of the consumer loan 
agreement amended by the force of this Act, upon the determination of the amount of the 
registered mortgage in forints, the exchange rate determined in Section 10 shall be applied.
5. §
(1) The financial institution shall send the text of the amended provisions of the consumer 
loan agreement, together with the statement of settlement under the Settlement Act, to the 
address determined in Section 16(1) of the Settlement Act by mail, with acknowledgement 
of receipt.
(2) The following shall be enclosed with the communication under subsection (1):
a) a summary of the material elements of the amendment as defined in the decree of the 
Governor of the National Bank of Hungary (hereinafter referred to as the „NBH”),
b) an amortisation table containing the amortisation instalments falling due during the 
remaining term as of the effective day,
c) a notice alerting the consumer to the right of termination set forth in Section 13,
d) a notice alerting the consumer to the possibility of initiating the procedure referred to 
in Section 12 and, in conjunction with this,
da) a list of the documents to be submitted by the consumer for the calculation of the 
income-proportionate amortisation instalment and the income-proportionate amortisation 
instalment indicator under the legal rule on the regulation of credit coverage ratios 
(hereinafter referred to as „IPAII”),
db) drawing attention to the existence of the conditions set forth in Section 12(3), 
paragraphs c) and d), and
dc) in the case of consumer loan agreements under the effect of the exchange rate cap, a 
warning alerting the consumer to make the written declaration referred to in Section 12(3).
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6. §
(1) The consumer shall pay the amortisation instalment payable on the basis of the 
amendment under this Act for the first time in the month following the last day of the time 
limit determined in Section 13(1) and (2) of the Settlement Act that is available for sending 
the settlement statement.
(2) After the financial institution ascertains the amount of the difference between the 
amortisation payments paid up to the date referred to in subsection (1) and payable as of the 
effective day, the financial institution
a) shall forthwith transfer the amount of the difference to the consumer’s payment account 
– if the financial institution is aware of the number of the consumer’s payment account 
– and shall inform the consumer thereof in its next notice concerning the change in the 
amortisation instalments,
b) shall forthwith inform the consumer – if the financial institution is not aware of 
the number of the consumer’s payment account – that it will transfer the amount of the 
difference to his/her payment account as soon as it is made aware of the number thereof and 
that, in the absence of such information, the consumer may collect the difference from the 
financial institution in cash.
7. §
(1) In the case of consumer loan agreements amended under this Act, the term of the in-
terest period (in the case of interest tied to a reference interest rate, the interest margin 
periods) shall be as follows:
a) if the remaining term reckoned from the effective day exceeds 16 years, it shall be five 
years,
b) if the remaining term reckoned from the effective day exceeds 9 years but is maximum 
16 years, it shall be four years,
c) if the remaining term reckoned from the effective day exceeds 3 years but is maximum 
9 years, it shall be three years.
(2) The initial day of the first new interest period or interest margin period following the 
entry into force of this Act shall be the day of the month that corresponds to the day and 
month of the effective day of the transaction year determined in the original consumer loan 
agreement during the period between 1 May 2015 and 30 April 2016.
(3) If there is no day corresponding to the initial day of the interest period or interest 
margin period in the month of the given year, the initial day of the interest period or interest 
margin period shall be the last day of the month.
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(4) The term of the last interest period or interest margin period may be shorter than the 
term determined in subsection (1).
8. §
(1) The amendment after the effective day of consumer loan agreements amended under 
this Act shall be governed by the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act, unless this Act 
provides otherwise.
(2) If the interest of the consumer loan agreement amended under this Act
a) is fixed during the interest periods, the rate of the interest
b) is tied to a reference interest rate, the rate of the interest margin
may for the first time only be altered to the consumer’s detriment as set forth in the 
Consumer Credit Act as of the initial day of the second interest period following the entry 
into force of this Act.
9. §
(1) Any fees, commissions and charges which were validly established in the consumer loan 
agreement prior to the entry into force of this Section shall remain part of the agreement.
(2) The financial institution shall be entitled to raise any fees, commissions and charges 
determined on an itemised basis once annually, effective as of 1 April – for the first time, as 
of 1 April 2016 – maximum by the rate of the previous year’s annual consumer price index 
published by the Central Statistical Office.
(3) The financial institution may not charge the consumer any fee, cost or commission in 
connection with the amendment under this Act.
4. Foreign Currency and Foreign Currency-Based Mortgage Loans
10. §
The financial institution that is the beneficiary of the given foreign currency or foreign 
currency-based mortgage loan agreement shall, by the deadline for the fulfilment of its 
obligation of settlement under the Settlement Act, convert the total debt existing on the 
basis of or arising from the foreign currency or foreign currency-based consumer mortgage 
loan agreement as determined on the basis of the settlement rendered in accordance with 
the Settlement Act, including any interest, fees, commissions and costs charged in a foreign 
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currency, into a forint claim as of the effective day at one of the following exchange rates, 
whichever is more favourable for the consumer:
a) the average of the foreign exchange rates of the given currency officially quoted by the 
NBH between 16 June 2014 and 7 November 2014, or
b) at the foreign exchange rate of the given currency officially quoted by the NBH on 7 No-
vember 2014
(hereinafter referred to as „forint conversion”).
11. §
(1) In the event of forint conversion upon the amendment of a foreign currency or foreign 
currency-based consumer mortgage loan agreement, the financial institution may only use 
interest that is tied to a reference interest rate.
(2) The applicable reference interest rate is the three-month BUBOR.
(3) The first day of the second interest period of the reference interest rate:
a) if the beginning of the first new interest margin period falls between 1 May 2015 and 1 
August 2015, it is that day,
b) in all other cases, it is the day of the month after 30 April 2015 which may be determined 
by counting back three months from the initial day of the first new interest margin period.
(4) The interest margin is the original interest margin, with the proviso that
a) it cannot be less than 1 per cent, and
b) may not exceed
ba) 4.5 per cent in the case of housing consumer mortgage loan agreements or
bb) 6.5 per cent in the case of non-housing consumer mortgage loan agreements.
(5) If the consumer mortgage loan agreement also contains an original initial handling 
charge expressed as a percentage, the rates of the interest margins referred to in subsection 
(4), paragraph b) shall be taken into consideration at a rate reduced by the percentage point 
of the original initial handling charge.
(6) The initial interest determined by virtue of the amendment under this Act may not 
exceed the originally calculable interest, unless this interest is lower than the minimum 
initial interest that may be determined on the basis of this Section.
12. §
(1) The consumer may, within thirty days of the receipt of the amended provisions of the 
consumer mortgage loan agreement, initiate with the credit institution the dispensation of 
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the forint conversion defined in Section 10 and of the application of the interest rules defined 
in Section 11 in writing, with the content and in the form determined in the decree of the 
Governor of the NBH.
(2) In the case of co-debtors, the procedure referred to in subsection (1) may be initiated 
on the basis of the joint and concordant statement of the co-debtors.
(3) The consumer may avail himself/herself of the option under subsection (1) if
a) he/she verifies that he/she has a regular income of an amount in excess of the expected 
amortisation instalment in the currency quoted by the NBH as an official exchange rate – 
which shall be construed as a combined income in the case of co-debtors, or
b) based on the IPAII, he/she should be eligible to obtain the given foreign currency-based 
loan and encloses the documents necessary for the verification thereof determined by the 
financial institution on the basis of Section 5(2), paragraph d), sub-paragraph da), or
c) the remaining term of the consumer mortgage loan agreement expires on 31 December 
2020, at the latest, or
d) the calculable initial interest in the case of forint conversion based on this Act exceeds 
the interest or interest margin originally calculable on the basis of subsection (7),
and, in the case of a consumer loan agreement under the effect of the exchange rate cap, 
the consumer makes a written declaration to the financial institution in acknowledgement 
of the fact that, as of the effective day, the financial institution will not provide the forint 
amount of the difference between the amortisation exchange rate applied by it and the 
exchange rate fixed in the Exchange Rate Cap Act through disbursement from the collection 
account credit under the Exchange Rate Cap Act.
(4) The financial institution shall assess the existence of the conditions laid down 
in subsection (3) within thirty days of the receipt of the procedure initiated under 
subsection (1) and shall forthwith notify the consumer thereof in a letter sent by mail, with 
acknowledgement of receipt.
(5) If the consumer satisfies any of the conditions laid down in subsection (3), the financial 
institution shall send the consumer the amended provisions of the foreign currency or 
foreign currency-based consumer mortgage loan agreement and the enclosures relating 
to the amended foreign currency or foreign currency-based consumer mortgage loan 
agreement set forth in Section 5(2), paragraphs a) and b) within sixty days of the assessment.
(6) If the consumer satisfies any of the conditions laid down in subsection (3), the 
amortisation instalments of the foreign currency or foreign currency-based consumer 
mortgage loan agreement falling due monthly and the forint amount of any charge, fee 
or commission determined in a foreign currency shall be determined on the basis of the 
foreign exchange rate defined in Section 21/B(1) and (2) of the Consumer Credit Act as of 
the effective day.
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(7) If the consumer satisfies any of the conditions laid down in subsection (3) and the in-
terest of the original foreign currency or foreign currency-based mortgage loan agreement
a) is fixed during the interest periods, the initial interest of the foreign currency or foreign 
currency-based consumer mortgage loan agreement applicable as of the effective day may 
not exceed the originally calculable interest;
b) is tied to a reference interest rate, the initial interest margin applicable as of the effective 
day may not exceed the originally calculable interest margin.
(8) If the consumer does not satisfy any of the conditions laid down in subsection (3), 
the consumer mortgage loan agreement shall be amended under the conditions set forth in 
Sections 10 and 11.
13. §
(1) If the foreign currency or foreign currency-based consumer mortgage loan agreement is 
changed to a forint-based consumer mortgage loan agreement under this Act, the consumer 
may terminate the consumer mortgage loan agreement within 60 days of the amendment.
(2) In the event of termination under subsection (1), the consumer shall pay the financial institution 
all his/her debts outstanding on the basis of the terminated agreement within 90 days of termination.
(3) If the consumer enters into a new consumer mortgage loan agreement with the 
financial institution or another financial institution in the interest of the fulfilment of his/
her payment obligation under subsection (2),
a) the financial institution affected by such termination may not charge the consumer any 
fee, cost or commission in connection with the fulfilment of the payment obligation,
b) the mortgage serving to secure the new consumer mortgage loan agreement shall have 
the ranking of the mortgage registered on the basis of the original consumer mortgage loan 
agreement maximum up to the amount used for the fulfilment of the payment obligation 
referred to in subsection (2) from the new consumer mortgage loan agreement, and
c) the new consumer mortgage loan agreement need not satisfy the conditions laid down 
in the legal rule on the regulation of the income-proportionate amortisation instalment and 
credit coverage ratios if
ca) the new consumer mortgage loan agreement is forint-based,
cb) the credit purpose of the new consumer mortgage loan agreement is the same as the 
credit purpose of the original consumer mortgage loan agreement, and
cc) the loan amount of the new consumer mortgage loan agreement does not exceed the 
amount of the payment liability under subsection (2).
(4) The intermediary shall not be entitled to charge its principal a fee for the mediation of 
financial services relating to forint-based consumer loans provided with a view to the full or 
partial repayment of the debt referred to in subsection (2).
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5. Forint-Based Consumer Loan Agreements and Foreign Currency and 
Foreign Currency-Based Consumer Loan Agreements Not Provided 
Against Mortgage Security
 
14. §
In the case of forint-based consumer loan agreements and foreign currency and foreign 
currency-based consumer loan agreements not provided against mortgage security, the in-
terest or interest margin applicable as of the effective day may not exceed the originally 
calculable interest or interest margin.
6. Conversion of Certain Debts into Claims Denominated in Forints
15. §
(1) Effective as of 1 February 2015, the financial institution shall convert the amount of 
the consumer’s debt arising from a foreign currency or foreign currency-based consumer 
mortgage loan agreement terminated by the credit institution but recorded by the financial 
institution or any other financial institution coming under collective regulatory supervision 
with the former as defaulted receivables, as determined on the basis of the settlement 
rendered in accordance with the Settlement Act, into a claim denominated in forints at one 
of the following exchange rates, whichever is more favourable for the consumer:
a) the average of the foreign exchange rates of the given currency officially quoted by the 
NBH between 16 June 2014 and 7 November 2014, or
b) at the foreign exchange rate of the given currency officially quoted by the NBH on 7 No-
vember 2014.
(2) The financial institution shall notify the consumer of the conversion referred to in 
subsection (1) and the amount of the debt outstanding in forints on the basis thereof, together 
with the settlement statement under the Settlement Act, whilst drawing attention to the option 
mentioned in subsection (3), in a letter sent by mail, with acknowledgement of receipt.
(3) If initiated by the consumer with the financial institution in writing, within 30 days of 
the receipt of the notification under subsection (2), the financial institution shall re-convert 
the claim converted into forints into a claim denominated in the original currency at the 
exchange rate determined in subsection (1).
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7. Review
16. §
(1) If the consumer
a) did not receive the information on the amendment of the agreement under this Act and 
the related documents or the information referred to in Section 15(2) within the prescribed 
time limit, or
b) disputes the calculation of the conversion of the claim expressed in forints under 
Sections 10 and 15, the calculation of the interest, or the adequacy of the data and calculations 
contained in the amortisation table stating the new amortisation instalments,
the consumer may request a review in accordance with the rules set forth in Sub-Title 11 
of the Settlement Act, except as set forth in subsections (2) and (3).
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the provision set forth in Section 18(4) of the 
Settlement Act is not applicable.
(3) In the event referred to in paragraph (1) a), the consumer may file a complaint with the 
financial institution within the time limit determined in Section 18(1) of the Settlement Act.
(4) Wherever Sub-Title 11 of the Settlement Act mentions settlement statement, it shall be 
construed as to also include the documents referred to in Section 5(1) and (2), Section 12(5) 
and Section 15(2), with the proviso that the consumer may also request the establishment of 
the fact that the financial institution would have been required to send these under this Act.
8. Rules of Delivery
17. §
Wherever this Act prescribes a notice to be sent by mail with acknowledgement of receipt, 
the delivery day is the day that may be determined on the basis of the rules of delivery of 
the Settlement Act, subject to the difference that if such notice is sent back with the message 
„address cannot be identified, „addressee unknown”, „moved”, „delivery obstructed” or 
„reported: deceased”, it is the day of re-delivery.
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9. Different Rules Applicable to Consumer Loan Agreements Under 
the Effect of the Fixing of the Amortisation Exchange Rates of Foreign 
Currency Loans
18. §
(1) The rules defined in this Act with respect to consumer loan agreements and the rules 
of the Exchange Rate Cap Act relating to the fixing of the amortisation exchange rates of 
foreign currency loans, the collection account credit agreement and the collection account 
credit shall apply subject to the differences under this sub-title.
(2) In the case of consumer loan agreements equally under the effect of the exchange rate 
cap and forint conversion on the basis of this Act, as of the amortisation instalment due in 
February 2015 until the amortisation instalment due in the sixtieth month reckoned from 
the initial day of the period of the application of the fixed exchange rate determined in 
the Exchange Rate Cap Act, the amortisation instalment may not exceed the amortisation 
instalment due in January 2015, not including any increase in the amortisation instalment 
arising from any interest changes calculable on the basis of this Act.
(3) In the case of loan agreements under the effect of the exchange rate cap, if a collection 
account credit debt expressed in forints remains outstanding after the settlement defined 
in Section 12 of the Settlement Act, collection account credit agreements and collection 
account credit shall be governed by the rules in force on the day before the entry into force 
of this Act, with the proviso that the collection account credit may not increase as of the 
effective day, not including any interest that may be charged to the debit of the collection 
account credit as defined in the Exchange Rate Cap Act.
(4) In the case of the consumer loan agreements defined in subsection (2), the financial 
institution shall determine the remaining term after the effective day in such a way that 
the amortisation instalments falling due after the sixtieth month reckoned from the initial 
day of the period of the application of the fixed exchange rate determined in the Exchange 
Rate Cap Act may not exceed 115 per cent of the amortisation instalments falling due in the 
sixtieth month reckoned from the initial day of the period of the application of the fixed 
exchange rate determined in the Exchange Rate Cap Act, or if this rate cannot be guaranteed, 
the amortisation instalment at the rate that is the most favourable for the consumer.
(5) The detailed rules of the calculation of the term defined in subsection (4) shall be 
determined by the minister responsible for the regulation of the money, capital and insurance 
markets in a decree.
(6) In the case of the consumer loan agreements defined in subsection (2), the consumer may, 
at any time until the sixtieth month reckoned from the initial day of the period of the application 
494 Foreign currency lending in Hungary
of the fixed exchange rate determined in the Exchange Rate Cap Act, initiate the amendment of 
the consumer loan agreement, based on which the consumer would pay a higher amortisation 
instalment than that determined therein also during the period referred to in subsection (2). The 
parties shall amend the agreement as initiated as of the due date of the first amortisation instalment 
falling due after a period of thirty days following the receipt of the initiated amendment.
10. Closing Provisions
19. §
(1) The Governor of the NBH is hereby authorised to establish the content and formal 
requirements relating to the
a) summary regarding the material elements of the contract amendment, and
b) the initiation of the procedure defined in Section 12(1)
by proceeding within his/her responsibilities identified in Section 4(9) of Act CXXXIX of 
2013 on the National Bank of Hungary.
(2) The minister responsible for the regulation of the money, capital and insurance markets 
is hereby authorised to establish the detailed rules of the calculation of the term defined in 
Section 18(4) in a decree.
20. §
(1) Except as set forth in subsection (2), this Act shall enter into force on the day following 
its promulgation.
(2) Section 3, Section 4(1), Sections 5-14, Section 18(4) and (5), Section 21(2) and Section 22 
shall enter into force on 1 February 2015.
21. §
(1) After 1 January 2015 – also until the payment of the amortisation instalment payable 
on the basis of the amendment under this Act for the first time –, upon determining the fo-
rint amount of the due amortisation instalment of the foreign currency or foreign currency-
based consumer mortgage loan agreement as well as the forint amount of any charge, fee or 
commission determined in a foreign currency, the financial institution shall apply one of the 
following exchange rates, whichever is more favourable for the consumer:
a) the average of the foreign exchange rates of the given currency officially quoted by the 
NBH between 16 June 2014 and 7 November 2014, or
b) at the foreign exchange rate of the given currency officially quoted by the NBH on 7 No-
vember 2014.
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(2) If the consumer satisfies any of the conditions laid down in Section 12(3), the financial 
institution shall account for the difference arising from the difference between the exchange 
rate defined in subsection (1) and the exchange rate applicable under the amended agreement 
to the debit or credit of the next due amortisation instalment falling due within 30 days of 
the amendment of the agreement, at the latest.
(3) In the case of foreign currency or foreign currency-based consumer mortgage loan 
agreements altered to forint-based agreements, the financial institution shall complete the 
settlements under this Act and the Settlement Act with the customer as at 1 February 2015, 
with the proviso that it shall transfer and record the consequences of such settlements in its 
internal records relating to the customer and in its accounting records by 31 March 2015.
(4) The financial institution shall meet its obligation of providing information in connection 
with consumer loan agreements prescribed in the Credit Institutions Act and the Consumer 
Credit Act in combination with the settlement under the Settlement Act between 1 January 
2015 and the last day of the time limit available for the sending of settlement statements 
determined in Section 13(1) and (2) of the Settlement Act.
(5) In the case of consumer loan agreements under the effect of the exchange rate cap, upon 
disbursement from the collection account credit defined in the Exchange Rate Cap Act, the 
exchange rate defined in subsection (1) shall be regarded as the amortisation exchange rate 
applied by the financial institution in January 2015.
22. §
Section 32/C(1) of Act LXXXV of 1996 on the amendment of Act XCIII of 1990 on duties 
and the administrative service fee of certified official title deeds shall be supplemented with 
the following paragraph q):
(Free of charge by virtue of its subject-matter:)
„q) entry in the real estate register of mortgage securing new consumer loan agreements 
under Section 13(3) of Act … of 2014 on the settlement of issues related to the conversion 
of the currency of certain consumer loan agreements and rules regarding interest, and 
deletion of mortgage securing consumer mortgage loan agreements terminated on the basis 
of Section 13(1) of Act … of 2014.”
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23. §
The Exchange Rate Cap Act shall be supplemented with the following Section 18/A:
„18/A.	§	New	credit	facility	agreements	relating	to	collection	account	credit	may	not	be	
initiated after the day of the entry into force of Act … of 2014 on the settlement of issues 
related to the conversion of the currency of certain consumer loan agreements and rules 
regarding interest.”
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ACT CLXII OF 2009
on Credit Provided for Consumers1
Scope of Act 
1. § (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to credit provided for consumers. 
(2) The provisions of this Act need not apply to the following:
a) hiring or lease which does not create an obligation of purchase for the consumer with 
respect to the object constituting the subject-matter of hiring or lease or does not provide a 
right for the creditor to prescribe an obligation to purchase,
b) overdraft facilities attached to payment accounts if the loans provided on the basis 
thereof must be repaid within one month, 
c) credit, in respect of which the consumer has no obligation to pay credit interest or any 
other consideration,
d) employer credit which is not available to members of the public and in conjunction with 
which the employee is obliged to pay credit interest and any other consideration at an annual 
percentage rate that is lower than the customary market rate or is not obliged to pay credit 
interest or any other consideration,
e)2 the investment credit defined in Act CXXXVIII of 2007 on investment enterprises 
and commodities exchange service providers and the rules of the activities which they may 
pursue, 
f) credit created by a court of law,
g) credit which relates to the rescheduling of an existing debt free of interest and any other 
consideration, 
h)3 credit defined by law or a legal rule issued on the basis of the authorisation of a law 
with a view to public interests which is provided within a limited range and interest-free or 
where the applicable credit interest rate is lower than the customary market rate or which is 
provided at the customary market credit interest rate but under terms and conditions that 
are more favourable for the consumer than the customary market terms and conditions; 
including bridging loans as defined in Act IV of 2009 on the joint and several state suretyship 
relating to housing loans, collection account credit as defined in the law on the fixing of 
the amortisation exchange rate of foreign currency loans and the forced sale of housing 
properties, and student loans provided under a separate legal rule.
(3) The provisions of this Act shall apply to financial leasing provided for consumers, with 
the proviso that wherever this Act mentions credit, it shall be construed as financial leasing, 
and wherever this Act mentions amortisation instalment, it shall be construed as lease fee 
for the purposes hereof.
1 Promulgated: 30 December 2009.
2 Amended by Section 96 of Act XCVIII of 2013.
3 Established by Section 16 of Act LXXV of 2011. In force as of 12 August 2011.
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(4) The provisions of this Act shall be applied in harmony with the rules of the obligations 
of cooperation and information that lie with the parties under Section 6:62 of Act V of 2013 
on the Civil Code.
(5) The provisions of this Act related to the information obligation and, if the surety or the 
lien obligor has a material legal interest therein, the provisions related to early repayment 
shall be applied in the manner laid down in the decree of the minister responsible for the 
regulation of the money, capital and insurance markets in the case of consumer suretyship 
agreements and consumer lien agreements attached to credit agreements in respect of the 
surety and the lien obligor not qualifying as a personal debtor.
2. § (1) The provisions of Section 17/B(2)–(4), Sections 17/C–17/E, Section 18(1)-(2) and 
Section 20/A need not apply to credit attached to credit card agreements or payment accounts. 
(2) In the case of credit facilities attached to payment accounts where the loans provided 
must be repaid within three months or at the creditor’s notice, Section 4(2), paragraphs d), f) 
and g), Section 4(3), Section 5, Section 6(1), paragraphs 6., 9–14, 16–19 and 21, Section 6(2)–
(5) and (7), Section 10, Section 12, Section 13, Section 16(1), paragraphs 6 and 9–24, Section 
17, Section 18(3) and (6), Sections 20–21, Section 21/B, Section 23, Section 24(1)–(4), (6) and 
(7) and Section 25 need not apply.
(3) In the case of overrunning, Sections 4–25 need not apply.
(4) Section 4(1)–(2), Section 6, Sections 8–11, Section 16(1), paragraphs 9, 11, 19 and 20 and 
(4), Section 17(1), Sections 19–20, Sections 21-22, Section 24 and Section 26 need not apply to 
mortgage loans and financial leasing. 
(5) The provisions of this Act shall apply to credit provided with state interest subsidies 
subject to the differences laid down in a separate legal rule.
Interpretative Provisions 
3. § For the purposes of this Act: 
1. early repayment: full or partial repayment of a debt existing on the basis of a credit 
agreement prior to the repayment date,
2. overdraft facility agreement attached to payment account: a credit agreement, by virtue 
of which the creditor places an amount at the consumer’s disposal that is in excess of the 
balance of the consumer’s payment account,
3. consumer: a natural person proceeding beyond the scope of his/her independent 
occupation and business activities,
4. full amount payable by consumer: the full amount of the credit and the totality of the 
charges payable thereon,
5. creditor: a legal entity who or which provides loans within the framework of its 
independent occupation or business activities, 
6. credit interest: a sum of money fixed annually as a fixed or variable percentage of the 
sum of credit drawn by the consumer,
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7. credit intermediary: a legal entity, other than a creditor, who engages in the following 
activities within the framework of its independent occupation or business activities against 
a consideration, including any fees, commissions or charges:
a) offering credit to consumers, or 
b) providing assistance for consumers in the interest of the conclusion of credit agreements, 
or
c) entering into credit agreements with consumers on behalf of creditors,
8. credit: a service provided on the basis of a credit agreement,
9. credit agreement: a credit agreement or a loan agreement as defined in the Act on the Ci-
vil Code, not including an agreement, on the basis of which the consumer makes instalment 
payments against the continuing provision of services or the sale of the same product in the 
same quantities,
10. total credit charge: all considerations known to the creditor and to be taken into 
consideration upon the calculation of the annual percentage rate under a separate legal rule, 
which are payable by the consumer on the basis of the credit agreement,
11. total credit amount: the full sum of the credit determined in the credit agreement or 
the upper limit thereof,
12. overrunning: credit attached to a payment account which the creditor places at the 
consumer’s disposal as an amount in excess of the amount stated in the overdraft facility 
agreement or in the absence of such agreement, 
13.4 mortgage loan: the term so defined in the Credit Institutions Act, 
14. interest period: a period determined in the credit agreement during which the creditor 
is not entitled to unilaterally alter the interest rate,
15. linked credit agreement: a credit agreement which is attached to the sale of a specified 
product or the provision of a service other than lending if
a) the credit is provided by the seller of the product or the provider of the service itself, or
b) the credit is provided by a third party and it uses the seller of the product or the provider 
of the service as intermediary during the course of the preparation or conclusion of the cre-
dit agreement, or the given product or service, to the sale or provision of which the credit 
agreement is attached was expressly specified in the credit agreement, 
16.5 financial leasing: the term so defined in the Act on Credit Institutions and Financial 
Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as the „Credit Institutions Act”), 
17. reference interest rate: the term so defined in the Credit Institutions Act, 
18. fixed credit interest: a credit interest rate determined in the credit agreement upon 
the conclusion thereof for the entire term of the credit agreement with the use of a single 
percentage rate or multiple percentage rates relating to parts of the term; the credit inte-
rest may only be regarded as fixed for the period, in respect of which its percentage rate was 
determined in the credit agreement, 
19. durable medium: the term so defined in the Credit Institutions Act,
4 Established by Act 128(1) of Act CCXXXVI of 2013. In force as of 1 January 2014.
5 Amended by Section 130a) of Act CCXXXVI of 2013.
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20. annual percentage rate: the ratio of the total credit charge to the full sum of the credit 
expressed in percentage per annum,
21. variable credit interest: any interest that does not qualify as fixed credit interest,
22.6 housing mortgage loan: a mortgage loan 
a) as part of which the credit purpose laid down by the parties in a deed is the purchase, 
construction, enlargement, modernisation or refurbishment of a housing property,
b) which was used, based on documentary evidence, for the replacement of a mortgage 
loan provided for the purposes determined in paragraph a) and the amount of which may 
only exceed the amount outstanding at the time of the replacement of the original credit 
debt on account of the relevant exchange rate differences between the creditors and by the 
verified fees and charges that are related to the closure of the original credit debt and the 
disbursement of the new loan, 
23.7 housing financial leasing: a lease, the purpose of which, as laid down by the parties in 
a deed, is the acquisition by the lessee of title to a housing property from a third party seller,
24. interest modification indicator: a relative number accessible to the public which serves as 
the basis for the calculation of any interest modification and which objectively expresses any 
change in circumstances related to the refinancing costs of lending and the provision of cre-
dit that fall beyond the range of business risks and the control of creditors, are independent 
of creditors, and cannot be prevented or controlled by creditors, 
25. interest margin: interest payable over and above the reference interest rate as part of 
the credit interest, the part of the interest defined as the difference of the credit interest and 
the reference interest, 
26. interest margin modification indicator: an interest modification indicator serving as 
the basis for the alteration of the interest margin.
Commercial Communication Relating to Credit Products
4. § (1) The annual percentage rate shall be stated in every instance in any commercial 
communication relating to credit products prominently, by using the relevant abbreviation, 
to the accuracy of one decimal point. 
(2) If a commercial communication relating to a credit product features figures that relate to 
the credit interest or any other consideration, including any fees, commissions and charges, 
in addition to the value of the annual percentage rate, such commercial communication 
shall clearly, concisely and prominently also feature the following items of data based on the 
demonstration of a representative example:
a) rate and type of credit interest (fixed credit interest, variable credit interest or both),
b) total credit charge, including the fees, commissions, charges and taxes forming part 
thereof,
c) full amount of credit, 
6 Established by Section 128(2) of Act CCXXXVI of 2013. In force as of 1 January 2014.
7 Promulgated by Section 6 of Act XCVI of 2010. In force as of 27 November 2010.
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d) term of credit, 
e) annual percentage rate,
f) in the case of credit provided in the form of deferred payment in connection with the 
sale of products or the provision of services, the cash price of the product or service and the 
own resources, and
g) the full amount payable by the consumer and the amounts of the amortisation 
instalments. 
(3) If the use of an ancillary service attached to the credit product (e.g. insurance) 
is necessary for the conclusion of the credit agreement or the conclusion of the credit 
agreement as per the creditor’s offer and the consideration payable for the ancillary servi-
ce attached to the credit product is not known, the obligation to enter into a agreement with 
respect to the ancillary service attached to the credit product shall also be clearly, concisely 
and prominently stated in the commercial communication relating to the credit product, in 
combination with the annual percentage rate. 
(4) Credit intermediaries shall state in any commercial communication relating to credit 
products on whose behalf they proceed.
Pre-Contractual Information 
5. § (1) Prior to the conclusion of credit agreements, creditors and credit intermediaries 
shall provide pre-contractual information for the consumer, on the basis of which the 
consumer may assess whether the credit product intended to be used is adapted to his/her 
needs and financial capacity. As part of this, the creditor or credit intermediary shall place 
at the consumer’s disposal the information necessary for comparing different offers in order 
to enable the consumer to make an informed decision on the possible conclusion of the cre-
dit agreement. 
(2) The information under subsection (1) shall, above all, extend to the most important 
characteristics of credit products, the impacts thereof on the consumer’s financial situation, 
and the consequences of defaulting on payments, in particular, the default interest rate, the 
termination of the credit, and the enforcement of the collateral provided. 
(3) The information under subsection (1) shall be provided in a concise and informative 
manner so as to ensure that it is comprehensible and transparent to the consumer and to 
demonstrate on the basis of representative examples the burden which the repayment of the 
credit will impose relative to the consumer’s income situation and any changes therein, and 
any further risks which the consumer is to reckon with during the course of the repayment 
of the credit, including any interest and exchange rate risks. 
(4) In the interest of providing pre-contractual information for consumers, creditors shall 
make the most typical sample texts of their credit agreements and mortgage agreements for 
each product group accessible on their Internet websites. 
(5) The detailed rules of the method and form of the provision of the information regulated 
in this Section shall be determined by the minister responsible for the regulation of the 
money, capital and insurance markets. 
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6. § (1) In addition to the information under Section 5, in the interest of the comparison of 
credit agreement offers and the adoption of informed consumer decisions on the conclusion 
of credit agreements, creditors and credit intermediaries shall, in good time but before any 
offer or credit agreement becomes binding on the consumer, inform the consumer of the 
following data in respect of the credit product that may be considered on the basis of the 
information supplied by the consumer on paper, by using the form attached hereto as Annex 
1, or any other durable media:
1. type of credit, 
2. name (company name) and mail address of creditor,
3. creditor intermediary’s name (company name) and mail address,
4. full amount of credit and drawdown conditions,
5. term of credit,
6. in the case of credit provided in the form of deferred payment in conjunction with the 
sale of a product or the provision of a service, description and cash price of the given product 
or service, 
7. the credit interest and credit interest conditions, the relevant reference interest rate if 
any, the interest margin, the interest modification or interest margin modification indicator, 
and the frequency, conditions and procedural rules of the modification of the credit interest, 
8. the annual percentage rate with a representative example, including all relevant 
conditions,
9. the full amount payable by the consumer on the basis of the conditions known at the 
time of the conclusion of the agreement, 
10. the amounts of the amortisation instalments payable by the consumer, number of 
amortisation instalments and frequency of amortisation, and order of accounting for 
amortisation instalments towards different credit interest debts,
11. all commissions, fees, charges or other payment liabilities related to payment accounts 
or cash substitute payment instruments, unless the maintenance of the payment account or 
cash substitute payment instrument is not mandatory,
12. all further considerations attached to the credit beyond the credit interest, including 
all fees, commissions (hereinafter collectively referred to as „fees”) and charges, and the 
conditions of their modification, 
13. any notarial fees where applicable, 
14. any ancillary services attached to the credit (e.g. insurance) which are necessary for 
the conclusion of the credit agreement or the conclusion thereof as per the creditor’s offer, 
15. default interest or any other payment liability which may arise from the non-fulfilment 
of the obligation undertaken in the agreement,
16. consequences of non-payment,
17. identification of required collateral,
18. right of withdrawal or the lack thereof,
19. right of early repayment and the costs thereof under Section 24 if any,
20. the obligation under Section 14(4),
21. the obligation under Section 9, and
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22. any temporal restriction on the validity of the data supplied.
(2) If the conditions of the application of the various credit interest rates under subsection 
(1)7 are different, information shall be supplied with respect to the frequency, conditions 
and procedural rules of the modification of the credit interest in the case of every credit in-
terest rate. 
(3) If, based on the data supplied, the consumer identifies the characteristics of the 
preferred credit product of his/her choice, the creditor or credit intermediary shall provide 
information on the annual percentage rate and the full amount payable by the consumer on 
the basis thereof.
(4) If, based on the credit agreement, the credit may be drawn upon in multiple manners 
and these result in different credit interest rates or other considerations payable beyond the 
credit interest, including any fees and charges, and the consumer took account of the most 
frequent drawdown method in the case of the given credit type, the creditor or the credit 
intermediary shall state as part of the pre-contractual information that other drawdown 
methods may result in a higher annual percentage rate. 
(5) If the instalments paid by the consumer do not forthwith result in the amortisation 
of the credit amount but are used to constitute capital during the periods and under the 
conditions defined in the credit agreement or an agreement attached thereto, as part of the 
pre-contractual information under subsection (1), the creditor or the credit intermediary 
shall clearly and concisely inform the consumer that payment of the instalments does not 
automatically result in the repayment of the full credit amount, unless the parties expressly 
so agree.
(6) In the case of an overdraft facility attached to a payment account, the creditor or the 
credit intermediary shall inform the consumer of the following by using the form attached 
hereto as Annex 2:
a) the data referred to in paragraphs 1–5, 7, 8, 15, 20 and 22 in subsection (1) above,
b) conditions and method of termination of facility, 
c) in the case of an overdraft facility attached to a payment account, based on which the 
loan provided must be repaid at the creditor’s notice, information to the effect that the 
creditor is entitled to demand the repayment of the full credit amount at any time, and
d) in the case of an overdraft facility attached to a payment account, based on which 
the loan provided must be repaid within three months or at the creditor’s notice, all other 
considerations that may emerge after the conclusion of the agreement beyond the credit in-
terest, including all fees and charges, and the conditions of the alteration thereof. 
(7) The creditor or credit intermediary may only supply information on data items 
additional to those defined in this Section separately from the form attached hereto as 
Annex 1.
7. § (1) Simultaneously with the provision of the information under Sections 5 and 6 as 
well as in all information documents, the credit intermediary shall state whether it proceeds 
in the consumer’s interest or on behalf of one or multiple creditors.
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(2) The credit intermediary shall inform the consumer of all fees, charges and other 
payment liabilities payable by the consumer to it prior to the conclusion of the credit 
agreement, and shall commit the agreement thereon to paper or any other durable media.
(3) If there is any fee, charge or other payment obligation lying with the consumer towards 
the credit intermediary that proceeds on behalf of the creditor, the credit intermediary shall 
inform the creditor of the rate of such payment obligation in the interest of the calculation 
of the annual percentage rate. 
8. § (1) The consumer shall verify receipt of the form containing the required pre-
contractual information and that he/she has received the information regulated in Sections 
5-7 by signing a duplicate copy thereof.
(2) If the parties conclude the credit agreement via an identified electronic channel or in 
the form of an electronic deed, there is no need for signing under subsection (1) as a means 
of verification. In this case, 
a) information on the modification of charges and fees may also be provided electronically, 
b) the information on interest changes shall be provided on paper or any other durable media. 
9. § If the creditor intends to enter into an agreement with the consumer as set forth in 
the form containing the pre-contractual information, at the consumer’s request, the draft 
credit agreement shall be made available to the consumer free of any fees, charges or other 
payment obligations.
10. § If, based on the consumer’s request, the credit agreement is concluded by way of a 
telecommunications medium under Act XXV of 2005 on service agreements concluded in 
the financial sector within the framework of distance sale (hereinafter referred to as the 
„Distance Sale Act”) which does not permit the provision of the pre-contractual information 
under Sections 6 and 7, in particular, if it is concluded by telephone under Section 4(3) of the 
Distance Sale Act, the creditor or the credit intermediary shall, forthwith after the conclusion 
of the credit agreement, meet its obligation of providing pre-contractual information for the 
consumer under Sections 6 and 7 on paper or any other durable media.
11. § If, based on the consumer’s request, the credit agreement is concluded by way of 
a telecommunications medium under the Distance Sale Act which does not permit the 
provision of the pre-contractual information under Sections 6 and 7, in particular, if it is 
concluded by telephone under Section 4(4) of the Distance Sale Act, the creditor or the 
credit intermediary shall, forthwith after the conclusion of the credit agreement, meet its 
obligation of providing pre-contractual information for the consumer under Sections 6 and 
7 on paper or any other durable media.
12. § (1) If a mortgage loan is requested, the creditor or, as the case may be, the cre-
dit intermediary shall provide the following information for the consumer, based on the 
information supplied by the consumer, on paper or any other durable media in good time, 
before any credit agreement or offer becomes binding on the consumer:
a) general information on the mortgage loan product offered by the creditor with the 
content defined in Section I of Annex 3, 
b) personalised information through the completion of the form referred to in Section II 
of Annex 3.
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(2) The information referred to in subsection (1)b) shall be delivered prior to the credit 
assessment, in line with the credit purpose identified by the consumer (with respect to the 
specific credit amount and term).
(3) A consumer requesting a mortgage loan shall be informed of the competent 
organisation on issues related to the information defined in subsection (1) by stating a name 
and a telephone number.
13. § (1) Section 8(1) and Section 9 shall apply to requests for mortgage loans and financial 
leasing relating to real estate, with the proviso that the draft agreement shall be placed at 
the consumer’s disposal minimum seven days prior to the conclusion of the agreement even 
without the consumer’s request. 
(2) The agreements under subsection (1) may not be concluded electronically; this, however, 
does not prevent the parties from resorting to electronic means as defined in Section 8(2) in 
respect of the fulfilment of the obligation to provide pre-contractual information and the 
verification thereof as well as in respect of the provision of the draft agreement if the relevant 
conditions exist.
Assessment of Borrowing Capacity (Creditworthiness)
14. § (1) The creditor shall evaluate the consumer’s borrowing capacity on the basis of 
the available information. The detailed rules of the assessment of borrowing capacity are 
defined by law.
(2) Unless a legal rule issued on the basis of the authorisation hereof provides otherwise, 
the information may be based on the information supplied by the consumer and the 
consultation of credit reference services. 
(3) If the parties agree on increasing the total credit amount after the conclusion of the 
credit agreement, the creditor shall repeatedly evaluate the consumer’s borrowing capacity 
free of any fees, charges and other payment liabilities before the amendment of the credit 
agreement. 
(4) If, based on the consultation of credit reference services, the creditor does not wish 
to enter into an agreement with the consumer, the creditor shall forthwith and free of 
charge notify the consumer of the outcome of the data disclosure made as part of the cre-
dit reference service and of the features of the credit reference service unless the fulfilment 
of the obligation of notification is precluded by law or a directly applicable legal act of the 
European Union with general force. 
Formal and Content Requirements Applicable to Credit 
Agreements
15. § One copy of the credit agreement shall be handed over to the consumer. 
16. § (1) Except as set forth in subsection (4), the credit agreement shall contain the 
following clearly and concisely:
1. type of credit, 
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2. names (company names) and mail addresses (head offices) of contracting parties, 
3. name (company name) and mail address (head office) of credit intermediary, 
4. term of credit,
5. total credit amount and drawdown conditions,
6. in the case of credit provided in the form of deferred payment in conjunction with the 
sale of a product or the provision of a service, description and cash price of the given product 
or service, 
7. the credit interest and credit interest conditions, the relevant reference interest rate if 
any, and the frequency, conditions and procedural rules of the modification of the credit in-
terest, 
8. the annual percentage rate as at the date of the conclusion of the credit agreement, and 
all relevant conditions taken into account upon the calculation thereof,
9. the full amount payable by the consumer, 
10. the amounts of the amortisation instalments payable by the consumer, number of 
amortisation instalments and frequency of amortisation, and order of accounting for 
amortisation instalments towards different credit interest debts,
11. in the case of principal amortisation for a fixed term, the consumer’s right to receive 
a statement of the debt in the form of an amortisation table during the term of the credit 
agreement free of any fee, charge or other payment liabilities,
12. if the consumer is obliged to pay the credit interest and all other considerations over 
and above the credit interest, including any fees, charges and commissions, separately from 
the amortisation of the principal, the frequency, conditions and amounts thereof,
13. all commissions, fees, charges or other payment liabilities related to payment accounts 
or cash substitute payment instruments, unless the maintenance of the payment account or 
cash substitute payment instrument is not mandatory,
14. all further considerations beyond the credit interest, including all fees, commissions 
and charges, and the conditions of their modification,
15. the default interest or any other payment liability which may arise from the non-
fulfilment of the obligation undertaken in the agreement,
16. consequences of non-payment,
17. where applicable, the obligation to pay the relevant notarial fees,
18. where applicable, identification of collateral and insurance,
19. the right of withdrawal (termination) or the lack thereof, the period during which 
the right of withdrawal exists, and the conditions, method and legal consequences of the 
exercise of the right of withdrawal (termination), including Section 21(4) and (5),
20. the existence of the right under Section 22 and the conditions of the exercise thereof, 
21. the right of early repayment, the method of the exercise thereof, the costs of early 
repayment if any, and the method of the calculation thereof,
22. the right of termination with respect to the credit agreement and the consequences thereof,
23. whether there is any mechanism for the consumer for the out-of-court settlement of 
legal disputes arising from the agreement, to the jurisdiction of which the creditor subjects 
itself, and
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24. name and head office of regulatory authority.
(2) If the conditions of the application of the various credit interest rates under subsection 
(1)7 are different, information shall be supplied with respect to the frequency, conditions 
and procedural rules of the modification of the credit interest in the case of every credit in-
terest rate.
(3) If the instalments paid by the consumer do not forthwith result in the amortisation 
of the credit amount but are used to constitute capital during the periods and under the 
conditions defined in the credit agreement or an agreement attached thereto, the creditor 
shall lay down in the credit agreement clearly and concisely that payment of the instalments 
does not automatically result in the repayment of the full credit amount, unless the parties 
expressly so agree.
(4) A credit facility agreement attached to a payment account shall contain the following 
clearly and concisely:
a) the information referred to in subsection (1), paragraphs 1-5, 7 and 8,
b) the total credit charge as at the date of the conclusion of the credit agreement, 
c) in the case of a credit facility attached to a payment account, on the basis of which the 
loan provided must be repaid at the creditor’s notice, the creditor’s right to demand the 
repayment of the total credit amount at any time, 
d) conditions, method and legal consequences of the exercise of the right of withdrawal, and
e) all other considerations over and above the credit interest that may emerge following 
the conclusion of the credit agreement, including all fees, commissions and charges, and the 
conditions of the modification thereof. 
(5) If the lack of any content item under this Section does not affect the coming into be-
ing of the agreement, the creditor shall compensate the consumer for any loss that may arise 
from the content deficiency of the agreement under the rules of liability for losses caused 
through a breach.
17. § (1) At the consumer’s request, the creditor shall place at the consumer’s disposal a 
statement of the consumer’s debts in the form of an amortisation table during the term of the 
credit agreement free of any fees, charges or other payment liabilities.
(2) In the case of mortgage loans, the creditor shall provide information on the debt for the 
consumer once annually and/or on the effective day of the interest period in the form of an 
amortisation table free of any fees, charges or other payment liabilities. 
(3) The amortisation table shall contain the amounts of the amortisation instalments, the 
frequency and conditions of amortisation, and the principal and credit interest elements 
of each amortisation payment and the element of all other considerations over and above 
the credit interest, including all fees, commissions and charges, separately. If the rate of 
the credit interest is not fixed or all other considerations over and above the credit inte-
rest, including any fees, commissions and charges, may change as defined in the credit 
agreement, the amortisation table shall indicate clearly and concisely that the data made 
available is valid until the date of any change. 
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Terms and Conditions of Credit Agreements and the 
Alteration Thereof
17/A. § (1) Except as set forth in subsection (2), the creditor may not provide credit for a 
consumer, the annual percentage rate of which exceeds the central bank prime rate plus 24 
percentage points.
(2) In the case of credit attached to credit card agreements or payment accounts or provided 
against pledged security, the annual percentage rate may not exceed the central bank prime 
rate plus 39 percentage points.  
(3) In the case of credit provided for the purchase of every-day items and consumer goods (not 
including automobiles) and the use of services (hire purchase), if the credit is directly disbursed 
to the seller of the product or the provider of the service procured under hire purchase, the 
annual percentage rate may not exceed the central bank prime rate plus 39 percentage points.
(4) For the purposes of this Section, the central bank prime rate quoted on the first day of 
the month preceding the calendar biannual period concerned shall govern the entire term 
of the given calendar biannual period. 
17/B. § (1) Only the credit interest, credit margin, charges and fees determined in the cre-
dit agreement may be unilaterally altered to the consumer’s detriment, provided that it is 
permitted by this Act and it was expressly stipulated by the parties in the agreement. No 
other term or condition, including a stipulation relating to unilateral amendment, may be 
altered unilaterally to the consumer’s detriment. 
(2) The rate of interest or interest margin applicable during the new interest period shall 
be fixed with regard to the interest modification or interest margin modification indicator 
as on the 120th day before the end of the interest period. 
(3) The creditor shall be entitled to exercise the right of unilateral amendment under 
subsection (1) under the terms and conditions laid down in the agreement, in accordance 
with the requirements defined in this Act. A contractual stipulation which does not conform 
to the requirements determined in this Act with respect to the unilateral amendment of the 
agreement is null and void.
(4) If the terms and conditions giving rise to the unilateral amendment of the cre-
dit agreement permit the reduction of the credit interest, the interest margin, the charges 
or fees, the creditor shall enforce such reduction to the consumer’s benefit as part of its 
contractual obligations. 
(5) Unless this Act provides otherwise, the consumer shall be informed of the unilateral 
amendment of the agreement under subsection (1) minimum 60 days prior to its entry into 
force in the manner determined in Section 18(5).
(6) In the case of the unilateral amendment of the terms and conditions of a credit 
agreement attached to a credit card or payment account, the consumer may terminate the 
agreement at 30 days’ notice free of any charge or fee even if the agreement was concluded 
for a fixed term. The termination of the agreement is valid if the consumer repays the credit 
amount drawn and the credit interest under the agreement that may be charged up to the 
date of repayment by the end of the notice period.
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17/C.	§	(1)	Credit	with	a	maximum	term	of	3	years	may	be	provided	
a) against a fixed rate of interest determined in the credit agreement, or
b) against a variable rate of interest tied to a reference interest rate published on the website 
of the National Bank of Hungary and a fixed interest margin,
and the interest conditions of such loans may not be unilaterally altered to the consumer’s 
detriment.
(2) Credit with a term of more than 3 years may be provided 
a) against a variable rate of interest tied to a reference interest rate published on the website 
of the National Bank of Hungary and a fixed interest margin for the entire term thereof or fi-
xed for minimum interest periods of 3 years,
b) against fixed credit interest for minimum interest periods of 3 years, or
c) against fixed interest.
(3) The term of the last interest period of the credit under subsection (2) may also be 
shorter than 3 years.
17/D. § (1) In the case of a credit agreement with interest tied to a reference interest rate, 
the reference interest rate shall be adjusted to the reference interest rate quoted 2 days before 
the last business day of the month preceding the effective day at intervals corresponding to 
the term of the reference interest determined in the credit agreement. 
(2) The creditor may change
a) the credit interest maximum in line with the interest modification indicator defined in 
the agreement and published on the website of the National Bank of Hungary, 
b) the interest margin maximum in line with the interest margin modification indicator 
defined in the agreement and published on the website of the National Bank of Hungary
maximum five times during the term of the credit facility, after the end of the given inte-
rest periods.
(3) If, as part of the interest modification under subsection (2), the creditor applied a 
more favourable credit interest rate or interest margin than that permitted by the interest 
modification or interest margin modification indicator, the creditor may, in subsequent in-
terest periods, offset the discount granted in respect of the rate of the interest or interest 
margin against the rate of interest or interest margin to be reduced up to the extent thereof.
(4) If, as part of the modification of the interest or interest margin, the creditor wishes to 
use an interest modification or interest margin modification indicator or a reference inte-
rest rate not published by the National Bank of Hungary, the creditor shall previously file a 
report thereon to the National Bank of Hungary with an introduction thereof as set forth in 
subsection (5). If the interest modification indicator, interest margin modification indicator 
or reference interest rate so reported conforms to the requirements set forth in this Act, 
the National Bank of Hungary shall publish such indicator or rate on its website within 30 
days of reporting; in a case to the contrary, the National Bank of Hungary shall refuse the 
publication thereof by proceeding within its regulatory powers.
(5) The interest modification and interest margin modification indicators or the reference 
interest rate as well as the conditions of the application thereof shall be submitted in a report 
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furnished with an easy-to-understand explanation, and the creditor shall provide for the 
publication thereof in the same manner. 
(6) The interest modification or interest margin modification indicator or the reference in-
terest rate intended to be applied shall be determined in the credit agreement and may not 
be unilaterally altered even after the end of the interest period, including any constituent 
thereof. If, however, the interest modification or interest margin modification indicator or 
the reference interest rate becomes unsuitable for the performance of its function due to a 
material change in the circumstances that determine the development thereof, the National 
Bank of Hungary shall delete it from its website and shall simultaneously designate the in-
terest modification or interest margin modification indicator or reference interest rate to 
replace the same.
17/E. § (1) The creditor may only establish or alter – in proportion to the increase thereof 
– charges, over and above the interest, to the consumer’s detriment which it identified in 
the agreement on an itemised basis and which emerged directly during the course of the 
conclusion or amendment of the agreement and communication with the consumer in the 
consumer’s interest in connection with the services of a third party in a way that permits the 
shifting thereof onto the consumer.
(2) The creditor may stipulate any fees other than interest, not including the fees that may 
be charged under this Act against costs directly related to the disbursement of the credit, the 
placement of the credit facility at the consumer’s disposal and early consumer repayments, 
in connection with its costs related to the conclusion, amendment and termination of the 
agreement and its administrative costs by laying them down in the credit agreement on an 
itemised basis, and may raise these fees maximum by the rate of the previous year’s annual 
consumer price index published by the Central Statistical Office.
(3) The creditor may alter its charges as and when they arise, while its fees once annually, 
effective as of 1 April.
(4) The fees determined in the agreement as a percentage rate may be determined in the 
currency of the credit, while the fees and charges fixed on an itemised basis may only be 
determined in HUF.
17/F.	§	In	the	event	of	belated	payment	on	the	consumer’s	part,	the	creditor	may	charge	
the consumer default interest for the term of the delay maximum at a rate which does not 
exceed one and a half times the transaction interest stipulated in the credit agreement plus 
maximum 3 percentage points and may not be higher than the maximum rate of the annual 
percentage rate as defined in Section 17/A in respect of credit agreements. 
Obligation of Providing Information on Changes in the 
Credit Charges 
18. § (1) Except as set forth in subsections (3) and (4), in the event of any changes in the in-
terest conditions of the credit, the creditor shall inform the consumer minimum 90 days pri-
or to the end of the interest period of
a) the rate of the interest or interest margin applicable during the new interest period,
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b) the expected amounts of the amortisation instalments payable after the change, and 
if the number of amortisation instalments or the frequency of amortisation changes in 
consequence, of the fact thereof.
(2) Except as set forth in subsections (3) and (4), in the event of changes in the fees or 
charges other than interest, the consumer shall be informed of the fact of the change and the 
new rate of the fee or charge and shall be given the information under subsection (1) b) mi-
nimum 30 days prior to the entry into force of the change. 
(3) In the case of credit provided with state interest subsidies, any changes concerning the 
credit interest, fees or charges shall be disclosed to the public in an announcement mini-
mum 15 days prior to the entry into force of the change.
(4) In the case of credit interest tied to a reference interest rate, in departure from subsection 
(1), the parties may agree in the credit agreement that the creditor shall regularly inform the 
consumer of any changes in the reference interest rate on its website and in announcements 
posted on its premises open to customers.
(5) If the credit agreement is concluded in the form of an electronic deed, 
a) the information on changes in the charges and fees may also be provided electronically,
b) any information on changes in the interest rate may be provided on paper or any 
other durable media, with the proviso that non-observance or belated observance of the 
communication time limits shall result in the forfeiture of rights in the case of a change that 
is detrimental to the consumer. 
(6) In the case of the provision of an electronic commerce service, any information on 
changes and alterations shall also be made available to consumers electronically on an 
ongoing basis and by easily accessible means.
Obligation of Providing Information on Credit Attached 
to Payment Accounts
19. § (1) In the case of a credit facility attached to a payment account, the creditor shall 
regularly furnish the consumer with the information defined in subsection (3) on paper or 
any other durable media. 
(2) The information under subsection (1) shall be provided as subsequent information 
as defined in Section 24(2) of Act LXXXV of 2009 on the provision of money transaction 
services, with the frequency agreed upon by the parties in the credit facility agreement 
attached to the payment account.
(3) The creditor shall provide the following information for the consumer:
a) the period to which the information relates,
b) amount of drawdown and date of drawdown,
c) date of the previous last information and the balance of credit attached to the payment 
account that existed at that date,
d) the balance of credit attached to the payment account outstanding at the time of the 
communication of the latest information,
e) amount repaid and date of repayment,
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f) credit interest,
g) all other considerations due beyond the credit interest, including all fees, commissions 
and charges, and 
h) minimum amount of repayment if there is such a stipulation. 
(4) In the event of any change in the credit interest and all other considerations beyond 
the credit interest, including all fees, commissions and charges, to the consumer’s detriment, 
the creditor shall inform the consumer, prior to the entry into force of the amendment, of 
the fact of the change, the new rate of the payment liability, the amounts of the amortisation 
instalments payable after the change and, if the number of amortisation instalments or the 
frequency of amortisation changes, the fact thereof, on paper or any other durable media. 
(5) In the case of credit interest tied to a reference interest rate, in departure from subsection 
(1), the parties may agree in the credit agreement that the creditor shall regularly inform the 
consumer of any changes in the reference interest rate on its website and in announcements 
posted on its premises open to customers.
Credit Agreements Entered into for an Indefinite Term
20. § (1) The consumer may at any time terminate a credit agreement entered into for an 
indefinite term at the notice period stipulated in the agreement. Unless a rule of law provides 
otherwise, the stipulation of a notice period that is longer than one month is null and void.
(2) If a credit agreement entered into for an indefinite term grants the creditor the right 
of serving ordinary notice, the creditor may terminate the credit agreement entered into for 
an indefinite term by serving ordinary notice on paper or any other durable media at mini-
mum two months’ notice. 
(3) The parties may agree in a credit agreement entered into for an indefinite term that the 
creditor is entitled to cancel the consumer’s drawdown entitlement for reasons beyond the 
creditor’s control identified in the agreement. 
(4) In the case of cancellation under subsection (3), the creditor shall forthwith notify the 
consumer of the fact of cancellation and its reasons before the act of cancellation but after 
the act of cancellation, at the latest, on paper or any other durable media. 
(5) The obligation of notification under subsection (4) shall not lie with the creditor if the 
fulfilment of the obligation of notification is precluded by a legal rule or a directly applicable 
legal act of the European Union with general force. 
Other Provisions Relating to the Termination of Credit 
Agreements
20/A. § (1) If the rate of the interest or interest margin changes in the new interest period 
after the end of the interest period determined in the credit agreement to the consumer’s 
detriment, the consumer shall be entitled to terminate the credit agreement free of any 
charge or fee.
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(2) The consumer shall serve his/her termination notice under subsection (1) upon the 
creditor 60 days prior to the end of the interest period, and its validity shall be subject to the 
repayment of the consumer’s outstanding debt towards the creditor on the last day of the in-
terest period, at the latest.
20/B. § (1) Prior to the termination of the credit agreement, the creditor shall draw the 
attention of the consumer, the surety and the lien obligor not qualifying as a personal debtor, 
in a written notice sent to the consumer, the surety and the lien obligor, to the amount of 
the total outstanding and overdue debt, the rate of the interest and default interest payable, 
any further interest liabilities payable in the event of non-payment, and the expected legal 
consequences that may set in in the event of the non-payment of the debt.
(2) The creditor shall send its termination notice to the consumer, the surety and the 
lien obligor not qualifying as a personal debtor, the verification of which shall lie with the 
creditor.
(3) Prior to the termination of a mortgage agreement, simultaneously with the written 
payment notice and information referred to in subsection (1), the creditor shall present a 
statement of the development of the amortisation instalments paid by the consumer as of 
the conclusion of the agreement – aggregated for each year but, at the consumer’s request, 
also in a monthly breakdown –, the amount of the repaid principal, the interest, default in-
terest and other charges accounted for, any capitalised interest, and the outstanding debt. 
20/C. § (1) In the case of housing credit agreements, after the expiry of a period of ninety 
days following the termination of the agreement, the financial institution may not charge 
default interest, charges and fees in excess of the transaction interest, charges and fees valid 
on the day before the day of termination due to non-performance on the consumer’s part.
(2) If the agreements under subsection (1) are foreign currency-based and the agreement 
stipulates the determination of the amount of the outstanding debt in HUF for the event of 
the termination thereof, subsection (1) shall apply subject to the difference that, after the 
expiry of a period of ninety days following the termination of the agreement, the creditor 
may not charge default interest, charges and fees in excess of the transaction interest and 
handling charges valid on the day of termination due to non-performance on the consumer’s 
part.
Right of Withdrawal
21. § (1) The consumer may withdraw from the credit agreement within fourteen days of 
the day of the conclusion of the agreement without stating his/her reasons if no credit has 
been disbursed yet. The consumer may terminate the credit agreement free of charge within 
fourteen days of the day of the conclusion of the agreement if the credit has already been 
disbursed.
(2) If the consumer receives the information under Sections 6 and 7 after the conclusion 
of the agreement on the basis of Section 8, in departure from the provisions set forth in 
subsection (1), he/she may exercise his/her right of withdrawal (termination) for a period of 
fourteen days reckoned from the receipt of such information. 
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(3) The right of withdrawal (termination) shall be regarded as duly exercised in a timely 
fashion if the consumer posts or sends in any other verifiable manner his/her declaration 
thereon to the creditor by the end of the time limits determined in subsections (1)-(2), in 
accordance with Section 16(1), paragraph 19.
(4) The consumer shall repay the creditor the credit amount drawn and the contractual 
credit interest that may be charged as of the date of the drawdown until the date of repayment 
forthwith after the sending of his/her declaration of withdrawal (termination) but within 
thirty days, at the latest.
(5) In the event of withdrawal by the consumer, other than the amount referred to in 
subsection (4), the creditor shall only be entitled to the amount that it paid the State or a local 
government in connection with the credit, provided that there is no scope for the refunding 
thereof.
(6) The exercise of the consumer’s right of withdrawal shall also dissolve any agreement 
relating to ancillary services attached to the credit which may relate to services provided by 
the creditor or, based on the prior agreement of a third party and the creditor, by such third 
party. 
Provisions Relating to Foreign Currency-Based Credit
21/A. § (1) If the creditor wishes to enter into a credit agreement with the consumer that is 
recorded in a foreign currency or is provided in a foreign currency but is repayable in HUF 
(hereinafter referred to as „foreign currency-based”), as part of its obligation of providing 
information under this Act, the creditor shall disclose to the consumer the risks that lie 
with the consumer in connection with the contractual transaction and shall verify the 
acknowledgement thereof with a statement signed by the customer.
(2) The risk disclosure statement shall contain a detailed description of the exchange rate 
risk that arises from foreign currency-based credit agreements and the effect thereof on the 
amortisation instalments. 
21/B. § (1) In the case of foreign currency-based consumer credit agreements, upon 
the disbursement of the loan, the amount of the loan and the amount of the amortisation 
instalment denominated in HUF that will fall due monthly shall be calculated, except as 
set forth in subsection (2), at the official foreign exchange rate quoted and published by the 
National Bank of Hungary in the capacity of central bank. 
(2) If the creditor quotes its own average foreign exchange rate, the amounts expressed in 
HUF under subsection (1) shall be calculated, at the creditor’s discretion, 
a) at its own average foreign exchange rate quoted and published by the creditor, or
b) at the official foreign exchange rate quoted and published by the National Bank of Hun-
gary.
(3) The creditor may not charge a separate fee or charge in connection with the conversion 
and calculation performed in accordance with subsection (1).
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(4) The provisions of subsections (1)–(3) shall also apply if the amortisation instalments 
are not paid with monthly regularity and if the consumer repays a part or the full amount of 
his/her outstanding debt early.
(5) The provisions of this Section need not apply if the amortisation instalments are paid 
in a foreign currency.
Linked Credit Agreements 
22. § (1) The exercise of the consumer’s right of withdrawal based on statutory provisions 
passed with a view to the transposition of the relevant mandatory legal act of the European 
Union in respect of an agreement for the sale of a product or the provision of a service shall 
also dissolve the linked credit agreement.
(2) In the case of a linked credit agreement under Section 3, sub-paragraph 15 b), if
a) the seller or the provider of the service falls into arrears with the performance of the 
agreement entered into with the consumer or the defective performance of the agreement 
frustrates the use of the product or service according to its designated purpose, and
b) the seller or the provider of the service failed to satisfy the consumer’s claims arising 
from such delay or defective performance by the relevant deadline, 
the consumer may retain the amortisation payment falling due on the basis of the credit 
agreement until the satisfaction of his/her claim. 
(3) No credit interest or any other consideration beyond the credit interest, including 
any fees, commissions and charges, may be charged for the term of retention referred to in 
subsection (2).
(4) The consumer shall notify the creditor of the circumstances giving rise to the exercise 
of the right of retention on paper or any other durable media. The consumer may exercise 
his/her right of retention after such notification. 
(5) In the case of a linked credit agreement under Section 3, sub-paragraph 15 b), the 
creditor and the seller or the provider of the service shall previously agree on notification 
of consumer claims arising from delays and/or defective performance which are not settled 
in a timely fashion as well as on the compensation for the creditor’s interest revenue lost on 
account of the retention of the amortisation payment.
Early repayment 
23. § (1) The consumer may in every instance avail himself/herself of the partial or full 
early repayment of the credit. 
(2) In the event of early repayment, the creditor shall reduce the total credit charge in 
respect of the tranche repaid early by the credit interest and all other considerations over 
and above the credit interest which relate to the remaining term of the credit agreement 
based on its original maturity.
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24. § (1) The creditor shall be entitled to compensation for its fair and objectively justified 
costs directly related to the early repayment, if any, if the early repayment falls on a period 
when the credit interest is fixed. 
(2) The rate of the costs referred to in subsection (1) may not exceed one per cent of the 
amount repaid early if the term between the date of the early repayment and the maturity of 
the credit under the credit agreement exceeds one year.
(3) The rate of the costs referred to in subsection (1) may not exceed half a per cent of the 
amount repaid early if the term between the date of the early repayment and the maturity of 
the credit under the credit agreement does not exceed one year.
(4) The rate of the costs referred to in subsection (1) may not exceed the amount of the cre-
dit interest payable for the term between the date of the early repayment and the maturity of 
the credit under the credit agreement with regard to the terms and conditions in force at the 
time of the early repayment. 
(5) The creditor shall not be entitled to the compensation under subsection (1) in the case 
of credit facility agreements attached to payment accounts. 
(6) The creditor shall not be entitled to the compensation under subsection (1) if the 
early repayment was made on the basis of an insurance agreement concluded as repayment 
collateral. 
(7) The creditor shall not be entitled to the compensation under subsection (1) if the amount 
of the early repayment made by the consumer once during a period of twelve months does 
not exceed two hundred thousand forints. 
25. § (1) In the event of the early repayment of a mortgage loan, the creditor shall be 
entitled to compensation for its costs emerging due to the early repayment. The rate of the 
costs enforced may not exceed 2 per cent of the amount repaid early, except as set forth in 
subsection (2).
(2) In the case of loan agreements financed with mortgage deeds, including loan agreements 
refinanced by a mortgage credit institution, the creditor shall also be entitled to enforce its 
costs related to the early repayment in excess of the rate determined in subsection (1) if the 
early repayment falls on a period when the interest of the mortgage loan is fixed or if the 
mortgage loan bears variable interest and the early repayment takes place during the inte-
rest period. In this case, the rate of the costs so enforced may not exceed 2.5 per cent of the 
amount repaid early.
(3) The creditor may not prescribe any further payment liability during the course of the 
early repayment over and above the costs referred to in subsection (1) or (2).
(4)8 In the case of housing mortgage loans, the rate of the enforced costs may not exceed 
1% of the amount repaid early in the case described in subsection (1) and 1.5% of the amount 
repaid early in the case described in subsection (2), unless the partial or full early repayment 
is made, whether partially or fully, from a loan disbursed by another financial institution.
8 Established by Section 7(1) of Act XCVI of 2010. In force as of 27 November 2010.
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(5)9 The creditor shall not be entitled to the compensation under subsection (1) or (2) if the 
early repayment was made on the basis of an insurance agreement concluded as repayment 
collateral.
(6)10 The creditor shall not be entitled to the compensation under subsection (1) or (2) in the 
event of the consumer’s partial or full early repayment (final amortisation) if the consumer’s 
outstanding debt does not exceed one million forints and made no early repayment during 
the preceding twelve months.
(7)11 In the case of housing mortgage loans, the creditor shall not be entitled to the 
compensation under subsection (1) or (2) on the occasion of the first partial or full early 
repayment (final amortisation) made after a period of twenty-four months reckoned from the 
entry into force of the agreement, unless the partial or full early repayment (final amortisation) 
is made, whether partially or fully, from a loan disbursed by another financial institution or the 
amount repaid early exceeds one half of the loan amount determined in the loan agreement. 
Overrunning
26. § (1) During the course of the conclusion of the framework agreement relating to 
the opening of a payment account under Act LXXXV of 2009 on the provision of money 
transaction services, the parties may agree that the consumer is entitled to overrun his/her 
credit limit.
(2) In the event of an agreement under subsection (1), the creditor shall regularly furnish 
the consumer with the information referred to in Section 6(3), paragraph 7 on paper or any 
other durable media.
(3) If the term of overrunning exceeds one month, the creditor shall forthwith inform the 
consumer of the data set forth in subsection (4) on paper or any other durable media. 
(4) The creditor shall inform the consumer of the following data:
a) the fact of overrunning,
b) the amount of overrunning, 
c) the credit interest, and 
d) the default interest or any other payment liability which may arise from overrunning 
for a period of more than one month. 
Procedure for the Event of the Violation of the 
Provisions Relating to Credit Provided for Consumers
27. § (1)12 Compliance with the provisions of this Act and the legal rules issued for the 
implementation hereof shall be monitored by the National Bank of Hungary which shall proceed 
in the event of the violation of these provisions, not including the establishment of the coming 
9 Established by Section 7(1) of Act XCVI of 2010. In force as of 27 November 2010.
10 Promulgated by Section 7(2) of Act XCVI of 2010. In force as of 27 November 2010.
11 Promulgated by Section 7(2) of Act XCVI of 2010. In force as of 27 November 2010.
12 Amended by Section 145 of Act CXLIII of 2013.
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into being, validity, legal consequences and termination of agreements and the establishment of 
breaches and their legal consequences, and except as set forth in subsection (2). 
(2) In the event of the violation of the provisions of this Act and the legal rules issued 
for the implementation hereof regarding commercial practices vis-à-vis consumers, in 
particular, the provision of information for consumers, the authority identified in the law 
on the prohibition of unfair commercial practices vis-à-vis consumers shall proceed in 
accordance with the rules set forth therein. 
Other Provisions
28. § (1) If the creditor assigns its claim against the consumer to a third party, the consumer 
shall be entitled to submit a statement of claim against such third party in respect of his/her 
claim against the original creditor. 
(2) If the creditor assigns its claim against the consumer to a third party, the creditor has 
no obligation to inform the consumer thereof if, based on the agreement entered into with 
such third party, it continues to proceed as creditor vis-à-vis the consumer also after the 
assignment of the claim.
(3)13 In the case of mortgage loans, the creditor shall not be entitled to charge any fee, 
commission or charge determined at its discretion for the extension of the term if the term 
was not extended within a period of five years.
(4)14 In the case of mortgage loans, if the consumer is in arrears by minimum ninety days 
with the fulfilment of his/her obligation existing on the basis of his/her agreement, the 
consumer may initiate the extension of the term by maximum five years, in writing, on a 
single occasion during the term. The creditor may not refuse such a request without good 
reason. In this case, the provisions set forth in subsection (3) shall apply to the fees, charges 
and commissions.
(5) The creditor shall be entitled to compensation as a disbursement fee for its costs directly 
related to the disbursement of the credit and determined in the agreement; however, the 
rate thereof may not be higher than 1% of the amount disbursed and may not exceed HUF 
200,000.
(6) The creditor shall be entitled to charge a commitment fee in relation to the amount of 
the credit facility for keeping the credit facility available; however, the rate thereof may not 
be higher than 50% of the transaction interest expressed in percentage.
29. § (1) The consumer may not validly waive his/her rights defined in this Act.
(2) If the credit agreement is closely related to a Member State of the European Economic 
Area, the selection by the parties of the law of a third country as the governing law of the 
agreement is invalid inasmuch as the law of such third country is contrary to the provisions 
–permitting no departure – of the legal rule of the said Member State transposing Directive 
13 Promulgated by Section 8 of Act XCVI of 2010. Amended by Section 130b) of Act CCXXXVI of 2013.
14 Promulgated by Section 8 of Act XCVI of 2010. Amended by Section 130b) of Act CCXXXVI of 2013.
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2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. In any such issue, the law of the 
said Member State shall govern instead of the law of the parties’ choice.
29/A. § (1) The organisations of financial institutions established for the representation 
of their interests as legal entities may, with the approval of the National Bank of Hunga-
ry, publish general terms of agreement serving as samples for the activities of financial 
institutions coming under the effect of this Act and sample rules incorporating such general 
terms of agreement. 
(2) The use or application of the sample rules under subsection (1) approved by the National 
Bank of Hungary shall not qualify as a market practice prohibited by Act LVII of 1996 on the 
prohibition of unfair market practices and of the restriction of competition. 
Closing Provisions 
30. § The Government is hereby authorised to establish the following in a decree:
a) the detailed rules relating to the definition, calculation and publication of the annual 
percentage rate;15
b)16 the detailed rules of the assessment of borrowing capacity (creditworthiness), not 
including the income-proportionate amortisation instalment, and the rules relating to the 
maximum debt coverage ratio of real estate and automobile credit and financial leasing 
transactions.17
30/A. § The minister responsible for the regulation of the money, capital and insurance 
markets is hereby authorised to establish the following in a decree:
a) in the case of consumer suretyship agreements and consumer lien agreements attached 
to credit agreements, the detailed rules of the obligation of providing information for the 
surety and the lien obligor not qualifying as a personal debtor, 
b) the detailed rules of the method and content of the provision of the information 
regulated in Section 5. 
31. § (1) Except as set forth in subsections (2)-(3), this Act shall enter into force on the 15th 
day following its promulgation.
(2) Sections 1-3, 20-25 and 35 of this Act shall enter into force on 1 March 2010.
(3) Sections 4-19, 26-30, 34 and 36-38 of this Act shall enter into force on 11 June 2010. 
(4)-(5)18
(6)19
32. § (1)20 Except as set forth in subsections (2)-(7), the provisions of this Act shall solely 
apply to agreements concluded after 11 June 2010.
15 See Government Decree No. 83/2010. (III. 25.).
16 Established by Section 144 of Act CXLIII of 2013. In force as of 1 October 2013.
17 See Government Decree No. 361/2009. (XII. 30.) and Government Decree No. 256/2011. (XII. 6.).
18 Repealed by Section 31(6) of the same Act. No longer in force as of 31 December 2010.
19 Repealed by the same subsection. No longer in force as of 1 January 2011.
20 Established by Section 9(1) of Act XCVI of 2010. In force as of 27 November 2010.
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(2) The provisions of Section 20(3)-(5), Sections 21-25 and Section 35 of this Act shall solely 
apply to agreements concluded after 1 March 2010.
(3) In the case of credit agreements already concluded on 11 June 2010 for an indefinite 
term, the creditor shall meet the obligations of providing information laid down in Section 
18, Section 19 and Section 26(2)-(4).
(4) The provisions set forth in Section 20(1) and (2) shall apply to credit agreements already 
concluded on 1 March 2010 for an indefinite term. 
(5) Section 33 of this Act may be applied in execution proceedings instituted on the basis 
of execution requests filed after the entry into force hereof. 
(6)21 The provisions of Section 25(4)-(7) established by Section 7(1) and (2) of Act XCVI of 
2010 on the amendment of certain laws covering financial subject-matters in the interest of 
helping consumers taking out loans for housing purposes who have found themselves in a 
difficult position (hereinafter referred to as the „Legislative Amendment”) shall also apply 
to early repayments made after the fifteenth day reckoned from the entry into force of the 
Legislative Amendment in the case of agreements concluded prior to the entry into force of 
the Legislative Amendment.
(7)22 The provisions of Section 28(3) established by Section 8 of the Legislative Amendment 
shall apply to term extensions initiated after the fifteenth day reckoned from the entry into 
force of the Legislative Amendment in the case of agreements concluded prior to the entry 
into force of the Legislative Amendment. 
(8)23 The provisions of Section 28(4) established by Section 8 of the Legislative Amendment 
shall apply to term extensions initiated after the thirty-fifth day reckoned from the entry 
into force of the Legislative Amendment in the case of agreements concluded prior to the 
entry into force of the Legislative Amendment.
(9)24 The provisions of Section 28(3) and (4) established by Section 93b) of Act CCXXXVI 
of 2013 on the amendment of certain laws covering financial subject-matters (hereinafter 
referred to as „Legislative Amendment 2”) shall apply to term extensions initiated after 1 
February 2014 in the case of agreements concluded prior to the entry into force of Legislative 
Amendment 2. 
33. § (1) The creditor shall amend its General Terms of Agreement and its business rules 
containing the same in accordance with the provisions of Act … of 2014 on the amendment 
of Act CLXII of 2009 on credit provided for consumers and certain related laws (hereinafter 
referred to as the „Amendment”) effective as of 1 February 2015.
(2) The amendment of the General Terms of Agreement under subsection (1) shall form 
part of the agreements existing at the time of the entry into force of the Amendment 
without any further legal act on the part of the parties thereto. Consumers shall be informed 
individually of the contents of the agreements so amended. 
21 Promulgated by Section 9(2) of Act XCVI of 2010. In force as of 27 November 2010.
22 Promulgated by Section 9(2) of Act XCVI of 2010. In force as of 27 November 2010.
23 Promulgated by Section 13 of Act CLXXIX of 2010. In force as of 31 December 2010.
24 Promulgated by Section 129 of Act CCXXXVI of 2013. In force as of 1 January 2014.
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(3) As part of the amendment under subsection (2), the method for fixing the interest on 
credit either bearing fixed interest or tied to a reference interest rate with the addition of an 
interest margin and the terms and conditions of the interest so fixed may not change. 
(4) If the remaining term of the credit exceeds 3 years, the creditor may alter the contractual 
terms and conditions by an interest modification or interest margin modification indicator 
published on the website of the National Bank of Hungary and through the determination 
of interest periods. 
(5) The creditor may not determine further charges or fees in addition to the charges and 
fees determined on an itemised basis which came to form part of the credit agreement. Any 
charges and fees which were established in consumer agreements before the entry into force 
of the Amendment shall remain part of the agreements; however, the unilateral alteration 
thereof shall be governed by the provisions of the Amendment. The creditor may render 
provisions conforming to the provisions of Section 17/E(1)–(3) part of the agreement in 
respect of charges and fees determined on an itemised basis, subject to the notification 
referred to in subsection (2).
(6) In the case of consumer credit agreements not affected by settlement on the basis of Act 
XL of 2014 on the rules of settlement laid down in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the settlement 
of certain issues related to the Curia’s legal unity decision concerning the consumer loan 
agreements of financial institutions, and certain other provisions (hereinafter referred to as 
„Act XL of 2014), the creditor shall meet its obligation under subsection (2) by 31 December 
2015, at the latest. If the creditor meets this obligation prior to this deadline, the prohibition 
of the unilateral raising of interest rates, charges and fees defined in Section 45(1) of Act 
XL of 2014 shall be lifted, and in this context the creditor shall have the option to make 
changes in accordance with the agreements amended in harmony with the provisions of the 
Amendment. 
(7) The creditor may report the interest modification and interest margin modification 
indicators and the reference interest rate intended to be applied by it as of the day of the entry 
into force of this provision on the basis of Section 17/D(4) and (5) established by Section 6 of 
the Amendment, and the National Bank of Hungary may examine and publish the same, or 
may decide to refuse the publication thereof.
(8) If a consumer loan agreement is affected by the settlement under Act XL of 2014, the 
provisions of a separate law shall govern instead of the provisions set forth in subsections 
(4) and (5).
34. § The provisions of Sections 17/A–17/F, 18, 20/A–20/C, 21/A, 21/B, 28(5), 29/A and 33 of 
this Act established by the Amendment shall apply to unterminated consumer agreements 
concluded after 1 May 2004.
33-37. §25
38. § This Act serves compliance with the following legal acts of the European Union:
25 Repealed by Section 31(6) of the same Act. No longer in force as of 31 December 2010.
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a) Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 
on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC [Sections 
1, 2.(1)-(2), 3-11, 14-16, 17(1) and (3), 18-24, 26-32, 34 and 36-38 and Annexes 1 and 2],
b) Commission Recommendation 2001/193/EC (1 March 2001) on pre-contractual 
information to be provided to consumers by lenders offering home loans (Section 12 and 
Annex 3).
Annex 1 to Act CLXII of 2009
General Pre-Contractual Information Prior to Conclusion of Credit 
Agreement
 1. Details of creditor/credit intermediary
 creditor’s name (company name)  ... [name[
 mail address  ... [address to be used by consumer]
 telephone number*  ...
 e-mail address*  ...
 fax number  ...
 internet website address*  ...
 where applicable, credit intermediary’s name 
(company name)
 ... [name]
 mail address  ... [address to be used by consumer]
 telephone number*  ...
 e-mail address*  ...
 fax number*  ...
 internet website address*  ...
 * completion of marked fields is not compulsory  
 Whenever the term „where applicable” is used, the creditor is only required to complete 
the given field in respect of the given data item if it is applicable to the credit; if not, the 
line must be deleted.
The relevant data must be entered in place of the text in [...].
 2. Description of material characteristics of credit
 type of credit  ...
 total credit amount
amount of credit stated in credit agreement or 
upper limit of amount available for drawdown 
 ...
 conditions of drawdown of credit
 method and date of placement of credit 
 ...
 term of credit  ...
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 amortisation instalments and method of 
settlement
 You are required to make the 
following payments:
... [amounts of amortisation 
instalments, number of amortisation 
instalments, frequency of amortisation]
Method of payment of credit interest 
and all other considerations, including 
fees, commissions and charges: ...
 total amount payable
principal and credit interest and all other considerations, 
including fees, commissions and charges
 ... [total credit amount and total 
credit charge]
 where applicable, in the case of credit provided in 
the form of deferred payment in connection with 
the sale of products or the provision of services, 
description and cash price of product or service
 ...
 where applicable, the required collateral
characteristics of collateral required for credit 
agreement
 ... [type of required collateral]
 where applicable
payment of amortisation instalments does not 
forthwith result in amortisation of credit amount 
 ...
 3. Consideration related to credit
 credit interest rate or rates  ...%
... [fixed or variable credit interest; in 
case of latter, initial reference interest 
rate; term of each credit interest rate]
 annual percentage rate (APR)  ...%
ratio of total credit charge to total credit amount 
expressed in percentage per annum; the APR helps 
to compare different offers
... [all terms and conditions of 
representative example]
 required for conclusion of credit agreement:
- insurance or
- existence of any other ancillary service agreement; 
if the creditor is not aware of the consideration payable 
for these services, they are not included in the APR
 yes/no [if yes, type] ...
yes/no [if yes, type] ...
 all considerations over and above credit interest, 
including fees, commissions and charges
 ...
 where applicable, one or multiple payment accounts 
required for conclusion of credit agreement
 ...
 where applicable, all commissions, fees, charges or 
other payment liabilities related to cash substitute 
payment instrument
 ...
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 where applicable, all other considerations over and 
above credit interest, including fees, charges and 
commissions
 ...
 where applicable, conditions of alteration of all 
considerations over and above credit interest, 
including fees, commissions and charges
 ...
 where applicable, notarial fee  ...
 default interest or any other payment liability 
arising from non-fulfilment of obligations 
undertaken in the agreement; defaulting on your 
payments may have serious consequences for you 
(e.g. execution of pledged property) and may render 
access to credit more difficult
You will incur the following 
payment liabilities if you default 
on your amortisation instalments: 
... [applicable credit interest and 
default interest]
 4. Other legal information
 existence of right of withdrawal
you have the right to withdraw from the credit 
agreement within 14 days
 yes/no
 early repayment
you are entitled to repay your credit early partially 
or fully
 ...
 where applicable, costs of early repayment if any
in case of early repayment, the creditor is entitled 
to compensation for the following costs
 ... [compensation for costs related to 
early repayment to be defined as per 
provisions of Section 24]
 information under Section 14(4) 
the creditor is required to notify you forthwith and free 
of charge of the outcome of any data disclosure made 
upon the consultation of any credit reference services 
if the creditor does not wish to enter into an agreement 
with you on the basis of the outcome of such credit 
reference services. This obligation does not lie with the 
creditor if the fulfilment of the obligation of notification 
is precluded by a rule of law or a directly applicable legal 
act of the European Union with general force.
 ...
 right to one copy of draft credit agreement
you have the right to receive one copy of the draft 
credit agreement from the creditor free of any fee, 
charge or other payment liability 
this obligation does not lie with the creditor if the creditor 
does not wish to enter into an agreement with you
 ...
 where applicable, temporal restriction of validity of 
this information
 This information is valid from … 
until …
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 5. Where applicable, supplementary information to be provided in the case of credit 
agreements concluded as part of distance sale
 name (company name) of representative of creditor in 
the Member State of the consumer’s place of residence
 ... [name]
 mail address  ... [address to be used by consumer]
 telephone number*  ...
 e-mail address*  ...
 fax number*  ...
 internet website address*  ...
 creditor’s company register number or court 
registration number
 ... [company register number or 
court registration number]
 regulatory authority licensing creditor’s activities  ...
 exercise of right of withdrawal  ... [conditions, method and legal 
consequences of exercise of right of 
withdrawal (termination); further, 
address (e-mail address, fax number) 
to which the consumer is required 
to send his/her declaration of 
withdrawal (termination)]
 law applicable by creditor during period before 
conclusion of agreement
 ...
 governing law, and stipulation of exclusive 
competence and jurisdiction
 ... [reference to relevant contractual 
provision]
 language regime  ... [language of pre-contractual 
information, language of conclusion 
of agreement, and language of 
communication with consumer 
during term of agreement agreed 
upon with consumer]
 out-of-court settlement of legal disputes arising 
from agreement
 availability of any mechanism which the creditor 
subjects itself to
 ...
Annex 2 to Act CLXII of 2009
Information for Credit Facility Agreement Attached to Payment Account
1. Details of creditor/credit intermediary
 creditor’s name (company name)  ... [name]
 mail address  ... [address to be used by consumer]
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 telephone number*  ...
 e-mail address*  ...
 fax number  ...
 internet website address*  ...
 where applicable, credit intermediary’s 
name (company name)
 ... [name]
 mail address  ... [address to be used by consumer]
 telephone number*  ...
 e-mail address*  ...
 fax number*  ...
 internet website address*  ...
 * completion of marked fields is not 
compulsory
 
Whenever the term „where applicable” is used, the creditor is only required to complete the given 
field in respect of the given data item if it is applicable to the credit; if not, the line must be deleted.
The relevant data must be entered in place of the text in [...].
 2.26 Description of material characteristics of credit
 type of credit  ...
 total credit amount
amount of credit stated in credit agreement or 
upper limit of amount available for drawdown 
 ...
 term of credit  ...
 where applicable, the creditor may at any 
time call upon you to repay the full amount 
of your credit
 ...
 3. Consideration related to credit
 credit interest rate or rates  ...%
... [fixed or variable credit interest; in case of 
latter, initial reference interest rate; term of 
each credit interest rate]
26 Established by Section 95 and Annex 3, Section 1 of Act XCVIII of 2013. In force as of 29 June 2013.
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annual percentage rate (APR)
ratio of total credit charge to total credit 
amount expressed in percentage per annum; 
the APR helps to compare different offers
 ...%
... [all conditions of representative example]
 where applicable, all other considerations 
over and above credit interest, including 
fees, commissions and charges, and 
conditions of the alteration thereof
 ... [All other considerations over and above 
credit interest payable as of conclusion of 
agreement,]
 default interest or other payment liabilities 
arising from the non-fulfilment of 
obligations undertaken in the agreement
 You will incur the following payment 
liabilities if you default on your amortisation 
instalments: ... [applicable credit interest and 
default interest]
 4. Other legal information 
 termination of credit agreement  ... [conditions and method of exercise of 
right of termination]
 information under Section 14(4) 
the creditor is required to notify you 
forthwith and free of charge of the outcome 
of any data disclosure made upon the 
consultation of any credit reference services 
if the creditor does not wish to enter into 
an agreement with you on the basis of the 
outcome of such credit reference services. 
This obligation does not lie with the 
creditor if the fulfilment of the obligation 
of notification is precluded by a rule of 
law or a directly applicable legal act of the 
European Union with general force.
 ...
 where applicable, temporal restriction of 
validity of information
 This information is valid from … until …
5.27 Where applicable, supplementary information to be provided in the case of credit 
agreements concluded as part of distance sale 
 name (company name) of representative 
of creditor in the Member State of the 
consumer’s place of residence 
 ... [name]
 Address  ... [address to be used by consumer]
 telephone number*  ...
 e-mail address*  ...
 fax number*  ...
 internet website address*  ...
27 Established by Section 95 and Annex 3, Section 2 of Act XCVIII of 2013. In force as of 29 June 2013.
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 creditor’s company register number or 
court registration number
 ... [company register number or court 
registration number]
 regulatory authority licensing creditor’s 
activities
 ...
 exercise of right of withdrawal  
 You have the right to withdraw from the 
credit agreement within 14 calendar days.
 ... [conditions, method and legal 
consequences of exercise of right of 
withdrawal (termination); further, address 
(e-mail address, fax number) to which 
the consumer is required to send his/her 
declaration of withdrawal (termination)] 
 law applicable by creditor during period 
before conclusion of agreement 
 ...
 governing law, stipulation of exclusive 
competence and jurisdiction
 ... [reference to relevant contractual 
provision]
 language regime  ... [language of pre-contractual information, 
language of conclusion of agreement, and 
language of communication with consumer 
during term of agreement agreed upon with 
consumer]
 availability of any mechanism for the out-
of-court settlement of legal disputes arising 
from agreement which the creditor subjects 
itself to 
 ...
Annex 3 to Act CLXII of 2009
I. General Information on Mortgage Loans
1. Details related to creditor:
1.1. creditor’s name (company name) and address (head office),
1.2. if any, credit intermediary’s name (company name) and address (head office).
2. Details related to mortgage loan:
2.1. purposes for which credit may be used,
2.2. collateral securing mortgage loan,
2.3. types of mortgage loans offered by creditor, with brief description of differences 
between loans bearing fixed and variable interest, including impacts concerning consumer; 
where applicable, interest margin, interest modification or interest margin modification 
indicator,
2.4. types of interest: fixed, variable or a combination of these,
2.5. charges of a typical mortgage loan that lie with the consumer:
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2.6. list of costs related to mortgage loans, e.g.: administrative, insurance, legal and 
intermediary charges,
2.7. amortisation options offered by creditor, including number and amounts of 
amortisation instalments, and frequency of amortisation, 
2.8. possibility of early repayment and its conditions,
2.9. whether appraisal of property serving as security is required, if so, by whom,
2.10. general information on tax benefits and other state subsidies related to the 
amortisation of housing credit, and information on where further information is obtainable,
2.11. where applicable, term of credit assessment. 
II. Personal Information on Mortgage Loans 
 Category of information  Description 
 Introductory text  „This information does not qualify as a legally binding offer.
The creditor provides the data stated in this information in 
good faith and it reflects its offer that it would make on the 
basis of the available information under the present market 
conditions. The data featured herein may change in the event 
of changes in the market conditions.
This information imposes no obligation on the creditor to 
approve the credit.”
 1. Creditor
 2. Description of product  Brief, easy-to-understand introduction of product 
It must be made clear whether it relates to mortgage established 
on real estate or any other generally applicable collateral.
It must be made clear whether, in the case of the product 
offered, payment of the principal debt is due in one sum at 
the end of the term or whether the consumer amortises both 
interest and principal during the term of the credit.
It must be made clear whether the terms and conditions 
of the credit depend on the size of the consumer’s own 
resources (e.g. expressed in percentage of value of home).
It must be made clear whether the terms and conditions of 
the credit depend on suretyship undertaken by a third party. 
 3. Interest (stating type of 
interest and term of fixed 
interest period)
 In case of variable interest, introduction of scenarios in 
which it may change.
Whether there is a preferential interest period and what conditions 
and penalties are attached thereto in case of early repayment.
Whether there is an upper or lower cap on the interest rate.
In case of variable interest rate, whether it is an indexed 
interest rate, and if so, details of indexing.
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 4. Annual percentage rate  
 5. Amount and currency 
of credit 
 
 6. Term  
 7. Number and frequency 
of amortisations
 
 8. In case of permanent 
(annuity) amortisation, 
amount of each 
amortisation instalment 
 
 9. Only in case of interest 
amortisation credit 
products combined with 
investment
 To be stated if grace period is granted:
a) amount and frequency of each interest payment (see item 
7),
b) amounts and frequency of payments into investments 
used for principal amortisation (see item 7).
The consumer’s attention must be drawn to the fact that 
there may be scenarios when the amount paid into the 
investment does not cover the amount of the loan.
It must be stated clearly whether the offer depends on 
whether the consumer accepts the given form of investment. 
 10. Other one-time 
charges
 List of one-time charges which the consumer is required to 
pay to take out the mortgage loan.
If such one-time charges fall within the creditor’s direct or 
indirect control, it is necessary to state their estimated amount.
It is necessary to state whether payment of the charge 
depends on the outcome of the credit assessment.
One-time charges, e.g. administrative charges, legal fees, 
notarial fees, appraisal fee.
It is necessary to state if the offer depends on whether the 
consumer uses the services linked to the credit via the creditor.
 11. Other regular costs 
(not listed under item 8)
 These costs e.g.,
- premium of credit collateral insurance,
- premium of fire insurance,
- premium of insurance of immovable and  movable property.
It is necessary to state if the offer depends on whether the 
consumer uses the services linked to the credit via the creditor.
 12. Early repayment  The creditor is required to state the following:
- possibility and conditions of early repayment,
- fees related to early repayment.
If the relevant fees cannot be determined at this stage, it is 
necessary to state that the consumer is required to pay the 
creditor’s costs arising from repayment prior to maturity.
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 13. Internal complaint 
handling
 Contact person’s name, address and telephone number
 14. Amortisation table  The creditor is required to provide a summary amortisation 
table for demonstration purposes which must contain 
minimum the following:
- monthly or quarterly amortisation instalments (where 
applicable) for the first year,
- annual amortisations during the entire term of the loan.
The following data must be stated in the table:
- amount of repaid principal,
- amount of interest,
- amount of outstanding principal,
- amount of each amortisation instalment,
- amount of principal and interest.
It must be stated clearly that the table serves demonstration 
purposes, and further the consumer must be alerted if the 
interest on the offered credit is variable.
 15. Payment account It must be stated clearly whether it is compulsory for the 
consumer to keep an account with the creditor and/or to have 
his/her income transferred to an account kept with the creditor.
532 Foreign currency lending in Hungary

